Scott Keith Lannom v. Renee Alyce Lannom

04/09/2026

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

February 5, 2026 Session

SCOTT KEITH LANNOM v. RENEE ALYCE LANNOM

Direct Appeal from the General Sessions Court for Wilson County

No. 2020-DC-90 A. Ensley Hagan, Jr., Judge

No. M2024-01952-COA-R3-CV

In this post-divorce action, the trial court conducted a two-day hearing regarding the

mother’s petition to modify the parties’ permanent parenting plan. At the conclusion of the

hearing, the father moved for involuntary dismissal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil

Procedure 41. The trial court granted the motion, determining that modification of the

parenting plan was not warranted because the mother had not met her burden to prove that

there had been a material change of circumstance affecting the minor child’s well-being.

The trial court accordingly dismissed the mother’s petition with prejudice and awarded the

father his reasonable attorney’s fees pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-103(c).

Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. We further determine that Father is entitled to

his reasonable attorney’s fees on appeal.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right;

Judgment of the General Sessions Court

Affirmed; Case Remanded

THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which FRANK G.

CLEMENT, JR., C.J., and W. NEAL MCBRAYER, J., joined.

Jay B. Jackson, Murfreesboro, Tennessee, for the appellant, Renee Alyce Lannom.

Donald Capparella, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Scott Keith Lannom.

OPINION

I. Factual and Procedural Background

The parties, Renee Alyce Lannom (“Mother”) and Scott Keith Lannom (“Father”),

were divorced on October 26, 2021, by final decree in the Wilson County General Sessions

Court (“trial court”). Attached and entered with the final decree were a marital dissolution

agreement and an agreed permanent parenting plan (“PPP”) setting forth Mother’s and

Father’s rights and responsibilities relative to the care of their then-two-year-old daughter,

H.W.L. (“the Child”).

The PPP designated Father as the primary residential parent for the Child and further

provided that the Child would reside with Father for 234 days per year and with Mother

for 131 days. According to the PPP, each parent was to make decisions regarding the day-

to-day care of the Child while the Child was residing with the respective parent. The PPP

further instructed that Father would maintain health and dental insurance for the Child and

that the parents would engage in joint decision-making for the Child regarding education,

non-emergency healthcare, religious upbringing, and extracurricular activities.

On December 14, 2022, Mother filed a Petition to Modify Parenting Plan (“the

Petition”). In the Petition, Mother alleged, inter alia, that a material change of

circumstance had occurred warranting modification of the PPP because Father had (1) sold

the marital home and changed residences, (2) violated the PPP by failing to communicate

with Mother regarding the Child’s well-being, (3) refused to allow Mother to exercise her

co-parenting time with the Child, and (4) allowed the Child’s paternal grandmother to

interfere with the Child’s relationship with Mother. Mother attached to the Petition a

proposed amended parenting plan, designating Mother as primary residential parent and

setting forth a schedule wherein the Child would reside with Mother for 234 days per year

and with Father for 131 days per year. On January 20, 2023, Father filed an answer to the

Petition, denying all of Mother’s claims. In November 2023, the parties engaged in

mediation, which was unsuccessful.

The trial court conducted a hearing relative to the Petition on November 19 and 20,

2024, during which it heard testimony from Mother, the Child’s maternal grandmother, and

Mother’s friend. Upon the conclusion of Mother’s proof, Father moved for involuntary

dismissal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 41, positing that Mother had not

proven by a preponderance of the evidence that a material change of circumstance had

occurred warranting modification of the PPP. The trial court granted Father’s motion to

dismiss from the bench and awarded to Father his reasonable attorney’s fees.

On December 5, 2024, the trial court entered a final order memorializing its decision

to grant Father’s Rule 41 motion and dismissing the Petition with prejudice. In support,

the trial court determined that the evidence presented at trial refuted Mother’s contention

that Father had violated the PPP by failing to communicate with her. Contrary to Mother’s

assertions, the court found that Mother and Father had co-parented successfully pursuant

to the PPP. The court specifically found that Mother’s expectations of the “level of

information and level of detail” that Father should provide were “not reasonable.”

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Additionally, the trial court questioned Mother’s credibility by reason of contradictions

between her statements given on the witness stand and the other evidence presented.

Concerning Father’s purported violations of the PPP, the trial court found that

Father’s actions did not violate the PPP and, even if they had been violations, did not

amount to a material change in circumstance because they did not affect the well-being of

the Child. The trial court also determined that even though both Mother and Father had

changed residences since the divorce, those changes did not establish a material change of

circumstance because the changes in residence had been contemplated at the time of

divorce.

The trial court concluded that Mother had not met her burden to prove by a

preponderance of the evidence that a material change in circumstance had occurred

warranting modification of the PPP, and accordingly granted Father’s Rule 41 motion for

involuntary dismissal. In turn, the trial court awarded to Father, as the prevailing party, his

reasonable attorney’s fees in the amount of $15,130.00 pursuant to Tennessee Code

Annotated § 36-5-103(c). Mother timely appealed.

II. Issues Presented

Mother presents the following issues for our review, which we have restated and

reordered slightly:

1. Whether the trial court erred by failing to identify and consider all

relevant facts to determine whether a material change in circumstance

had occurred warranting modification of the PPP.

2. Whether the trial court erred by including findings of fact in its final

order that were not supported by a preponderance of the evidence at

trial.

3. Whether the trial court failed to properly weigh the evidence and

apply the correct legal standard when it dismissed Mother’s Petition

pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 41.02.

4. Whether the trial court erred when it awarded Father his reasonable

attorney’s fees and costs.

Father has raised the following additional issue:

5. Whether Father is entitled to his attorney’s fees on appeal.

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III. Standard of Review

We review a non-jury case de novo upon the record with a presumption of

correctness as to the findings of fact unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise.

See Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d); Bowden v. Ward, 27 S.W.3d 913, 916 (Tenn. 2000). We review

questions of law, including those of statutory construction, de novo with no presumption

of correctness. Bowden, 27 S.W.3d at 916 (citing Myint v. Allstate Ins. Co., 970 S.W.2d

920, 924 (Tenn. 1998)). To the extent that the trial court’s determinations rest upon an

assessment of the credibility of witnesses, the determinations will not be overturned absent

clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Wells v. Tenn. Bd. of Regents, 9 S.W.3d 779,

783 (Tenn. 1999).

Regarding an action to modify a permanent parenting plan, our Supreme Court has

explained:

A trial court’s determinations of whether a material change in

circumstances has occurred and whether modification of a parenting plan

serves a child’s best interests are factual questions. See In re T.C.D., 261

S.W.3d 734, 742 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007). Thus, appellate courts must presume

that a trial court’s factual findings on these matters are correct and not

overturn them, unless the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s

findings. See Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d); In re C.K.G., 173 S.W.3d [714,] 732

[(Tenn. 2005)]; Kendrick [v. Shoemake], 90 S.W.3d [566,] 570 [(Tenn.

2002)]; Hass [v. Knighton, 676 S.W.2d [554,] 555 [(Tenn. 1984)].

Armbrister v. Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d 685, 692-93 (Tenn. 2013).

IV. Material Change in Circumstance

Mother argues that the trial court erred in dismissing the Petition because she had

successfully established a material change in circumstance warranting modification of the

PPP. In the Petition, Mother had sought to be named primary residential parent and

included with the Petition a proposed parenting plan that altered the parties’ co-parenting

time such that Mother would receive 234 days co-parenting time and Father would receive

131 days. This Court has determined that a request to modify the primary residential parent

designation should be considered a request for modification of “custody,” as governed by

Tennessee Code Annotated 36-6-101(a)(2)(B). See McClain v. McClain, 439 S.W. 3d 170,

187 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2017) (quoting Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d at 703). Section 36-6-

101(a)(2)(B) (West April 11, 2024, to current) provides in pertinent part:

If the issue before the court is a modification of the court’s prior

decree pertaining to custody, the petitioner must prove by a preponderance

of the evidence a material change in circumstance. A material change of

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circumstance does not require a showing of a substantial risk of harm to the

child. A material change of circumstance may include, but is not limited to,

failures to adhere to the parenting plan or an order of custody and visitation

or circumstances that make the parenting plan no longer in the best interest

of the child.

As this Court has explained regarding the procedure for determining whether to

change the primary residential parent designation:

Courts apply a two-step analysis to requests to change the primary

residential parent designation. Keisling v. Keisling, 196 S.W.3d 703, 718

(Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). The threshold issue is whether a material change in

circumstance has occurred since the court’s prior custody order. See

Armbrister [ ], 414 S.W.3d [at] 697-98 [ ]; Tenn. Code Ann. [§] 36-6-

101(a)(2)(B). Only if a material change in circumstance has occurred do we

consider whether a modification is in the child’s best interest. Armbrister,

414 S.W.3d at 705. The “determinations of whether a material change of

circumstances has occurred and where the best interests of the child lie are

factual questions.” In re T.C.D., 261 S.W.3d 734, 742 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007).

Smithwick v. Smithwick, No. W2024-00081-COA-R3-CV, 2025 WL 3152217, at *8 (Tenn.

Ct. App. Nov. 12, 2025) (quoting Skowronski v. Wade, No. M2014-01501-COA-R3-CV,

2015 WL 6509296, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 27, 2015)). Thus, if a trial court determines

that a material change of circumstance has not occurred, the trial court need not move on

to the best interest analysis. See id.; See also McClain, 539 S.W.3d at 187 (“In considering

a petition to modify custody from one parent to the other parent, the threshold issue is

whether a material change in circumstances has occurred after the initial custody

determination.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). As this Court has

clarified:

There are no bright line rules for determining when a change of

circumstances should be deemed material enough to warrant changing an

existing custody arrangement. These decisions turn on the unique facts of

each case. As a general matter, however, the following principles illuminate

the inquiry. First, the change of circumstances must involve either the child’s

circumstances or a parent’s circumstances that affect the child’s well-being.

Second, the changed circumstances must have arisen after the entry of the

custody order sought to be modified. Third, the changed circumstances must

not have been reasonably anticipated when the underlying decree was

entered. Fourth, the change in circumstances must affect the child’s well-

being in some material way.

McClain, 539 S.W.3d at 188 (citations omitted).

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In its final order, the trial court undertook the threshold analysis to determine

whether a material change in circumstance warranted modification of the PPP. At the

outset, the trial court noted that Mother was not required to demonstrate a “substantial risk

of harm” to the Child for a finding of material change of circumstance and noted that

“thankfully there is no allegation of such.” The trial court then addressed in detail each of

Mother’s complaints against Father, including Mother’s allegations that Father had

violated the PPP by failing to (1) communicate with Mother regarding the Child’s well-

being and activities; (2) provide tax return documents for 2022 and 2023; (3) provide

Mother with the Child’s health insurance card; (4) provide the Child’s “medical bills” to

Mother; and (5) consult with Mother when making decisions about the Child’s educational,

religious, and extracurricular activities. After considering Mother’s testimony and the

evidence presented, the trial court determined that the proof did not support Mother’s

claims that a material change of circumstance warranted modification and therefore did

“not rise to the level of doing a best interest analysis.” As such, the trial court concluded

its inquiry after the first step of the two-step inquiry. See Smithwick, 2025 WL 3152217,

at *8.1

Regarding Mother’s contention that Father did not sufficiently communicate with

Mother concerning the Child, the trial court acknowledged that Father’s communication

“could improve” but explained that Mother’s expectations for communication were “not

reasonable as far as the level of information and level of detail that she is expecting.”

Furthermore, in reviewing the testimony and exhibits presented, the trial court determined

that Father had communicated sufficiently with Mother. The court referenced text

messages demonstrating that Father had at times communicated “very minor details” about

the Child’s health and activities to Mother. The trial court further found that Father had

sufficiently communicated about his travel with the Child, “including the mode of travel,

the destination, the dates of travel, and where they [were] staying.”

The trial court also addressed Mother’s contention that Father had failed to inform

Mother of the Child’s physician’s appointments. The court noted that according to

Mother’s testimony, Father had communicated with Mother regarding the Child’s “five (5)

year checkup,” but that Mother had missed the appointment because she had “[written] the

date down wrong.” As to Mother’s claim that Father had failed to inform Mother about

“four” “nonemergency healthcare visits,” the court found that Mother had not provided any

evidence that Father had taken the Child to doctor visits without informing Mother. The

trial court concluded that “just because the level of detail” in Father’s communications to

Mother did “not meet Mother’s standard,” this did not establish that Father was “failing to

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Although only a material change of circumstance was required, the trial court sometimes stated that it did

not find the evidence to amount to a “material and substantial change in circumstances.” Because the trial

court did not find that the alleged changes amounted to a material change of circumstance, the court’s use

of the phrase “material and substantial change of circumstances” was harmless error. The court expressly

stated that it did not need to find a substantial risk of harm to the Child.

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communicate in violation of the [PPP].” Upon review, we determine that the evidence

preponderates in favor of the trial court’s conclusion that Father had sufficiently

communicated with Mother concerning the Child’s healthcare.

As to Father’s purported failure to provide Mother with the Child’s health insurance

card and medical bills, the trial court found that the evidence did not support Mother’s

assertion that Father had not provided these items. Regarding the health insurance card,

the trial court referenced a text message from Father stating that he was “sending Mother

the insurance card” and noted that Mother had not provided any evidence to contradict this

statement. Regarding Father’s purported failure to “provide medical bills,” the court found

there was “no proof” of any such failure and that in any case the PPP did not require Father

to provide the Child’s medical bills to Mother. The court thus determined that even if

Mother had proven that Father had failed to provide Mother with the Child’s medical bills,

such failure was not a violation of the PPP and did not warrant modification. The evidence

presented at trial supports the trial court’s determinations regarding the health insurance

card and the medical bills.

With respect to Father’s 2022 and 2023 tax documents, it was undisputed that Father

did not provide those documents to Mother. However, the trial court determined that

Father’s failure to provide them was not “material” because it did not “have any effect on

the well-being of the [Child].” We agree with the trial court. As stated above, a material

change in circumstance warranting a change in custody “must involve either the child’s

circumstances or a parent’s circumstances that affect the child’s well-being.” See McClain,

539 S.W.3d at 188. Father’s failure to provide Mother with his 2022 and 2023 tax

documents, standing alone, does not constitute a material change in circumstance affecting

the Child’s well-being. Therefore, Mother’s postulate on this point is unavailing.

Concerning Mother’s claim that Father had violated the PPP by placing the Child in

a “Parent’s Day Out” program at a church without consulting her, the trial court determined

that this was “not an educational decision” and was thus “not a violation of the joint

decision-making portion” of the PPP. Similarly, the court did not find Father’s action in

enrolling the Child in “vacation bible school” to be a violation of the PPP. Regarding

Mother’s contention that Father had violated the PPP by attending a particular church with

the Child, the trial court expressly declined to “pick a religion or denomination” for the

parties and stated that it would “not interfere or dictate which religion is the right one for

the minor child.” Such determinations were well within the trial court’s “broad discretion”

to make. See Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d at 693. Therefore, we decline to overturn the trial

court’s findings regarding Father’s actions of enrolling the Child in these programs or in

Father’s attending church with the Child.

The trial court also addressed Mother’s argument that Father’s change of address

constituted a material change in circumstance. Since the divorce, Father had sold the

marital home, moved into a home with his parents, and subsequently purchased a home of

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his own. Mother also had acquired a new residence since the divorce. The trial court

considered the testimony concerning both parents’ changes of residence but concluded that

neither constituted a material change warranting modification of the PPP. Regarding

Father, the trial court noted that there was nothing in the PPP preventing him from selling

the marital home and moving to a different address. The court determined that Mother’s

change of residence was not material because it was “contemplated as part of the divorce”

when “Father was awarded the marital residence.”

As our Supreme Court articulated in Armbrister, “facts or changed conditions which

reasonably could have been anticipated . . . may support a finding of a material change in

circumstances, so long as the party seeking modification has proven by a preponderance of

the evidence ‘a material change of circumstance affecting the child’s best interest.’” See

Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d at 704 (quoting Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-101(a)(2)(C)). Thus, in

some instances, a change in circumstance that was anticipated at the time a parenting plan

was created could be deemed a “material” change warranting modification so long as the

change is proven to affect the Child’s well-being in some way. See id.

In the case at bar, however, Mother did not present any evidence that either parent’s

change of residence had affected the Child. Although Mother provided photographs of her

new home, which the trial court deemed to be “very nice,” there was no evidence regarding

how Mother’s new home affected the Child’s well-being. Similarly, there was a dearth of

evidence establishing that Father’s move to a new home had affected the Child’s well-

being. Ergo, Mother’s and Father’s respective changes of residence did not constitute “a

material change of circumstance affecting the child’s best interest.” See id. (emphasis

added).

The trial court emphasized the parents’ successful co-parenting since the divorce

and concluded, from Mother’s own testimony and exhibits in the form of text messages

between the parties, that the parents had co-parented well employing the PPP. The trial

court noted that neither parent was “missing visitation,” both parties had “cooperated and

worked well” together in “accommodating various requests,” and that there had not been

any allegations of “anyone saying ugly things about the other in front of the [Child].” Thus,

despite Mother’s assertions to the contrary, the trial court found that the parties appeared

to have been “getting along well and communicating well” under the PPP. We will not

disturb the trial court’s assessment of the facts concerning the parents’ co-parenting

success, especially considering the trial court’s repeated assessment that Mother’s

testimony during and before the final hearing was not credible. See Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d

at 693 (“[T]rial judges, who have the opportunity to observe the witnesses and make

credibility determinations, are better positioned to evaluate the facts than appellate

judges.”).

The trial court concluded that Mother had not sufficiently proven by a

preponderance of the evidence that there had been a material change in circumstance

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warranting modification of the PPP. For the above-stated reasons, we agree with the trial

court.

V. Involuntary Dismissal Pursuant to Rule 41.02

Mother argues that the trial court failed to properly apply the standard of review for

a motion for involuntary dismissal when it dismissed Mother’s petition at the close of her

proof at trial. Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 41.02(2) provides in pertinent part:

After the plaintiff in an action tried by the court without a jury has

completed the presentation of plaintiff’s evidence, the defendant, without

waiving the right to offer evidence in the event the motion is not granted,

may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the

plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The court shall reserve ruling until all

parties alleging fault against any other party have presented their respective

proof-in-chief. The court as trier of the facts may then determine them and

render judgment against the plaintiff or may decline to render any judgment

until the close of all the evidence. If the court grants the motion for

involuntary dismissal, the court shall find the facts specially and shall state

separately its conclusion of law and direct the entry of the appropriate

judgment.

As our Supreme Court has explained:

A trial court entertaining a motion for involuntary dismissal under Tenn. R.

Civ. P. 41.02(2) must impartially weigh and evaluate the evidence just as it

would after all the parties had presented their evidence. Building Materials

Corp. v. Britt, 211 S.W.3d 706, 711 (Tenn. 2007) (citing City of Columbia v.

C.F.W. Constr. Co., 557 S.W.2d [734,] 740 [(Tenn. 1977)]). The court may

dismiss the plaintiff’s claim if the plaintiff has failed to make out a prima

facie case. Building Materials Corp. v. Britt, 211 S.W.3d at 711; Smith v.

Inman Realty Co., 846 S.W.2d 819, 822 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992). If the trial

court grants a motion for involuntary dismissal, Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.02(2)

requires the court to “find the facts specially and . . . state separately its

conclusions of law.”

Appellate courts review a trial court’s decision to grant an involuntary

dismissal in accordance with Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d). Building Materials

Corp. v. Britt, 211 S.W.3d at 711; Irvin v. City of Clarksville, 767 S.W.2d 649,

653 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988). Accordingly, we must review the record de novo,

presuming that the trial court’s factual findings are correct unless the

evidence preponderates otherwise. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d); Burton v. Warren

Farmers Coop., 129 S.W.3d 513, 521 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). If the trial court

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has not made a specific finding on a particular matter, we review the record

to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies without

employing a presumption of correctness. Hickman v. Continental Baking

Co., 143 S.W.3d 72, 75 (Tenn. 2004); Ganzevoort v. Russell, 949 S.W.2d 293,

296 (Tenn.1997).

The presumption of correctness afforded by Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d)

applies only to findings of fact, not to conclusions of law. We review a trial

court’s resolution of legal issues without employing a presumption of

correctness, and we reach our own independent conclusions. In re Estate of

Brown, 402 S.W.3d 193, 197-98 (Tenn.2013)[.]

Shore v. Maple Lane Farms, LLC, 411 S.W.3d 405, 413-14 (Tenn. 2013).

In support of her argument that the trial court erred in dismissing the Petition

pursuant to Rule 41, Mother asserts that Father “could have put on proof and at the close

of all the evidence moved to dismiss on the same basis” but that instead, he “chose to not

put on any proof.” Mother is correct that Father did not present any proof. However, the

trial court was only required to hear Mother’s case in chief before entertaining a Rule 41

motion to dismiss. See Tenn. Rule Civ. P. 41.02(2) (“The court shall reserve ruling until

all parties alleging fault against any other party have presented their respective proof-in-

chief.”) (emphasis added); see also Gordon v. Gordon, No. M2017-01275-COA-R3-CV,

2018 WL 5014239, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 16, 2018) (explaining that a trial court cannot

grant a motion for involuntary dismissal before the plaintiff closes his or her proof). Here,

the trial court considered testimony from Mother and her witnesses, reviewed the trial

exhibits presented, and considered arguments of counsel. Upon the close of Mother’s

proof, the trial court properly addressed Father’s Rule 41 motion to dismiss.

Moreover, in the final order, the trial court expressly stated that pursuant to Rule 41,

the court was required to “state separately its conclusions of law” and consider the evidence

in the light most favorable to Mother. The trial court accordingly addressed each of

Mother’s allegations in the Petition and applied them specially to the evidence that Mother

had presented. See Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.02(2). For each of Mother’s claims, the trial court

entered its conclusions of law, determining that Father’s purported actions had either (1)

not amounted to a violation of the PPP or (2) did not constitute a material change in

circumstance as contemplated by § 36-6-101(a)(2). Throughout the final order, the trial

court included references to specific portions of the testimony and exhibits. Significantly,

the trial court found Mother to have “credibility issues,” citing specific examples wherein

Mother’s testimony directly contradicted the evidence. Based upon the foregoing and our

independent review of the record, we determine that the trial court properly weighed the

evidence and employed the proper legal standard for a dismissal pursuant to Rule 41.

VI. Attorney’s Fees Awarded by the Trial Court

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Mother contends that the trial court erred in awarding Father his attorney’s fees at

the conclusion of the trial. Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-103(c) (West July 1, 2021,

to current) provides for an award of attorney’s fees in an action to modify a parenting plan:

A prevailing party may recover reasonable attorney’s fees, which may

be fixed and allowed in the court’s discretion, from the nonprevailing party

in any criminal or civil contempt action or other proceeding to enforce, alter,

change, or modify any decree of alimony, child support, or provision of a

permanent parenting plan order, or in any suit or action concerning the

adjudication of the custody or change of custody of any children, both upon

the original divorce hearing and at any subsequent hearing.

At the close of Mother’s proof, Father presented an affidavit in support of his request for

attorney’s fees, which was marked as an exhibit and entered into evidence. In the final

order, the trial court determined that Father’s request was reasonable and accordingly

awarded attorney’s fees to Father in the amount of $15,130.00.

“Tennessee courts long have recognized that the decision to grant attorney’s fees

under section 36-5-103(c) is largely within the discretion of the trial court and that, absent

an abuse of discretion, appellate courts will not interfere with the trial court’s finding.”

Eberbach v. Eberbach, 535 S.W.3d 467, 475 (Tenn. 2017) (citing Keyt v. Keyt, 244 S.W.3d

321, 334 (Tenn. 2007)). In the instant action, the trial court dismissed the Petition,

rendering Father the prevailing party and as such, Father was entitled to an award of

attorney’s fees pursuant to § 36-5-103(c). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in

awarding Father his attorney’s fees or in determining that the fee amount was reasonable.

VII. Father’s Attorney’s Fees on Appeal

Father seeks his attorney’s fees on appeal pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated §

36-5-103(c). In support, Father argues that Mother had “agreed” to the PPP “a mere

thirteen months before filing a petition to modify,” forcing Father to defend the underlying

lawsuit despite Father’s having acted in “good faith” in attempting to abide by the PPP and

in his conduct throughout the litigation. Father contends that he is entitled to his attorney’s

fees on appeal because he was forced to defend a lawsuit so “flimsy” that it was “dismissed

at the close of [Mother’s] proof.”

“The decision to award attorney fees incurred on appeal lies solely within the

discretion of the appellate court.” See Andrews v. Andrews, 344 S.W.3d 321, 340 (Tenn.

Ct. App. 2010) (citation omitted). “When considering a request for attorney’s fees on

appeal, we also consider the requesting party’s ability to pay such fees, the requesting

party’s success on appeal, whether the requesting party sought the appeal in good faith,

and any other equitable factors relevant in a given case.” Chase v. Chase, 670 S.W.3d 280,

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304-05 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2022) (quoting Darvarmanesh v. Gharacholou, No. M2004-00262-

COA-R3-CV, 2005 WL 1684050, at *16 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 19, 2005)).

This is an appropriate case for an award of attorney’s fees because Father has

prevailed in all aspects of his defense of this appeal, which was filed by Mother after the

trial court dismissed her Petition pursuant to Rule 41. Although there was no evidence

presented regarding Father’s income, the record reflects that Mother’s income is sufficient

to pay Father’s attorney’s fees as well as her own. We therefore exercise our discretion to

determine that Father is entitled to his reasonable attorney’s fees on appeal, and remand to

the trial court for a determination concerning the amount of those fees.

VIII. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s final order in all respects. We

additionally award to Father his reasonable attorney’s fees incurred on appeal. This matter

is remanded to the trial court for a determination of the reasonable amount of Father’s

attorney’s fees on appeal, enforcement of the judgment, and collection of costs below.

Costs on appeal are assessed to the appellant, Renee Alyce Lannom.

s/Thomas R. Frierson, II

_________________________________

THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, JUDGE

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