State of Tennessee v. Christopher Lance Osteen

04/08/2026

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

Assigned on Briefs January 7, 2026

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. CHRISTOPHER LANCE OSTEEN

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Henry County

No. 16979 Bruce I. Griffey, Judge

___________________________________

No. W2024-00986-CCA-R3-CD

___________________________________

The Defendant, Christopher Lance Osteen, entered a guilty plea to two counts of

aggravated kidnapping. As a part of his plea, and pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal

Procedure 37, the Defendant sought to reserve one certified question of law related to the

trial court’s finding that his right to a speedy trial did not attach when he was arrested in

Florida due to his escape status as well as being served with a warrant from Kentucky; one

certified question related to the trial court’s finding that the Defendant’s verbal request to

the Florida court to invoke his constitutional rights was insufficient to properly invoke his

rights to speedy trial and due process; and one certified question related to the trial court’s

finding that the Defendant’s written letters and motion to dismiss sent to both the general

sessions clerk and the district attorney’s office failed to properly invoke his constitutional

rights to a speedy trial and due process as it pertained to his Henry County, Tennessee

general session case arrest warrants. Because the Defendant did not properly reserve

certified issues for review, we are without jurisdiction to review the merits of the

Defendant’s claims, and we dismiss his appeal.

Tenn R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Appeal Dismissed

CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which J. ROSS DYER,

and MATTHEW J. WILSON, JJ., joined.

Joshua V. Lehde, Assistant Public Defender – Appellate Division, Tennessee District

Public Defenders Conference (on appeal); David Walker, Paris, Tennessee (at trial), for the

appellant, Christopher Lance Osteen.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Park Huff, Assistant Attorney General;

J. Neil Thompson, District Attorney General; and Courtney Morgan Crocker, Assistant

District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

On September 21, 2011, a Madison County jury convicted the Defendant of

burglary, reckless aggravated assault, unlawful possession of a weapon, evading arrest, and

resisting arrest. State v. Osteen, No. 2011-02714-CCA-R3-CD, 2013 WL 298042, at *1

(Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 25, 2013), perm. app. denied (Tenn. June 11, 2013). The trial court

then imposed an effective sentence of sixteen years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days

in confinement for these convictions. Id.

On December 11, 2020, the Defendant and another inmate, Robert Lee Brown,

escaped from the Northwest Correctional Complex in Lake County, Tennessee, where they

were serving their sentences. The Defendant and Brown then went to Fulton County,

Kentucky, where they forcibly confined Christopher Lattus, took Lattus’s truck, and then

drove in Lattus’s truck to Henry County, Tennessee, with Lattus bound and blindfolded.

The Defendant and Brown ultimately left Lattus bound in the vehicle in Henry County.

The next day, on December 12, 2020, the Defendant and Brown forcibly entered Charles

Carter’s home in Henry County, confined Carter by tying him to a chair in the home, took

$1,400 in cash, and stole Carter’s truck.

On December 12, 2020, the Henry County General Sessions Court judge issued a

warrant in docket number 22-CR-1830, charging the Defendant with aggravated

kidnapping and theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000 for the

offenses involving victim Christopher Lattus. The same date, the Henry County General

Sessions Court judge issued a warrant in docket number 22-CR-1833, charging the

Defendant with aggravated kidnapping, aggravated burglary, and theft of property valued

at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000 for the offenses involving victim Charles Carter.

On December 13, 2020, the Defendant was arrested in Broward County, Florida,

due to his fugitive status. At the time of his arrest, the Defendant had been placed on the

Tennessee Bureau of Investigation’s (TBI) Most Wanted List and had active warrants from

Henry County, Tennessee, and Fulton County, Kentucky. On December 15, 2020, the

Defendant waived extradition and was transported back to Tennessee to serve the

remainder of his sentence.

On December 20, 2022, the Defendant filed a motion to dismiss his Henry County

charges with prejudice. In this motion, the Defendant argued, in part, that he had invoked

his right to a speedy trial when he made an “open court” request to begin the proceedings

in Henry County as soon as possible. He claimed that once the State received this notice,

it was mandated to seek his delivery and to uphold and protect his right to a speedy trial in

Henry County.

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On June 3, 2022, the Defendant filed a motion to dismiss in Henry County General

Sessions Court.1

In a June 29, 2022 letter, the Defendant informed the Henry County Court Clerk

that on June 1, 2022, he had sent a letter asking about clarification of a detainer listed on

the Tennessee Department of Correction (TDOC) system as well as a Motion to Dismiss.

The Defendant asked the clerk to check his database to determine if there were any

outstanding warrants for him and to clarify whether his Motion to Dismiss has been filed.

In an August 17, 2022 letter, the Defendant asked the Henry County Court Clerk to

clarify if he had any active charges pending. The Defendant claimed he had contacted the

clerk’s office “multiple times” and had made two attempts to file a motion to dismiss

charges in “Indictment #2012111355” and had been “repeatedly informed” that the system

did not show any pending charges. Nevertheless, the Defendant asserted that prison

officials reported that this “[i]ndictment” and the “[d]etainers” were still “active.”

On December 20, 2022, the Defendant filed a second Motion to Dismiss with

Prejudice in Henry County General Sessions Court, alleging that he had invoked his right

to a speedy trial in Florida when he agreed to be extradited to Henry County, Tennessee

and when he made an “open court” request to begin the Henry County proceeding as soon

as possible. He claimed the State’s failure to bring him to trial upon his return to Tennessee

violated his right to a speedy trial.

On April 21, 2023, the Defendant was served with his Henry County warrants. On

April 25, 2023, the Defendant was arraigned on those charges in the Henry County General

Sessions Court and was appointed counsel. Thereafter, the Defendant’s preliminary

hearing was continued one time to accommodate his new counsel’s schedule and

availability, one time at the request of the Defendant’s new counsel, two times by

agreement of the parties due to a delay in the Defendant’s receipt of documents from

Florida, one time because Investigator Gary Vandiver was unavailable on the day of the

hearing, and one time because victim Christopher Lattus had a death in his family.

On October 24, 2023, the Henry County General Sessions Court judge heard and

denied the Defendant’s motions to dismiss the Henry County charges, determining that the

Defendant’s right to a speedy trial was not violated because only six months had lapsed

between the Defendant being served with the warrants and his preliminary hearing and that

the Defendant did not have a right to a speedy trial at the time he filed his motions to

1

The Defendant’s June 3, 2022 motion to dismiss is not included in the appellate record but is

referenced in the general sessions judge’s November 8, 2023 order denying the motion to dismiss.

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dismiss because he had not yet been served with his warrants.2 The same day, the

Defendant waived his preliminary hearing.

On November 6, 2023, the Henry County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant for one

count of aggravated kidnapping of Christopher Lattus (Count 1), two counts of theft of

property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000 (Counts 2 and 5), one count of

aggravated burglary (Count 3), and one count of aggravated kidnapping of Charles Carter

(Count 4).

On November 17, 2023, the Defendant filed a pro se notice of appeal to the Henry

County Circuit Court from the denial of his motion to dismiss the Henry County charges.

In this appeal, he argued, in part, that his Henry County charges should be dismissed

because he was denied a speedy trial. On November 20, 2023, the Defendant was

appointed counsel.

On February 1, 2024, the Defendant, with the assistance of counsel, filed a Motion

to Dismiss Due to Violations of the Sixth Amendment Right to Speedy Trial and Due

Process in the Henry County Circuit Court. The State filed a response, contending that the

Defendant’s right to a speedy trial was not triggered when he was apprehended in Florida

on December 13, 2020, but was triggered when the Defendant was arrested and booked

into the Henry County jail on April 21, 2023. The State also asserted that the Defendant

was not “actually restrained” on his Henry County warrants until April 21, 2023, and that

from December 13, 2020, until April 21, 2023, the Defendant was incarcerated on a

previously imposed sentence.

On February 16, 2024, the Henry County Circuit Court conducted a hearing on the

Defendant’s motion to dismiss. Defense counsel, in response to questioning from the trial

court, acknowledged that the Defendant, who was on escape status at the time of his arrest

in Florida, had to serve the remainder of his sentence in the Tennessee Department of

Correction before being indicted in the Henry County Circuit Court. The trial court

questioned how the Defendant’s speedy trial rights been violated if the Defendant had to

spend time in “another jail” before his indictment in Henry County, and defense counsel

replied that State v. Utley, 956 S.W.2d 489 (Tenn. 1997), did not require that an arrest

warrant be served, only that the “actual restraints of an arrest” be effectuated. Defense

counsel then asserted that “all the paperwork from Florida cites the Aggravated Kidnapping

warrant out of Henry County[, Tennessee]” as the reason for his arrest in Florida and that

the Defendant was “brought here on a warrant based out of [Henry County, Tennessee],”

which meant that “Florida effectuated” the restraint of arrest for Henry County to bring the

2

A written order outlining these determinations was filed by the Henry County General Sessions

Court on November 8, 2023.

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Defendant back. The State countered that if Henry County had not had its arrest warrants

filed, Florida would not have let the Defendant go because he was on the TBI’s Most

Wanted List at the time of his arrest in Florida. Defense counsel then introduced the

Waiver of Extradition from Florida, the probable cause determination, booking report,

complaint affidavit from Florida, the Henry County records system printout, and the

obituary of Charles Carter, who was the victim from one of the Defendant’s aggravated

kidnapping charges.

The trial court noted that the unique factors in this case were that the Defendant was

an escaped felon and was on the TBI’s Most Wanted List and that although Henry County

had a warrant for the Defendant’s arrest, the Defendant also had warrants for his escape

and the hold from Kentucky. The trial court questioned whether the Defendant had to send

a letter to the district attorney’s office asking to be transported promptly to Henry County

in order to trigger his speedy trial right on those charges. Defense counsel replied that the

Defendant wrote “multiple letters” to the Henry County circuit court clerk and the district

attorney’s office. When the trial court asked the State if it had received any letters from

the Defendant asking to be prosecuted promptly, the State asserted that “the only thing”

the Henry County General Sessions clerk “ever received in writing from [the Defendant]

was a Motion to Dismiss based on his belief that he invoked his right to a speedy trial to a

magistrate in Florida, when he was picked up.” Defense counsel acknowledged that the

Defendant never sent a letter demanding transport to Henry County; however, he asserted

that the Defendant did make an oral argument concerning his right to a speedy trial to a

Florida magistrate when he was “picked up on escape status, and on these warrants. The

State countered that the Defendant “did not have the right to a speedy trial at that time”

because there had been no formal indictment or arraignment on those charges. The trial

court noted that the Defendant had escaped from the penitentiary in Lake County,

Tennessee, and was not arraigned on his Henry County General Sessions charges until after

serving the remainder of his sentence at the prison in Lake County.

Defense counsel argued that the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, along with his

letters, “would have put [the State] on notice that he was asking for a speedy trial . . . at the

Sessions Court level . . . .” The trial court asserted its belief that the Defendant had to first

make a demand to be transported and prosecuted on the Henry County charges before

asking for a speedy trial. Defense counsel replied that the Defendant believed that he was

coming back to Henry County to get arraigned and to be tried on these charges but instead,

was taken back to the TDOC in Lake County. He asserted that the Florida charges were

dismissed and that Florida was only holding the Defendant based on the Henry County

charges, which meant that “[t]he restraints were effectuated in Florida” for the Henry

County charges. When the trial court asserted that the Defendant’s freedom was in

jeopardy from both the pending warrant based on his escape from prison in the Lake

County, Tennessee, as well as the warrant based on the Henry County charges, defense

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counsel acknowledged that was “probably true” but that he did not have any proof that this

was the case “from the Florida documentation.” Defense counsel also introduced the

Defendant’s handwritten appeal after the general sessions court denied the motion to

dismiss. Defense counsel acknowledged that at the time the Defendant was arrested in

Florida, he had outstanding warrants from Henry County, Tennessee, and the State of

Kentucky. He noted that although Florida filed a fugitive from justice warrant against the

Defendant, this charge was dismissed when the Defendant signed the extradition waiver.

Defense counsel stated, “In [the Defendant’s] mind . . . he was coming back to Henry

County to be brought up on these charges [at the time when] he allegedly made a statement

in open court in Florida that he wanted to execute his right to a speedy trial.” However,

the Defendant was “brought back to Tennessee and sent back to TDOC” because he was

an escaped prisoner. Defense counsel admitted that the Defendant did not “step foot back”

into Henry County Circuit Court until approximately one year prior to this hearing. The

State countered that “[n]o one from the State of Tennessee ever got a demand for a Motion

for a Speedy Trial” and that the State only received a “Motion to Dismiss based on . . . a

speedy trial that there [was] no record of.” The State also argued that the Defendant “did

not have a right to a speedy trial until he was brought [to Henry County] and arraigned,

and fully arrested, held in jail only on this [Henry County] case that’s pending[.]” Defense

counsel acknowledged that the Defendant did not complete his sentence in TDOC until

April 2023, and at that point, the Defendant was then transported to Henry County and

arraigned in Henry County General Sessions Court. Defense counsel also acknowledged

that the Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss in Henry County General Sessions Court,

which was denied, and then the Defendant’s case was bound over for action by the Henry

County Grand Jury, who indicted the Defendant in November 2023.

The trial court found that the Defendant “had failed to demonstrate that he made a

written demand to the [Henry County] District Attorney’s Office to be transported for

prosecution . . . at any time until he was brought [to Henry County] and arraigned on the

. . . Kidnapping charge[s] . . . in Henry County General Sessions.” The court then held that

the Defendant had “not made a sufficient basis to invoke a violation of his speedy trial

rights or . . . due process rights for a speedy resolution to the charges pending against him.”

On March 27, 2024, the Henry County Circuit Court entered an order denying the

Defendant’s motion to dismiss. In it, the court found that after the Defendant was arrested

in Florida, he was “brought back to Tennessee to serve the remainder of his TDOC sentence

from which he escaped.” The court noted that “the [D]efendant’s liberty was not restrained

for the Henry County charges until he was brought here in April of 2023 when he was

served with the arrest warrant.” The court then held that the Defendant had “failed to

demonstrate to the Court that he made a written demand to the District Attorney’s office to

be transported for prosecution on the charges at any time before he was brought here and

arraigned on the arrest warrant in April of 2023.” Lastly, the court held that the Defendant

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had “not made a sufficient basis to invoke violation of speedy trial rights, violation of sixth

amendment rights, or due process rights.

Following the trial court’s denial of the motion to dismiss, the Defendant entered a

guilty plea to two counts of aggravated kidnapping (Counts 1 and 4), and the State agreed

to enter a nolle prosequi on the remaining counts. As a part of his plea agreement, the

Defendant received an effective ten-year sentence in confinement and expressly reserved

three certified questions for appellate review through an agreed order. This agreed order

stated the following, in part:

The Defendant appeals the decision of this Court pertaining to Defendant’s

Motion to Dismiss, which was argued before the Court on February 16, 2024.

The factual findings and legal determination of the Court, as stated on the

record at the February 16, 2024[] hearing, and noted in the Court’s Order

entered on March 27, 2024[,] are adopted in regard to the certified questions

of law listed below.

The agreed order then presented the following certified questions for this court’s review:

i. Did the Trial Court err in finding that the Defendant’s right to speedy trial

did not attach when he was arrested in Florida due to his escape status as well

as being served with a warrant from Kentucky?

ii. Did the Trial Court err in finding that the Defendant[’]s verbal request to the

Florida Court to invoke his constitutional rights was insufficient to properly

invoke his rights to speedy trial and due process?

iii. Did the Trial Court err in finding that the Defendant’s written letters and

Motion to Dismiss sent to both the General Sessions Clerk and the District

Attorney’s office failed to properly invoke his constitutional rights to a

speedy trial and due process as it pertained to his Henry County, Tennessee

general session case arrest warrants?

Notably, the agreed order stated, “All parties in this matter are of the opinion that these

questions would be dispositive of this matter.”

Thereafter, the Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.

ANALYSIS

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The Defendant argues in his certified questions of law that the trial court erred in its

finding that his right to a speedy trial did not attach when he was arrested in Florida due to

his escape status as well as being served with a warrant from Kentucky; that the trial court

erred in finding that his verbal request to the Florida Court to invoke his constitutional

rights was insufficient to properly invoke his rights to speedy trial and due process; and

that the trial court erred in finding that his written letters and motion to dismiss sent to both

the general sessions clerk and the district attorney’s office failed to properly invoke his

constitutional rights to a speedy trial and due process as it pertained to his Henry County,

Tennessee general session case arrest warrants. The Defendant also maintains that his

certified questions properly identify the scope and limits of the legal issues and are

dispositive of this case.

The State counters that this appeal should be dismissed because the Defendant did

not properly reserve a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal

Procedure 37(b). It asserts that the Defendant’s certified questions do not adequately

identify “the scope and limits of the legal issue” as required by Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(ii) and

that the certified questions are not dispositive of the case. Alternatively, the State contends

that if the certified questions somehow satisfy the requirements of Rule 37(b), then the trial

court properly denied the motion to dismiss because the Defendant’s rights to a speedy trial

and due process were not violated. We are constrained to conclude that the Defendant

failed to properly reserve his certified questions of law.

A defendant must properly reserve a certified question before this court has

jurisdiction to consider the merits of the question. Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure

37(b)(2)(A) allows for an appeal from any order or judgment on a conditional plea of guilty

or nolo contendere if the defendant reserves, with the consent of the State and the trial

court, the right to appeal a certified question of law that is dispositive of the case, so long

as the following four requirements are met:

(i) the judgment of conviction or order reserving the certified question that

is filed before the notice of appeal is filed contains a statement of the

certified question of law that the defendant reserved for appellate

review;

(ii) the question of law as stated in the judgment or order reserving the

certified question identifies clearly the scope and limits of the legal

issue reserved;

(iii) the judgment or order reserving the certified question reflects that the

certified question was expressly reserved with the consent of the state

and the trial court; and

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(iv) the judgment or order reserving the certified question reflects that the

defendant, the state, and the trial court are of the opinion that the

certified question is dispositive of the case[.]

Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37(b)(2)(A). As relevant here, if the judgment does not set out the

certified question, the judgment may refer to, or incorporate by reference, another

document that satisfies these requirements. See State v. Irwin, 962 S.W.2d 477, 479 (Tenn.

1998).

In 1988, the Tennessee Supreme Court in State v. Preston outlined the requirements

for reserving a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure

37:

Regardless of what has appeared in prior petitions, orders, colloquy in open

court or otherwise, the final order or judgment from which the time begins to

run to pursue a [Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure] 3 appeal must

contain a statement of the dispositive certified question of law reserved by

defendant for appellate review and the question of law must be stated so as to

clearly identify the scope and the limits of the legal issue reserved. For

example, where questions of law involve the validity of searches and the

admissibility of statements and confessions, etc., the reasons relied upon by

defendant in the trial court at the suppression hearing must be identified in the

statement of the certified question of law and review by the appellate courts

will be limited to those passed upon by the trial judge and stated in the

certified question, absent a constitutional requirement otherwise. Without an

explicit statement of the certified question, neither the defendant, the State nor

the trial judge can make a meaningful determination of whether the issue

sought to be reviewed is dispositive of the case. Most of the reported and

unreported cases seeking the limited appellate review pursuant to [Tennessee

Rule of Criminal Procedure] 37 have been dismissed because the certified

question was not dispositive. Also, the order must state that the certified

question was expressly reserved as part of a plea agreement, that the State and

the trial judge consented to the reservation and that the State and the trial judge

are of the opinion that the question is dispositive of the case. Of course, the

burden is on defendant to see that these prerequisites are in the final order and

that the record brought to the appellate courts contains all of the proceedings

below that bear upon whether the certified question of law is dispositive and

the merits of the question certified. No issue beyond the scope of the certified

question will be considered.

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759 S.W.2d 647, 650 (Tenn. 1988) (emphases added). Rule 37(b) was amended in 2002

to include the Preston requirements. State v. Day, 263 S.W.3d 891, 899 (Tenn. 2008).

Strict compliance, rather than substantial compliance, with the requirements of Rule

37(b) is necessary to perfect the reservation of a certified question of law and to confer

jurisdiction on an appellate court following entry of a guilty plea. Id. (stating that the

Preston requirements, which were incorporated into Rule 37, have been “strictly

construed”); State v. Armstrong, 126 S.W.3d 908, 912 (Tenn. 2003) (rejecting “substantial

compliance” with the Preston requirements). The Tennessee Supreme Court recognized

that “a substantial compliance standard would be very difficult to apply in a consistent and

uniform manner, and therefore would conflict with the very purpose of Preston.”

Armstrong, 126 S.W.3d at 912.

“The defendant bears the burden of ensuring that the final order complies with the

requirements of Rule 37 and that the appellate record is sufficient for review.” State v.

Springer, 406 S.W.3d 526, 531 (Tenn. 2013); see State v. Pendergrass, 937 S.W.2d 834,

837 (Tenn. 1996). The failure to properly reserve a certified question of law pursuant will

result in dismissal of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Pendergrass, 937 S.W.2d at 838.

This court has frequently warned attorneys and trial courts of the inherent dangers

of a Rule 37 appeal. In the past, we have described the inappropriate utilization of Rule 37

as “the quagmire of criminal jurisprudence in Tennessee.” State v. Thompson, 131 S.W.3d

923, 923-24 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003). We have also referred to the conditions for certified

questions as “‘a trap’ for the unwary.” State v. Bolka, No. W2018-00798-CCA-R3-CD,

2019 WL 1958110, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 30, 2019) (citation omitted). Regrettably,

the Defendant in this case joins the long list of defendants who have failed to follow the

exacting requirements for an appeal of a certified question.

First, the Defendant’s agreed order does not show that the trial court was of the

opinion that the certified questions were dispositive of the case. The order identifies the

certified question and then provides, in pertinent part, that “[t]hese certified questions are

expressly consented to by the State and the Court,” and that “[a]ll parties in this matter are

of the opinion that these questions would be dispositive of this matter.” The order was

then signed by the trial court, the attorney for the Defendant, and the prosecutor. Although

this order states that the trial court consented to the reservation of these certified questions,

it does not show that the trial court was of the opinion that this question was dispositive.

See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(iv) (requiring that “the judgment or order reserving the

certified question reflects that the defendant, the state, and the trial court are of the opinion

that the certified question is dispositive of the case” (emphasis added)); see also Preston,

759 S.W.2d at 650.

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In Graves, this court held language stating that “[t]he parties agree that a finding

related to the above outlined issues would be dispositive of the case” failed to strictly

comply with Rule 37(b). State v. Graves, No. E2021-00647-CCA-R3-CD, 2022 WL

4835190, at *8-9 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 4, 2022). The court observed that “the trial court

is not a ‘party’ with an interest in the outcome of the case and is therefore not included in

the language on the judgment form about the dispositive nature of the certified question.”

Id. at *9 (citing Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining “Party” as “One by or

against whom a lawsuit is brought; anyone who both is directly interested in a lawsuit and

has a right to control the proceedings, make a defense, or appeal from an adverse

judgment”)). The Graves court further concluded that the trial court’s oral finding at the

plea submission hearing on the dispositive nature of the certified question did “not save

this appeal from dismissal because Rule 37(b) requires the trial court’s opinion be in ‘the

judgment or order reserving the certified question’ and not in some other part of the

record.” Id. (citing Preston, 759 S.W.2d at 650). Moreover, the court asserted that the trial

judge’s signature on the judgments including the certified question was insufficient to show

“the judge’s consent to reserving the certified question and the judge’s opinion that the

question is dispositive of the case.” Id. (citing State v. McDonald, No. E2006-02568-CCA-

R3-CD, 2007 WL 4460141, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 20, 2007) (stating that “[w]hile

it may be inferred from the placement on the judgment that the State and the court agreed,

it is not explicitly stated as required by the rule”)). The Graves court ultimately concluded

that it was “without jurisdiction to consider this appeal due to the lack of compliance with

Rule 37(b).” Id.

In the Defendant’s case, the statement in the judgments that “all parties involved

agreed [the certified questions of law] would be dispositive” and the statement in the agreed

order that “[a]ll parties in this matter are of the opinion that these questions would be

dispositive of this matter” fail to strictly comply with Preston and Rule 37(b). See State v.

Wheatley, No. M2019-00071-CCA-R3-CD, 2020 WL 774161, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App.

Feb. 18, 2020) (dismissing appeal where neither the judgment nor the order contained the

required statements that “the State and the trial court agreed to the reservation of a certified

question or that the Defendant, the State, and the trial court were of the opinion that the

certified questions were dispositive of the case”); State v. Davis, No. W2017-02145-CCA-

R3-CD, 2018 WL 3409678, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 12, 2018) (concluding that the

defendant “failed to follow the mandatory requirements of Tennessee Rule of Criminal

Procedure 37(b)(2) and Preston” because the record did not include an order containing a

statement that “the State and the trial court believed the [certified] questions to be

dispositive”); State v. Simmons, No. M2003-03064-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 468295, at *3

(Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 23, 2005) (dismissing appeal where neither the judgment nor the

order showed that the certified question was “expressly reserved with the consent of . . .

the trial judge” or that “the trial judge [is] of the opinion that the certified question is

dispositive of the case”). Because the trial court is not a “party” to the Defendant’s case,

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the judgments and agreed order fail to show that the trial court was of the opinion that the

certified questions of law were dispositive. Accordingly, we conclude that the Defendant

failed to strictly comply with the requirements of Preston and Rule 37(b) by omitting a

specific statement that the trial court, the State, and the Defendant are of the opinion that

the certified question is dispositive of this case. See Preston, 759 S.W.2d at 650; Tenn. R.

Crim. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(iv).

Second, we conclude that the Defendant’s certified questions are not, in fact,

dispositive of the case. Generally, a “question is dispositive when the appellate court must

either affirm the judgment [of conviction] or reverse and dismiss [the charges].” State v.

Dailey, 235 S.W.3d 131, 134 (Tenn. 2007) (internal quotations marks and citations

omitted). A certified question is never dispositive “when we might reverse and remand.”

State v. Wilkes, 684 S.W.2d 663, 667 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1984). We emphasize that “[i]f

the appellate court does not agree that the certified question is dispositive, appellate review

should be denied.” Preston, 759 S.W.2d at 651, pet. to rehear denied (Tenn. Oct. 24, 1988).

In the instant case, the certified questions are not dispositive because a reversal on

any one of the three certified questions would not require dismissal of the Defendant’s

charges. The first certified question addresses when the Defendant’s speedy trial right

attached, and the second and third certified questions address when the Defendant invoked

his right to a speedy trial and to due process. These certified questions would require

additional analysis under the factors in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530-33 (1972), to

determine if the Defendant’s right to a speedy trial was violated or would require additional

analysis under the factors in the “Marion-Dykes test” in United States v. Marion, 404 U.S.

307, 324-25 (1971), and State v. Dykes, 803 S.W.2d 250, 256 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990), to

determine if the Defendant’s right to due process was violated. Accordingly, we conclude

that the Defendant’s certified questions are not dispositive of the case.

Lastly, we conclude that the Defendant’s certified questions do not clearly identify

“the scope and limits” of the issues reserved. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(ii);

Preston, 759 S.W.2d at 650 (requiring that the issue be stated in such a way as “to clearly

identify the scope and limits of the legal issue reserved.”). A defendant’s certified issue

must identify, among other things: (1) “the reasons relied upon by defendant in the trial

court” to advance the motion to dismiss, and (2) the reasons “passed upon by the trial

judge” in denying the motion. Preston, 759 S.W.2d at 650. “The scope and limits of the

legal issue reserved, the reasons relied upon by Defendant in the trial court . . . , and the

trial court’s reasoning . . . should be discernable from the certified question of law without

the need to analyze any other portions of the appellate record, including hearing transcripts,

exhibits, briefs, and pleadings.” State v. Potts, No. M2020-01489-CCA-R3-CD, 2021 WL

4714716, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 11, 2021).

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Here, the Defendant’s certified questions not only fail to state the reasoning the

Defendant employed during the motion to dismiss but also fail to state the reasoning the

trial court employed in denying his motion to dismiss. See, e.g., State v. Elliott, No.

M2022-00789-CCA-R3-CD, 2023 WL 2727587, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 31, 2023)

(dismissing the Rule 37(b)(2) appeal when the certified question “did not identify the

reasons he relied upon in advancing his motion to dismiss” and “failed to identify the

reasons passed upon by the trial court in denying his motion”), perm. app. denied (Tenn.

June 28, 2023); Potts, 2021 WL 4714716, at *5 (observing that a certified question is overly

broad pursuant to Rule 37 and Preston if it requires the appellate court to “‘comb the record’

to discern” the reasons relied upon by the defendant and the trial court at the suppression

hearing); State v. Rickman, No. W2019-00778-CCA-R3-CD, 2020 WL 1894693, at *2

(Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 16, 2020) (holding that “the reasons relied upon by Defendant in

the trial court at the suppression hearing, and the trial court’s reasoning for denying the

motion to suppress should be discernable from the certified questions of law without

looking at any other portions of the appellate record”); State v. Treat, No. E2010-02330-

CCA-R3-CD, 2011 WL 5620804, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nov. 18, 2011) (dismissing

appeal where the certified question of law did not “articulate the reasons previously relied

upon by the Defendant in support of his argument [and did] not describe the trial court’s

holdings on the constitutional issues presented”). Because the Defendant’s certified

questions also require us to “comb the record,” including hearing transcripts, exhibits,

briefs, and pleadings, to find a reason to give him relief, the Defendant has failed to clearly

identify the scope and limits of the legal issue reserved. See Tenn. R. Crim. P.

37(b)(2)(A)(ii); Preston, 759 S.W.2d at 650.

Because the Defendant failed to comply with the requirements for an appeal of a

certified question, we may not accept jurisdiction where it would not otherwise exist. We

agree with this court’s previous sentiment that “[w]e take no satisfaction in the dismissal

of this or the many other failed Rule 37(b)(2) appeals” but we “cannot assume jurisdiction

where it is denied due to failures in meeting the strict prerequisites” of Rule 37(b). State

v. Pride, No. E2010-02214-CCA-R3-CD, 2011 WL 4424354, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App.

Sept. 23, 2011). Therefore, we must dismiss the Defendant’s appeal.

CONCLUSION

We are without jurisdiction to consider the merits of the Defendant’s claims because

he has failed to properly reserve his certified questions of law. Accordingly, the appeal is

dismissed.

S/ Camille R. McMullen____________

CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN, JUDGE

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