RODRIGUEZ

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

JORGE A. RODRIGUEZ, II, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 1:23-cv-01697-TWP-CSW

)

INDIANA UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF )

MEDICINE, )

)

Defendant. )

ORDER ON MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION AND/OR RECONSIDERATION

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Jorge A. Rodriguez II's ("Rodriguez") Motion

for Clarification and/or Reconsideration of the Court's September 19, 2025 Order (Filing No. 79).

Rodriguez asks for clarification as to whether the Court dismissed all or only some of his claims

for compensatory damages in the September 19, 2025 summary judgment order; and, if the Court

did dismiss all such claims, for reconsideration of that decision. For the following reasons,

Rodriguez's Motion is granted in part in that the Court clarifies that the summary judgment order

dismissed all of Rodriguez's compensatory damages claims, and denied in part in that the Court

declines to reconsider the summary judgment order.

I. BACKGROUND

Rodriguez was a student at Defendant Indiana University School of Medicine ("IUSM")

from 2020 until his withdrawal in 2022. He initiated this action under the Americans with

Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (the "ADA"), and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794,

alleging that IUSM discriminated against him and failed to reasonably accommodate his Attention-

Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder ("ADHD"). Rodriguez seeks compensatory damages, injunctive

and declaratory relief, interest, and attorneys' fees and costs.

IUSM moved for summary judgment, and on September 19, 2025, the Court issued its

Order (the "Summary Judgment Order"), which granted IUSM summary judgment on Rodriguez's

discrimination claim, denied summary judgment on his failure to accommodate claim, and granted

summary judgment on his compensatory damages claims (Filing No. 72).

Several months later (and shortly before a scheduled Court settlement conference),

Rodriguez filed the instant Motion seeking clarification as to whether the Summary Judgment

Order dismissed all of his claims for compensatory damages or just the damages claim arising

from his discrimination claim. And, to the extent all of his compensatory damages claims were

dismissed, Rodriguez seeks reconsideration. Following an unsuccessful settlement conference, the

parties fully briefed Rodriguez's Motion, which is now ripe for the Court's review.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Although motions to reconsider are not specifically authorized by the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure, Rodriguez's Motion is properly classified as one under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 54(b) because no final judgment has been entered in this case. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b)

("[A]ny order or other decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or

the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties does not end the action as to any of the claims

or parties and may be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims

and all the parties' rights and liabilities."). When ruling on a Rule 54(b) motion, the Court applies

a similar standard as applied to motions to alter or amend a judgment under Rule 59(e).

Motions to reconsider filed pursuant to Rule 54(b) or Rule 59(e) are for the purpose of

correcting manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence not available at

the time of briefing, and a motion to reconsider an order under Rule 54(b) is judged by largely the

same standard as a motion to alter or amend a judgment under Rule 59(e). Katz-Crank v. Haskett,

No. 13-cv-00159, 2014 WL 3507298, at *1–2 (S.D. Ind. July 14, 2014); Woods v. Resnick, 725 F.

Supp. 2d 809, 827–28 (W.D. Wis. 2010). Motions to reconsider "serve a limited function: to correct

manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence." State Farm Fire & Cas.

Co. v. Nokes, 263 F.R.D. 518, 526 (N.D. Ind. 2009). The motion is to be used "where the Court

has patently misunderstood a party, or has made a decision outside the adversarial issues presented

to the Court by the parties, or has made an error not of reasoning but of apprehension." Bank of

Waunakee v. Rochester Cheese Sales, Inc., 906 F.2d 1185, 1191 (7th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted).

A motion to reconsider under Rule 54(b) also may be appropriate where there has been "a

controlling or significant change in the law or facts since the submission of the issue to the Court."

Id. (citation omitted).

The purpose of a motion for reconsideration is to ask the court to reconsider matters

"properly encompassed in a decision on the merits." Osterneck v. Ernst & Whinney, 489 U.S. 169,

174 (1989). The motion "will be successful only where the movant clearly establishes: (1) that the

court committed a manifest error of law or fact, or (2) that newly discovered evidence precluded

entry of judgment." Cincinnati Life Ins. Co. v. Beyrer, 722 F.3d 939, 954 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation

and quotation marks omitted). A manifest error "is not demonstrated by the disappointment of the

losing party. It is the wholesale disregard, misapplication, or failure to recognize controlling

precedent." Oto v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 224 F.3d 601, 606 (7th Cir. 2000) (citation and quotation

marks omitted). A motion to reconsider "is not an opportunity to relitigate motions or present

arguments, issues, or facts that could and should have been presented earlier." Id.

III. DISCUSSION

To start, the Court grants Rodriguez's request for clarification, in that the Court clarifies

that the Summary Judgment Order dismissed all of Rodriguez's compensatory damages claims,

not just his request for compensatory damages arising from his discrimination claim. As Rodriguez

acknowledges in his Motion, IUSM requested summary judgment as to all of Rodriguez's damages

claims (Filing No. 42 at 30), and that request was "granted without qualification." (Filing No. 80

at 3). The Court's analysis patently applied to all of Rodriguez's requests for damages under Title

II of the ADA, and not to specific claims (Filing No. 72 at 20). Further, as IUSM notes in response,

by the time the Court addressed Rodriguez's damages claims, it "had already granted IUSM

summary judgment as to liability on [the] intentional discrimination claims, [so] there was no

reason for the Court to even reach the damages issue unless it meant for its ruling to apply, as the

Order states, to Rodriguez's claims for compensatory damages, period." (Filing No. 85 at 3). The

Summary Judgment Order clearly granted IUSM summary judgment on all compensatory damages

claims. To the extent Rodriguez needed further clarification, it has now been provided.

The Court now turns to Rodriguez's request for reconsideration. Rodriguez argues that the

Court's dismissal of his compensatory damages claims is "in direct contradiction to the Court's

own findings that there was sufficient evidence from which a jury could find that IUSM . . . was

aware of Plaintiff's disability and need for accommodations, and acted in bad faith in failing to

accommodate him." (Filing No. 80 at 4). However, the Court held only that a reasonable jury could

find that IUSM was aware of Rodriguez's disability (Filing No. 72 at 12–15), not Rodriguez's need

for an accommodation (Filing No. 80 at 2).

To show a failure to accommodate under Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must only show

that: he is a qualified individual with a disability; the defendant was aware of his disability; and

the defendant failed to reasonably accommodate his disability. See E.E.O.C. v. AutoZone, Inc., 809

F.3d 916, 919 (7th Cir. 2016). Based on the summary judgment record, the Court concluded that a

reasonable jury could find that Rodriguez has proven each of these elements. To prove deliberate

indifference, by contrast, a plaintiff must show "both (1) knowledge that a harm to a federally

protected right is substantially likely, and (2) a failure to act upon that likelihood." Lacy v. Cook

County, 897 F.3d 847, 862–63 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing Liese v. Indian Rivers Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 701

F.3d 334, 334 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing T.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Sch. Bd. of Seminole Cnty., 610 F.3d

588, 604 (11th Cir. 2010) (finding school board did not act with deliberate indifference because it

was not able to substantiate complaints of student mistreatment after investigating complaints))).

IUSM's knowledge of Rodriguez's disability is not sufficient to show that IUSM knew of

a substantial likelihood that its failure to provide an accommodation would harm Rodriguez's

federally protected rights, or a failure by IUSM to act on that substantial likelihood. See Moore v.

W. Ill. Corr. Ctr., 89 F.4th 582, 595 (7th Cir. 2023) (affirming dismissal of ADA damages claim;

"Our review of the record demonstrates that there is no evidence from which a jury could infer that

any defendant knew that harm to a federally protected right was substantially likely. . . . In fact,

[the plaintiff] never followed any of the prisons' prescribed policies for alerting the correct

individuals of his need for an accommodation."); Lange v. City of Oconto, 28 F.4th 825, 841 (7th

Cir. 2022) (denying request for new trial as to deliberate indifference claim; "While the officers

here knew that Lange was deaf from past interactions, they also had ample experience

communicating with her . . . without an ASL interpreter. . . . Given the officers' understanding of

Lange's skills based on their prior interactions, Lange has not demonstrated that they knew that

harm to a federally protected right was substantially likely." (citation modified)).

Moreover, even though Rodriguez believed that he needed an accommodation, "the

deliberate indifference standard is directed to the defendants' state of mind, not the plaintiff's."

Lange, 28 F.4th 841 (emphasis in original). Based on the summary judgment record, the Court

found that a disputed material fact exists—one that could affect the outcome of the case—that

would allow a reasonable jury to find that Defendants obstructed the interactive process, but not

that IUSM knew that Rodriguez needed an accommodation for his ADHD or that there was a

substantial likelihood that his federally protected rights would be violated if no accommodation

was provided. Rodriguez has failed to show that the Court committed any manifest errors of law

or fact in dismissing all of his compensatory damages claims on summary judgment. His request

for reconsideration of the Summary Judgment Order is denied.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Rodriguez's Motion for Clarification and/or Reconsideration of

the Court's September 19, 2025 Order (Filing No. 79) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in

part. The Motion is granted in that the Court clarifies that the Summary Judgment Order

dismissed all of Rodriguez's compensatory damages claims, and denied in that the Court declines

to reconsider the Summary Judgment Order. Rodriguez's claim that IUSM failed to reasonably

accommodate his disability remains set for final pretrial conference on June 24, 2026 and trial on

July 20, 2026.

SO ORDERED. A .

Date: _ 4/3/2026 able Nncith

Hon. Tanya Walton Pratt, Judge

Distribution: United States District Court

Southern District of Indiana

Jennifer Westerhaus Adams

Mattingly Burke Cohen & Biederman LLP

jennifer.adams@mbcblaw.com

Jason J. Bach

THE BACH LAW FIRM LLC

jbach@bachlawfirm.com

Hamish S. Cohen

Mattingly Burke Cohen & Biederman LLP

hamish.cohen@mbcblaw.com

Brian Robison Weir-Harden

Mattingly Burke Cohen & Biederman LLP

brian.weir-harden@mbcblaw.com