Walton

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

CHRISTOPHER M. WALTON, )

) Case No. 3:26-cv-134

Plaintiff, )

) Judge Atchley

v. )

) Magistrate Judge Poplin

SHAWN PHILLIPS, OFFICER F/N/U )

JEFFERS, and BRANDON FOSTER, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Christopher M. Walton, a State prisoner incarcerated at the Morgan County

Correctional Complex (“MCCX”), filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 [Doc. 1] and an

application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis [Doc. 2] in the United States District Court for

the Middle District of Tennessee. After granting Plaintiff in forma pauperis status, the Middle

District transferred the action to this Court [Doc. 10]. Plaintiff’s complaint is now before the Court

for screening pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) and

1915A, to determine whether it states a justiciable claim. For the reasons set forth below, the Court

finds Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim but will permit Plaintiff an opportunity to file an

amended complaint within fourteen (14) days.

I. SCREENING STANDARD

Under the PLRA, district courts must screen prisoner complaints and sua sponte dismiss

any claims that are “frivolous, malicious, or fail[] to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted,” or “seek[] monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Benson v. O’Brian, 179 F.3d 1014 (6th Cir. 1999).

The dismissal standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)

and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) “governs dismissals for failure to state a

claim under [28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A] because the relevant statutory language

tracks the language in Rule 12(b)(6)” of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Hill v. Lappin, 630

F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). Thus, to survive an initial review under the

PLRA, a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

Courts should liberally construe pro se pleadings filed in civil rights cases and hold them

to a less stringent standard than lawyer-drafted pleadings. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520

(1972). Even so, allegations that give rise to a mere possibility that a plaintiff might later establish

undisclosed facts supporting recovery are not well-pled and do not state a plausible claim.

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570. Further, formulaic and conclusory recitations of the elements of a

claim which are not supported by specific facts are insufficient to state a plausible claim for relief.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681.

To state a claim under § 1983, Plaintiff must establish that a “person” acting “under color

of” state law deprived him of “any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution

and laws” of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

II. ALLEGATIONS OF COMPLAINT

At around 12:40 p.m. on February 5, 2025, Plaintiff was “being escorted to [the] H.S.A.”

when Officer Jeffers “slammed [Plaintiff’s] head into the intake window[.]” [Doc. 1 at 3]. Plaintiff

was handcuffed at the time. [Id.]. Plaintiff received a large knot on his head and requested medical

treatment but was denied. [Id. at 3–4]. He also “ask[ed] to speak with high authority” but was

placed in a cell without speaking with anyone. [Id. at 3]. Plaintiff filed a grievance about Officer

Jeffers’s conduct on February 12, 2025, even though he was later told he did not have any

grievances pending. [Id.].

Internal Affairs reviewed security footage and witnessed Officer Jeffers push a handcuffed

Plaintiff into the glass intake window. [Id.]. Officer Jeffers was fired after the incident. [Id. at 2].

Aggrieved, Plaintiff filed this action against Warden Shawn Phillips, Internal Affairs

Officer Brandon Foster, and Officer Jeffers, seeking $3,500 from the State of Tennessee and

transfer to another prison. [Id. at 4–5].

III. ANALYSIS

All Defendants are employed by the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”),

which is an arm of the State of Tennessee. Thus, suit against Defendants in their respective official

capacities is suit against the State itself. See Hix v. Tenn. Dep’t of Corr., 196 F. App’x 350, 355

(6th Cir. 2006) (holding TDOC is equivalent of the “State”); Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159,

166 (1985) (holding “an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a

suit against the entity”); Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978) (“[O]fficial-

capacity suits generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which

an officer is an agent.”). But Plaintiff may not maintain suit against a State or its employees in

their official capacities because “a state is not a person within the meaning of §1983.” Will v. Mich.

Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989).

Also, the Eleventh Amendment typically “bars all suits, whether for injunctive, declaratory

or monetary relief, against the state and its departments.” Thiokol Corp. v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury,

987 F.2d 376, 381 (6th Cir. 1993) (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S.

89, 100–01 (1984)). Because there has not been congressional abrogation or waiver of immunity,

Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants in their official capacities are otherwise barred by the

Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 345 (1979) (finding § 1983 does

not waive state sovereign immunity); Berndt v. State of Tennessee, 796 F.2d 879, 881 (6th Cir.

1986) (holding Tennessee has not waived immunity to suit under § 1983). Thus, Plaintiff’s claims

against Defendants in their official capacities are impermissible and will be dismissed.1

And to seek relief from an individual, the Sixth Circuit requires a plaintiff to “set forth

clearly in their pleading that they are suing the state defendants in their individual capacity for

damages, not simply in their capacity as state officials.” Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 592 (6th

Cir. 1989). Here, Plaintiff does not state that he intends to sue any Defendant in his individual

capacity, and there is nothing in his complaint to permit such an inference. However, because

Plaintiff may be able to raise a plausible personal liability claim against one or more Defendants

if permitted to amend his pleadings to clearly state his intention to do so, the Court will permit

Plaintiff an opportunity to file an amended complaint.

Accordingly, if Plaintiff desires to proceed with this action against any Defendant in his

personal capacity, he must file an amended complaint within fourteen (14) days of entry of this

Order that contains a short and plain statement of specific facts setting forth exactly how his rights

were violated, the specific party(ies) responsible for that violation, any injury(ies) he has suffered,

and his request for relief. Plaintiff must avoid conclusory legal statements or arguments in this

amended complaint. The Court will DIRECT the Clerk to mail Plaintiff a § 1983 form for this

purpose.

The Court NOTIFIES Plaintiff that it will only address the merits of Plaintiff’s claims that

relate to his original complaint. Accordingly, Plaintiff SHALL NOT attempt to set forth in his

amended complaint any additional claims, and he is advised that the Court will DISMISS any such

1 An exception to sovereign immunity, known as the Ex Parte Young exception, exists when a

State official is sued in his or her official capacity for prospective injunctive relief. Ex Parte

Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155–56 (1908); Thiokol Corp. v. Dep’t of Treasury, State of Mich., Revenue

Div., 987 F.2d 376, 381 (6th Cir. 1993). But where the complaint is “based entirely on past acts

and not continuing conduct that, if stopped, would provide a remedy to [Plaintiff] . . . it . . . does

not come under the doctrine of Ex Parte Young.” Gean v. Hattaway, 330 F.3d 758, 776 (6th Cir.

2003). Here, Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief as a retroactive measure for past alleged harms, and

therefore, his claims do not come within the Ex Parte Young exception.

claims. Further, the Court NOTIFIES Plaintiff that this amended complaint will be the sole

operative complaint that the Court considers, and therefore, it must be complete in and of itself

and must not refer to any previously filed allegations or pleadings.

If Plaintiff does not file an amended complaint by the deadline, the Court will DISMISS

his complaint for failure to prosecute and comply with an order of the Court, and for failure to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

The Court NOTIFIES Plaintiff that it WILL NOT consider any other kind of motion for

relief until after the Court has screened the amended complaint pursuant to the PLRA, which the

Court will do as soon as practicable. Accordingly, the Court will automatically deny any motions

filed before the Court has completed this screening.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above:

1. Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants are DISMISSED;

2. The Clerk is DIRECTED to forward Plaintiff a § 1983 form;

3. Plaintiff is ORDERED to complete the § 1983 form within fourteen (14) days in

accordance with the directives stated above if he desires to seek relief from the

individual Defendant(s);

4. Plaintiff is NOTIFIED that failure to comply with this Order will result in the

dismissal of this action; and

5. Plaintiff is ORDERED to immediately inform the Court of any address changes in

writing. Pursuant to Local Rule 83.13, it is the duty of a pro se party to promptly

notify the Clerk and the other parties to the proceedings of any change in his

address, to monitor the progress of the case, and to prosecute or defend the action

diligently. E.D. Tenn. L.R. 83.13. Failure to provide a correct address to this Court

within fourteen (14) days of any change in address may result in the dismissal of

this action.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Charles E. Atchley, Jr.

CHARLES E. ATCHLEY, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE