Hammond

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

TIFFANY HAMMOND and JAMES )

HAMMOND, as next friends on behalf )

of their minor son, R.W.H., and in their )

individual capacities, )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 3:25-cv-01283-DWD

)

CAHOKIA UNIT SCHOOL DISTRICT )

#187 and ILLINOIS STATE BOARD )

OF EDUCATION, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

DUGAN, District Judge:

On July 31, 2025, Plaintiffs, Tiffany Hammond and James Hammond (collectively

“Parents”), individually and on behalf of their minor son, R.W.H. (“R.W.H.”) (collectively

“Plaintiffs”), and in their individual capacities, filed their Amended Complaint regarding

disability discrimination against Defendant Cahokia Unit School District #187

(“Defendant”) and Defendant Illinois State Board of Education (“ISBE”) pursuant to the

Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., Section 504

of the Rehabilitation Act (“Section 504”), 29 U.S.C. § 794 et seq., the Americans With

Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., the Illinois Human Rights Act

(“IHRA”), 775 ILCS 5/1-101 et seq., and the Illinois Civil Rights Remedies Restoration Act,

775 ILCS 60/1 et seq., seeking the reversal of a special education hearing decision made

by ISBE, as well as an award of monetary damages and attorney’s fees and costs. Now

before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and Alternative Motion to Strike

Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint. (Doc. 15). For the reasons detailed below, the Motion is

GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Termination of R.W.H.’s Speech-Language Services

R.W.H. is a six-year-old kindergarten student diagnosed with Speech and/or

Language Impairment and Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder. (Docs. 12, pg. 2; 22,

pg. 9). In May 2023, Defendant found R.W.H. eligible for special education services. (Doc.

12, pg. 4). On May 15, 2023, Defendant and Parents participated in an Individualized

Education Plan (“IEP”) meeting, creating an IEP that provided R.W.H. with twenty

minutes of speech-language services per week. (Docs. 12 pg. 4; 22, pgs. 9-10). On April

17, 2024, Defendant revised R.W.H.’s IEP to increase speech-language services to thirty

minutes per week for the 2024-2025 school year. (Docs. 12, pg. 4; 22, pg. 10). On August

21, 2024, Defendant ceased providing speech-language services to R.W.H. without notice

to Parents and without amending R.W.H.’s IEP. (Doc. 12, pg. 5). Parents did not learn

R.W.H. was not receiving speech-language services until October 24, 2024, at parent-

teacher conferences. (Doc. 12, pg. 5). Four days later, Parents sent an email to Defendant

requesting a meeting to discuss the cessation of speech-language services, but that

request was denied. (Doc. 12, pg. 5). On November 8, 2024, Parents filed a due process

complaint with the ISBE on behalf of R.W.H. (Doc. 22, pg. 33). A week later, Parents

received a certified letter from Interim Director of Special Education Kelly Richards, who

explained that staffing shortages at District 187 resulted in a cessation of speech therapy

services. (Doc. 12, pg. 6). Richards explained in the letter that Defendant would resume

speech-language services when it concluded its hiring search for a new therapist. (Doc.

12, pg. 6). R.W.H. did not receive speech-language services until January 21, 2025, when

Defendant initiated virtual speech therapy for R.W.H. for sixty minutes per week. (Docs.

12, pg. 7; 22, pg. 11). Defendant did not provide R.W.H. with the speech-language service

minutes required by the April 2024 IEP for the twenty-one weeks between August 21,

2024, and January 21, 2025. (Doc. 22, pg. 10). Defendant did not hold an IEP meeting to

address the changes to R.W.H.’s speech-language services nor did Defendant provide

Parents with prior written notice of its proposed changes to R.W.H.’s speech-language

services during this time. (Doc. 12, pg. 7).

B. ISBE Proceeding

On November 8, 2024, Parents filed a due process complaint with the ISBE on

behalf of R.W.H. (Doc. 12, pg. 6). On January 7, 2025, Parents filed a Charge of

Discrimination with the IDHR on behalf of R.W.H. (Doc. 12, pgs. 6-7). On March 20, 2025,

an independent hearing officer (IHO), appointed by ISBE, conducted a due process

hearing remotely via Zoom. (Doc. 22, pg. 7). On April 1, 2025, the IHO entered her Final

Determination and Order. (Doc. 22, pg. 24). That Order found R.W.H. did not receive the

required speech-language service minutes due to a staffing shortage of speech language

pathologists in the District. (Doc. 22 pg. 11). The Order further found that R.W.H. did not

require an additional thirty minutes per week of speech-language services above the sixty

minutes per week provided by Defendant. (Doc. 22, pgs. 21-22). Plaintiffs have appealed

the Order and made additional claims against Defendant. (Doc. 12).

II. JURISDICTION

This Court has federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3), 28

U.S.C. § 1331 and § 1343, and 42 U.S.C. § 12133. This Court has supplemental jurisdiction

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Plaintiffs request judicial review of the final decision by the IHO appointed by the

ISBE. (Doc. 12, pgs. 13-14). Defendant argues this request should be dismissed for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). (Doc. 16, pg.

3). Defendant argues Plaintiffs failed to timely file the Amended Complaint, naming ISBE

as a party, within the deadline of 120 days from the date of the IHO’s decision. (Doc. 16,

pgs. 3-5).

The IDEA provides that a party aggrieved by the findings and decision of an IHO

may bring a civil action within 90 days from the date of the IHO’s decision, or, if the State

has an explicit time limitation for bringing such action under the IDEA, in such time as

the State allows. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(B). Article 14 of the Illinois School Code sets the

deadline at “120 days after a copy of the decision of the impartial due process hearing

officer is mailed to the party.” 105 ILCS 5/14-8.02a(i). The IHO’s final decision was issued

on April 1, 2025. (Doc. 22, pg. 25). The 120-day period for appealing that decision began

to run the next day on April 2, 2025. See 5 ILCS 70/1.11 (“The time within which any act

provided by law is to be done shall be computed by excluding the first day and including

the last.”). Thus, the 120-day period ended on July 31, 2025, that being the last day that

falls within the statutory period. Plaintiffs filed their Amended Complaint, naming ISBE

as a Defendant, on July 31, 2025. (Doc. 12, pgs. 1, 25).

Defendants also argue that because Plaintiffs did not serve ISBE until August 8,

2025, Count I should be dismissed for failure to timely request and serve the summons

on ISBE. (Doc. 16 pg. 4-5). Defendants rely on Illinois’ Administrative Review Act. Under

the Administrative Review Act, service is mandatory but not jurisdictional. See Palos Bank

& Tr. Co. v. Illinois Prop. Tax Appeal Bd., 2015 IL App (1st) 143324, ¶ 26 (citing Cox v. Bd. of

Fire & Police Comm’rs of City of Danville, 96 Ill. 2d 399, 404 (1983)). Further, Defendants do

not point to any relevant statute or case law showing Article 14 of the School Code adopts

the strict service requirements of the Administrative Review Act. (Doc. 16 pg. 4-5).

Because Plaintiffs filed the Complaint naming ISBE as a defendant within the

statute of limitations pursuant to 105 ILCS 5/14-8.02a(i), and served ISBE eight days later,

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss under 12(b)(1) is DENIED.

III. REQUEST FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

A. Standard

Rule 12(c) provides that “[a]fter the pleadings are closed - but early enough not to

delay a trial - a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). “A

motion for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) is

designed to provide a means of disposing of cases when the material facts are not in

dispute and a judgment on the merits can be achieved by focusing on the content of the

pleadings and any facts of which the court will take judicial notice.” Archer Daniels

Midland Co. v. Burlington Ins. Co. Grp., 785 F. Supp. 2d 722, 726 (N.D. Ill. 2011). A motion

for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) “is governed by the same standards as a

motion to dismiss a failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).” BBL, Inc. v. City of Angola,

809 F.3d 317, 325 (7th Cir. 2015). When deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the

court accepts all of the well-pleaded factual allegations of the complaint as true, and

draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “[D]etailed factual allegations” are not required, but the plaintiff

must allege facts that, when “accepted as true…state a claim to relief that is plausible on

its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

A motion for judgment on the pleadings is also an appropriate vehicle for seeking

dismissal of a claim based on an affirmative defense. Yassan v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., 708

F.3d 963, 975–76 (7th Cir.2013). A plaintiff is not required to plead facts in the complaint

to anticipate and defeat affirmative defenses. Indep. Tr. Corp. v. Stewart Info. Servs. Corp.,

665 F.3d 930, 935 (7th Cir. 2012). However, when the allegations of the complaint reveal

that relief is barred, dismissal is appropriate. Id. Judgment entered for the movant on a

motion for judgment on the pleadings is a final judgment on the merits. See Wright &

Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1369 (3d ed. 2025).

B. Associational Discrimination under the ADA

Parents claim they were discriminated against as R.W.H.’s parents in violation of

the ADA and IHRA by Defendant’s refusal to allow Parents to advocate for R.H.W.

Defendants argue this claim is insufficient to establish liability for associational

discrimination and that the Court should enter judgment on the pleadings for Defendants

on both claims in accordance with Rule 12(c).

Parents allege Defendant violated Title II of the ADA by excluding Parents from

the IEP process, ignoring Parents’ repeated requests for a meeting, and failing to provide

notice or convene meetings. (Docs. 12 pgs. 18-19; 23, pgs. 6-8). Title II of the ADA states

that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be

excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or

activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42

U.S.C. § 12132. To establish a violation of Title II of the ADA, plaintiffs must prove they

are a “qualified individual with a disability,” and that they were denied “the benefits of

the services, programs, or activities of a public entity” or otherwise subjected to

discrimination by such an entity, and that the denial or discrimination was “by reason

of” the disability. Wagoner v. Lemmon, 778 F.3d 586 (7th Cir. 2015). Other cases in the

Seventh Circuit have recognized that parents may bring a discrimination by association

claim under Title II of the ADA. See, e.g. Hale v. Pace, No. 9-cv-5131, 2011 WL 1303369, *1,

4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2011); Gross v. The Gap, Inc., No. 6-cv-3413, 2007 WL 1075029, *4-5

(N.D. Ill. Apr. 5, 2007).

1. Zone of Interest

The Court first asks whether Parents’ injuries fall within the zone of interests

Congress sought to protect through the ADA. Friends of Trumbull v. Chicago Bd. of Educ.,

123 F. Supp. 3d 990, 995 (N.D. Ill. 2015). A statutory cause of action extends only to

plaintiffs whose interests fall within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked.

Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 129 (2014). Simply put,

“a plaintiff must belong to the class of persons to whom the statute grants a right to sue.”

Food & Drug Admin. v. R. J. Reynolds Vapor Co., 606 U.S. 226, 232 (2025). The zone-of-

interests limitation always applies in statutory causes of action but certain statutes may

protect a more expansive range of interests. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 572 U.S. at 129 (citing

Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 164 (1997)). Whether a plaintiff falls within the “zone of

interests” is an issue that requires courts to determine, using traditional tools of statutory

interpretation, whether a legislatively conferred cause of action encompasses a particular

plaintiff’s claim. Id. at 127. The text of the ADA grants the right to relief to “any person

alleging discrimination on the basis of disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12133 (incorporating by

reference 29 U.S.C. § 794a). Because of its broad language, plaintiffs pleading under Title

II of the ADA likely need only trace their alleged injury to any proscribed discrimination

within that portion of the ADA. See Access Living of Metro. Chicago v. Uber Techs., Inc., 958

F.3d 604 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing Innovative Health Sys., Inc., v. City of White Plains, 117 F.3d

37, 47 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting that the “broad language in [Title II’s] enforcement provision

evinces a congressional intention to define standing to bring a private action…as broadly

as is permitted by Article III of the Constitution”)).

Here, Parents allege Defendant discriminated against them on the basis of their

child’s disability. (Doc. 12, pgs. 18-19, 23). Parents also allege a concrete and

particularized injury under Article III by showing they were excluded from decisions

regarding their child’s education, and that Defendant refused to convene a meeting to

discuss the cessation of speech services for their child. (Docs. 12, pgs. 5-6; 22, pg. 391).

Because Parents plead an injury from discrimination based on their child’s disability, they

fall under the ADA’s zone of interest.

2. Separate and Direct Injury

To bring a claim for associational discrimination, Parents must “suffer some

specific, separate, and direct injury as a result of [their] association with the disabled

individual.” Hale, 2011 WL 1303369 at *5 (internal quotations omitted). Plaintiffs must

have been “discriminated against or singled out in a discriminatory way due to [their]

association with disabled persons.” See id. An “indirect” injury is not enough. Id.

Parents argue they suffered a direct injury when Defendant excluded Parents from

decisions regarding their child’s education and refused to convene a meeting to discuss

R.W.H.’s ceased speech-language services. Defendant argues Parents’ exclusion from the

IEP process and participation in their child’s education decisions is insufficient to

establish liability for associational discrimination. (Doc. 16, pg. 6). Defendants argue

R.W.H. was denied services, not Parents, and that any advocation by Parents would be

for R.W.H.’s sole benefit. (Doc. 16, pg. 6).

Parents’ injury must be separate from the injuries R.W.H. suffered from the

discontinuation of R.W.H.’s speech therapy services. Zimny v. Geneva Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist.

304, 718 F. Supp. 3d 766, 798 (N.D. Ill. 2024). In Zimny, the court found that a father’s

stress, frustration and mental anguish caused by the bullying of his son was an indirect

injury. See id. The court reasoned Zimny was injured simply because his child was

injured, so his injury did not stand alone. See id.

In the present case, Parents’ interest in being involved in decisions regarding

R.W.H.’s education is separate from R.W.H.’s interest in receiving a free appropriate

public education. Parents have the right to direct the upbringing and education of their

children. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923); Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters of the

Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925). Recently, the Supreme Court

recognized the right of primary authority over a child’s education includes the parent’s

right to participate in decisions regarding the child’s mental health. Mirabelli v. Bonta, 607

U.S. ----, 146 S. Ct. 797, 803 (2026) (citing Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979)). If parents

have a right to participate in decisions regarding their child’s mental health, it follows

that parents have a right to participate in decisions regarding their child receiving

adequate speech-language services. And, while this is not a Fourteenth Amendment case,

the Court observes that the long line of cases recognizing parents’ right to have primary

authority over their children’s education shows parents have a separate interest in being

involved in decisions regarding their children’s education. In this case, Parents were

seeking services from the school to obtain information on their child’s education and

speech services. As alleged, their injury of being denied that information, and meetings

with Defendant, was not an indirect result of Defendant ceasing R.W.H.’s speech services

but a direct result of Defendant’s failure to include them in the decisions regarding their

child’s education.

This case is also different from Simenson v. Hoffman, No. 95-cv-1401, 1995 WL

631804 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 24, 1995). In Simenson, parents sued a medical center for

associational discrimination after they were told by a doctor to leave with their disabled

child. The court found the parents were “not at the medical center for any purpose other

than to seek treatment for [their child.]” Id. at *7. In this case, Parents allegedly sought to

be included in the decisions regarding their child’s education for the purpose of being

informed and to advocate for their child, not just to seek speech services for R.W.H.

Accordingly, Parents’ interest and injury is separate from R.W.H.’s injury. Plaintiffs have

adequately alleged a claim of associational discrimination under the ADA.

Alternatively, Defendant requests a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). That request is

denied because, under the same analysis, the Court concludes Plaintiffs pled a sufficient

claim.

C. Associational Discrimination under the IHRA

Defendants argue Plaintiff’s claim under the IHRA should also be dismissed under

Rule 12(c).

The IHRA explicitly defines discrimination based on disability as including

“unlawful discrimination against an individual based on the individual’s association

with a person with a disability.” 775 ILCS 5/1-103. The IHRA expands that it is the public

policy of Illinois “to secure for all individuals within Illinois the freedom from

discrimination based on…physical or mental disability…[and] the availability of public

accommodations, including in elementary, secondary, and higher education. 775 ILCS

5/1-102. The Supreme Court of Illinois has instructed courts that, as remedial legislation,

the IHRA “must be liberally construed to achieve its purpose – here, the prevention of

discrimination in public accommodations for all individuals.” M.U. By & Through Kelly

U. v. Team Illinois Hockey Club, Inc., 2024 IL 128935 at ¶ 17. Based on the analysis above,

and giving a liberal construction to the IHRA, Plaintiffs have adequately pled they were

unlawfully discriminated against by Defendant based on their association with R.W.H.

IV. REQUEST FOR DISMISSAL FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM

A. Standard

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim serves to test the sufficiency of the

complaint, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. AnchorBank, FSB v. Hofer,

649 F.3d 610, 614 (7th Cir. 2011). Courts take as true all well-pleaded factual allegations

and make all possible inferences from the allegations in the plaintiff’s favor. Roe v.

Dettelbach, 59 F.4th 255, 262 (7th Cir. 2023)(citing AnchorBank, FSB, 649 F.3d at 614). Courts

do not decide the merits of the case but whether the complaint “contains enough facts to

state a claim that is plausible on its face.” Citadel Grp. Ltd. v. Washington Reg’l Med. Ctr.,

692 F.3d 580, 591 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678). In deciding a motion to

dismiss, courts are limited to the allegations in the pleadings but they may consider

documents attached to or referenced in the pleadings if they are central to the claim. Id.

B. ADA, Section 504, and IHRA Claims

Both Title II of the ADA and Section 504 prohibit discrimination against disabled

individuals. The ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by

reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of

the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination

by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Section 504 provides that “[n]o otherwise qualified

individual with a disability…shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded

from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination

under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).

For purposes of this case, the statutes are “functionally identical.” P.F. by A.F. v. Taylor,

914 F.3d 467, 471 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting Wagoner, 778 F.3d at 592).

To show a prima facie violation of either statute, Plaintiffs must show: (1) R.W.H.

is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) R.W.H. was denied “the benefits of services,

programs, or activities of a public entity or otherwise subjected to discrimination” by

Defendant; and (3) that denial or discrimination was “by reason of his disability.” Hildreth

v. Butler, 960 F.3d 420, 430 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting Wagoner, 778 F.3d at 592). A failure to

make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures constitutes

discrimination. A.H. by Holzmueller v. Ill. High Sch. Ass'n, 881 F.3d 587, 594 (7th Cir. 2018).

Plaintiffs do not have to establish bad faith or gross misjudgment. A. J. T. by & through A.

T. v. Osseo Area Schs., Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 279, 605 U.S. 335, 345 (2025) (holding ADA and

Rehabilitation Act claims regarding educational services are subject to same standard as

other disability discrimination cases). Because Plaintiffs ask for compensatory damages,

they must show deliberate indifference by showing Defendant “knew that harm to a

federal protected right was substantially likely and failed to act.” Hildreth, 960 F.3d at 430

(quoting Lacy v. Cook Cty., 897 F.3d 847, 862 (7th Cir. 2018)) (cleaned up).

The Illinois courts analyze IHRA claims under “a framework that is practically

indistinguishable from the ADA framework.” Tate v. Dart, 51 F.4th 789, 793 (7th Cir. 2022)

(citing Fox v. Adams & Assocs., Inc., 445 Ill. Dec. 342 (2020)). Accordingly, the analysis

applies to the IHRA, ADA, and Section 504 claims in equal force.

1. Disability Discrimination

The parties do not dispute R.W.H. is a qualified individual with a disability but they

disagree over whether R.W.H. experienced discrimination because of his disability.

Plaintiffs argue Defendant discriminated against R.W.H. on the basis of his

disability when Defendant unilaterally terminated his speech therapy services for 21 days

without notice or an IEP meeting. (Doc. 23, pgs. 8-9). Plaintiffs argue Defendant failed to

reasonably accommodate R.W.H.’s disability, denying him meaningful and equal access

to Defendant’s educational programs and services. (Doc. 12, pgs. 5, 14-15).

Defendant argues Plaintiffs cannot establish the temporary termination of speech

therapy services was based on R.W.H.’s disability because any failure to provide these

services was due to staffing shortages. (Doc. 16, pg. 8). Defendant argues that because it

had no staff to provide speech therapy services to R.W.H., providing speech therapy was

an unreasonable accommodation. (Doc. 16, pg. 8).

An accommodation is unreasonable if it imposes significant financial or

administrative costs. A.H. by Holzmueller at 594 (citing Oconomowoc Residential Programs

v. City of Milwaukee, 300 F.3d 775, 784 (7th Cir. 2002)). Accepting Plaintiffs’ factual

allegations as true, Defendant failed to provide speech-language services for 21 weeks as

a result of systematic staffing shortages. (Doc. 12, pgs. 6, 10, 12). At the end of these 21

weeks, Defendant provided R.W.H. with virtual speech therapy services starting January

21, 2025. (Doc. 12, pg. 7). At this juncture, whether Defendant could have accommodated

R.W.H. before January 2025, without incurring significant financial or administrative

costs, is a factual dispute. A court deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) does

not resolve factual disputes or the merits of a claim but decides whether a plaintiff has

given enough details to state a claim that is plausible on its face. Swanson v. Citibank, N.A.,

614 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 677). Plaintiffs pled that

Defendant cancelled R.W.H.’s speech-therapy accommodations without notice and

without consultation with Parents in August 2024. (Doc 12 pgs. 4-8). They also pled that

Defendant refused to provide R.W.H. with speech-therapy accommodations for the next

21 weeks. (Doc 12, pgs. 4-8, 14-17). Plaintiffs pled these speech-therapy accommodations

had been offered the year prior and could be offered again without undue financial or

administrative burden. (Doc. 12, pgs. 4-8, 15- 16). Finally, Plaintiffs have pled that the lack

of speech-therapy accommodations deprived R.W.H. of an equal opportunity to

participate in and benefit from Defendant’s educational offerings because he regressed

in communication skills. (Doc. 12, pgs. 7, 16). Plaintiffs have given enough factual details

to state a disability discrimination claim under the ADA, Section 504, and the IHRA.

2. Deliberate Indifference

Plaintiffs have also adequately shown deliberate indifference at this stage. Based

on the pleadings, Defendant knew R.W.H. would not receive speech-therapy services,

harming his federal right to meaningful participation in its special education programs,

yet failed to act. (Doc. 12, pgs. 14-17). Plaintiffs showed R.W.H.’s speech-therapy services

were terminated in August 2024, but Defendant did not notify Parents until October 2024

or secure virtual speech-therapy services for R.W.H. until January 2025. (Doc. 12, pgs. 4-

7). Whether and to what extent Defendant was searching for a speech therapist, as to the

question of whether Defendant failed to act, is a factual dispute that will not be decided

on the present procedural posture.

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims of Section 504, ADA, and IHRA

violations for failure to state a claim is DENIED.

C. Illinois Civil Rights Remedies Restoration Act Claim

Defendant argues Plaintiff’s claims under the Illinois Civil Rights Remedies

Restoration Act must be dismissed because Plaintiffs cannot maintain a cause of action

under the ADA or Section 504. (Doc. 16, pg. 10) Defendant does not present any other

argument for dismissal. (Doc. 16, pg. 10) Because Plaintiffs can maintain a cause of action

under both federal statutes, Defendant’s argument has no force.

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims of violations of the Illinois Civil

Rights Remedies Act for failure to state a claim is DENIED.

V. REQUEST TO STRIKE REQUEST FOR PUNITIVE AND EMOTIONAL

DISTRESS DAMAGES

Plaintiffs request punitive damages for violations of the ADA and the Illinois Civil

Rights Remedies Restoration Act. (Doc. 12, pgs. 15-19, 24). Plaintiffs also request damages

for emotional distress for violations of the ADA, IHRA, and Illinois Civil Rights Remedies

Restoration Act. (Doc. 12, pg. 24). Defendant seeks to strike Plaintiff’s request for punitive

and emotional damages under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f).

Rule 12(f) states: “The court may strike from a pleading…any redundant,

immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). “A district court has

considerable discretion in deciding a Rule 12(f) motion.” Wilkins v. City of Chicago, 736 F.

Supp. 3d 616, 626 (N.D. Ill. 2024) (quoting Delta Consulting Grp., Inc. v. R. Randle Constr.,

Inc., 554 F.3d 1133, 1141 (7th Cir. 2009)). A motion to strike should not be granted unless

the relevant language in the Amended Complaint has no possible relation to the

controversy and is clearly prejudicial. See Wilkins, 736 F. Supp. 3d at 626.

Punitive damages are not available in private causes of action under the ADA. CTL

ex rel. Trebatoski v. Ashland Sch. Dist., 743 F.3d 524, 528 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing Barnes v.

Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 184–85 (2002)). Similarly, damages for emotional distress are not

available under the ADA. In Cummings v. Premier Rehab Keller, P.L.L.C., the Court held

damages for emotional distress are not recoverable under the Spending Clause

antidiscrimination statutes, including the Rehabilitation Act, because funding recipients

did not have “ ‘clear notice’…that they would face such a remedy in private action

brought to enforce the statutes at issue.” 596 U.S. 212, 230 (2022) (quoting Arlington Cent.

Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 296 (2006)). In Cummings, the Court employs

the contract analogy only to statutes passed under the Spending Clause. Id. at 225.

The ADA, in contrast to the Rehabilitation Act, is passed under “the power to

enforce the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment and to regulate commerce[.]” 42 U.S.C.A. §

12101(b)(4). However, in Barnes v. Gorman, the Court made explicit that although the

ADA is not Spending Clause legislation, Congress has made clear that the remedies

under the ADA are identical to the remedies available under the Rehabilitation Act. 536

U.S. 181, 189 n. 3 (2002); see also A.W. by & Through J.W. v. Coweta Cnty. Sch. Dist., 110 F.4th

1309 (11th Cir. 2024), cert. denied 145 S. Ct. 1058, (2025) (finding damages for emotional

distress are not recoverable under the ADA after Cummings); Payan v. Los Angeles Cmty.

Coll. Dist., No. 24-1809, 2026 WL 684094 (9th Cir. Mar. 11, 2026) (finding the same).

Accordingly, since punitive damages and damages for emotional distress are unavailable

under the ADA, Defendant’s motion is GRANTED only as to the references to punitive

and emotional damages in Plaintiffs’ claims under the ADA.

The Illinois Civil Rights Remedies Restoration Act expressly authorizes “all

remedies available at law, including, but not limited to, damages for…emotional pain,

suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other

nonmonetary losses, and any amount that may be determined by a jury, or a court sitting

without a jury[.]” 775 ILCS 60/20. The plain reading of the statute does not support

striking references to punitive damages nor damages for emotional distress. For that

reason, Defendant’s motion is DENIED as to the references to punitive and emotional

damages in Plaintiffs’ claims under the Illinois Civil Rights Remedies Restoration Act.

Lastly, the IHRA allows recovery of “actual damages,” including damages for

emotional distress. 775 ILCS 5/8A-104(B). Because the plain reading of the IHRA does

not support striking references to emotional damages, Defendant’s motion is DENIED

as to references to emotional damages in Plaintiff’s claims under the IHRA.

VI. CONCLUSION

As explained above, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and Alternative Motion to Strike Plaintiffs’ Amended

Complaint. (Doc. 16). The Court GRANTS Defendant’s request to strike Plaintiffs’

prayers for punitive damages and emotional damages under the ADA. (Doc. 16, pg. 11).

The Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss as to Plaintiffs’ claims under the

IDEA, Section 504, the ADA, the IHRA, and the Illinois Civil Rights Remedies Restoration

Act. The Court DENIES the request to strike Plaintiff’s prayers for punitive and

emotional damages under the Illinois Civil Rights Remedies Restoration Act and IHRA.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 27, 2026.

s/ David W. Dugan

___________________________

DAVID W. DUGAN

United States District Judge