Russo

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JONATHAN RUSSO, : CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:25-CV-1772

:

Plaintiff : (Judge Neary)

:

v. :

:

KENNETH REISINGER, et al., :

:

Defendants :

MEMORANDUM

This is a prisoner civil rights case filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Plaintiff, Jonathan Russo, alleges that defendants, officials at Adams County Adult

Correctional Complex (“ACACC”), violated his rights by denying him due process

and physically assaulting him during multiple prison disciplinary hearings.

Defendants have filed a partial motion to dismiss. The motion will be granted.

I. Factual Background & Procedural History

Russo filed this case on September 13, 2025, and the court received and

docketed his complaint on September 23, 2025. (Doc. 1). According to the complaint,

Russo was placed in ACACC on January 26, 2023, and was in that prison at all

times relevant to the complaint. (Id. ¶ 1). Defendant Reisinger allegedly conducted a

hearing for a disciplinary charge against Russo on July 18, 2023, and allegedly

refused to allow Russo to call witnesses or produce documents during the hearing.

(Id. ¶¶ 3-4). The complaint alleges that Reisinger took these actions to cover up

falsification of documents by the correctional officer who brought the disciplinary

charge. (Id. ¶ 5). Russo was found guilty of the disciplinary charge and sentenced to

70 days of disciplinary custody. (Id. ¶ 7).

On September 20, 2023, an attorney allegedly visited Russo at the prison and

informed him that he had not received any legal calls during the previous two

weeks because the prison had “banned him.” (Id. ¶ 10). Russo filed a grievance

about this but did not receive a timely response. (Id. ¶ 11). Around this time,

defendant Reisinger purportedly ordered that Russo would have to receive legal

calls directly through him. (Id. ¶ 14). Reisinger also allegedly required Russo to

submit requests for legal calls by paper forms, so that he could then claim that he

did not receive the requests. (Id. ¶ 15). Russo allegedly only received 4-5 legal calls

from September 2023 to June 2024, the period when he was purportedly required to

request the calls through Reisinger. (Id. ¶ 17). Russo purportedly began to make

carbon copies of his paper requests for legal calls in order to maintain records of the

requests. (Id. ¶ 18). Reisinger allegedly told Russo that he was not able to speak to

his attorney because the attorney would not accept collect calls. (Id. ¶ 21). Reisinger

also allegedly told Russo that he was listening to Russo’s calls with his attorneys

and monitoring the calls. (Id. ¶ 22). Reisinger also purportedly interfered with

Russo’s ability to investigate alleged wrongdoing by other prison officials by telling

officials to not make a written record of Russo’s verbal requests for writing

materials and grievance forms and to not give him grievance forms. (Id. ¶ 23).

Defendant Reisinger purportedly conducted another disciplinary hearing on

October 23, 2023. (Id. ¶ 26). Russo requested a continuance of the hearing until he

could obtain a pencil and paper and an inmate handbook to prepare his defense to

the disciplinary charges. (Id. ¶ 27). Reisinger allegedly denied the request and

stated that it was “not his problem” that Russo did not have the proper materials.

(Id. ¶ 28).

Reisinger conducted a third disciplinary hearing in January 2024, following

an incident on January 22, 2024. (Id. ¶ 29). Reisinger purportedly violated prison

policy by allowing the officer who had written the misconduct complaint against

Russo to serve Russo with the complaint. (Id.).

Reisinger then allegedly conducted a fourth disciplinary hearing on February

1, 2024. (Id. ¶ 30). During the hearing, Russo asserted that he had a previous

agreement with the warden of the prison regarding the reporting of contraband in

the prison that would allow Russo to be placed on a behavior adjustment plan, but

Reisinger allegedly “refused to hear” this information. (Id. ¶ 31). Russo objected that

Reisinger was biased against him, which purportedly angered Reisinger. (Id. ¶ 33).

Reisinger ordered the correctional officers present at the hearing to “front cuff”

Russo—i.e., handcuff him in front of his body. (Id. ¶ 35). Reisinger allegedly did this

to “create[] the illusion” that Russo was reaching for his tape recorder. (Id. ¶ 36).

Reisinger then allegedly performed a “trained take down move” on Russo, which

purportedly caused Russo to suffer injuries to his face requiring stitches, a black

eye, and a minor concussion. (Id. ¶ 37).

Russo was charged with destroying property for this incident. (Id. ¶ 38).

Russo contacted the Pennsylvania State Police asking them to investigate the

incident, but they purportedly ignored the request. (Id. ¶ 39). Reisinger purportedly

instructed other prison employees to falsify information about the incident. (Id. ¶

40). Russo requested “DNA for this matter,” but his request was denied. (Id. ¶ 41).

The complaint alleges that Russo was “forced to take a global plea offer that

consolidated all his cases to run concurrent” and that if he attempted to challenge

the cases separately “all cases [would run] consecutive[ly].” (Id. ¶ 42). The complaint

alleges that Russo was taken to the hospital “sometime in the end of January

2024.”1 (Id. ¶ 43). Russo remained in the hospital for four days, at which point

Reisinger purportedly came to the hospital and instructed a nurse to sedate him

before he transported him back to ACACC. (Id. ¶ 44). Russo refused the sedative

and pulled his arm away, but Reisinger allegedly “armbarred, choked and struck”

him and forced him to take the sedative. (Id. ¶ 45).

Defendants Hileman and Snyder, the warden and deputy warden of the

prison, were allegedly “made aware” of Reisinger’s actions and had “multiple

opportunities to rectify and remedy them but failed to.” (Id. ¶ 49). The complaint

alleges that because of Reisinger’s interference with Russo’s ability to speak with

his attorney his criminal case “was in common pleas court longer than need be,” and

he was unable to “assist in recovering evidence for his defense that could [have]

proved [him] innocent, lessened charges or lessened his time.” (Id. ¶¶ 52-53).

1 This date appears to be before the alleged assault by defendant Reisinger.

The court assumes this is an error and liberally construes the complaint as alleging

that Reisinger’s alleged assault caused the hospital visit.

The complaint names Reisinger, Hileman, and Snyder as defendants. Russo

asserts claims for excessive force, assault, and battery against defendant Reisinger,

deliberate indifference against Hileman and Snyder, and violation of due process

and denial of access to the courts in violation of the First Amendment against all

defendants. (Id. ¶¶ 56-60). Although they are not specifically enumerated in the

complaint, the court liberally construes the complaint as additionally asserting a

claim against Reisinger for violation of Russo’s right to due process during several

disciplinary hearings and a claim against Reisinger for retaliation in violation of the

First Amendment. Russo requests damages, declaratory relief, and injunctive relief.

(Id. at 10-11).

II. Legal Standard

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the

dismissal of complaints that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). When ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the

court must “accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable

reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Phillips v. County

of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Pinker v. Roche Holdings,

Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002)). In addition to reviewing the facts

contained in the complaint, the court may also consider “exhibits attached to the

complaint, matters of public record, [and] undisputedly authentic documents if the

complainant’s claims are based upon these documents.” Mayer v. Belichick, 605

F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol.

Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993)).

Federal notice and pleading rules require the complaint to provide “the

defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”

Phillips, 515 F.3d at 232 (alteration in original) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To test the sufficiency of the complaint, the court

conducts a three-step inquiry. See Santiago v. Warminster Township, 629 F.3d 121,

130-31 (3d Cir. 2010). In the first step, “the court must ‘tak[e] note of the elements a

plaintiff must plead to state a claim.’” Id. at 130 (alteration in original) (quoting

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009)). Next, the factual and legal elements of

a claim must be separated; well-pleaded facts are accepted as true, while mere legal

conclusions may be disregarded. Id. at 131-32; see Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578

F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009). Once the court isolates the well-pleaded factual

allegations, it must determine whether they are sufficient to show a “plausible

claim for relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556); Twombly,

550 U.S. at 556. A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff pleads facts “that

allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for

the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Courts must liberally construe complaints brought by pro se litigants. Sause

v. Bauer, 585 U.S. 957, 960 (2018). Pro se complaints, “however inartfully pleaded,

must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,

106 (1976)).

III. Discussion

Plaintiff brings his constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section

1983 creates a private cause of action to redress constitutional wrongs committed by

state officials. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute is not a source of substantive rights,

but serves as a mechanism for vindicating rights otherwise protected by federal law.

See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284-85 (2002); Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d

1199, 1204 (3d Cir. 1996). To state a Section 1983 claim, plaintiffs must show a

deprivation of a “right secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United

States . . . by a person acting under color of state law.” Kneipp, 95 F.3d at 1204

(quoting Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1141 (3d Cir. 1995)).

A. Motion to Dismiss

Defendants argue that the claims against Hileman and Snyder should be

dismissed because: (1) Russo fails to allege their personal involvement in the

alleged civil rights violations; (2) they are immune from Russo’s state tort claims for

assault and battery; and (3) they are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to

Russo’s constitutional claims. (Doc. 13). Defendants also seek dismissal of the access

to courts claim against defendant Reisinger because Russo fails to allege that he

suffered an actual injury to his right of access to the courts. (Id.) Finally, defendants

seek dismissal of Russo’s request for punitive damages against them in their official

capacities. (Id.)

Defendants’ personal involvement argument is correct. A defendant cannot be

liable for a violation of a plaintiff’s civil rights unless the defendant was personally

involved in the violation. Jutrowski v. Twp. of Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280, 289 (3d Cir.

2018). The defendant’s personal involvement cannot be based solely on a theory of

respondeat superior. Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988).

Rather, for a supervisor to be liable for the actions of a subordinate, there must be

allegations of personal direction or actual knowledge and acquiescence. Id. A

defendant’s after-the-fact review and denial of a prisoner’s grievance is not

sufficient to establish the defendant’s personal involvement. Dooley v. Wetzel, 957

F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020).

Personal involvement may also be pleaded through allegations that a

supervisory defendant “established and maintained a policy, practice or custom

which directly caused [the] constitutional harm.” Santiago, 629 F.3d at 129 n.5

(quoting A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cnty. Juvenile Detention Ctr., 372 F.3d 572,

586 (3d Cir. 2004)). To state such a claim, a plaintiff must allege the existence of a

policy or practice and allege that: “(1) the existing policy or practice created an

unreasonable risk of . . . injury; (2) the supervisor was aware that the unreasonable

risk was created; (3) the supervisor was indifferent to that risk; and (4) the injury

resulted from the policy or practice.” (citing Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1118

(3d Cir. 1989)).

Here, Russo plainly fails to allege that Hileman and Snyder were personally

involved in the alleged civil rights violations. His only allegations against Hileman

and Snyder are conclusory assertions that they were “made aware” of Reisinger’s

actions in an unspecified manner and failed to intervene. (Id. ¶ 49). This conclusory

statement amounts to an attempt to hold Hileman and Snyder liable solely based on

their supervisory roles in the prison, which is not sufficient to allege personal

involvement. Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207. Russo also does not allege the existence of any

policy that could support a finding of personal involvement. Accordingly, all civil

rights claims against Hileman and Snyder will be dismissed for failure to allege

personal involvement.

Turning next to Hileman and Snyder’s argument that they are entitled to

immunity from Russo’s state law tort claims for assault and battery, the

Pennsylvania Subdivision Tort Claims Act generally grants immunity to local

agencies for any action for damages caused by the actions of the agency or its

employees. 42 Pa.C.S. § 8541. Employees of the local agency are granted immunity

“to the same extent” as the agency. Id. § 8545. There are several enumerated

exceptions to this immunity. Id. § 8542. Additionally, immunity does not apply if

the claim alleges an “injury caused by the act of the employee . . . [that] constituted

a crime, actual fraud, actual malice or willful misconduct.” Id. § 8550.

Hileman and Snyder assert that they are entitled to immunity pursuant to

Section 8545 because none of the enumerated exceptions under Section 8542 apply

to this case and their actions do not constitute willful misconduct or any of the other

categories enumerated by Section 8550. (Doc. 13 at 20-21).

The court agrees. The enumerated exceptions under Section 8542 plainly do

not apply to this case, and there is also no basis to conclude that Hileman and

Snyder committed a crime, actual fraud, or actual malice. Although the allegations

in the complaint may support a finding that Reisinger’s actions constituted willful

misconduct,2 Hileman and Snyder may not be held liable for this purported willful

misconduct under a respondeat superior theory. See McNeal v. City of Easton, 598

A.2d 638, 642 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991) (noting that supervisory defendants were

entitled to immunity for alleged wrongdoing by subordinate employees because

there was no evidence that the supervisory defendants were aware of the

subordinate employees’ actions and therefore no basis to conclude that supervisory

defendants committed willful misconduct). Accordingly, the tort claims against

Hileman and Snyder will be dismissed.

Defendants next argue that the access to courts claim against Reisinger

should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.3

Access to courts claims require allegations that (1) prison officials impeded the

2 Defendants do not seek to dismiss the tort claims against Reisinger.

3 Defendants note that they do not seek dismissal of the excessive force claim

against Reisinger. (Doc. 13 at 13 n.3). Additionally, although defendants’ brief

includes a header stating that the “due process claim against Hileman, Snyder, and

Reisinger fail[s],” the text of the accompanying argument only pertains to the due

process claim against Hileman and Snyder. (See id. at 17-19). Defendants similarly

have not advanced any argument for dismissal of the retaliation claim, despite

noting that they liberally construe the complaint as advancing such a claim. (See

Doc. 13 at 8). Thus, the court concludes that defendants have forfeited any

argument for the dismissal of the due process and retaliation claims against

Reisinger. This conclusion is without prejudice to Reisinger’s right to seek summary

judgment on these claims or otherwise assert defenses and immunities to the claims

at later stages of litigation.

plaintiff’s access to courts and (2) the plaintiff suffered actual injury in his ability to

access the courts. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996); Rivera v. Monko, 37

F.4th 909, 915 (2022). To show an actual injury, the plaintiff must show that the

defendants’ actions have impeded his ability to bring a nonfrivolous or arguable

legal claim. Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2008).

Here, Russo’s complaint plainly fails to allege an actual injury to his access to

the courts. His only alleged injuries are conclusory assertions that with more access

to his attorney his criminal trial could have been resolved more quickly or may have

resulted in his acquittal or a lesser sentence. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 52-53). Russo does not

allege any facts to support these assertions, and his conclusory and unsupported

speculation of injuries that may have occurred is not sufficient to state an access to

courts claim upon which relief may be granted.

Finally, defendants are correct that Russo’s claim for punitive damages must

be dismissed to the extent it seeks punitive damages against defendants in their

official capacities. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n.13 (1985).

Before dismissing a civil rights complaint for failure to state a claim, courts

must permit a curative amendment unless the amendment would be inequitable or

futile. Phillips, 515 F.3d at 245. Here, the court will deny leave to amend the

dismissed claims as futile. Russo’s brief in opposition to defendants’ motion to

dismiss does not indicate any additional facts he could allege that would cure the

defects in his complaint. Instead, he simply reiterates the conclusory assertions of

liability included in his complaint. (See Doc. 16). Thus, it appears that any amended

complaint would not cure the pleading deficiencies the court has identified in this

opinion and leave to amend will be denied.

IV. Conclusion

The motion for partial dismissal is granted, and the complaint will be

dismissed except to the extent that it states excessive force, assault, battery, due

process, and retaliation claims against defendant Reisinger. Reisinger will be

required to answer plaintiff’s complaint, and a case management order will be set to

govern this case. An appropriate order shall issue.

/S/ KELI M. NEARY

Keli M. Neary

United States District Judge

Middle District of Pennsylvania

Dated: March 4, 2026