Bordelon

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

RANDY BORDELON, et al. CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO: 25-00725

JEFFERSON PARISH SHERIFF’S SECTION: T (5)

OFFICE, et al.

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court is a second Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) filed by Defendants Joseph Lopinto and Wade St. John.1

R. Doc. 22. Plaintiffs Randy Bordelon and Beth Bordelon have filed a response in opposition. R.

Doc. 27. After reviewing the pleadings and the applicable law, the Court will deny Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss.

BACKGROUND

In his Complaint filed in state court, which was removed to this court, and his Amended

Complaint (R. Docs. 2-1 and 15), Plaintiff essentially alleges that, at approximately 11:00 p.m. on

January 23, 2025, Plaintiff and his wife Beth Bordelon were asleep at their residence located at

7909 Jefferson Highway, Harahan, LA, when they were awakened by deputies from the Jefferson

1 Defendants’ first Motion to Dismiss was dismissed without prejudice after Plaintiffs were

permitted to file an Amended Complaint. R. Doc. 28.

1

Parish Sheriff’s Office. The deputies had set up a perimeter in the area searching for a rape suspect.

They inquired of Plaintiff if his security system had caught anyone on his cameras. Plaintiff

attempted to comply with their request, but because of a technical problem, he could not retrieve

any video at that time. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff decided to search the rear of his property where

a two-story workshop and stall for the family pony were located. Concerned for the safety of his

family (his wife and two daughters), Plaintiff brought his handgun with him into the workshop,

turning on the lights in the building and going up to the upper floor of his workshop. As he was

coming down the stairs from the second story, Sheriff’s Deputy Wade St. John saw Plaintiff in the

building through a window carrying his handgun. The deputy commanded Plaintiff to put the

handgun down. Plaintiff hesitated briefly not realizing the deputy was talking to him. He pointed

his gun down and finally put the gun down into a planter.2

Deputy St. John then proceeded to strike Plaintiff in the throat area with his hand causing

him to fall backward over the planter. Plaintiff alleges he did not make a threatening move against

the deputy, which would justify striking Plaintiff in this manner. The deputy further did not instruct

Plaintiff to back away from the planter or to move away from the gun. Deputy St. John then kicked

Plaintiff in the groin area several times causing injury to his groin area, while on the ground in a

2 Plaintiff argues that in their second Motion to Dismiss, defendants argue his use of the word

”finally” suggested “an extended period of time. However, Plaintiff contends the use of the

adverb “finally” was only to indicate the last point or step in the original confrontation with

Deputy St. John and in not meant to indicate there was some kind of extended period before he

complied.

2

defenseless position and not within the wingspan of the gun. Plaintiff picked himself up and the

deputies escorted him to the rear of his residence where they spoke with him about having a firearm

while they were in the area.

Plaintiff and his wife filed suit alleging a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, namely excessive

force, and various state law claims including loss of consortium. Defendants have filed a Motion

to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim.

LAW and ANALYSIS

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must plead enough facts “to

state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570

(2007). A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff pleads facts that allow the court to “draw

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and must draw all

reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Lormand v. U.S. Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3 228, 239

(5th Cir. 2009). Nevertheless, the Court is not bound to accept as true legal conclusions couched

as factual allegations. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

A legally sufficient complaint must establish more than a “sheer possibility” that the

plaintiff's claim is true. Id. It need not contain detailed factual allegations, but it must go beyond

labels, legal conclusions, or formulaic recitations of the elements of a cause of action. Id. In other

words, the face of the complaint must contain enough factual matter to raise a reasonable

expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of each element of the plaintiff's claim. Lormand,

3

565 F.3d at 257. If there are insufficient factual allegations to raise a right to relief above the

speculative level, or if it is apparent from the face of the complaint that there is an insurmountable

bar to relief, the claim must be dismissed. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

Section 1983 affords citizens the ability to sue police officers for deprivation of statutory

or constitutional rights stemming from the use of excessive force. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Such claims

encompass two foundational elements: (1) the conduct complained of was committed by a person

acting under color of state law; and (2) the conduct deprived a person of rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Wollfarth v. New Orleans

City, Civ. A. No. 20-01537, 2021 WL 6496847, *2 (citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535

(1981)). On the other hand, the doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from

liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Pearson v. Callahan, 555

U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Qualified immunity

balances two important interests—the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise

power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability

when they perform their duties reasonably. Id.

In light of these interests, the Supreme Court established in Katz v. Saucier a two-prong

sequence for resolving government officials qualified immunity claims. Id. at 232 (citing Katz v.

Saucier, 533 U.S. 194 (2001)). First, a court must decide whether the facts alleged establish a

violation of a constitutional right. Id. (citing Katz v. Saucier at 201). Second, if the plaintiff has

4

satisfied this first step, the court must then decide whether the right at issue was “clearly

established” at the time of defendant's alleged misconduct. Id. Qualified immunity is applicable

unless the official's conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right. Anderson v.

Creighton, 483 U. S. 635, 640 (1987). The Supreme Court has since reconsidered the inflexibility

of Katz v. Saucier by granting lower court judges discretion in deciding which of the two prongs

of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in the light of the particular case at

hand. Wollfarth, supra, at *2 (citing Pearson, 555 U.S. 223, 236). Even if the evidence supports a

conclusion that plaintiff's rights were violated, qualified immunity may still be invoked unless “the

government officials violated clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

reasonable person would have known.” Manis v. Lawson, 585 F.3d 839, 845 (5th Cir. 2009).

“Qualified “immunity shields from civil liability all but the plainly incompetent or those who

knowingly violate the law.” Id.

When the defense of qualified immunity is raised in a motion to dismiss, “it is the

defendant's conduct as alleged in the complaint that is scrutinized for objective legal

reasonableness.” McClendon v. City of Columbia, 305 F.3d 314, 323 (5th Cir. 2002). A court must

determine that a plaintiff's pleadings “assert facts which, if true, would overcome the defense of

qualified immunity.” Zapata v. Melson, 750 F.3d 481, 485 (5th Cir. 2014). A plaintiff seeking to

overcome qualified immunity “must plead specific facts that both allow the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the harm he has alleged and that defeat a

qualified immunity defense with equal specificity.” Blacke v. LeBlanc, 692 F.3d 645, 648 (5th Cir.

5

2012).

Here, Defendants argue that Deputy St. John did not use excessive force. The elements of

an excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment are: “(1) injury, (2) which resulted directly

and only from a use of force that was clearly excessive, and (3) the excessiveness of which was

clearly unreasonable.” Trammell v. Fruge, 868 F.3d 332, 340 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting reference

omitted). “The second and third elements collapse into a single objective-reasonableness inquiry.”

Pena v. City of Rio Grande City, 879 F.3d 613, 619 (5th Cir. 2018). The reasonableness of a

deputy’s use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene,

rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S.Ct.

1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). “Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary

in the peace of a judge’s chambers, violates the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 396. “To be reasonable

is not to be perfect, and so the Fourth Amendment allows for some mistakes on the part of

government officials, giving them ‘fair leeway for enforcing the law in the community’s

protection.’” Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 60–61, 135 S.Ct. 530, 190 L.Ed.2d 475 (2014)

(quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949)). A

court’s analysis “turns on the facts of each case, including the severity of the crime at issue,

whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether

he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna,

595 U.S. 1, 6, 142 S.Ct. 4, 211 L.Ed.2d 164 (2021) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). “This list

is not exclusive, however, and the Court may examine the totality of the circumstances.” Drumgole

6

v. Frumveller, No. 14-2827, 2015 WL 2250134, at *8 (E.D. La. May 13, 2015). Moreover, the

Fifth Circuit has frequently held that takedown procedures used to control unhandcuffed, non-

subdued suspects are lawful means of effecting an arrest. Buehler v. Dear, 27 F.4th 969, 989 n. 67

(5th Cir. 2022); see also Bailey v. Ramos, 125 F.4th 667, 682 (5th Cir. 2025).

The Court, however, in deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion must accept all well-pleaded facts

as true and view them in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff. Campbell v. Wells Fargo Bank,

N.A., 781 F.2d 440, 442 (5th Cir. 1986). Defendants assert that the pursued subject was a rape

suspect, which weighs heavily in Deputy St. John’s favor. Defendants argue that Plaintiff need not

have committed the crime, only that he was suspected of criminal activity. Here, Plaintiff admitted

in his petition that despite being warned that a K-9 would assist in a nighttime, snow-covered

search for a rape suspect, he armed himself and entered the search area without notifying the

deputies. Further, Defendants point to the language in the pleading suggesting that Plaintiff did

not put down his weapon immediately when ordered to do so.

While it is a close question, the Court can reasonably infer that the officers might have

used excessive force under the circumstances of this incident. Especially where they initially spoke

to Plaintiff and asked for his help in reviewing camera footage, and Plaintiff did ultimately comply

with the command to put his weapon down before he was struck. Notwithstanding the Court's

finding that Plaintiff has minimally satisfied the pleading standard by alleging facts essential to

the establishment of a violation of his rights, relief is not guaranteed. The issues pertaining to the

question of excessive force and qualified immunity are questions better suited for summary

7

judgment or trial. For pleading purposes, however, Plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief

may be granted.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim is DENIED.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 31st day of March 2026.

is GERARD GUIDRY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE