JOSE LUIS SANTIAGO v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, et al.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JOSE LUIS SANTIAGO, :

Plaintiff, :

:

v. : CIVIL ACTION NO. 25-CV-6816

:

CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, et al., :

Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM

MCHUGH, J. FEBRUARY 11, 2026

Pro se Plaintiff Jose Luise Santiago brings this civil action, asserting claims pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1985, and state tort law against the City of Philadelphia, The

Estate of the Honorable Paul Ribner, and David Disiderio. He also seeks leave to proceed in

forma pauperis. For the following reasons, the Court will grant Santiago leave to proceed in

forma pauperis and dismiss the Complaint.

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS1

In September 1992, Mr. Santiago was charged with first-degree murder and other crimes

by the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office (“DAO”), arising from an August 1992 drive-by

shooting in which he was the alleged driver. (Compl. ¶ 22); see Commonwealth v. Santiago, CP-

51-CR-0923471-1992 (C.P. Philadelphia). The victim was an innocent bystander who was killed

by a stray bullet. (Compl. ¶ 2.) Defendant Assistant District Attorney David Disiderio

1 The facts set forth in this Memorandum are taken from Santiago’s Complaint (ECF

No. 2). The Court adopts the pagination assigned to the Complaint by the CM/ECF docketing

system. Additionally, the Court includes facts reflected in publicly available state court records,

of which this Court may take judicial notice. See Buck v. Hampton Twp. Sch. Dist., 452 F.3d

256, 260 (3d Cir. 2006).

prosecuted the case for the Commonwealth. (Compl. ¶ 21.) At a pretrial conference on

September 20, 1993, Disiderio announced that his office would be pursuing the death penalty on

the first-degree murder charge, but that if Mr. Santiago waived his right to a jury trial in favor of

a bench trial, the DAO would agree not to pursue the death penalty. (Id. ¶¶ 33-34.)

Mr. Santiago chose a bench trial and was ultimately found guilty of first-degree murder

by Judge Paul Ribner. (Id. ¶¶ 7-10.) Santiago asserts that the trial was flawed in several ways.

He alleges that Desiderio failed to present any evidence that Santiago intended to kill the

bystander victim, as required for a first-degree murder charge, but that Ribner nevertheless found

Santiago guilty. (Compl. ¶ 10.) When Santiago appealed his conviction on that grounds,

Desiderio raised the theory of transferred intent for the first time, and Ribner echoed that theory

in his post-trial Pa. R. A. P. 1925(a) opinion. (Id.) Santiago contends that if he had known he

could be convicted on a transferred intent theory he would have chosen a trial by jury. (Id. ¶¶

32, 37-38.) Santiago also asserts that Judge Ribner improperly credited the eyewitness testimony

of “a set of impeached criminal witnesses—drug users and sellers with prior convictions and

inconsistent statements,” and improperly allowed testimony regarding Santiago’s prior drug

dealing and convictions. (Id. ¶¶ 9, 25, 39-43.)

While pursuing post-conviction relief years later, Mr. Santiago learned that Ribner had a

potential conflict of interest that he had failed to disclose: Disiderio was an eyewitness in a

personal injury lawsuit in which Judge Ribner and his wife were plaintiffs, arising from a car

accident months before Santiago’s trial. (Id. ¶¶ 4, 26-29, 51.) Ribner had disclosed the potential

conflict in several other cases, including another capital murder case tried roughly one month

before Santiago’s, but failed to do so in Santiago’s case. (Id. ¶ 5.) Santiago contends that if he

had known of the Judge’s conflict he would have sought the Judge’s recusal or chosen a jury

trial. (Id. ¶ 32.) Based on the newly-discovered information, Santiago filed a Post Conviction

Relief Act (“PCRA”) petition, which was ultimately granted. (Id. ¶¶ 52-54.) The Court vacated

Santiago’s first-degree murder conviction and ordered a new trial. (Id. ¶ 54.) Rather than go to

trial, the DAO offered Santiago the option to plead guilty to third-degree murder and be

sentenced to time served. (Id. ¶ 55.) Despite maintaining his innocence, Santiago accepted the

plea on March 1, 2024 and was released in October 2024. (Compl. ¶ 56.) See also Santiago,

CP-51-CR-0923471-1992.

Mr. Santiago contends that the City is liable for the constitutional injuries he suffered

because they created a “culture in which constitutional violations were tolerated, where

prosecutors were not meaningfully disciplined for Brady2 violations or conflicts of interest, and

where the City failed to implement structural reforms.” (Compl. ¶ 58.) He asserts that the City

maintained various customs that caused the violation of his rights, including:

(a) a pattern and practice of failing to disclose exculpatory and

impeachment evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland;

(b) A culture that rewarded high conviction rates and tolerated the use of

unreliable witnesses, coerced testimony, and after-the-fact

rationalization of legal theories;

(c) Failure to train and supervise prosecutors regarding conflicts of

interest, including situations where a prosecutor is a witness to a

judge’s personal litigation;

(d) Failure to implement effective supervisory systems to detect and

prevent structural due-process violations, particularly in capital and

homicide prosecutions; and

(e) Failure to discipline, retrain, or meaningfully sanction prosecutors like

Desiderio after judicial findings exonerations, or civil litigation

exposed patterns of misconduct.

2 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

(Compl. ¶ 64.) In apparent support of his failure to train/supervise claim, he asserts that

Desiderio “has been named in multiple civil rights lawsuits alleging Brady violations, use of

lying informants, fabrication of evidence, and wrongful convictions” and that some of these

cases have resulted in civil settlements and convictions being overturned. (Compl. ¶ 57.)

Based on these allegations, Santiago asserts claims under § 1983, § 1985,3 and state law

for: (a) deprivation of liberty without due process and denial of a fair trial; (b) malicious

prosecution and wrongful conviction; (c) “extraordinary judicial and prosecutorial misconduct,

including unlawful manipulation of his jury trial rights”; (d) conspiracy; (e) municipal and

supervisory liability; and (f) state law claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and

false imprisonment. (Id. ¶ 13.) He seeks millions in damages, retrospective declaratory relief,4

“injunctive and policy-reform relief” via changes to City of Philadelphia policies, and attorney’s

fees. (Id. at 26-27.)

3 Other than the passing reference to 42 U.S.C. § 1985, Santiago fails to allege any facts

to support a civil rights conspiracy claim actionable under § 1985. That claim is, therefore, not

plausible. See Campbell v. LVNV Finding, LLC and Resurgent Capital Servs., No. 21-5388,

2022 WL 6172286, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 7, 2022) (stating that a “‘passing reference’ to

jurisprudential precepts without more does not bring that issue before the Court in that it

provides no basis for a ruling one way or the other” (citing Laborers’ Int’l Union of N. Am.,

AFL-CIO v. Foster Wheeler Energy Corp., 26 F.3d 375, 398 (3d Cir. 1994))).

4 Declaratory relief is unavailable to adjudicate past conduct, so Santiago’s request for

this declaratory relief is improper. See Corliss v. O’Brien, 200 F. App’x 80, 84 (3d Cir. 2006)

(per curiam) (“Declaratory judgment is inappropriate solely to adjudicate past conduct” and is

also not “meant simply to proclaim that one party is liable to another.”); see also Andela v.

Admin. Office of U.S. Courts, 569 F. App’x 80, 83 (3d Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (“Declaratory

judgments are meant to define the legal rights and obligations of the parties in the anticipation of

some future conduct.”). A declaratory judgment is also not “meant simply to proclaim that one

party is liable to another.” Corliss, 200 F. App’x at 84 (per curiam); see also Taggart v. Saltz,

No. 20-3574, 2021 WL 1191628, at *2 (3d Cir. Mar. 30, 2021) (per curiam) (“A declaratory

judgment is available to define the legal rights of the parties, not to adjudicate past conduct

where there is no threat of continuing harm.”).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court will grant Mr. Santiago leave to proceed in forma pauperis because it appears

that he is incapable of paying the fees to commence this civil action. Accordingly, 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) requires the Court to dismiss Santiago’s Complaint if it fails to state a claim.

The Court applies the same standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6), see Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999), that is,

whether a complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotations omitted);

Talley v. Wetzel, 15 F.4th 275, 286 n.7 (3d Cir. 2021). At the screening stage, the Court will

accept the facts alleged in the pro se Complaint as true, draw all reasonable inferences in the

Plaintiff’s favor, and “ask only whether that complaint, liberally construed, contains facts

sufficient to state a plausible claim.” Shorter v. United States, 12 F.4th 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2021)

(cleaned up), abrogation on other grounds recognized by Fisher v. Hollingsworth, 115 F.4th 197

(3d Cir. 2024). Conclusory allegations do not suffice. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also

Martinez v. UPMC Susquehanna, 986 F.3d 261, 266 (3d Cir. 2021) (“A plaintiff cannot survive

dismissal just by alleging the conclusion to an ultimate legal issue.”).

As Mr. Santiago is proceeding pro se, the Court construes his allegations liberally. Vogt

v. Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239,

244-45 (3d Cir. 2013)). The Court will “apply the relevant legal principle even when the

complaint has failed to name it.” Id. However, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts

in their complaints to support a claim.” Id. (quoting Mala, 704 F. 3d at 245). An unrepresented

litigant “cannot flout procedural rules—they must abide by the same rules that apply to all other

litigants.” Id.

The Court must also review the pleadings and dismiss the matter if it determines that the

action fails to set forth a proper basis for this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court

must dismiss the action.”); Group Against Smog and Pollution, Inc. v. Shenango, Inc., 810 F.3d

116, 122 n.6 (3d Cir. 2016) (explaining that “an objection to subject matter jurisdiction may be

raised at any time [and] a court may raise jurisdictional issues sua sponte”). A plaintiff

commencing an action in federal court bears the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction. See

Lincoln Ben. Life Co. v. AEI Life, LLC, 800 F.3d 99, 105 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing DaimlerChrysler

Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 n.3 (2006)).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Federal Claims

Santiago asserts constitutional claims against the Defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

1983, the vehicle by which such claims may be brought in federal court. “To state a claim under

§ 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the

United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting

under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); see also Groman v. Twp. of

Manalapan, 47 F .3d 628, 638 (3d Cir. 1995) (“The color of state law element is a threshold

issue; there is no liability under § 1983 for those not acting under color of law.”).

1. Claims Against the Estate of Judge Ribner

Santiago’s claims against the Estate of Judge Ribner are not plausible. Judges are

entitled to absolute immunity from civil rights claims that are based on acts or omissions taken in

their judicial capacity, so long as they do not act in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. See

Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-56 (1978); Harvey v. Loftus, 505 F. App’x 87, 90 (3d Cir.

2012) (per curiam); Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 303-04 (3d Cir. 2006) (per curiam). An act

is taken in a judge’s judicial capacity if it is “a function normally performed by a judge.” Gallas

v. Supreme Ct. of Pa., 211 F.3d 760, 768 (3d Cir. 2000). Moreover, “[g]enerally . . . ‘where a

court has some subject matter jurisdiction, there is sufficient jurisdiction for immunity

purposes.’” Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208 F.3d 435, 443-44 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Barnes v.

Winchell, 105 F.3d 1111, 1122 (6th Cir. 1997)). Because judges must feel free to act without

fear of incurring personal liability for their actions in court, judicial immunity remains in force

even if the actions are alleged to be legally incorrect, in bad faith, malicious, or corrupt, Mireles

v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991), or are taken as a result of a conspiracy with others. Dennis v.

Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980).

Santiago contends that Ribner’s (and Desiderio’s) actions and omissions are not entitled

to immunity because they were “administrative, investigative, or non-judicial acts not entitled to

absolute immunity” (Compl. ¶ 112.). Beyond this conclusory statement, Santiago does not

allege any facts to indicate that Ribner’s actions were not “judicial acts” or that he acted in the

absence of all jurisdiction. Rather, each of the alleged acts and omissions giving rise to

Santiago’s claims occurred in the course of Ribner’s presiding over Santiago’s criminal case,

namely: (1) failing to disclose a potential conflict of interest; (2) unfairly discrediting Santiago’s

witnesses; (3) improperly allowing testimony adverse to Santiago; and (4) providing a post-hoc

rationale for Santiago’s conviction on appeal. (See generally Compl.) While Santiago contends

that Ribner’s actions and omissions amount to legal and ethical violations, even when a judge

commits “grave procedural errors,” see Stump, 435 U.S. at 359, or takes actions that are alleged

to be legally incorrect, in bad faith, malicious or corrupt, so long as they were taken in his

judicial capacity they remain protected by absolute immunity. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11-12.

Because each of the acts giving rise to Santiago’s claims were taken in Ribner’s judicial capacity

in an action over which he clearly could exercise jurisdiction as a judge of the Court of Common

Pleas, they are entitled to absolute immunity. Accordingly, Santiago’s § 1983 claims against

Ribner are dismissed with prejudice.

2. Claims Against ADA Desiderio

Santiago’s claims against Defendant Desiderio are also not plausible. Prosecutors are

entitled to absolute immunity from liability under § 1983 for acts that are “intimately associated

with the judicial phase of the criminal process” such as “initiating a prosecution and . . .

presenting the State’s case.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31 (1976). Absolute

immunity extends to the decision to initiate a prosecution, Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431, including

“soliciting false testimony from witnesses in grand jury proceedings and probable cause

hearings,” Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1465 (3d Cir. 1992), presenting a state’s case at

trial, Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431, and appearing before a judge to present evidence. Fogle v. Sokol,

957 F.3d 148, 160 (3d Cir. 2020); see also id. at 164 (prosecutors were entitled to immunity from

claims based on allegations “that at hearings and at trial the Prosecutors withheld material

exculpatory evidence from defense counsel, the court, and the jury; filed a criminal complaint

without probable cause; and committed perjury before and during trial”).

While prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity from liability under § 1983 for acts

that are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process,” a prosecutor does

not have absolute immunity when performing administrative functions or the traditionally

investigative functions of law enforcement. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 274-75

(1993) (holding that prosecutor’s evaluation and alleged fabrication of forensic evidence, prior to

developing probable cause to arrest, “was entirely investigative in character” and therefore only

protected by qualified immunity); Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 493 (1991) (holding that

advising the police in the investigative phase of a criminal case was an investigative function that

did not entitle a prosecutor to absolute immunity); Odd v. Malone, 538 F.3d 202, 211 (3d Cir.

2008) (holding that a prosecutor’s failure to notify a judge of a continuance in a related case was

an administrative act not entitled to absolute immunity) (citation omitted); Carter v. City of

Philadelphia, 181 F.3d 339, 356 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting that “a prosecutor acting in an

investigative or administrative capacity is protected only by qualified immunity”) (citations

omitted).

Mr. Santiago’s constitutional claims against Desiderio appear to be based on three

principal allegations: (1) he failed to disclose his involvement as a witness in Judge Ribner’s

ongoing civil lawsuit; (2) he “manipulated” Santiago into waiving his right to a jury trial by

threatening to pursue the death penalty; and (3) he failed to advise Santiago that he could be

convicted on a transferred intent theory of liability. (See generally Compl.) All three of these

allegations arise from Desiderio’s role as an advocate for the Commonwealth during the judicial

phase of Santiago’s prosecution, and his actions are thus protected by absolute immunity. See

Yarris v. County of Delaware, 465 F.3d 129, 136 (3d Cir. 2006) (“Ultimately, whether a

prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity depends on whether . . . she was functioning as the

state’s ‘advocate’ while engaging in the alleged conduct that gives rise to the constitutional

violation”); see also Fogle, 957 F.3d at 164; Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431. Beyond his conclusory

statement that Desiderio’s challenged conduct consisted of “administrative, investigative, or non-

judicial acts not entitled to absolute immunity” (Compl. ¶ 112.), there is no allegation that the

conduct arose from the investigative phase of the case, or that Desiderio was performing an

administrative function separate from his advocacy role. Cf. Odd, 538 F.3d at 211; Giuffre v.

Bissell, 31 F.3d 1241, 1253 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that a prosecutor facilitating the sale of

plaintiff’s property pursuant to an immunity agreement was a strictly administrative function not

entitled to absolute immunity); Schrob v. Catterson, 948 F.2d 1402 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that

prosecutor’s “management of and negotiations concerning return of . . . [seized] property [was]

not directly related to the judicial process” and therefore not entitled to judicial immunity). And

while Santiago asserts that Desiderio engaged in “extraordinary . . . prosecutorial misconduct”

(Compl. ¶ 13), he does not allege any acts or omissions so egregious that they “fall wholly

outside the prosecutorial role no matter when or where they are committed.” Cf. Odd, 538 F.3d

at 211 (noting that, for example, a prosecutor is never entitled to absolute immunity for

deliberately destroying exculpatory evidence) (citing Yarris, 465 F.3d at 136-37). Accordingly,

Santiago’s claims against Desiderio are barred by absolute immunity and will be dismissed with

prejudice.

3. City of Philadelphia

Finally, Mr. Santiago asserts several claims against the City of Philadelphia under §

1983, alleging that his constitutional injuries were caused by City policies and customs,

including a failure to train and supervise.5 To state a claim for municipal liability, a plaintiff

must allege that the defendant’s policies or customs caused the alleged constitutional violation.

See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); Natale v. Camden Cnty.

Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 583-84 (3d Cir. 2003). The plaintiff “must identify [the] custom or

5 Santiago does not specify whom the City failed to train or supervise, however the Court

infers that his claim is based on the underlying actions of Judge Ribner and ADA Desiderio since

no other individual is mentioned in the Complaint.

policy, and specify what exactly that custom or policy was” to satisfy the pleading standard.

McTernan v. City of York, 564 F.3d 636, 658 (3d Cir. 2009). Liability based on a custom rather

than a formal adopted policy proceeds on the theory that the relevant practice is so widespread as

to have the force of law. Board of County Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997). It is

not enough, however, to allege the existence of a policy or custom. “A plaintiff must also allege

that the policy or custom was the ‘proximate cause’ of his injuries.” Estate of Roman v. City of

Newark, 914 F.3d 789, 798 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1213 (3d Cir.

1996)). This can be done “by demonstrating an ‘affirmative link’ between the policy or custom

and the particular constitutional violation” alleged. Id. Allegations that simply paraphrase the

standard for municipal liability are too vague and generalized to support a Monell claim. See,

e.g., Szerensci v. Shimshock, No. 20-1296, 2021 WL 4480172, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2021)

(“Plaintiffs’ conclusory allegation, which generally paraphrases the relevant standard, is

insufficient to state a claim for § 1983 liability under Monell.”) (citing cases). “Where . . . the

policy in question concerns a failure to train or supervise municipal employees, liability under

section 1983 requires a showing that the failure amounts to deliberate indifference’ to the rights

of persons with whom those employees will come into contact.” Carter, 181 F.3d at 357

(quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989)).

To the extent Mr. Santiago alleges the City is vicariously liable for Desiderio’s alleged

misconduct in prosecuting his case, those claims fail because Desiderio was not an employee of

the City. See Bey v. Amoroso, No. 24-1786, 2024 WL 3071065, at *5 (E.D. Pa. June 20, 2024)

(“even construing the Complaint liberally, none of the individual Defendants appears to be an

employee of the City since assistant district attorneys are employees of the Philadelphia District

Attorney’s Office”); Holland v. City of York, No. 24-1501, 2025 WL 1109025, at *4 (M.D. Pa.

Mar. 14, 2025) (“neither Magisterial District Judges nor the District Attorney or the District

Attorney’s Office are employees of the City of York”), report and recommendation adopted,

2025 WL 1106075 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 14, 2025). Rather, he was acting on behalf of the

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania rather than the City in his function as a prosecutor. See

Laughman v. Pennsylvania, No. 05-1033, 2006 WL 709222, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 17, 2006)

(“When a District Attorney is making prosecutorial decisions, he is serving in the role of a state

actor and the county where his office is located is not liable for his prosecutorial decisions,”); see

also, e.g., Tavenner v. Shaffer, No. 08-1089, 2008 WL 4861982, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 6, 2008)

(holding that where an ADA is acting in a “completely prosecutorial” capacity in prosecuting the

plaintiff, his alleged misconduct cannot “represent the policy of York County such that the

county can be held vicariously liable under § 1983”); Barnes v. City of York, No. 10-1684, 2011

WL 1398399, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 24, 2011) (“Examining the particular job functions of a

district attorney, a district attorney’s actions in prosecuting a criminal case are a function of the

state for purposes of municipal liability.”), report and recommendation adopted, No. 10-1684,

2011 WL 1396834 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 13, 2011). Judge Ribner was also not an employee of the City

since, as a member of the Common Pleas Court, he was an employee of the Commonwealth.

See, e.g., Quisenberry v. Ridge, No. 20-1824, 2021 WL 4340549, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 23,

2021) (“Quisenberry’s Monell claim against the County is tied to the conduct of Mr. Ridge and

Judge Emery—who are, again, Commonwealth employees”); Watson v. Kameen, No. 15-1060,

2015 WL 7068133, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 15, 2015) (dismissing Monell claim against the county

arising from judge’s actions in underlying custody proceedings). report and recommendation

adopted, 2015 WL 7016503 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 12, 2015). For the same reasons, Santiago’s

custom-based claims, alleging that the City had a “pattern or practice of failing to disclose

exculpatory and impeachment evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland,” and “[a] culture that

rewarded high conviction rates and tolerated the use of unreliable witnesses, coerced testimony,

and after-the-fact rationalizations of legal theories,” (Compl. ¶ 64), are not plausible because

they are based on the DAO exercising its prosecutorial functions on behalf of the

Commonwealth.6 Santiago’s failure to supervise claims against the City are likewise not

plausible because he does not allege any underlying misconduct by a City employee.

In any event, Mr. Santiago does not allege any facts suggesting that at the time of his

trial some policymaker was “on actual or constructive notice” of any deficiency in Desiderio’s

training or supervision that was causing the violation of citizens’ constitutional rights, as

required to allege the deliberate indifference required for a plausible claim. See Connick v.

Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011); see also Washington v. City of Philadelphia, No. 11-3275,

2012 WL 85480, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 11, 2012) (“Plaintiff’s failure to train claim also must fail

because he alleges no facts to show deliberate indifference. He does not plead any fact to

suggest a ‘pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees.’ Plaintiff merely

refers to ‘other’ aggrieved parties in the most abstract, conclusory terms.”). Santiago alleges

vaguely that “[f]ormer ADA Desiderio has been named in multiple civil rights lawsuits alleging

Brady violations, use of lying informants, fabrication of evidence, and wrongful convictions.”

(Compl. ¶ 57.) He does not, however, allege any facts to suggest these lawsuits or any other

incident placed officials on notice of the need for further training or supervision of Judge Ribner

6 Moreover, other than asserting the existence of these alleged customs, Santiago does not

allege any facts describing these customs or indicating that they were “so widespread as to have

the force of law.” Board of County Comm’rs, 520 U.S. at 404; see also Lang v. Schouppe, No.

24-1194, 2025 WL 1747077, at *5 (W.D. Pa. May 19, 2025) (dismissing Monell claims where

plaintiff “does not allege facts to establish a custom so widespread ‘as to have the force of law.’

In fact, he provides no factual basis for or describing these supposed customs or practices at

all.”), report and recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 1746670 (W.D. Pa. June 24, 2025).

or ADA Desiderio prior to Santiago’s trial concerning disclosing conflicts of interest, waiving

jury trial rights, the rules of evidence, or the need to advise a defendant of the use of a transferred

intent theory of liability.

B. State Law Claims

Because the Court has dismissed Santiago’s federal claims, the Court will not exercise

supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) over any state law claims. Accordingly, the

only independent basis for jurisdiction over any such claims is 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), which grants

a district court jurisdiction over a case in which “the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or

value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between . . . citizens of different States.”

Section 1332(a) requires “‘complete diversity between all plaintiffs and all defendants,’

even though only minimal diversity is constitutionally required. This means that, unless there is

some other basis for jurisdiction, ‘no plaintiff [may] be a citizen of the same state as any

defendant.’” Lincoln Ben. Life Co., 800 F.3d at 104 (quoting Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546

U.S. 81, 89 (2005) and Zambelli Fireworks Mfg. Co. v. Wood, 592 F.3d 412, 419 (3d Cir. 2010)

(internal footnotes omitted)). An individual is a citizen of the state where he is domiciled,

meaning the state where he is physically present and intends to remain. See Washington v.

Hovensa LLC, 652 F.3d 340, 344 (3d Cir. 2011). It is the plaintiff's burden to establish diversity

of citizenship, see Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U.S. 66, 72 (1939); Quaker State Dyeing & Finishing Co.,

Inc. v. ITT Terryphone Corp., 461 F.2d 1140, 1143 (3d Cir. 1972) (stating that, in diversity

cases, the plaintiff must demonstrate complete diversity between the parties and that the amount

in controversy requirement has been met); Jackson v. Rosen, No. 20-2842, 2020 WL 3498131, at

*8 (E.D. Pa. June 26, 2020).

Mr. Santiago does not allege the citizenship of the parties, however he provides a

Philadelphia residential address for himself and asserts that “all Defendants reside in, or are

deemed to reside in, [the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.]” (Compl. ¶¶ 17-18.) He thus

appears to allege that he and all of the Defendants are Pennsylvania citizens. Accordingly,

Santiago has not sufficiently alleged that the parties are diverse for purposes of establishing the

Court’s jurisdiction over any state law claims he intends to pursue.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Santiago leave to proceed in forma

pauperis and dismiss the Complaint. His federal claims will be dismissed with prejudice

because amendment would be futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108

(3d Cir. 2002) (stating that complaints dismissed under the Prison Litigation Reform Act should

be with leave to amend “unless amendment would be inequitable or futile”). His state law

claims will be dismissed without prejudice, so Mr. Santiago can file these claims in the

appropriate court if he chooses to do so. The Court expresses no opinion on the merits of any

such lawsuit. An Order follows, which dismisses this case.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Gerald Austin McHugh

GERALD A. MCHUGH, J.