Larrabee-Barrett

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

__________________________________________________________________

Bertena L.,1

Plaintiff,

v. 3:25-CV-65

(MJK)

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

__________________________________________________________________

Peter A. Gorton, Esq., for Bertena L.

Vernon Norwood, Special Asst. U.S. Attorney, for Defendant

Mitchell J. Katz, U.S. Magistrate Judge

MEMORANDUM-DECISION and ORDER

Bertena L. brought this action under the Social Security Act (42

U.S.C. § 405(g)) seeking judicial review of the Social Security

Commissioner’s final decision denying her application for benefits. (Dkt.

1). Bertena L. consented to the jurisdiction of a Magistrate Judge. (Dkt.

5). Both parties filed briefs (Dkts. 7, 8, 9), which the Court treats as

1 In accordance with guidance from the Committee on Court Administration and

Case Management of the Judicial Conference of the United States, which was

adopted by the Northern District of New York in June 2018 to better protect

personal and medical information of non-governmental parties, this Memorandum-

Decision and Order will identify the plaintiff using only his first name and last

initial.

1

motions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c), in accordance with General Order

18.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On June 10, 2022, Bertena L. filed an application for Disability

Insurance Benefits (“DIB”), alleging disability beginning on January 10,

2019 (T. 18).2 Her application was initially denied on September 23,

2022, and upon reconsideration on April 25, 2023. (Id.). On December

14, 2023, Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Paul Goodale held a

virtual hearing during which Bertena L. and Vocational Expert (“VE”)

Francesco Fazzolari testified. (T. 37-95). On April 3, 2024, ALJ Goodale

issued a decision denying Bertena L. benefits. (T. 29). This became the

agency’s final decision after the Appeals Council denied Bertena L.’s

request for review. (T. 1-3).

II. GENERALLY APPLICABLE LAW

A. Disability Standards

To be considered disabled, a claimant seeking Title II benefits

must establish that they are “unable to engage in any substantial

2 All page references are to the Administrative Transcript (“T.”), and not the page

numbers assigned by the CM/ECF pagination system. All other page references are

to the numbers assigned by the CM/ECF pagination system.

2

gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or

mental impairment which can be expected to result in death, or which

has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less

than twelve months . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). Additionally, the

claimant must show:

physical or mental impairment or impairments [must be] of

such severity that they are not only unable to do their

previous work but cannot, considering their age, education,

and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial

gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless

of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which

they live, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for them, or

whether they would be hired if they applied for work.

42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B) (cleaned up).

The Commissioner uses a five-step process, set forth in 20 C.F.R. §

404.1520 (for DIB) to evaluate disability claims:

First, the [Commissioner] considers whether the claimant is

currently engaged in substantial gainful activity. If [they are]

not, the [Commissioner] next considers whether the claimant

has a “severe impairment” which significantly limits [their]

physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. If the

claimant suffers such an impairment, the third inquiry is

whether, based solely on medical evidence, the claimant has

an impairment which meets or equals the criteria of an

impairment listed in Appendix 1 of the regulations. If the

claimant has such an impairment, the [Commissioner] will

consider [them] disabled without considering vocational

factors such as age, education, and work experience . . . .

Assuming the claimant does not have a listed impairment, the

fourth inquiry is whether, despite the claimant’s severe

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impairment, [they have] the residual functional capacity to

perform [their] past work. Finally, if the claimant is unable to

perform [their] past work, the [Commissioner] then

determines whether there is other work which the claimant

can perform.

Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir. 1982) (per curiam); see

also Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 77 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Berry,

675 F.2d at 467). The claimant has the burden of establishing disability

at the first four steps. Berry, 675 F.2d at 467. If the claimant

establishes that their impairments prevent them from performing their

past work, then the burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove the fifth

and final step. Id.

B. Scope of Review

When reviewing a final decision of the Commissioner, courts must

determine whether the correct legal standards were applied and

whether substantial evidence supported the decision. Id. at 417; see also

Brault v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’r, 683 F.3d 443, 448 (2d Cir. 2012); 42

U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”

Talavera v. Astrue, 697 F.3d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 2012). It is “more than a

scintilla” of evidence scattered throughout the administrative record.

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Id. But this standard is a very deferential standard of review “—even

more so than the ‘clearly erroneous standard.’” Brault, 683 F.3d at 448.

“To determine on appeal whether an ALJ’s findings are supported by

substantial evidence, reviewing courts consider the whole record,

examining the evidence from both sides, because an analysis of the

substantiality of the evidence must also include that which detracts

from its weight.” Williams ex rel. Williams v. Bowen, 859 F.2d 255, 258

(2d Cir. 1988). Even so, reviewing courts may not substitute their

interpretation of the administrative record for that of the Commissioner

if the record contains substantial support for the ALJ’s decision. Id.; see

also Rutherford v. Schweiker, 685 F.2d 60, 62 (2d Cir. 1982).

ALJs need not explicitly analyze every piece of conflicting evidence in

the record. See Mongeur v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1033, 1040 (2d Cir. 1983);

see also Miles v. Harris, 645 F.2d 122, 124 (2d Cir. 1981) (“[W]e are

unwilling to require an ALJ explicitly to reconcile every conflicting

shred of medical testimony[.]”). But they cannot “‘pick and choose’

evidence in the record that supports [their] conclusions.” Cruz v.

Barnhart, 343 F. Supp. 2d 218, 224 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); see also Fuller v.

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Astrue, No. 09-CV-6279, 2010 WL 5072112, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 6,

2010).

III. FACTS

The record includes Bertena L.’s medical treatment records which

the parties are familiar with. The Court will refer to the pertinent

records and Bertena L.’s hearing testimony in its analysis as

appropriate.

IV. THE ALJ’S DECISION

At step one of the five-step sequential evaluation, ALJ Goodale

determined that Bertena L. had not engaged in substantial gainful

activity since January 10, 2019, the alleged onset date. (T. 21).

At step two, ALJ Goodale found that Bertena L. had the following

severe impairments: right hip disorder, disorder of the lumbar spine,

and obesity. (Id.). ALJ Goodale also found that Bertena L. had the

following non-severe physical impairments: left hip disorder, cervical

spine disorder, TBI, headache disorder, and neuropathy. (Id.).

At step three, ALJ Goodale determined that Bertena L.’s

impairments or combination of impairments did not meet or medically

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equal the severity of one of the listed impairments in Appendix 1 to 20

C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P. (Id.).

Next, ALJ Goodale addressed the “paragraph B” criteria. (T. 21-

22). “To satisfy the paragraph B criteria,” mental impairments “must

result in one extreme limitation or two marked limitations in a broad

area of functioning.” See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, §

12.00(A)(2)(b) (cleaned up). The four broad areas of mental functioning

are: (1) understanding, remembering, or applying information;

(2) interacting with others; (3) maintaining concentration, persistence,

or pace; and (4) adapting and managing oneself. See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404,

subpt. P, app. 1, § 12.00(C). Here, ALJ Goodale found that Bertena L.

did not meet the “paragraph B” criteria because it was determined that

Bertena L. had no limitations in understanding, remembering, or

applying information; no limitations in interacting with others; and

only mild limitations in concentrating, persisting, maintaining pace,

and adapting or managing herself. (T. 21-22).

Next, ALJ Goodale determined that Bertena L. had the residual

functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform:

light work, but with the following limitations: she could

occasionally stoop, crouch, crawl and kneel, occasionally

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balance per the Selected Characteristics of Occupations; she

could occasionally climb ramps and stairs, but could not climb

ladders, ropes or scaffolds. Bertena L. needed to avoid

concentrated exposure to workplace hazards such as

dangerous machinery (excluding passenger motor vehicles),

and unprotected heights. Bertena L. could not do production

rate work such as assembly line type work . . . but could do

individual table/bench work.

(T. 23) (cleaned up).

When crafting the RFC, ALJ Goodale stated that he considered all

Bertena L.’s symptoms, and the extent to which those symptoms could

“reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical

evidence and other evidence[.]” (Id.). ALJ Goodale added that he fully

considered “the medical opinion(s) and prior administrative medical

finding(s)” as required by 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c. (Id.).

At step four, ALJ Goodale found that Bertena L. could perform

past relevant work as an inventory clerk. (T. 28).

Accordingly, at step five, ALJ Goodale determined that Bertena L.

was not disabled, as defined in the Social Security Act, from the onset

date to the date last insured. (T. 29).

V. ISSUES IN CONTENTION

At base, Bertena L. appears to argue that ALJ Goodale did not

support his RFC determination with substantial evidence. To support

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her argument, Bertena L. alleges that ALJ Goodale failed to consider

medical evidence produced after her date last insured (“DLI”)—evidence

that allegedly would have required further limitations due to her right

hip impairments. (Bertena L.’s Brief (Pl. Br.), pg. 7 (Dkt. 7)). (Bertena

L.’s Reply Brief (“Rep. Br.”), pgs. 1-2 (Dkt. 9)). Bertena L. also alleges

that ALJ Goodale improperly evaluated medical opinions from state

agency examiner Dr. Vazquez-Gonzalez and treating provider PA Webb.

Id.

The Commissioner responds that ALJ Goodale’s opinion was

supported by substantial evidence. (Defendant’s Brief (“Def. Br.), pgs.

5–15 (Dkt. 8). The Court agrees with the Commissioner and declines to

disturb ALJ Goodale’s decision.

VI. DISCUSSION

The Court affirms ALJ Goodale for two reasons. First, ALJ

Goodale properly considered post-DLI evidence to support his opinion.

And second, ALJ Goodale properly analyzed the medical opinions from

Dr. Vazquez-Gonzalez and PA Webb. In consequence, the Court affirms

ALJ Goodale’s decision.

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A. ALJ Goodale properly evaluated post-DLI evidence.

ALJ Goodale properly evaluated the post-DLI evidence. To start, a

Title II period of disability does not begin after a claimant’s DLI status

has expired. See Woods v. Colvin, 218 F. Supp. 3d 204, 207 (W.D.N.Y.

Nov. 3, 2016)). The claimant is required to establish a disability prior to

their DLI. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A) (incorporated by 42 U.S.C. §

1382c(a)(3)(H)(i)). And the disability must result from a medically

determinable impairment that has lasted, or is expected to last, for a

continuous period of not less than twelve months. Id. § 423(d)(1)(A).

Bertena L.’s alleged onset date was January 10, 2019, and her

DLI was March 19, 2019. (T. 18-19). Thus, the time at issue in this case

is a very narrow period between the alleged onset date and the DLI.

Even so, ALJ Goodale cannot automatically discount evidence created

outside of the three-month timeframe. See Arnone v. Bowen, 882 F.2d

34, 39 (2d Cir. 1989). Said differently, “Medical opinions given after the

date that [plaintiff's] insured status expired are taken into

consideration if such opinions are relevant to [plaintiff's] condition prior

to that date. The expiration date should not act as a cutoff with regard

to the reports considered on this specific issue.” Dailey v. Barnhart, 277

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F. Supp. 2d 226, 233 n.14 (W.D.N.Y. 2003) (citation omitted). This is so

because “evidence bearing upon [a plaintiff’s] condition subsequent to

the date upon which the earning requirement [i.e., insured status] was

last met is pertinent evidence in that it may disclose the severity and

continuity of impairments existing before the earning requirement date

or may identify additional impairments which could reasonably be

presumed to have been present . . . .” Pollard v. Halter, 377 F.3d 183,

193-94 (2d Cir. 2004) (quotations omitted and alterations in the

original). When an ALJ fails to consider post-DLI evidence that could

reflect the severity and continuity of impairments that existed before

the DLI, remand is warranted. See id. at 194-95 (reversing and

remanding because neither the ALJ nor the district court considered

post-DLI evidence).

In DIB cases, “evidence that an impairment reached disabling

severity only after a claimant’s DLI cannot be the basis for a

determination of entitlement to disability insurance benefits, even if the

impairment may have existed before the claimant’s DLI and

subsequently worsened.” Burch v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 15-CV-9350,

2017 WL 1184294, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2017). Instead, a claimant is

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only entitled to benefits if they establish that their conditions reached

disabling severity on or before the DLI. See Arnone v. Bowen, 882 F.2d

34, 37-38 (2d Cir. 1989).

Bertena L. argues that post-DLI evidence shows that her hip

condition was “a severe impairment that existed before the DLI,” and

“that the severe impairment lasted 12 months.” (Pl.’s Br. At 9). And

thus, she argues, it was error for ALJ Goodale not to consider post-DLI

evidence. First, ALJ Goodale did consider post-DLI evidence. She

argues that ALJ Goodale only analyzed a single piece of imaging from

post-DLI evidence of record—but this is not so. See (Pl. Br., pgs. 10, 12).

ALJ Goodale analyzed an MRI taken two months post-DLI which

showed “status post total right hip arthoplasty with no right thing

hematoma.” (T. 25). ALJ Goodale also rejected (and therefore must have

considered) a medical opinion from Bertena L.’s treating provider Dr.

Renzi, which was given one year after the DLI. (T. 27). In fact, ALJ

Goodale rejected Dr. Renzi’s opinion partly because he opined that

Bertena L. had no limitations. (T. 10). ALJ Goodale reasoned that Dr.

Renzi’s opining no work-related limitations did not square with Bertena

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L.’s right hip disorder “as documented by imaging studies and physical

examinations.” (Id.).

Second, the post-DLI evidence confirmed ALJ Goodale’s findings

of a severe medical impairment that was not disabling during the

relevant period. ALJ Goodale found Bertena L.’s right hip condition

severe, but he did not find it disabling. (T. 21). And in this case, it was

not enough for Bertena L. to show that she had a severe impairment,

that had lasted or could be expected to last over twelve months; she

needed to show that her severe impairment rendered her disabled on or

before the DLI. See McIntyre v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 146, 151 (2d Cir. 2014)

(explaining that finding an impairment “severe,” but not disabling, is

permissible because “the standard for a finding of severity under [s]tep

[t]wo of the sequential analysis is de minimis and is intended only to

screen out the very weakest cases.”). Bertena L. has not done so.

In any event, ALJ Goodale considered sufficient evidence from the

medical records pre and post-DLI to craft an RFC determination that

fits within the narrow window applicable to Bertena L.’s application.

See e.g. (T. 25-27). Bertena L. claims that ALJ Goodale should have

provided restrictions that would have precluded her from light work due

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to her right hip condition. See (Pl. Br., pgs. 12-15). Yet ALJ Goodale

specifically accounted for Bertena L.’s continued right hip pain by

restricting her to no assembly line type work—and by rejecting Dr.

Renzi’s opinion. (T. 23, 26-27). Altogether, Bertena L.’s arguments

about post-DLI evidence do not help her because she has not shown that

her right hip disorder rendered her disabled before or on the DLI.

Again, “[i]t is the disability, and not just the impairment, that must

have existed before the person’s insured status expired.” Arnone, 882

F.2d at 38. And although “medical evidence generated after an ALJ’s

decision cannot be deemed irrelevant solely because of timing,”

Williams, 236 F. App’x at 644 (cleaned up), ALJ Goodale did not reject

post-DLI evidence solely on timing in this case. In the end, the Court

finds ALJ Goodale’s decision supported by substantial evidence.

B. ALJ Goodale properly evaluated the medical opinions

of Dr. Vazquez-Gonzalez and PA Webb.

ALJ Goodale properly evaluated the medical opinions of Dr.

Vazquez-Gonzalez and PA Webb. When evaluating medical opinion

evidence, ALJs’ must consider all medical opinions and “evaluate their

persuasiveness” under a five-factor framework. The five factors are:

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(1) supportability, (2) consistency, (3) relationship with the claimant

(which has five sub-factors to consider), (4) specialization, and (5) other

factors. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a)-(c). The two “most important factors

for determining the persuasiveness of medical opinions are consistency

and supportability.” Lisa J.H. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 5:24-CV-01247,

2025 WL 3669633, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2025).

“Supportability” is an internal check: “The more relevant the

objective medical evidence and supporting explanations presented by a

medical source are to support his or her medical opinion(s) or prior

administrative medical finding(s), the more persuasive the medical

opinions or prior administrative medical finding(s) will be.” 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1520c(c)(1), 416.920c(c)(1). “Consistency” is an external check: “The

more consistent a medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical

finding(s) is with the evidence from other medical sources and

nonmedical sources in the claim, the more persuasive the medical

opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s) will be.” 20 C.F.R. §

404.1520c(c)(2), § 416.920c(c)(2). ALJs’ must explicitly state how they

considered both factors. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(b)(2), 416.920c(b)(2).

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ALJ Goodale properly analyzed the supportability and

consistency of Dr. Vazquez-Gonzalez’s opinion. To begin, Dr. Vazquez-

Gonzalez based his opinion on evidence from the adjudicative time

period—January 10, 2019 to March 31, 2019. (T. 112). He specifically

focused on a treating session that Bertena L. had on March 28, 2019.

(Id.). Dr. Vazquez-Gonzalez opined that Bertena L. could occasionally

lift or carry 20 pounds and frequently lift or carry 10 pounds. (T. 111).

Dr. Vazquez-Gonzalez also opined that Bertena L. could stand, walk, or

sit (with normal breaks) for “about 6 hours in an 8-hour workday.” (Id.)

(cleaned up). He based his opinions on treatment records from March

25, 2019, and March 28, 2019. (Id.). Dr. Vazquez-Gonzalez ultimately

determined that Bertena L. could perform her past relevant work. (T.

113).

ALJ Goodale properly found that Dr. Vazquez-Gonzalez’s opinion

was supported by substantial evidence. When analyzing the

supportability of Dr. Vazquez-Gonzalez’s opinion, ALJ Goodale

reasoned that Dr. Vazquez-Gonazlez supported his review by the

medical evidence from the period under adjudication, and that the

medical evidence offered post-DLI did not show a significant worsening

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during the period at issue. (T. 26). ALJ Goodale also noted that Dr.

Vazquez-Gonazlez “provided extensive rational in support of his

opinion, citing to specific evidence of record, and resolving

inconsistencies in the record.” (T. 26-27). Although ALJ Goodale’s

supportability analysis could have been clearer, he referred to his

previous analysis of the medical evidence, and “courts have regularly

held that an ALJ has sufficiently articulated his reasoning regarding

supportability and consistency where they directly refer back to a

thorough discussion of the record evidence that immediately precedes

his analysis of the medical opinion evidence.” Adam R. T. v. Comm’r of

Soc. Sec., No. 5:21-CV-1170 (FJS/ATB), 2023 WL 1775689, at *4

(N.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2023) (cleaned up). And so, ALJ Goodale properly

analyzed and found Dr. Vazquez-Gonzalez’s opinion supported.

ALJ Goodale properly found Dr. Vazquez-Gonzalez’s opinion

consistent with other medical evidence of record. When analyzing the

consistency of Dr. Vazquez-Gonzalez’s opinion, ALJ Goodale reasoned

that it was “consistent with the relatively minimal abnormalities

note[d] on physical examinations and imaging studies . . . [and] the

noted improvement with treatment during the period at issue.” (T. 27).

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To the extent that Bertena L. suggests that Dr. Vazquez-Gonzalez’s

opinion is “grossly inconsistent” with the remainder of the record, she is

mistaken. (Pl. Br., pg. 17). Dr. Vazquez-Gonzalez found that Bertena L.

retains full muscle strength and presents with a normal gait. (T. 112).

Likewise, Dr. McConn found that Bertena L. possessed full muscle

strength, sensation, and range of motion in her arms and legs. See (T.

798-99). Dr. Stuelke observed that Bertena L. had no abnormalities and

that she presented with a normal gait. (T. 1407). And Michael Fritzen,

PT, noted that Bertena L. gait is “much better” when she is not under

observation. (T. 1410). Moreover, Dr. Vazquez-Gonzalez’s opined

limitations are consistent, and in some cases more generous, than other

medical professionals in the record. For example, Dr. Vazquez-Gonzalez

found that Bertena L. could not sit, stand, or walk for more than 6

hours per 8-hour workday. (T. 111). Dr. Wulff, by contrast, did not limit

Bertena L.’s ability to ambulate. See e.g., (T. 825-26, 828).

In addition, ALJ Goodale found that Dr. Vazquez-Gonzalez is an

expert in social security claims, that he provided “extensive rationale”

to support his opinion, that his opined limitation were consistent with

the record, and that his opinion was consistent with the relatively

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minimal abnormalities noted on Bertena L.’s physical examinations and

imaging. (T. 26-27). This language is sufficient to support ALJ Goodale’s

consistency analysis of Dr. Vazquez-Gonzalez’s opinion. See Justin S. v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 5:20-CV-1575 (ATB), 2022 WL 306445, at *10

(N.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2022) (holding that the ALJ properly gave persuasive

value to a mental health medical opinion by noting it was supported

with detailed explanation, was consistent with the record as a whole,

and by noting the doctor was a mental health expert well versed in

agency standards and evidentiary requirements). Further, Bertena L.

argues that ALJ Goodale improperly referred to Dr. Vazquez-Gonzalez

as “expert,” but that is simply not so. (Pl. Br., pg. 16). ALJs’ are

entitled to rely on opinions from both examining and non-examining

State agency medical consultants because these consultants are

qualified experts in the field of Social Security disability. See Frye ex rel.

A.O. v. Astrue, 485 F. App’x 484, 487 (2d Cir. 2012) (summary order)

(explaining that “[t]he report of a [s]tate agency medical consultant

constitutes expert opinion evidence which can be given weight if

supported by medical evidence in the record.”). And ALJ Goodale was

entitled to rely on Dr. Vazquez-Gonzalez’s opinion in this case. At

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bottom, ALJ Goodale properly analyzed the supportability and

consistency of Dr. Vazquez-Gonzalez’s opinion.

ALJ Goodale also properly analyzed the supportability and

consistency of PA Webb’s medical opinion. Bertena L. argues that ALJ

Goodale impermissibly rejected PA Webb’s opinion because it was

provided in check-box form. (Pl. Br. at 18). While true that a medical

opinion cannot “be discounted . . . based on the naked fact that it was

provided in a check-box form,” Colgan v. Kijakazi, 22 F.4th 353, 361 (2d

Cir. 2021), it may be discounted if it is not “supported by substantial

evidence.” Schillo v. Saul, 31 F.4th 64, 77 (2d Cir. 2022); see also

Halloran v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 28, 31 n.2 (2d Cir. 2004) (stating that a

standardized form without accompanying explanation is “only

marginally useful for purposes of creating a meaningful and reviewable

factual record”).

Here, ALJ Goodale rejected PA Webb’s opinion not because it was

provided on a checkbox form, but because it was unsupported by “any

significant narrative explanation, rational, or description of clinical or

diagnostic findings in support of the extreme limitations she assessed.”

(T. 27); see also Robert O. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:20-CV-1612

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(TWD), 2022 WL 593554, at *13 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2022) (holding that

the ALJ did not err in concluding medical opinions on check-box forms

lacked supporting explanations “or references to specific clinical or

diagnostic findings to support the proposed limitations.”) (cleaned up).

ALJ Goodale further clarified that PA Webb’s opinion was unsupported

by physical and mental status examinations that she herself conducted

during the time under adjudication. (T. 27) (citing (T. 1732, 1735)).

ALJ Goodale properly assessed the consistency of PA Webb’s

opinion. For consistency, ALJs’ “must look outside the medical opinion

itself to evidence from other medical sources and nonmedical sources in

the claim and will find the medical opinion more persuasive the more

consistent it is with these external sources.” Kathleen A. v. Comm’r of

the SSA, No. 3:20-CV-1034, 2022 WL 673824, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 7,

2022) (cleaned up). That is precisely what ALJ Goodale did. ALJ

Goodale noted that PA Webb’s opined limitations were inconsistent

with imaging studies that showed minimal abnormalities. (T. 27); see

e.g., (T. 1531-33, 1538, 1546-48). ALJ Goodale also noted that PA

Webb’s assessed limitations were inconsistent with relatively minimal

physical abnormalities assessed. (Id.); see e.g., (T. 111-12, 798-99, 1407,

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1732, 1735). ALJ Goodale acknowledged that the record showed

improvements in Bertena L.’s conditions and that PA Webb’s opinion

was inconsistent with Dr. Vazquez-Gonzalez’s opinion. (T. 27); see e.g.,

(T. 111-12, 798-99, 1407, 1732, 1735).

Further, and despite Bertena L.’s argument, ALJ Goodale

correctly declined to impose the additional time-off task and

absenteeism limitations that PA Webb recommended. Bertena L.

argues that PA Webb’s “undisputed medical opinion” shows that her

physical and mental impairments would cause her to exceed employer

tolerances for time-off task and absenteeism (Pl. Br., pg. 20). The Court

disagrees.

When an ALJ’s RFC finding conflicts with a medical opinion, the

ALJ must explain why the conflicting opinion was not adopted. See SSR

96-8P, 1996 SSR LEXIS 5 (S.S.A. July 2, 1996) (“The RFC assessment

must always consider and address medical source opinions. If the RFC

assessment conflicts with an opinion from a medical source, the

adjudicator must explain why the opinion was not adopted.”). And

although an ALJ need not reconcile every conflicting shred of evidence,

they cannot selectively choose evidence that supports their conclusions.

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See Williams v. Colvin, No. 13-roncv-5431 (RLE), 2015 WL 1223789, at

*8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2015) (cleaned up); see also Balsamo v. Chater,

142 F.3d 75, 81 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that an ALJ may not “arbitrarily

substitute his own judgment for competent medical opinion”).

In rejecting PA Webb’s opined limitations, ALJ Goodale compared

PA Webb’s opinion with Dr. Vaquez-Gonzalez’s and explained why he

declined to adopt the limitations that Bertena L. now requests. See e.g.,

(T. 26–27). ALJ Goodale specifically noted that PA Webb’s opined

limitations were inconsistent with those offered by Dr. Vazquez-

Gonzalez—whose opinion he found more persuasive. (T. 27). What’s

more, ALJ Goodale noted that PA Webb’s “extreme limitations” were

inconsistent “with [the] relatively minimal abnormalities noted on

imaging studies.” (Id.). In regard to time-off task and absenteeism

limitations, the Court ultimately finds that Bertena L.’s arguments

amount to mere disagreement with how ALJ Goodale weighed evidence.

But disagreement is not enough to overturn an ALJ’s decision. See Lisa

M. ex rel. J.S. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:21-CV-00292 EAW, 2023 WL

3943997, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. June 12, 2023) (“A disagreement with how the

ALJ weighed the evidence is not a valid basis to challenge the ALJ's

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determination.”). In sum, ALJ Goodale properly analyzed and rejected

PA Webb’s opinion.

* * *

The Court finds that ALJ Goodale properly evaluated the medical

opinions offered by Dr. Vazquez-Gonzalez and PA Webb. Although

Bertena L. disagrees with ALJ Goodale’s assessment, the question is

not whether substantial evidence supports Bertena L.’s views; “rather,

[the Court] must decide whether substantial evidence supports the

ALJ’s decision.” Bonet ex rel. T.B. v. Colvin, 523 F. App’x 58, 59 (2d Cir.

2013). Bertena L.’s disagreement with ALJ Goodale’s RFC is not a basis

for remand. See Wilson o/b/o J.J.W. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:19-

CV-737-DB, 2020 WL 3447800, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. June 24, 2020) (“[M]ere

disagreement with the ALJ's findings does not warrant remand.”). And

so, the Court will not disturb ALJ Goodale’s evaluation of Dr. Vazquez-

Gonzalez’s and PA Webb’s opinions.

* * *

Taken together, Bertena L.’s arguments are unavailing. ALJ

Goodale properly considered post-DLI evidence and properly evaluated

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medical opinions from Dr. Vazquez-Gonzalez and PA Webb. In

consequence, the Court affirms ALJ Goodale’s decision.

VII. CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, based on the findings above, it is

ORDERED, that Bertena L.’s motion for judgment on the

pleadings (Dkt. 7, 9) be DENIED; and it is further

ORDERED, that the Commissioner’s motion for judgment on the

pleadings (Dkt. 8) be GRANTED; and it is further

ORDERED, that the ALJ’s decision be AFFIRMED.

Dated: March 17, 2026.

U.S. Magistrate Judge

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