Moyers

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

SHAUN MOYERS CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 24-974

W. STOWE ET AL. SECTION: P (2)

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court is a motion for summary judgment1 filed by Defendants, Plaquemines

Parish Sheriff, Gerald A. Turlich, Jr., Plaquemines Parish Sheriff’s Officer Willie Stowe, and

Plaquemines Parish Sheriff’s Officer John Wigstrom. Plaintiff, Shaun Moyers, filed an

opposition2 to the motion. And Defendants filed a reply.3 For the reasons that follow, IT IS

ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Facts4

1 R. Doc. 17.

2 R. Doc. 19.

3 R. Doc. 23.

4 This section of the Court’s opinion sets forth facts the Court finds are not in dispute. If there is an arguable dispute,

the Court finds the dispute is not “genuine.” Under Rule 56.1 of the Local Civil Rules for this Court, “[e]very motion

for summary judgment must be accompanied by a separate and concise statement of the material facts which the

moving party contends present no genuine issue.” Under Local Rule 56.2, “[a]ny opposition to a motion for summary

judgment must include a separate and concise statement of the material facts which the opponent contends present a

genuine issue.” According to Rule 56.2, “[a]ll material facts in the moving party’s statement will be deemed admitted,

for purposes of the motion, unless controverted in the opponent’s statement.” In support of their motion for summary

judgment, Defendants submitted a roughly seven-page narrative of what they contend are the undisputed material

facts. Defendants cite to statements made in Moyers’s complaint and deposition testimony and to the video evidence.

R. Doc. 17-2. In response, Moyers submitted a list of eight issues in a “Statement of Material Facts at Issue.” But in

numerous instances, Moyers failed to directly address Defendants’ contentions, as the Local Rules require.

Consequently, Moyers has failed to controvert many of Defendants’ statements. Of the issues Moyers did address,

some of the items identified by Moyers are not “material,” i.e., legally significant, (numbers 1, 5, 6); at least one is

not a fact question (number 8); and others (numbers 2, 3, 4, 6, 7) are belied by the video evidence, the complaint itself,

or Moyers’s own deposition testimony. R. Doc. 19-1. For example, based upon the Court’s review of the video

evidence, the officers were courteous to Moyers, but this fact is not necessarily material. Also, because the Court did

not need to consider Moyers’s statements at the hospital to determine whether Defendants violated Moyers’s rights

(and because in some instances Moyers’s summary judgment evidence failed to satisfy his burden after the burden

shifted to him as the non-movant), the Court’s opinion granting summary judgment is not based on anything that

happened after Moyers was taken into custody, thus rendering immaterial, for example, Moyers’s “material fact”

number 5 (“[w]hether it is a material fact that Shaun Moyers advised the nurse this was all his fault and that the

deputies were very professional”). See R. Doc. 19-1. In fairness to Moyers, the Court did not need to consider this

On the evening of July 14, 2023, Plaquemines Parish Sheriff’s officers were dispatched to

Plaintiff Shaun Moyers’s trailer in Belle Chasse, Louisiana. Lieutenant Willie Stowe, Deputy John

Wigstrom, Sergeant Ling, and Deputy Smithey arrived at the trailer park where Moyers was

temporarily residing in response to a call from Moyers’s soon-to-be-ex-wife, Ciji Moyers. Moyers

had reportedly texted Ciji—who was living in Alabama at the time—a photograph of himself with

what appeared to be a gun barrel in his mouth.5 The photo was, reportedly, one message in an

exchange of text messages suggesting Moyers wanted to kill himself. The exchange of messages

included the following messages from Moyers: “I still have my 22 left it will go through the

temple”; “I don’t plan on waking up goodbye beautiful”; and “I’m about to go to sleep and I don’t

plan on waking up again.”6 This was the second time that day that Plaquemines Parish Sheriff’s

officers had gone to Moyers’s trailer in response to a call from Ciji expressing concerns about

Moyers’s suicidal behavior.7

When Deputy Wigstrom and Lieutenant Stowe arrived at the scene, Deputy Wigstrom

informed Moyers of the reason of the call, and Lieutenant Stowe convinced Moyers, who was

wearing only shorts, to step out of his trailer to talk. But when asked if Stowe could search

Moyers’s trailer for weapons, Moyers refused. Moyers also refused to show Stowe his cell phone

or any messages between Moyers and Ciji. When Stowe asked Moyers if he wanted to hurt himself,

Moyers stated that he did not. And when Stowe asked Moyers how much alcohol he had consumed

that day, Moyers stated that he had consumed a half gallon of alcohol.8

evidence to reach its decision on the issues presented in Defendants’ motion. Most facts are taken from the police

report, which Moyers’s attached to his opposition and the video evidence.

5 R. Doc. 1 ¶ 7; R. Doc. 19 at 1–2.

6 The subject photograph and some of the text messages are part of the summary judgment record. R. Doc. 17-6.

7 R. Doc. 19 at 2.

8 R. Doc. 17-4 at 5.

Meanwhile, Sergeant Ling made contact with Ciji via cell phone. Ciji sent Ling the

concerning text messages, including the photograph of Moyers with what appeared to be a gun in

his mouth.9 Ling showed Moyers the photo, but Moyers told Ling it was not him and that he did

not know what was in the mouth of the person in the photo. Moyers also told Ling he did not have

a gun. Ling again asked Moyers what was in Moyers’s mouth. This time, Moyers replied that it

was a broomstick from his bathroom. With Moyers’s permission, Stowe retrieved the broomstick.

The broomstick Stowe retrieved, however, was blue, and the object in the photo was black. This

prompted Ling to question Moyers some more, to which Moyers became agitated. Consequently,

Ling stepped away, and Stowe resumed questioning Moyers. Stowe asked Moyers why he sent the

photo to his wife, and Moyers responded by asking why his wife was cheating on him.10

Deputy Wigstrom then joined the questioning. Wigstrom too asked Moyers what was in

his mouth in the photo and eventually Moyers replied that it was a crowbar. When Wigstrom asked

where the crowbar was located, Moyers replied that it was either in front of the trailer or that he

had thrown it over the fence behind the trailer, but he could not remember. Learning that the object

in the photo might be part of a shop vacuum, the officers asked Moyers if he had a shop vacuum.

Moyers admitted he did and showed Stowe a shop vacuum with the black hard tube that the officers

believed resembled the object in the photograph.11

After admitting to the officers that he had sent the photo, Moyers also admitted that he had

been suspended from work and that he was not happy with the direction of his life. During this

exchange, Moyers, who initially denied having a gun, advised the officers that he did indeed have

9 Id.

10 Id.

11 Id. at 6.

a gun but that it was locked in his truck. After this sequence of events, the officers believed Moyers

posed a danger to himself and decided they were going to bring him to a hospital for observation.12

The officers then approached Moyers, who was leaning over the tailgate of his pickup

truck. Stowe advised Moyers that the officers were going to take Moyers to the hospital and

instructed Moyers to place his hands behind his back. Moyers responded by asking why he was

being taken to jail. The officers assured Moyers they were taking him to the hospital and not to

jail. Stowe and Wigstrom then began trying to handcuff Moyers. Wigstrom was able to place

Moyers’s right wrist in a handcuff when Moyers suddenly exclaimed, “I’m about to f*cking hurt

y’all.” He then forcefully moved away from Stowe and Wigstrom. Moyers’s right wrist remained

in a handcuff, but his left wrist was free so that the other handcuff dangled from his right arm.

Wigstrom tried to pin Moyers against the tailgate of his truck and gain control of Moyers’s hands,

but Wigstrom could not physically restrain Moyers.13

Meanwhile, Stowe, who had been assisting Wigstrom in the attempt to restrain Moyers,

stepped a few feet away from Moyers. Stowe retrieved his taser and shouted, “Don’t make me tase

you.” Wigstrom also moved away from Moyers. The officers thought Moyers was reaching into

the bed of his truck.14 Stowe then fired his taser and struck Moyers on Moyers’s left side. Moyers,

who at the time weighed nearly 300 pounds, was unaffected by the taser. Instead, he stared Stowe

down, ripped the taser probes from his body, and threw the probes towards Stowe. Stowe then

fired his taser a second time. But the second shot, like the first, did not appear to affect Moyers.

Wigstrom, though, fired his taser almost simultaneously with Stowe’s second shot. Wigstrom’s

12 Id. at 5–6.

13 The entire episode involving the officers’ efforts to take Moyers into custody was captured on video by the body

cameras worn by Lieutenant Stowe, Deputy Wigstrom, and Deputy Smithey. This footage is part of the summary

judgment evidence in this case. See R. Doc. 17-7 (referencing Manual Attachment “Exhibit 4”); see also R. Doc. 19-

6 (referencing Manual Attachment “Exhibit E1-3”).

14 The body camera footage worn by Deputy Smithey shows Moyers reaching into the bed of the truck and shows

Wigstrom backing away from Moyers.

shot was successful. Once struck with the probes from Wigstrom’s taser, Moyers screamed,

became incapacitated, and fell to the ground, breaking his left arm in the fall. Ling and Smithey

then placed Moyers in handcuffs. After, the officers removed the taser probes and helped Moyers

to his feet before placing him in the back of Wigstrom’s patrol unit. Emergency Medical Services

personnel then arrived on scene to examine Moyers and cleared him for transport to Ochsner West

Bank Hospital, where Moyers was evaluated and released.15 Moyers subsequently underwent

surgery for his arm.16

B. Relevant Procedural History

On April 18, 2024, Moyers filed this lawsuit against Lieutenant Willie Stowe, Deputy John

Wigstrom, and Sheriff Gerald Turlich, Jr., in Turlich’s personal and official capacities.17 He claims

that Stowe and Wigstrom used excessive force in violation of his constitutional rights and seeks

compensatory and punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, along with attorney’s fees under 42

U.S.C. § 1988.18 Moyers also claims that Stowe and Wigstrom committed “battery, intentional

infliction of emotional distress and fault as those terms are understood in Louisiana tort law.”19

And he claims that Sheriff Turlich “is vicariously liable for the misconduct and fault of his

employees, Lt. Stowe and Deputy Wigstrom[.]”20

15 R. Doc. 17-4 at 6.

16 R. Doc. 17-5 at 4.

17 R. Doc. 1. A Supplemental and Amending Complaint was filed on April 19, 2024. But this complaint only amended

the signature block to correct the office telephone number of Moyers’s counsel. R. Doc. 3.

18 Id. ¶ 22.

19 Id. ¶ 23.

20 Id. ¶ 24.

Defendants answered about two months later.21 Then, in May 2025, Defendants filed the

subject motion for summary judgment.22 There has been adequate time for discovery, and the

motion is ripe for adjudication.23

C. Parties’ Arguments

In their motion, Defendants first contend that there was no constitutional violation. They

assert that Moyers cannot show that he was deprived of the right to be free from excessive force

under either the federal or state constitution.24 Defendants second argue that they are otherwise

entitled to qualified immunity.25 Defendants also assert that Sheriff Turlich cannot be held liable

in his official capacity because there was no underlying constitutional violation, and even if there

was, Moyers failed to show an official policy or practice that permitted the alleged civil rights

violation.26 They argue that Sheriff Turlich cannot be held liable in his individual capacity because

he was not present at the scene and did not participate in the acts giving rise to Moyers’s alleged

damages.27 As to the state law claims, Defendants argue that they are entitled to state statutory

immunity and that Moyers has not pled a cause of action for battery.28 They also contend that

because they are entitled to summary judgment on the § 1983 claim, they are also entitled to

summary judgment on the state law claims.29

In his opposition, Moyers maintains that Defendants improperly and prematurely resorted

to overwhelming physical force, violating his Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive

21 R. Doc. 10.

22 R. Doc. 17.

23 See R. Docs. 12–16.

24 R. Doc. 17-1 at 11–12.

25 Id. at 12–13.

26 Id. at 14–18.

27 Id. at 13–14.

28 Id. at

29 Id. at 21.

force.30 Moyers also contends that Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity on summary

judgment because there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the officers’ conduct

violated his constitutional rights and because the officers’ actions were not objectively reasonable

in light of clearly established law at the time of the conduct in question.31 Because tasing Moyers

was objectively unreasonable, Moyers argues, Defendants are not entitled to state statutory

immunity either.32

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is proper when “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”33 A federal court must view the facts in the

light most favorable to the nonmovant.34 Initially, the movant bears the burden of showing the

absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact,35 but the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to

come forward with specific facts showing there is a genuine dispute for trial.36 A fact is “material”

if proof of its existence or nonexistence would affect the outcome of the lawsuit under the

applicable law in the case.37 A dispute about a material fact is “genuine” if it is one upon which a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party based upon the jury’s resolution of

the particular factual issue.38 When assessing whether a dispute as to any material fact exists, a

30 R. Doc. 19 at 5–9.

31 Id. at 9–12.

32 Id. at 13.

33 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986).

34 Coleman v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 113 F.3d 528, 533 (5th Cir. 1997).

35 Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323.

36 See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87 (1986).

37 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

38 Bodenheimer v. PPG Indus., Inc., 5 F.3d 955, 956 (5th Cir. 1993).

court considers all evidence in the record but refrains from making credibility determinations or

weighing the evidence.39

B. Qualified Immunity

Qualified immunity protects government officials from liability when they violate the law,

but could have reasonably believed they were acting lawfully.40 The qualified immunity doctrine

tries to balance two competing societal interests: (1) the importance of a damages remedy to protect

the rights of citizens and (2) the need for officials to be free from undue influence with their duties

and potentially disabling threats of liability.41 A plaintiff can defeat a qualified immunity defense

by showing “(1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right

was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.”42 When a defendant official moves

for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, the burden shifts to the plaintiff, who

must rebut the defense by establishing a genuine issue of fact as to whether the official’s allegedly

wrongful conduct violated clearly established law.43

Qualified immunity “gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable but

mistaken judgments” and, when properly applied, protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those

who knowingly violate the law.”44 The law in the Fifth Circuit is clear that qualified immunity

represents the norm,45 and federal courts should deny a defendant qualified immunity only

39 Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins., 530 F.3d 395, 398–99 (5th Cir. 2008) (first citing Reeves

v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000); and then citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S.

at 587).

40 Ramirez v. Killian, 113 F.4th 415, 421 (5th Cir. 2024).

41 Id. (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806–07 (1982)).

42 Allen v. Cisneros, 815 F.3d 239, 244 (5th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735

(2011)).

43 Crane v. City of Arlington, Texas, 50 F.4th 453, 461 (5th Cir. 2022) (citations omitted).

44 Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).

45 Romero v. City of Grapevine, Texas, 888 F.3d 170, 176 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 807).

in rare circumstances.46

Because a court must adhere to the axiom that, in ruling on a motion for summary

judgment, the evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed and all justifiable inferences are to be

drawn in his favor,47 this usually means adopting the plaintiff’s version of the facts in the qualified

immunity context.48 But when, like here, there is clear video evidence in the record, the court

should rely on the video evidence, which can be dispositive on a motion for summary judgment.49

Thus, video evidence can override the nonmovant’s version of the facts if it “provides so much

clarity that a reasonable jury could not believe his account.”50

III. LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Section 1983 Excessive Force Claim

Moyers’s § 1983 excessive force claim fails because, under the first prong of the qualified

immunity defense, the officers’ use of the taser was not excessive under the Fourth Amendment.

Even if the use of the taser was found to be excessive, the claim is barred under prong two of the

qualified immunity defense because the officers did not violate any clearly established law when

they tased Moyers.

i. No Constitutional Violation

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects an individual’s right to

be free from unreasonable search and seizure.51 A violation of the Fourth Amendment occurs when

46 Brady v. Fort Bend Cnty., 58 F.3d 173, 173 (5th Cir. 1995), dismissed (Nov. 17, 1995) (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at

807).

47 Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 651 (2014) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)).

48 Joseph ex rel. Estate of Joseph v. Bartlett, 981 F.3d 319, 325 (5th Cir. 2020) (“In qualified immunity cases, which

often involve competing versions of events, we take the plaintiff’s version of the facts, unless that version is blatantly

contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it.” (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted)).

49 Crane v. City of Arlington, Texas, 50 F.4th 453, 461–62 (5th Cir. 2022).

50 Id. at 462.

51 “The right of the people to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable . . . seizures, shall not be violated

. . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394–95 (1989).

a seized person suffers an injury that results directly from a clearly excessive and objectively

unreasonable use of force.52 When determining whether an officer’s use of force was excessive,

federal courts consider three factors (the “Graham factors”): (1) the severity of the suspected

crime; (2) whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officer or others; and

(3) whether the suspect was actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.53 In

conducting this inquiry, a court must consider the totality of the facts and circumstances54 from the

perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.55

Thus, in evaluating excessive force claims, courts are required to look beyond the moment an

officer employs force and should consider how earlier facts and circumstances could affect how a

reasonable officer might perceive and respond to later events.56 In other words, “[t]he history of

the interaction, as well as other past circumstances known to the officer, thus may inform the

reasonableness of the use of force.”57

The U.S. Supreme Court has counseled that “[t]he calculus of reasonableness must

embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second

judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount

of force that is necessary in a particular situation.”58 Accordingly, whether a defendant’s use of

force was excessive or unreasonable is a fact-intensive and case-specific inquiry,59 and it requires

a careful balancing of the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment

interests against the importance of the governmental interests that are alleged to justify the

52 Bartlett, 981 F.3d at 332.

53 Harmon v. City of Arlington, Texas, 16 F.4th 1159, 1163 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396).

54 Barnes v. Felix, 605 U.S.73, 83 (2025).

55 Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20–22 (1968)).

56 Barnes, 605 U.S. at 80.

57 Id. at 80–81.

58 Graham, 490 U.S. at 396–97.

59 Joseph ex rel. Estate of Joseph v. Bartlett, 981 F.3d 319, 332 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Poole v. City of Shreveport,

691 F.3d 624, 628 (5th Cir. 2012)).

intrusion.60

Of the Graham factors, the second and third factors— “whether the suspect posed an

immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others” and “whether the suspect was actively

resisting arrest”—are the most determinative here. The first factor—“the severity of the suspected

crime”—is less illuminating. Moyers was not engaged in a crime, at least when the police initially

arrived on the scene. Accordingly, only the second and third factors will be analyzed.

As the evening progressed, Moyers’s behavior became more unpredictable and steadily

escalated until the moment the officers tased him, ultimately creating a threat to not only the

officers but to himself. In the back-and-forth leading to the tasing, Moyers changed his story

multiple times. For instance, he denied sending the subject photo of himself multiple times before

admitting to sending the photo, and he denied having a gun before admitting to having a gun,

which he alleged was locked in his truck. His behavior then climaxed when—mid arrest—he

suddenly wrestled free from the officer’s grasp and threatened to “f*cking hurt” the officers.

Although he was unarmed, the officers believed he was reaching into the bed of his truck, the

vehicle in which he claimed to have his gun.

And all of this occurred against a backdrop of events and circumstances that only further

intensified the situation: Moyers, a nearly 300-pound man, had admitted to consuming a half gallon

of alcohol when the officers first encountered him; the officers had read text messages expressing

what appeared to be Moyers’s intent to commit suicide; and officers had already been called to

Moyers’s trailer earlier that day for similar behavior. In fact, the reason the officers finally decided

to place Moyers in handcuffs was to transport him to a hospital because they thought he posed a

danger to himself. Thus, Moyers’s volatile state, coupled with his anger, intoxication, and large

60 Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471

U.S. 1, 8 (1985)).

size, created an unpredictable situation where a reasonable officer could have concluded that

Moyers posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officers and even Moyers himself.61 And

therefore the second factor weighs in favor the officers.

Regardless of the first and second factors, however, “a suspect’s active resistance to arrest

may justify this degree of force.”62 Although Moyers was not under criminal arrest, he was being

placed in handcuffs to be transported to the hospital for involuntary mental health treatment.63

Thus, the situation is analogous to one in which a suspect is placed in handcuffs when being

arrested.

The Fifth Circuit cases on police use of tasers have paid particular attention to whether

officers faced active resistance when they resorted to using a taser.64 The Fifth Circuit has held it

was reasonable to tase an arrestee where the arrestee had “aggressively evaded” two officers’

“attempts to apprehend him” and because the officers tased him after the arrestee had

“continuously failed to comply” and “other ‘efforts to subdue [him] were ineffective.’”65 In that

case, the Fifth Circuit “took as further evidence of ‘measured and ascending’ action that ‘neither

officer used [his] taser as the first method to gain [the arrestee’s] compliance.’”66 In another case—

one not involving a taser but “nonetheless relevant” according to the Fifth Circuit—the circuit

“held that an officer reasonably pushed an arrestee onto the hood of a police cruiser, causing some

bruises and chest pain, because the arrestee ‘resisted when [the officer] attempted to place

61 See Cadena v. Ray, 728 F. App’x 293, 296 (5th Cir. 2018) (finding that plaintiff’s intoxication and erratic behavior

gave officers, who had previously spoken calmly to him for several minutes, reason to believe plaintiff was a threat

when plaintiff failed to comply with their request to turn around and be handcuffed and instead back peddled away

from them).

62 Cloud v. Stone, 993 F.3d 379, 384 (5th Cir. 2021).

63 See LA. STAT. ANN. § 28:53(L)(1) (stating that person may be taken into protective custody and transported to

treatment facility for an involuntary medical evaluation if law enforcement officers believe the person poses a danger

to himself or others).

64 Cloud, 993 F.3d at 384.

65 Id. (discussing Pratt v. Harris Cnty., 822 F.3d 174, 182 (5th Cir. 2016)).

66 Cloud, 993 F.3d at 384–85 (discussing Pratt, 822 F.3d at 182).

handcuffs on him.’”67 “Specifically, the arrestee had ‘pulled his hand back and turned away from

the officer,’ then grappled with him briefly.”68 Moyers argues that in the moments immediately

preceding being tased, he was not actively resisting arrest.69 He also asserts that Stowe and

Wigstrom did not use “measured and ascending actions that correspond[ed] to the escalating verbal

and physical resistance,” such as negotiations and verbal commands.70

Here, Moyers’s behavior is like that of the arrestees in the cases relied on by the Fifth

Circuit. First, like the latter arrestee who was thrown on the hood of the car, he resisted by moving

away from officers when they tried put the handcuffs on him. Then, like the former arrestee,

previous physical efforts to subdue him were ineffective. He evaded both Wingstrom and Stowe,

and he continued to resist as Wingstrom tried to pin him to the truck, all the while with a handcuff

dangling from one arm. And all this took place after Moyers threatened to “f*cking hurt” the

officers. Coupled with the verbal aggression, Moyers’s resistance was active, rather than passive.71

And, therefore, the Court cannot find that it was unreasonable for Stowe to attempt to tase Moyers

the first time.72

Even after been tased once by Stowe, Moyers was not subdued or otherwise restrained. 73

In fact, the video evidence shows that the first taser shot was almost completely ineffective. Rather

67 Cloud, 993 F.3d at 385 (discussing Collier v. Montgomery, 569 F.3d 214, 219 (5th Cir. 2009)).

68 Cloud, 993 F.3d at 385 (discussing Collier, 569 F.3d at 219).

69 R. Doc. 19 at 9.

70 Id. at 8–9.

71 Cf. Cloud, 993 F.3d at 385 (describing cases where the Fifth Circuit has found passive or no resistance at all) (first

citing Newman v. Guedry, 703 F.3d 757, 762–63 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding that officers could not tase someone who

had not committed a crime, attempted flight, or disobeyed any commands, and who may have only provoked police

with an “off-color joke”); and then citing Ramirez v. Martinez, 716 F.3d 369, 372, 378 (5th Cir. 2013) (finding

excessive force when an officer tased someone who did no more than pull his arm out of the officer’s grasp, and who

was not suspected of a crime up to that point)).

72 See Pratt v. Harris Cnty., 822 F.3d 174, 182 (5th Cir. 2016) (finding officers were reasonable in using tasers when

there was evidence of “measured and ascending” action and tasers were used only after other measures to subdue

suspect were ineffective).

73 Joseph ex rel. Estate of Joseph v. Bartlett, 981 F.3d 319, 335 (5th Cir. 2020) (“Force must be reduced once a suspect

has been subdued.”).

than yield and submit to Stowe and Wigstrom, Moyers pulled Stowe’s taser probes out of his body

and threw them toward Stowe. Additionally, Stowe attempted to use some additional method of

compliance by shouting at Moyers before tasing him. But even if the shouting is not found to be

evidence of “measured and ascending action,” the Court cannot find that requiring either Wigstrom

or Stowe to make additional verbal requests of Moyers was necessary, where the purpose of trying

to subdue Moyers was to get him to a hospital so he could be evaluated because the deputies were

afraid he would kill himself, and the circumstances were clearly tense and rapidly evolving.74

Further, Stowe and Wigstrom each shot their tasers after Stowe’s initial shot within a second or

two of one another, clearly unaware that the other officer was going to fire his taser. Thus, the

Court cannot find that it was unreasonable for Wigstrom and Stowe to tase Moyers after Stowe’s

initial shot.

In short, when considering the totality of the circumstances, even drawing all reasonable

inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, the officers’ use of their tasers was not clearly excessive or

objectively unreasonable. 75 When the officers deployed their tasers, Moyers was unrestrained

and unsubdued, had not complied with the officers’ commands, continued to wield a swinging

handcuff, and appeared to the officers to be reaching for something in the back of his truck.

Because Moyers failed to meet his burden under the first prong of the qualified immunity inquiry,

Lieutenant Stowe and Deputy Wigstrom are both entitled to qualified immunity on his § 1983

claim of excessive force.

74 Crane v. City of Arlington, Texas, 50 F.4th 453, 464–65 (5th Cir. 2022); see also Cloud, 993 F.3d at 384–86 (finding

officer’s use of taser reasonable when suspect took a confrontational stance, turned to face officer with handcuffs

dangling from left wrist, and thwarted officer’s efforts to complete the arrest).

75 See e.g., Salazar v. Molina, 37 F.4th 278, 284 (5th Cir. 2022) (finding officer’s use of taser was objectively

reasonable before handcuffing the previously noncompliant suspect, who was in close physical proximity to officers,

when the suspect was unrestrained at night and in the open and the suspect had just led the officers on a chase).

ii. No Clearly Established Right

Because the Court finds Lieutenant Stowe and Deputy Wigstrom did not violate Moyers’s

Fourth Amendment rights, the Court need not reach the second prong of the qualified immunity

analysis—whether the right was clearly established.76 Nonetheless, to provide a complete

analysis of the qualified immunity issues presented in this action, the Court will assume for the

sake of argument there was a constitutional violation and analyze whether the officers’ conduct

violated clearly established law at the time of Moyers’s alleged injuries.

Qualified immunity shields officers from civil liability so long as their conduct “does not

violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would

have known.”77 While a plaintiff need not identify a case directly on point in order to show the

law was clearly established, he must provide authority at a sufficiently high level of specificity to

put law enforcement officers on notice that such conduct is definitively unlawful.78 Without a

closely analogous controlling case or a consensus of persuasive cases that serve to place the

constitutional violation “beyond debate,” a plaintiff’s claims are barred by the doctrine of qualified

immunity unless it is a rare obvious case in which the unlawfulness of the officer’s conduct is

sufficiently clear even though existing precedent does not address similar circumstances.79

Preliminarily, the facts of this case do not place it in the rare category of an obvious

constitutional violation. That being the case, the Court must identify a controlling case or a robust

consensus of persuasive authority where an officer acting under similar circumstances to the

officers in this case was held to have violated an individual’s Fourth Amendment right to be free

76 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236–37 (2009).

77 City of Tahlequah v. Bond, 595 U.S. 9, 12 (2021).

78 Est. of Parker v. Miss Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 140 F.4th 226, 242 (5th Cir. 2025) (quoting Vincent v. City of Sulphur,

805 F.3d 543, 547 (5th Cir. 2025)).

79 Joseph ex rel. Estate of Joseph v. Bartlett, 981 F.3d 319, 330 (5th Cir. 2020) (citations omitted).

from excessive force.80 And the authority must pre-date the events of this case to have provided

the officers here with fair notice of their legal obligations.81

The “clearly established” inquiry is demanding, especially when a court is faced with a

claim of excessive force and regarding an officer’s need to make split second decisions.82 In such

cases, “existing precedent must squarely govern the specific facts at issue such that only someone

who is plainly incompetent or who knowingly violates the law would have behaved as the official

did.”83

Moyers cannot meet this exacting inquiry because it was not clearly established, as of July

14, 2023, that Stowe and Wigstrom would violate Moyers’s rights when they deployed their tasers

during a volatile exchange involving an upset, intoxicated 300-pound man who was actively

resisting their efforts to handcuff him, who had just threatened to “f*cking hurt” them, who the

officers believed was reaching into the back of his pickup truck for an object, and who they had

reason to believe might want to die.

While it was clearly established that an officer could not use force on a suspect who is

complying with his commands,84 that rule does not match the facts of this case, as explained above.

In the same vein, the Fifth Circuit has also held that when a suspect initially resists, any

subsequent use of force must be reduced once the suspect has been subdued,85 and after the suspect

has been subdued and is no longer resisting, an officer’s subsequent use of force is excessive.86

But, again, that was not the case here.

80 Id. at 338 (stating that a court need not limit its analysis to the cases cited by plaintiffs but must explain why cases

it identifies prohibits the challenged conduct in a given case).

81 See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232.

82 Harmon v. City of Arlington, Texas, 16 F.4th 1159, 1167 (5th Cir. 2021) (citations omitted).

83 Ramirez v. Escajuda, 44 F.4th 287, 292 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting Bartlett, 981 F.3d at 332).

84 Bagley v. Guillen, 90 F.4th 799, 803 (5th Cir. 2024) (collecting cases).

85 Bartlett, 981 F.3d at 335 (citations omitted).

86 Id. at 341 (finding that continuing to inflict force despite suspect having committed no crime, presenting no threat,

and giving no active resistance is a violation of clearly established law).

Moyers cites several Fifth Circuit cases arguing that the cases clearly establish that Stowe’s

and Wingstrom’s conduct was unlawful. But these cases are not factually similar enough to the

situation Stowe and Wingstrom faced to have placed the lawfulness of the taser use beyond

debate.87 For example, Moyers cites Cloud v. Stone.88 In Cloud, the Fifth Circuit held that officers

may properly use “measured and ascending actions,” including the use of a taser, corresponding to

escalating verbal and physical resistance.89 Mr. Cloud was pulled over for a minor traffic offense,

but he refused to sign his traffic ticket. The officer moved to arrest Cloud but had successfully

handcuffed only his left wrist, at which point Cloud turned partially around to his left. The officer

then ordered Cloud to turn back around and tried to finish handcuffing him, but Cloud spun around,

turning away from the officer’s reach and facing him with the handcuffs hanging from his left wrist.

The officer stepped a few feet back and tased Cloud in the chest. Cloud yelled, pulled the prongs

from his chest, after which the officer grabbed Cloud around the waist and tased him again with

the taser in “drive-stun” mode.90 The Fifth Circuit concluded the evidence showed Cloud “actively

resisted arrest,” and the officer had “reasonable grounds to tase him.”91 The court distinguished

Cloud’s actions from those of a person who is merely passively resisting,92 concluding Cloud

“was more than merely uncooperative or argumentative: his actions—not just his failure to follow

directions—prevented [the officer] from completing a lawful arrest.”93 In reaching its conclusion,

87 Moyers’s argument also requires the Court to assume that Fifth Circuit precedent alone can clearly establish the law

for qualified immunity purposes, “something the Supreme Court has left open.” See Ramirez v. Escajeda, 44 F.4th

287, 293 (5th Cir. 2022) (citing Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, 595 U.S. 1 (2021)).

88 993 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2021).

89 Cloud v. Stone, 993 F.3d 379, 384 (5th Cir. 2021).

90 “When taser prongs are deployed, they conduct an electric current that can immobilize a person by causing his

muscles to seize up. A taser in drive-stun mode inflicts a painful electric shock on contact, but does not cause the same

seizing effect.” Id. at 382 n.2.

91 Id. at 385 (collecting cases).

92 Id. at 386 (distinguishing Cloud from Ramirez v. Martinez, 716 F.3d 369 (5th Cir. 2013), and Newman v. Guedry,

703 F.3d 757 (5th Cir. 2012), both of which are relied upon by Moyers).

93 Cloud, 993 F.3d at 386.

the court in Cloud discussed Fifth Circuit precedent establishing the reasonableness of the use of

nonlethal force on one who is actively resisting. While Moyers cites Cloud to show it was clearly

established that Stowe and Wigstrom could not lawfully act as they did when dealing with Moyers

that night, the Court finds Plaintiff’s reliance on Cloud is misplaced.

In Ramirez v. Escajeda,94 not cited by Moyers and decided the year before these officers’

encounter with Moyers, the Fifth Circuit gave qualified immunity to an officer after he responded

to a 9-1-1 call regarding a suicidal suspect. The suspect was in the process of hanging himself and

refused the officer’s commands to show his hands. The officer, concerned the man had a weapon

and that he might be walking into an ambush, used his taser on the man who died shortly

afterwards. The Fifth Circuit found significant that the suspect was not in custody, which created

a tense and uncertain situation for the officer, who feared the suspect had a weapon.95 Indeed, the

Fifth Circuit explained the law was not clearly established that an officer could not use taser force

against a person who had not been subdued, and “who may be hanging himself, who may or may

not have a weapon, who does not respond to the officer’s commands—all when the officer

approaches him rapidly, alone, and in the dark.”96

As previously stated, Escajeda was decided in 2022, and Moyers has failed to identify any

intervening case law between that decision and the events giving rise to this action that would have

reasonably put Stowe and Wigstrom on notice that their conduct was clearly prohibited under the

particular and specific circumstances of this case. To the contrary, Moyers cites cases that are

generally defined by a lack of any substantial threat to officer safety and a lack of resistance by

94 44 F.4th 287 (5th Cir. 2022).

95 Id. at 293–94.

96 Id. at 294. Indeed, Escajeda is particularly instructive in this case because, as Judge Duncan eloquently observed,

“Escajeda used the taser precisely because Daniel was not in custody and Escajeda was unsure whether the strange

scenario he faced posed a threat to his safety.” Judge Duncan noted, “Perhaps his fear that he might be walking into

an ‘ambush’ was unfounded; in that event, the tasing could be excessive under prong one of the analysis.” Id.

the suspect at the time the officer resorted to the use of force.97 The common thread in the cases

Moyers cites is that the subjects in those cases were either already subdued and under police control,

were not actively resisting arrest, were complying with police requests, or were subjected to

excessive force after having been subdued.

Because Moyers has failed to identify a case that places “beyond debate” that Stowe and

Wigstom’s use of their tasers violated his Fourth Amendment rights, the Court finds the law was

not clearly established at the time of events giving rise to this action. Because the Court finds

Deputy Wigstrom and Lieutenant Stowe did not violate a clearly established statutory or

constitutional right, Wigstrom and Stowe are entitled to qualified immunity.

B. Claims Against Sheriff Turlich

Plaintiff contends the alleged wrongful conduct by Stowe and Wigstrom occurred when

they “were acting under color of state law and in the course and scope of their employment with

the Plaquemines Parish Sheriff’s Office,”98 such that “Plaquemines Parish Sheriff, Gerald A.

Turlich, Jr., is vicariously liable for the misconduct and fault of his employees.” 99 Plaintiff’s

complaint seeks damages against Sheriff Turlich “in both his personal and official capacities.”100

Not only has Moyers waived or abandoned these claims, but his claims fail on the merits. The

Court will analyze the claims under each of Sheriff Turlich’s capacities.

i. Claims Against Sheriff Turlich in His Individual Capacity

97 See, e.g., Darden v. City of Fort Worth, Texas, 880 F.3d 722 (5th Cir. 2018) (finding officer violated established

law when he used force against subdued, compliant subject who was not resisting arrest); Newman, 703 F.3d at 760

(finding it was objectively unreasonable for officers to injure man whose behavior did not amount to active resistance

and who had not failed to comply with officers’ commands); Martinez, 716 F.3d 369 (denying qualified immunity

because plaintiff, who posed no threat to officers, was tased twice, including once after he was handcuffed and lying

face down on the ground).

98 R. Doc. 1 at ¶ 21

99 Id. at ¶ 24.

100 Id. at ¶ 4.

Defendants contend Moyers has not alleged that Sheriff Turlich participated in any of the

acts involving his officers on the night Moyers was taken into custody. They also argue that

Moyers cannot meet his burden of proof on his claims against the Sheriff in his individual

capacity.101 In his opposition, Moyers failed to address Defendants’ arguments regarding his

claims against Sheriff Turlich. The law is clear in this circuit that when a non-moving party fails

to include argument about a claim, defense, or theory that a summary judgment motion seeks to

dismiss, the district court can conclude that the nonmovant has abandoned the unaddressed

claim.102 Here, not only does the Court find that Plaintiff waived or abandoned his individual

capacity claims against Sheriff Turlich by failing to address Defendants’ arguments in his

opposition memorandum, Moyers’s complaint does not allege that Sheriff Turlich was involved in

any of the interactions between his officers and Moyers on July 14, 2023, or that he was even

aware of any of the alleged violations.

A plaintiff suing a governmental official in the official’s individual capacity must allege

specific conduct giving rise to a constitutional violation, and must explain how the government

official, through his own actions, caused a deprivation of a plaintiff’s rights.103 Moyers, who has

failed to plead any facts or provide any evidence that Sheriff Turlich is guilty of any fault in his

personal capacity, cannot defeat Sheriff Turlich’s claim of qualified immunity. Indeed, even

putting aside the Court’s finding of abandonment and waiver of these claims by Moyers, because

the Court has found that Turlich’s two officers who were on the scene and engaged with Moyers

are entitled to qualified immunity, the Court also finds that Sheriff Turlich, who was not present

101 R. Doc. 17-1 at 14.

102 Harris v. City of Schertz, 27 F.4th 1120, 1123 (5th Cir. 2022); Vela v. City of Houston, 276 F.3d 659, 678–79 (5th

Cir. 2001); see also Dauterive v. Marcal, No. 22-3067, 2025 WL 3628112, at *10 (E.D. La. Dec. 15, 2025).

103 See, e.g., Abbott v. Town of Livingston, No. CV 16-00188-BAJ-EWD, 2018 WL 1095557, at *4–5 (M.D. La. Feb.

27, 2018) (citations omitted).

on the scene and who had no interaction with Moyers that evening, is also entitled to qualified

immunity in his individual capacity.

ii. Claims Against Sheriff Turlich in His Official Capacity

Although Moyers alleges Sheriff Turlich is vicariously liable for the misconduct or fault

of his employees, a suit against a public servant in his official capacity is treated as a suit against

a public entity.104 While a public entity can be held liable under § 1983 when an official policy or

custom is the cause of a plaintiff’s injuries, supervisory officials are not liable for the actions of

subordinates on any theory of vicarious liability.105 Here, Moyers has failed to address any of

Defendants’ summary judgment arguments on his official capacity claims against Sheriff Turlich.

Because Moyers failed to brief those claims in response to Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment, the Court deems Moyers’s official capacity claims against Sheriff Turlich waived106

and abandoned.107

Additionally, the Court finds that summary judgment is appropriate on Moyers’s official

capacity claims against Sheriff Turlich because Moyers has failed to put forth any evidence

whatsoever that any injury he claims to have suffered arose from a constitutional deprivation

arising from a violation of an official policy or custom of Sheriff Turlich’s department.108 For

these reasons, the Court finds summary judgment is required on all of Moyers’s official capacity

claims against Sheriff Turlich.

104 Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471–72 (1985).

105 Williams v. Biggs, No. CV 21-333, 2024 WL 776442, at *6 (E.D. La. Feb. 26, 2024), appeal dismissed, No. 24-

30164, 2024 WL 5466853 (5th Cir. Oct. 31, 2024).

106 JMCB, LLC v. Bd. of Com. & Indus., 336 F. Supp. 3d 620, 634 (M.D. La. 2018) (citations omitted) (finding that

failure to brief an argument in the district court waives that argument).

107 See Windsor v. Olson, No. 3:16-CV-934-L, 2019 WL 2080021, at *9 (N.D. Tex. May 10, 2019) (“When a plaintiff

fails to defend a claim in response to a motion to dismiss or summary judgment motion, the claim is deemed

abandoned.”) (citations omitted).

108 City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (finding that municipality cannot be held liable for

employee’s actions when employee does not inflict a constitutional injury).

C. State Law Claims

Moyers brings various state law claims. Each fails for its own reasons. The Court addresses

each in turn.

i. Battery, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, and Fault

Relying on the same factual allegations that formed the basis of his excessive force claims

under federal law, Moyers also brings claims under Louisiana state law, arguing that the actions

of Defendants “constituted battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and fault as those

terms are understood in accordance with Louisiana law.”109 Under Louisiana law, however, the

standard of care owed by a sheriff’s deputy when interacting with a person like Moyers and under

circumstances like those in the instant case is one of “reasonableness under the totality of the

circumstances.”110 Indeed, the Fifth Circuit has made clear that “excessive force claims under

both federal and Louisiana law turn on whether the use of force was objectively reasonable given

the totality of the circumstances.”111 Because, as Moyers concedes,112 the factual allegations

regarding his state law battery and general fault claims arise out of the same facts Moyers alleged

with respect to his federal constitutional claims, for all the reasons the Court has previously cited

in support its finding that Wigstrom and Stowe did not act unreasonably and did not violate

Moyers’s constitutional rights, Moyers’s state law battery and general “fault” claims cannot

survive Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and must also be dismissed.

Turning to Moyers’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, Moyers offers

nothing to support his allegation that the officers intended to inflict severe emotional distress upon

109 R. Doc. 1 ¶¶ 6, 23.

110Mathieu v. Imperial Toy Corp., 646 So. 2d 318, 322 (La. 1994) (quoting Kyle v. City of New Orleans, 353 So. 2d

969, 973 (La. 1977)).

111 Shepherd ex rel Est. of Shepherd v. City of Shreveport, 920 F.3d 278, 286 (5th Cir. 2019) (collecting cases).

112 R. Doc. 19 at 14.

him or that the officers knew or were substantially certain to know that such distress would result

from their actions.113 Because Moyers has the burden of proof on his claim of intentional infliction

of emotional distress, Defendants do not need to produce any evidence to negate the elements of

Moyers’s claim, and they can prevail on summary judgment by pointing out the absence of

evidence to support the claim, as they have done in this case.114 Accordingly, the Court is required

to enter summary judgment in Defendants’ favor on Moyers’s intentional infliction of emotional

distress claim.

ii. State Law Immunity

While the Court has found that Moyers cannot recover against Defendants on his state law

claims because he cannot meet his legal burden on those claims, the Court need not decide whether

Defendants are, as they contend, immune from Moyers’s claims under the protection provided by

La. R.S. 28:53(L)(3). But for the sake of being complete in its analysis, the Court finds, under the

facts of this case, and for all the same reasons the Court found no constitutional violation and no

violation of Louisiana law, that Defendants are shielded under Louisiana state law immunity from

Moyers’s state law claims.

Under Louisiana Revised Statute § 28:53(L)(1), an officer can take a person into protective

custody and transport him to a treatment facility for medical evaluation when, as a result of the

officer’s personal observation, the officer has reasonable grounds to believe the person is acting in

a manner dangerous to himself or others and is in need of hospitalization to protect himself or

others from physical harm.115 Here, in light of the photograph and text messages that Moyers sent

his wife, along with his statements to the officers and his actions in dealing with the officers, the

113 Curran v. Aleshire, 67 F. Supp. 3d 741, 754–55 (E.D. La. 2014).

114 Muslow v. City of Shreveport, 491 F. Supp. 3d 172, 200 (W.D. La. 2020).

115 LA. STAT. ANN. § 28:53(L)(1).

Court has no trouble finding these deputies had reasonable grounds to believe Moyers was acting

in a manner dangerous to himself. Louisiana’s protective custody statute also provides that officers

“may take reasonable steps to protect themselves,” and an officer who acts in compliance with

Louisiana’s protective custody law “is acting in the course of his official duty and shall not be

subject to criminal or civil liability as a result thereof.”116 Because the Court has found Wigstrom

and Stowe acted reasonably during their encounter with Moyers, including in using their tasers to

take him into custody, the Court finds Defendants are immune from civil liability under Louisiana

state law for claims arising out of their actions in taking Moyers into protective custody.

iii. State Constitutional Claims

Finally, in his complaint, Moyer alleges Defendants violated his rights under the Louisiana

Constitution, but Moyers has not set forth what specific provisions of the Louisiana Constitution

were allegedly violated by Defendants or how Moyers’s rights differ from federal constitutional

law under Louisiana constitutional law. Regardless, Moyers cannot prevail on any separate

Louisiana constitutional claim because excessive force claims under both federal and Louisiana

law turn on whether the use of force was objectively reasonable given the totality of the

circumstances.117 Here, again, for all the reasons set forth above regarding the reasonableness of

the officers’ actions, Moyers’s state constitutional claims cannot survive summary judgment and

must be dismissed.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (R. Doc. 17) is

GRANTED.

116 Id. § 28:53(L)(3).

117 Shepherd v. City of Shreveport, 920 F.3d 278, 286 (5th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted).

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that all of Plaintiff's claims against all Defendants are

DISMISSED with prejudice.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 31st day of March 2026.

DARREY JAMES PAPILLION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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