Magee

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

ERICE D. MAGEE * CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS * NO. 25-1241

AMAZON CORPORATION, LLC, ET * SECTION “L” (2)

AL.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Pending before me is Plaintiff Erice D. Magee’s Motion for Reconsideration and Vacate

Dismissal. ECF No. 17. The Honorable Eldon E. Fallon referred the motion to the undersigned

magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). ECF No. 19.

For the following reasons, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Motion for

Reconsideration and Vacate Dismissal be GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART,

denying the motion as to Defendant Lamb but granting the motion as to Defendant Amazon.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Erice D. Magee filed this Title VII, ADEA and retaliation action against his former

employer (identified as Amazon Corporation, LLC), its Human Resources Manager (Robert

Lamb), and, based on the caption, other unnamed defendants on June 17, 2025. ECF No. 1. Over

90 days after filing suit, Plaintiff filed a Return into the court record for a Summons issued to

“Amazon Corp. LLC.” ECF No. 4 at 2. Although this Summons purports to have been served

“Amazon Corp. LLC,” the return fails to indicate the name or title of the individual served; rather,

the return portion of the USM 285 filed into the record indicates the Summons was simply left at

an Amazon Distribution Center in Alabama. Id. at 1. Weeks later, a Summons directed to

Defendant Lamb was returned unexecuted. ECF No. 6. The Court issued a show cause order, to

which Plaintiff responded. ECF Nos. 6, 7. On November 21, 2025, the Court extended the

deadline for effecting service, explaining to Plaintiff that the obligations to properly effect service

and provide valid addresses for service rest with Plaintiff. ECF No. 8 at 2-3. The Court also

explained that failure to effect service could result in a recommendation that his claims be

dismissed without prejudice. Id. at 3-4.

Plaintiff failed to effect service within the extended deadline. Instead, he filed a Notice

and Response, confirming that, contrary to his earlier suggestion, he was not proceeding in forma

pauperis and reiterating his arguments for good cause to extend Rule 4(m)’s deadline for service

despite the undersigned’s previous exercise of discretion to extend the deadline. ECF Nos. 9, 10.

Again, though finding that Plaintiff had not established good cause for the failure to effect service,

the undersigned nonetheless granted him another extension of time in which to effect service,

reiterating that the obligation to comply with Rule 4 rests with him and warning that failure to

comply will result in a recommendation of dismissal without prejudice. ECF No. 11. The Court

also directed Plaintiff to the Louisiana Secretary of State website to assist in his efforts to obtain

appropriate service information as to Defendant Amazon. Id. at 3.

Plaintiff then filed a document entitled “Proof of Service” asserting that he had properly

served Amazon at its corporate headquarters in Seattle, Washington because “any person at this

location is a registered agent of Amazon.” ECF No. 12 at 1; see also ECF No. 13 at 1-2, 4

(asserting that delivery of documents to Amazon’s corporate headquarters established service on

both Amazon and Defendant Lamb). This document, however, merely reiterated the prior service

at Amazon’s Distribution Center and a request for service to Amazon’s corporate headquarters.

Almost 8 months after Plaintiff filed suit and after having received two extension, Plaintiff

still failed to effect service, as required by Rule 4(m), the undersigned issued a Report and

Recommendation that Plaintiff’s case be dismissed for failure to serve the defendants. ECF Nos.

8, 11, 14. Treating Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration as an Objection to the Report and

Recommendation, the Court adopted that Report and Recommendation on February 9, 2026. ECF

Nos. 15, 16. Plaintiff filed another Motion for Reconsideration and Vacate Dismissal, which was

referred to the undersigned. ECF Nos. 17, 19. Before that motion was addressed, Plaintiff filed

into the record three Returns, which appear to be duplicative. ECF Nos. 18, 20, 21. Each of these

filings reflects a Summons addressed to Defendant Robert Lamb along with completed USM 285

forms1 indicating service for “Amazon Corporation LLC and/or Andy Jessy, President/CEO and/or

Robert Lamb” at Amazon’s corporate headquarters located at 410 Terry Ave North, Seattle,

Washington. ECF Nos. 18, 20, 21. The Returns attached to each filing reflect personal delivery

of same to “Cynthia Jones, Customer Service Associate” at an address in Washington different

from that of the Amazon corporate headquarters service address identified on the Summons,

specifically 300 Deschutes Way SW, Tumwater, Washington. ECF No. 18 at 2-3; No. 20 at 1, 3;

No. 21 at 1, 3.

II. APPLICABLE LAW

A. Standard for Reconsideration

Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not provide specifically for motions to

reconsider a court’s order,2 the Fifth Circuit has consistently recognized that parties may seek

reconsideration under Rules 54(b), 59(e), or 60(b).3 Because an order that adjudicates fewer than

1 It is unclear how the U.S. Marshal Service came to effect service. Plaintiff is not proceeding in forma pauperis. As

such, the U.S. Marshal Service is not required to serve summons and complaint absent a court order, which was not

issued in this case. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(c)(3); see also Suarez v. Walker, No. 23-2806, 2024 WL 4193963, *2-3

(N.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2024). Nor did Plaintiff filed a request for court order directing the U.S. Marshal Service to effect

service, which should not be granted unless absolutely necessary and then only after plaintiff first exhausts service by

private means. See Suarez v. Walker, No. 23-2806, 2024 WL 4193963, *2-3 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2024).

2 Shepherd v. Int'l Paper Co., 372 F.3d 326, 328 n.1 (5th Cir. 2004); Cressionnie v. Hample, 184 F. App'x 366, 369

(5th Cir. 2006).

3 Koeppel v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 608 F. Supp. 3d 398, 402 (E.D. La. 2022) (citing Reyes v. Julia Place

Condo. Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., No. 12-2043, 2016 WL 4272493, at *2 (E.D. La. Aug. 15, 2016) (citing cases)).

all the claims among the parties “may be revised at any time” before the entry of a final judgment,

a court “possesses the inherent procedural power to reconsider, rescind, or modify an interlocutory

order for cause seen by it to be sufficient.”4

Though Rule 54(b) empowers the court with “broad discretion” in addressing a motion for

reconsideration, “reconsideration ‘is not provided indiscriminately whenever some party may wish

it,’ as judges ‘must protect themselves and the other parties against the delay and burdens that

could be imposed by yielding to simple disappointment or a deliberate desire to inflict delay and

burden.’”5 Further, a motion to reconsider “is not the proper vehicle for rehashing evidence, legal

theories, or arguments that could have been offered or raised before the entry of [the order].”6

Courts addressing motions to reconsider under Rule 54(b) look to similar considerations

as those used when evaluating a Rule 59(e) motion,7 asking whether (1) the motion is necessary

to correct a manifest error of law or fact upon which the judgment is based; (2) the movant presents

newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence; (3) the motion is necessary to prevent

manifest injustice; or (4) the motion is justified by an intervening change in controlling law. 8

B. Requirements for Proper Service

Rule 4 makes clear that “plaintiff is responsible for having the summons and complaint

served within the time allowed by Rule 4(m) and must furnish the necessary copies to the person

who makes service.” FED. R CIV. P. 4(c)(1). Indeed, the obligation to locate defendant’s address

4 Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b); Melancon v. Texaco, 659 F.2d 551, 553 (5th Cir. Unit A Oct. 1981)); see also

Austin v. Kroger Tex., L.P., 864 F.3d 326, 336 (5th Cir. 2017) (citations omitted).

5 Koeppel, 608 F. Supp. 3d at 402 (quoting 18B WRIGHT & MILLER’S FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 4478.1

(3d ed. 2021); and citing Calpetco 1981 v. Marshall Expl., Inc., 989 F.2d 1408, 1414-15 (5th Cir. 1993)).

6 Templet v. HydroChem Inc., 367 F.3d 473, 478-79 (5th Cir. 2004).

7 Koeppel, 608 F. Supp. 3d at 402 (citing Austin, 864 F.3d at 336; quoting Edwards v. Take Fo’ Records, Inc., No. 19-

12130, 2020 WL 3832606, at *11 & n.12 (E.D. La. July 8, 2020)); accord. Antoine’s Rest., LLC v. Certain

Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, No. 23-229, 2023 WL 3751509, at *2 (E.D. La. June 1, 2023) (citing S. Snow Mfg.

Co. v. SnoWizard Holdings, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 2d 548, 565 (E.D. La. 2013) (internal citation omitted)).

8 Antoine’s Rest., 2023 WL 3751509, at *2 (citing cases).

and provide same to the court for issuance of summons remains with plaintiff.9 And once a

plaintiff has been notified that service attempts have been unsuccessful, the plaintiff must present

a new or updated address for service.10

1. Robert Lamb

Proper service of a summons on an individual may be accomplished in several ways. See

FED. R CIV. P. 4(e). While one method for serving an individual is leaving a copy of the summons

and the complaint “at the individual’s dwelling or usual place of abode with someone of suitable

age and discretion who resides there,”11 in the context of determining the validity of service of

process, courts hold that leaving a summons at a defendant's place of employment or business does

not qualify as service under Rule 4(e)(2).12 Rule 4(e)(1) also authorizes service pursuant to state

law. But neither Louisiana nor Washington authorize service of an individual by leaving the

summons at the individual’s place of employment.13

To date, eight months after filing suit and despite prior extensions, Plaintiff has still not

9 Wright v. TDCJ-CID Dir., No. 21-280, 2023 WL 3589777, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 21, 2023) (noting that plaintiff

retains the obligation to find and provide the court with the proper address for service), R.&R. adopted, 2023 WL

3586416 (E.D. Tex. May 22, 2023); Clark v. ASC Mortg., No. 14-4236, 2015 WL 3632562, at *1 (N.D. Tex. June 10,

2015) (quoting Shelton v. Mich. Turkey Producers Co-op., Inc., No. 13-441, 2014 WL 4388366, at *6 (W.D. Mich.

Sept. 5, 2014) (citing Byrd v. Stone, 94 F.3d 217, 219 (6th Cir. 1996))); Boyer v. Taylor, No. 06-694, 2009 WL

2338173, at *11 (D. Del. July 30, 2009) (“[A] district court has no duty to assist a plaintiff in locating a defendant's

address for the purpose of service of process.” (citing Barmes v. Nolan, 123 F. App'x 238, 249 (7th Cir. 2005))).

10 Wright, 2023 WL 3589777, at *2 (quoting Kaufman v. Corizon Health, No. 12-10162, 2012 WL 5830229, *1 (E.D.

Mich. 2012); see also Hall v. Tilton, No. 07-3233, 2008 WL 4614520, *2 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (noting that, if the USM

is unable to effectuate service through no fault of his own, e.g., because plaintiff provided insufficient information,

and plaintiff is informed, plaintiff must seek to remedy the situation or face dismissal).

11 FED. R. CIV. P. 4(e)(2)(B). Plaintiff could also effect service on non-resident Defendant Lamb by personally

delivering the summons and complaint to him or via Louisiana’s long-arm statute, which requires sending the

summons and complaint, via certified mail to Defendant’s actual, correct domiciliary address or actual delivery to

Defendant by a commercial carrier. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 4(e)(1), (2)(A); LA. REV. STAT. § 13:3204; Crump v.

Lawrence, No. 24-872, 2024 WL 3064608, at *4 (E.D. La. June 20, 2024) (Brown, C.J.); Walker v. Dupart, No. 20-

2193, 2021 WL 2930728, at *4 (E.D. La. July 12, 2021) (Africk. J.).

12 See 4A WRIGHT & MILLER’S FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1096 (4th ed. 2025) (citing cases); accord. Doe

v. St. James Par. Sch. Bd., No. 15-5370, 2016 WL 1558794, at *3 (E.D. La. Apr. 18, 2016) (Vance, J.) (“Delivering

a summons and complaint to an employee at a defendant’s workplace does not constitute personal service; nor does it

qualify as service at a defendant’s ‘dwelling or usual place of abode.’” (citing cases)).

13 Doe, 2016 WL 1558794, at *3 (citing Jason v. Nugent, No. 04-1722, 2005 WL 53301, at *2 (E.D. La. Jan. 7, 2005));

Fleury v. Platt, No. 24-1321, 2025 WL 1089524, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 18, 2025) (citation omitted).

located a proper service address for Defendant Lamb. Nor has Plaintiff established good cause for

his failure to do so. As such, dismissal of his claims against Lamb remains proper.

Even were Plaintiff to properly serve Defendant Lamb, his claims would be subject to

summary dismissal because employment discrimination claims are limited to suits against

employers, not supervisors.14

2. Amazon

As previously explained, Plaintiff’s first Return of Summons directed to Amazon reflects

delivery at “Amazon’s Distribution Center” in Alabama, with no indication of a name or title of

any individual recipient. ECF No. 4.15 Then, beginning on February 19, 2026, over a week after

the Court adopted the undersigned’s Report and Recommendation and dismissed Plaintiff’s

claims, Plaintiff filed a series of apparently duplicative Returns, ostensibly as to Defendant

Amazon. Each of these Summons is addressed as follows:

Robert Lamb

Amazon Corporate Offices

Attn: Andy Jassy, President/CEO

410 Terry Ave. North

Seattle, WA 98109-521016

The accompanying USM-285 form requested that the U.S. Marshal serve “Amazon Corporation

14 See, e.g., Grant v. Lone Star Co., 21 F.3d 649, 651–53 (5th Cir 1994) (holding that an individual supervisor who

does not otherwise qualify as an employer cannot be held liable for a violation of Title VII); Stults v. Conoco, Inc., 76

F.3d 651, 655 (5th Cir. 1996) (extending the holding in Grant to ADEA claims); see also Foley v. Univ. of Hou. Sys.,

355 F.3d 333, 340 n.8 (5th Cir. 2003) (noting “relief under Title VII is available only against an employer, not an

individual supervisor or fellow employee”); Provensal v. Gaspard, 524 F. App’x 974, 976 (5th Cir. 2013)

(characterizing employment claim against individual supervisor as “frivolous”); Ackel v. Nat’l Commc’ns, Inc., 339

F.3d 376, 381 n.1 (5th Cir. 2003); Smith v. Amedisys Inc., 298 F.3d 434, 448 (5th Cir. 2002) (stating “there is no

individual liability for employees under Title VII”).

15 For service on corporations under Rule 4(h)(1)(B), service is deficient where the process server makes “no attempt

to ascertain the title or corporate position of the individual who accepted the papers or even to inquire whether the

individual was actually an employee of the defendant corporation.” Prescription Containers, Inc. v. Cabiles, No. 12-

4805, 2014 WL 1236919, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2014), R.&R. adopted, 2014 WL 1237098 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 25,

2014); see also Riordan v. Power Fasteners, Inc., No. 11-1207, 2011 WL 4571891, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 30, 2011)

(“The process server's declaration says nothing about [the person receiving service's] title or position and thus cannot

serve as evidence sufficient on its face to establish prima facie satisfaction of RCW 4.28.080(9).”).

16 ECF No. 18 at 1; No. 20 at 2; No. 21 at 2.

LLC and/or Andy Jassy, President/CEO and/or Robert Lamb” at the 410 Terry Ave. North

address.17 The Returns all reflect Summons was served on Amazon Corporation, LLC (not

Defendant Lamb) by personal delivery to customer service representative Cynthia Jones at 300

Deschutes Way SW, Suite 208, Tumwater, Washington, 98501.18

Like Louisiana, Washington requires service on an entity by serving its registered agent.

WASH. REV. CODE § 23:95.450; see also WASH. REV. CODE § 23B.05.040. If there is no registered

agent, service may be effected by registered or certified mail addressed to the entity at its principal

office. WASH. REV. CODE § 23:95.450. The Washington Secretary of State’s Corporations and

Charities Filing System does not reflect any entity named “Amazon Corporation, LLC.” That

website does, however, list several Amazon entities at the 410 Terry Avenue North, Seattle,

Washington, 98109 address (e.g., Amazon.com Sales, Inc., Amazon.com Services, LLC, Amazon

Data Services, Inc., Amazon Development Center U.S., Inc., Amazon Logistics, Inc.).19 These

Amazon entities (as well as others), designate “Corporation Services Company” with an address

of 300 Deschutes Way SW, Suite 208 MC-CSC1, Tumwater, Washington, 98501, as their

registered agent for service.20

C. Dismissal for Failure to Serve

Timely and proper service of process is important. Lengthy delay between filing and

service risks prejudice to the defendant.21 Without proper service, the court may not exercise

17 ECF No. 18 at 2; No. 20 at 1; No. 21 at 1.

18 ECF No. 18 at 3; No. 20 at 3; No. 21 at 3.

19 See Washington Corporations and Charities Filing System, WASH. SEC’Y of STATE,

https://ccfs.sos.wa.gov/?_gl=1*1cl9zfs*_ga*MTExMDQ0MTYxLjE3NzI0ODAxNDk.*_ga_7B08VE04WV*czE3

NzI0ODAxNDkkbzEkZzEkdDE3NzI0ODAxNjAkajQ5JGwwJGgw*_ga_X6SDF160YQ*czE3NzI0ODAxNDkkbz

EkZzEkdDE3NzI0ODAxNjAkajQ5JGwwJGgw#/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2026) (search “Amazon” in “Corporation

Search” section).

20 Id.

21 See Sealed Appellant v. Sealed Appellee, 452 F.3d 415, 418 (5th Cir. 2006) (“We view a delay between filing and

service as being more likely to result in prejudice than a delay occurring after service, for in the former situation the

defendant is not put on formal notice and allowed a full opportunity to discover and preserve relevant evidence when

the matter is still relatively fresh and the evidence is intact and available.” (citation omitted)).

personal jurisdiction over the defendant.22 And the court cannot enter a default against a defendant

that had no duty to answer the suit, which answer is not required until “service has been

perfected.”23 Were the court to enter default judgment based on an insufficient return, the

judgment would be void for lack of personal jurisdiction due to defective service of process.24

Dismissal for failure to timely serve process is governed by Rule 4(m), and pro se litigants

are not excused from its requirements.25 While a Rule 4(m) dismissal for failure to serve is

generally without prejudice, the court may order a Rule 4(m) dismissal even where it will operate

as “with prejudice” dismissal, such as when the statute of limitations has run.26 When the dismissal

without prejudice effectively constitutes a dismissal with prejudice (e.g., due to statute of

limitation), the standard of review is the same as used when reviewing a dismissal with prejudice.27

The court looks for a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct by the plaintiff and considers

whether lesser sanctions would prompt diligent prosecution or if there is a record of lesser

sanctions that proved futile.28

Likewise, Rule 41(b) also allows a court to dismiss an action sua sponte for failure to

prosecute or for failure to comply with the federal rules or any court order.29 This authority flows

from the court's inherent power to control its docket and prevent undue delays in the disposition

22 Murphy Bros. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 350 (1999).

23 Espinoza v. Humphries, 44 F.4th 275, 276 (5th Cir. 2022) (citing Jenkens & Gilchrist v. Groia & Co., 542 F.3d 114,

123 n.6 (5th Cir. 2008)).

24 Id. (quoting Harper Macleod Solics. v. Keaty & Keaty, 260 F.3d 389, 393 (5th Cir. 2001)).

25 Thrasher v. City of Amarillo, 709 F.3d 509, 512 (5th Cir. 2013) (“A litigant’s pro se status neither excuses his failure

to effect service nor excuses him for lack of knowledge of the Rule of Civil Procedure.”).

26 Sanchez v. Perez, 96 F.3d 1145, 1996 WL 512289, at *2 (5th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (citing Norlock v. City of

Garland, 768 F.2d 654, 658 (5th Cir.1985)).

27 Berry v. CIGNA/RSI-CIGNA, 975 F.2d 1188, 1191 (5th Cir. 1992); Boazman v. Econs. Lab., Inc., 537 F.2d 210,

212-13 (5th Cir. 1976).

28 Boudy v. McComb Sch. Dist., No. 24-60386, 2026 WL 507784, at *6 (5th Cir. Feb. 24, 2026) (citations omitted);

Berry, 975 F.2d at 1191; McNeal v. Papasan, 842 F.2d 787, 790 (5th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted).

29 Griggs v. S.G.E. Mgmt., L.L.C., 905 F.3d 835, 844 (5th Cir. 2018) (citing McCullough v. Lynaugh, 835 F.2d 1126,

1127 (5th Cir. 1988)); Nottingham v. Warden, Bill Clements Unit, 837 F.3d 438, 441 (5th Cir. 2016).

of pending cases.30 The same heightened standard applies to with-prejudice dismissals under

Rules 4(m) and 41(b).31 Thus, the court looks for a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct

and considers whether lesser sanction would better serve the interests of justice. In addition, the

court looks for at least one of three aggravating factors: “(1) delay caused by [the] plaintiff himself

and not his attorney; (2) actual prejudice to the defendant; or (3) delay caused by intentional

conduct.”32 Because plaintiff is proceeding pro se, any delay is attributed to him, not counsel.

D. Suits by Pro Se Litigants May Be Dismissed for Failure to Comply with Rule 4

A pro se litigant is not exempt from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and

substantive law.33 Indeed, a plaintiff's pro se status and ignorance of the law do not constitute

cause for failure to effect service in compliance with the rules.34 And while a pro se plaintiff is

entitled to notice before a district court dismisses an action sua sponte for failure to timely serve

the defendants under Rule 4(m),35 Plaintiff received that notice on two prior occasions. See ECF

Nos. 8, 11; see also ECF No. 14 at 1-2. In addition, the undersigned employed less severe

measures when granting the extensions. Thus, there is a clear record of delay attributable solely

to Plaintiff, and lesser sanctions are futile considering the prior orders addressing the insufficient

service and directing Plaintiff to effect proper service and file the proper return into the record.

The Fifth Circuit addressed a similar case involving a dismissal of a plaintiff’s case where

the plaintiff failed to serve the defendant for nine months in Buchanan v. United States, No. 24-

30 See McCullough, 835 F.2d at 1127 (citing Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962)); Link, 370 U.S.

at 630-31.

31 Millan v. USAA Gen. Indem. Co., 546 F.3d 321, 326 (5th Cir. 2008).

32 Price v. McGlathery, 792 F.2d 472, 474 (5th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); accord. Markwell v. Cnty. of Bexar, 878 F.2d

899, 902 (5th Cir. 1989).

33 Birl v. Estelle, 660 F.2d 592, 593 (5th Cir. Nov. 1981) (per curiam); Edwards v. Harris Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 864 F.

Supp. 633, 637 (S.D. Tex. 1994).

34 Kersh v. Derozier, 851 F.2d 1509, 1512 (5th Cir. 1988).

35 Lindsey v. U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd., 101 F.3d 444, 446 (5th Cir. 1996).

50194, 2024 WL 4057580 (5th Cir. Sept. 5, 2024).36 In noting that the district court did not abuse

its discretion in dismissing the case with prejudice under Rule 41(b), the court recognized that,

after each failed service effort, plaintiff was notified that service was defective and instructed how

to effectuate proper service along with warnings that the case would be dismissed if service was

not effectuated within a specified time.37

III. ANALYSIS

Although the face of the recent, duplicative Summonses (ECF Nos. 18, 20, 21) incorrectly

name defendant Robert Lamb rather than Amazon, Plaintiff’s returns filed into the record after

adoption of the undersigned’s Report and Recommendation appear to reflect that Plaintiff has

served the incorrect Summons via personal delivery to Amazon’s registered agent for service of

process. The recipient is identified as “Cynthia Jones, Customer Service Representative” located

at the address listed for the designated agent of several Amazon entities. Therefore, to avoid

manifest injustice, the appropriate course of action in this matter is to grant, in part, Plaintiff’s

motion and vacate, in part, the dismissal to provide him with the opportunity to obtain a re-issued

Summons addressed to the proper Amazon Defendant for service via delivery to its registered

agent for service of process, Corporation Services Company at 300 Deschutes Way SW, Suite 208

MC-CSC1, Tumwater, Washington, 98501.38

For Defendant Lamb, however, Plaintiff has not established that reconsideration of the

prior dismissal is proper. Plaintiff has not identified a manifest error of law or fact, newly

36 See also Epley v. Luong, No. 23-40038, 2023 WL 8595674 (5th Cir. Dec. 12, 2023) (affirming sua sponte dismissal

of pro se lawsuit for failure to serve defendants in case that would later be barred by statute of limitation).

37 2024 WL 4057580, at *2.

38 Bailey v. AT&T Corp./Headquarters, No. 16-1464, 2017 WL 1178310, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 29, 2017) (citing

Grandey v. Pac. Indem. Co., 217 F.2d 27, 29 (5th Cir. 1954); Grant-Brooks v. Nationscredit Home Equity Servs.

Corp., No. 01-2327, 2002 WL 424566, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 15, 2002) (citing 5B WRIGHT & MILLER’S FEDERAL

PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1354 (3d ed.) (Service is usually quashed “in those situations in which there is a reasonable

prospect that the plaintiff ultimately will be able to serve the defendant properly.”); Jackson v. Duke, 259 F.2d 3, 7

(5th Cir. 1958)).

discovered or previously unavailable evidence, manifest injustice, or intervening change in

controlling law. Again, at no point has Plaintiff personally served Lamb, served Lamb via

domiciliary service, otherwise effected proper service as to Lamb, or even obtained Lamb’s home

address. Moreover, further proceedings would appear futile given that a plaintiff cannot state an

employment discrimination claim against non-employer such as Defendant Lamb.

Like the Buchanan case, rather than properly serve Defendant Lamb, Plaintiff continued

to argue that his attempts at service were proper because “all employees there are agents of

Amazon” when such efforts are clearly not compliant with Rule 4. Despite having filed suit 8

months ago, Plaintiff has still evidently not located a home address for service on Defendant Lamb.

The Court brought Plaintiff’s service deficiencies to his attention in prior orders and sought to

impress upon Plaintiff the need to properly serve the defendants so that the case may proceed.

Unfortunately, Plaintiff has not complied with those directions. The Court is unable to proceed to

address the merits of Plaintiff’s claims absent proper service, Plaintiff still has not provided a

proper service address for Lamb, and Plaintiff alone is responsible for the delay.

III. CONCLUSION

The Court’s exercise of its discretion to dismiss this action as to Defendant Lamb without

prejudice was appropriate, even if the dismissal has the effect of a dismissal with prejudice. And

Plaintiff has not established that reconsideration is appropriate as to Defendant Lamb. Plaintiff

was notified that this case would be dismissed for failure to properly serve the defendants within

the specified time period and the Court explicitly addressed the requirements for proper service.

Rather than properly serve the defendants, Plaintiff directed the U.S. Marshal Service to serve a

summon on Lamb using an “and/or” designation for delivery at Amazon’s Seattle headquarters.

For unknown reasons, the U.S. Marshal Service delivered the summons and complaint to

Amazon’s registered agent.

While delivery of the Summons directed to Lamb by personal delivery to Amazon’s

registered agent is improper, this defective service on Amazon’s registered agent’s address justifies

reconsideration of the dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims against Amazon (but not Lamb). In the

interests of justice, Plaintiff should be allowed to obtain a Summons correctly identifying the

Amazon Defendant and directing service upon its registered agent, Corporation Services

Company, at 300 Deschutes Way SW, Suite 208 MC-CSC1, Tumwater, Washington, 98501.

Plaintiff should be allowed 60 days within which to accomplish same. Should Plaintiff fail to

serve Amazon within this period, dismissal of his claims against Amazon would be proper.

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff Erice D. Magee’s Motion for Reconsideration and

Vacate Dismissal be GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART, granting the motion as to

Defendant Amazon and denying the motion as to Defendant Lamb.

NOTICE OF OPPORTUNITY TO OBJECT

A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and

recommendation in a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation within fourteen (14) days

after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon grounds of plain error, from

attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by

the district court, provided that the party has been served with notice that such consequences will

result from a failure to object.°”

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 3rd day of March, 2026

DONWA PHILL CURRAULT

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

39 Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F. 3d 1415, 1430 (Sth Cir. 1996) (en banc) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)).

Douglass referred to the previously applicable ten-day period for filing of objections, which was extended to fourteen

days by amendment effective December 1, 2009, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

13