WARD

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ERWIN WARD,

2:24-CV-00432-CCW

Plaintiff,

vs.

UNIVERSAL STAINLESS AND ALLOY

PRODUCTS, INC.,

Defendant,

OPINION

Plaintiff Erwin Ward claims that his former employer, Defendant Universal Stainless and

Alloy Products, Inc., discriminated against him on the basis of his race (African American) and

retaliated against him for engaging in protected activity, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964, the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”), and 42 U.S.C § 1981.1 Universal

moves for summary judgment on all claims. ECF No. 54. Relatedly, Universal moves to strike

Mr. Ward’s Responsive Concise Statement of Material Facts, ECF No. 68. ECF No. 70. For the

reasons that follow, the Court will grant both Motions.

I. Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Responsive Concise Statement of Material Facts

Universal argues that Mr. Ward failed to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

56(c)(1) and with Local Rule 56.C.1 and moves to strike Mr. Ward’s Responsive Concise

Statement of Material Facts, ECF No. 68, and have its own Concise Statement of Material Facts

1 The Court has jurisdiction over Mr. Ward’s Title VII and § 1981 claims, which raise federal questions, under 28

U.S.C. § 1331 and may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state-law claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

(“DSOMF”), ECF No. 55, deemed admitted.2 ECF No. 71. Mr. Ward did not respond to the

Motion to Strike.

The Western District of Pennsylvania’s Local Rules specifically require a party opposing

a motion for summary judgment to file a responsive concise statement of material fact that

responds to each numbered paragraph in the movant’s concise statement by (1) admitting or

denying the facts asserted in the movant’s concise statement; (2) setting forth the basis for any

denial, to the extent a fact is not admitted entirely, with appropriate citation to the record; and (3)

setting forth, in separately numbered paragraphs, any other material facts at issue. See LCvR

56.C.1. Courts in this district “require strict compliance with the provisions of Local Rule 56.”

Mattis v. Overmyer, No. 1:16-cv-00306, 2019 WL 2542283, at *2 (W.D. Pa. June 20, 2019)

(collecting cases). A non-moving party “faces severe consequences for not properly responding

to a moving party’s concise statement[,]” namely, that any fact claimed to be undisputed in the

moving party’s concise statement “‘will for the purpose of deciding the motion for summary

judgment be deemed admitted unless specifically denied or otherwise controverted by a separate

concise statement of the opposing party.’” Hughes v. Allegheny Cnty. Airport Auth., No. 15-221,

2017 WL 2880875, at *1 (W.D. Pa. July 6, 2017) (quoting LCvR 56.E).

2 In addition to his responses to the DSOMF, Mr. Ward also included in ECF No. 68 his own statement of additional

facts (the “PSOMF”), see ECF No. 68 at 106–143. Universal seeks to strike Mr. Ward’s response to the DSOMF,

ECF No 68 at 1 –105, but does not expressly seek to strike his statement of additional facts. See ECF No. 70. But, in

its reply in support of summary judgment, Universal asks in passing for the Court to strike Mr. Ward’s statement of

additional facts as well. ECF No. 72 at 1. The Court agrees with Universal that the PSOMF suffers from many of the

same defects as Mr. Ward’s response to the DSOMF. Specifically, numerous statements in the PSOMF contain legal

and factual arguments. See, e.g., ECF No. 68 ¶¶ 95, 106, 119, 199, 233. Others lack any citation to the record, id. ¶¶

206, 208, 218, 233. However, Universal did not fully develop its arguments regarding the PSOMF’s noncompliance

with the federal and local rules, or file a separate motion to strike the PSOMF. Therefore, the Court declines to strike

the PSOMF on this limited record. Nevertheless, the shortcomings in Plaintiff’s statement of additional facts, plus

additional shortcomings in Plaintiff’s briefing, have made the Court’s review of the record very difficult in this case.

For example, Plaintiff’s Brief in Opposition to Summary Judgment does not cite to either DSOMF or Plaintiff’s own

PSOMF. Rather, where it includes citations to the record, they are to specific depositions or documents, rather than

to the parties’ statements of facts. Therefore, it is difficult for the Court to discern from the briefing whether a matter

is disputed between the parties, and if so, whether that dispute is material.

The Court agrees with Universal that Mr. Ward’s Responsive Concise Statement is wildly

noncompliant with Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 and with Local Rule 56.C. As Universal points out in its

Motion to Strike, ECF No. 71, Mr. Ward’s submission contains: (1) substantial amounts of

superfluous content that is not responsive to the corresponding paragraph in the DSOMF; (2)

numerous factual assertions without reference to the record; and (3) numerous factual and legal

arguments that should have been raised in a legal brief, not a statement of material facts. See, e.g.,

ECF No. 68 ¶¶ 10, 11, 14, 55, 70, 93, 117 (superfluous assertions not responsive to corresponding

paragraph in DSOMF); id. ¶¶ 18, 20, 37, 39, 68, 85, 129 (factual assertions without reference to

the record); id. ¶¶ 7, 55, 66, 77, 110, 117, 130, 135 (factual and legal arguments). Indeed, while

the DSOMF is 23 pages long, Mr. Ward’s Responsive Concise Statement is 105 pages long. See

ECF Nos. 55, 68. And some of Mr. Ward’s “responses” to single paragraphs in the DSOMF are

over a full page in length. See e.g., ECF No. 68 ¶ 39.

When a party fails to properly address facts presented in an opposing party’s statement of

material facts, both the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules allow those facts to

be deemed admitted. See Walter v. McDonaugh, No. 2:22-CV-01213-MJH, 2024 WL 4025877,

at *3 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 3, 2024) (Horan, J.) (striking noncompliant CSOMF which “fail[ed] to admit

or deny various facts set forth in . . . SOMF,” failed to “cite to any record evidence,” and which

“ma[de] many legal arguments” and deeming opposing party’s CSOMF admitted); see also Byron

v. Columbia Gas of Pa., No. 2:21-cv-1365-CCW, ECF No. 32 at 2–3 (W.D. Pa. December 2, 2022)

(Wiegand, J.) (deeming admitted facts in CSOMF opposed with boilerplate, citationless

responses). Because Mr. Ward’s Responsive Concise Statement so substantially fails to comply

with Fed. R. Civ. P 56 and with Local Rule 56.C, the Court concludes that it is appropriate to strike

it in its entirety and deem Universal’s Statement of Facts admitted. Having resolved Universal’s

Motion to Strike, the Court now turns to Universal’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

II. Material Facts

The following facts are drawn from Universal’s Concise Statement of Material Facts, ECF

No. 55, unless otherwise noted.

Universal produces specialty steel products at its facility in Bridgeville, Pennsylvania (the

“Bridgeville facility” or the “plant”). In November 2018, Universal hired Mr. Ward, who is

African American, to work as a “stamper” at the Bridgeville facility. DSOMF ¶¶ 16, 17, 20. Mr.

Ward eventually became a forklift operator at the plant, and then a shear operator. Id. ¶¶ 23–24.

In March 2022, Mr. Ward began training as a “heater/charger.” Id. ¶ 27. Heater/chargers are

responsible for loading steel into furnaces, heating the steel, and then unloading the steel from the

furnace so that it can be processed in the mill. Id. ¶¶ 30–31. Heater/chargers use “charger buggies”

to transport steel to and from the furnace. Id. ¶ 33.

While training in the heater/charger role, Mr. Ward reported to a supervisor named Mike

Harmon. Id. ¶¶ 15, 35. Mr. Harmon reported to the operations manager at the plant, Andrew

Matthews. Id. ¶¶ 12, 14. Mr. Matthews reported to the plant manager, Jeffrey Graeber, who in

turn reported to Universal’s vice president of manufacturing, Wendel Crosby. Id. ¶¶ 8–13.

On August 2, 2022, Mr. Ward was training as a heater/charger with a colleague, Anthony

Upshaw, when the charger buggy he and Mr. Upshaw were using broke down. Id. ¶¶ 34, 36.

Messrs. Ward and Upshaw were instructed to use another charger buggy, known as “the Pegasus,”

that had recently been removed from service for maintenance. Id. ¶ 37. But Mr. Ward expressed

concern that the Pegasus was not safe to use and refused to operate it. Id. ¶¶ 39–40; ECF No. 57-

7 at 43–44. Universal’s corporate director of environmental, health and safety, Michael Alderson,

and a technician from Burns Industrial, Universal’s third-party maintenance provider, then

examined the Pegasus and determined that it was safe to operate. DSOMF ¶¶ 41–43; ECF No.

57-5 at 122. Tyson Rebecca, a maintenance supervisor, also informed Mr. Ward that the Pegasus

was safe to operate. DSOMF ¶ 45; ECF No. 57-7 at 45.

After these employees deemed the Pegasus safe for use, Wendel Crosby instructed Andrew

Matthews to direct Messrs. Ward and Upshaw to begin operating the Pegasus. DSOMF ¶¶ 46–47.

But when Mr. Matthews instructed Mr. Ward to operate the Pegasus, Mr. Ward refused. Id. ¶¶

48–49, 51; ECF Nos. 57-5 at 122, 271–72; 57-7 at 42. When Mr. Crosby learned that Mr. Ward

continued to refuse to operate the Pegasus, Mr. Crosby decided to impose a five-day suspension

and a last-chance agreement for insubordination. DSOMF ¶¶ 53–54. Mr. Ward signed a written

notice of the 5-day suspension, which stated that “[a]ny additional infractions or violations will be

cause for immediate termination[,]” on August 16, 2022.3 Id. ¶ 55; ECF No. 57-7 at 47–49.

Subsequently, on August 23, 2022, Mr. Ward was disqualified from training as a

heater/charger during a meeting with Mr. Matthews, Mr. Graeber, and Jeffrey Astle, the President

of Mr. Ward’s union (the “disqualification meeting”). DSOMF ¶¶ 60–61. During the meeting,

Mr. Ward received a written disqualification notice which detailed multiple reasons for his

disqualification as a heater/charger, including that Mr. Ward was unable to competently perform

the required functions of a heater/charger, had taken unapproved time off, and had been found

sleeping at work on two occasions. Id. ¶ 64; ECF No. 57-7 at 51–55. Mr. Matthews testified that,

during the disqualification meeting, Mr. Ward complained that “he felt he was being treated

differently because of his race.” DSOMF ¶ 122; ECF No. 57-5 at 82, 163. After the

disqualification meeting, Mr. Matthews informed Mr. Ward that he was being assigned back to

3 Mr. Ward did not serve the five-day suspension due to the plant’s operational needs. Id. ¶¶ 56–57.

the shear. DSOMF ¶ 66. Mr. Ward told Mr. Matthews he would prefer to return to his position

as a stamper. Id. ¶ 67. During his deposition, Mr. Ward explained that he did not want to train

another employee on the shear who would then progress into higher positions at the plant and earn

more money than he did. Id. ¶ 68; ECF No. 57-7 at 62, 67.

On August 25, 2022, Mr. Matthews held a meeting with Mr. Ward, Mr. Graeber, and Rod

Shy, Mr. Ward’s union representative, to discuss Mr. Ward’s next assignment. DSOMF ¶ 70.

During that meeting it was agreed that, rather than returning to the shear, Mr. Ward would take a

“two-day look”—essentially, a trial run—at an assignment in the milling department. Id. ¶ 71.

However, during Mr. Ward’s two-day look in the milling department, Mr. Crosby determined that

reassigning Mr. Ward to the milling department violated the plant’s collective bargaining

agreement (“CBA”), which requires employees to bid on positions in different departments. Id. ¶

73–74. Mr. Crosby informed Mr. Graeber that Mr. Ward’s two-day look in the milling department

violated the CBA, and Messrs. Matthews and Shy then informed Mr. Ward that he was being

reassigned back to the shear. Id. ¶ 76.

On September 8, 2022, Mr. Ward was instructed to train another employee, Mike

Woodson, on the shear. Id. ¶ 77. Mr. Ward refused. Id. ¶ 78; ECF No. 57-7 at 61. Instead, Mr.

Ward went on the plant’s intercom system (also referred to as the “Femco” or the “Terry phone”)

and requested that another employee, Dylan Pareso, come to the shear to train Mr. Woodson.

DSOMF ¶ 78; ECF No. 57-7 at 61–62. Cody Anderson, one of the supervisors at the plant, told

Mr. Ward that Mr. Pareso was unable to come to the shear. DSOMF ¶ 79. Mr. Ward then returned

to the intercom and, using profanity, demanded that Mr. Pareso come to the shear and stated that

he would not train Mr. Woodson and would instead “shut everything down . . . and wait for his

union rep.”4 Id. ¶ 80; ECF No. 57-7 at 68–69. After hearing Mr. Ward’s broadcast on the

intercom, Mike Harmon approached Mr. Ward and instructed him to train Mr. Woodson on the

shear. DSOMF ¶ 81. Mr. Ward again refused. Id. Mr. Harmon then instructed Mr. Ward to leave

the plant for insubordination. Id. ¶ 82.

News of Mr. Ward’s outburst soon began to circulate. Mr. Harmon contacted Mr.

Matthews and informed him of the incident while hourly employees at the plant contacted Mr.

Crosby to inquire why production had ceased. Id. ¶¶ 83–84. Mr. Crosby then called Mr. Matthews

and directed him to assist Mr. Harmon in escorting Mr. Ward out of the plant. Id. ¶ 85. Mr.

Matthews did so, and informed Mr. Ward that his conduct constituted insubordination and that he

would be terminated. Id. ¶ 86. After escorting Mr. Ward out of the plant, Messrs. Matthews and

Harmon took statements from the employees who heard Mr. Ward’s outburst on the intercom, and

Mr. Matthews advised Mr. Crosby that Mr. Ward’s conduct constituted insubordination and

recommended that Mr. Ward be terminated. Id. ¶¶ 87–88, 90. Mr. Crosby terminated Mr. Ward’s

employment the next day, September 9, 2022. Id. ¶¶ 90, 92; ECF No. 57-7 at 69.

Universal now moves for Summary Judgment on all of Mr. Ward’s claims. ECF No. 54.

The Motion is fully briefed and ripe for resolution. ECF Nos. 56, 67, 72.

III. Legal Standard

To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must establish that “there

is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A factual dispute is ‘genuine’ if the ‘evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Razak v. Uber Techs., Inc., 951

4At his deposition, Mr. Ward denied that he threatened to “shut everything down” on the intercom, but admitted that

he demanded that Mr. Pareso come to the shear, PSOMF ¶ 212, announced that he would not train anyone, that he

was using his “seniority card,” that he would do “nothing,” and that he would “lay the fuck down and wait for his

union rep.” ECF No. 57-7 at 68–69.

F.3d 137, 144 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).

“A factual dispute is ‘material’ if it ‘might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.’”

Id. (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a

rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” NAACP

v. N. Hudson Reg’l Fire & Rescue, 665 F.3d 464, 475 (3d Cir. 2011) (alteration omitted) (quoting

Matsushita Elect. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).

The burden to establish that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact “remains

with the moving party regardless of which party would have the burden of persuasion at trial.”

Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental Corp., 85 F.3d 1074, 1080 (3d Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks

omitted). Furthermore, “[i]f the non-moving party bears the burden of persuasion at trial, ‘the

moving party may meet its burden on summary judgment by showing that the nonmoving party’s

evidence is insufficient to carry that burden.’” Kaucher v. Cnty of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d

Cir. 2006) (quoting Wetzel v. Tucker, 139 F.3d 380, 383 n.2 (3d Cir. 1998)).

Once the moving party has carried its initial burden, the party opposing summary judgment

“must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. . .

. Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving

party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586–87. Thus, while “[t]he

evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his

favor[,]” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, “Rule 56(e) . . . requires the nonmoving party to go beyond

the pleadings” and point to “‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986) (citation omitted). But, while the court must “view the

facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that

party’s favor . . . to prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must present

more than a mere scintilla of evidence. . . .” Burton v. Teleflex Inc., 707 F.3d 417, 425 (3d Cir.

2013) (internal citations omitted). Instead, “there must be evidence on which the jury could

reasonably find for the non-movant.” Id. (cleaned up). If the non-moving party “fails to make a

showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to [the non-movant's] case,

and on which [the non-movant] will bear the burden of proof at trial,” Rule 56 requires the entry

of summary judgment because such a failure “necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.”

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322–23; Jakimas v. Hoffmann La Roche, Inc., 485 F.3d 770, 777 (3d Cir.

2007).

IV. Discussion

A. Legal Framework

The parties agree that the familiar McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework applies

to Mr. Ward’s disparate treatment claims under Title VII (Count IV), the PHRA (Count IV), and

§ 1981 (Count II) and to Mr. Ward’s retaliation claims under Title VII (Count V), the PHRA

(Count V), and § 1981 (Count III).5 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–03

(1973); Burton, 707 F.3d at 425–27; ECF Nos. 56 at 7, 67 at 2.

The McDonnell Douglas analysis has three steps. First, the plaintiff must point to evidence

sufficient to satisfy the elements of a prima facie case of employment discrimination or retaliation,

thereby creating an inference that the employer acted unlawfully. See Burton, 707 F.3d at 426.

Next, the defendant must rebut this inference by articulating a legitimate, non-discriminatory

reason for its actions. See id. The burden of production then shifts back to the plaintiff, who, in

order to survive summary judgment, must provide evidence from which a jury could reasonably

5 Mr. Ward also asserted a claim for wrongful termination in violation of a clear mandate of public policy under

Pennsylvania common law (Count I). ECF No. 1 at 7–10. Mr. Ward dismissed his wrongful termination claim with

prejudice on April 2, 2025. ECF No. 51.

infer that the defendant’s proffered explanation for its conduct is, in reality, pretext for unlawful

discrimination or retaliation. See id. at 426–27; see also Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 763–64

(3d Cir. 1994) (setting forth burden shifting framework under McDonnell Douglas at summary

judgment). Although the McDonnell Douglas framework contemplates a shifting burden of

production, the burden of persuasion always remains with the plaintiff. Smith v. City of Allentown,

589 F.3d 684, 691 (3d Cir. 2009).

Additionally, while it is true that the United States Supreme Court has held that to prevail

on a § 1981 claim a plaintiff must ultimately “prove that but for his race, he would not have been

discriminated against,” Williams v. Tech Mahindra (Americas) Inc., 70 F.4th 646, 651 (3d Cir.

2023) (citing Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Assoc. of African Am.-Owned Media, 589 U.S. 327, 589 U.S.

at 341), and that this is a higher causal burden than is required for Title VII disparate treatment

claims, Comcast, 589 U.S. at 337–38, the McDonnell Douglas framework still governs Mr. Ward’s

§ 1981 claims. See Tech Mahindra, 70 F.4th at 651. Thus, to survive summary judgment, a §

1981 plaintiff need only present evidence that tends to show that her race was the “likely reason

for the adverse [employment] action. . . . To hold otherwise ‘would be tantamount to eliminating

the McDonnell Douglas framework[.]’” Onely v. Redner’s Markets, Inc., 697 F. Supp. 3d 410,

421 (E.D. Pa. 2023) (quoting Carvalho-Grevious v. Del. State Univ., 851 F.3d 249, 259 (3d Cir.

2017)) (analyzing Title VII and § 1981 disparate treatment claims together). Finally, because the

Third Circuit has found that “[c]laims under the PHRA are interpreted coextensively with Title

VII claims[,]” the Court will address Mr. Ward’s federal and state-law claims in tandem. Atkins

v. Lafayette Coll., 460 F.3d 447, 454 n.6 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d 102,

105 (3d Cir. 1996)).

B. Universal is Entitled to Summary Judgment on Mr. Ward’s Disparate

Treatment Claims (Counts II, IV)

Mr. Ward asserts that Universal discriminated against him on the basis of his race when it

imposed the five-day suspension and then terminated him. ECF No. 1. Universal asserts that Mr.

Ward cannot make out a prima facie case of race discrimination and that, even if he could, he

cannot show that Universal’s reasons for disciplining and firing him were a pretext for

discrimination. ECF No. 56.

1. Mr. Ward Cannot Establish a Prima Facie Case

To prove a prima facie case of employment discrimination, a plaintiff must show that (1)

he is a member of a protected class, (2) that he was qualified for the position he sought to attain or

retain, (3) that he suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) the action occurred under

circumstances that support an inference of intentional discrimination. In re Tribune Media Co.,

902 F.3d 384, 402 (3d Cir. 2018). The parties dispute only the fourth element—whether Mr.

Ward’s discipline and termination occurred under circumstances that support an inference of

intentional discrimination.6 ECF Nos. 56, 67.

To show an inference of intentional discrimination, a plaintiff may either:

6 Universal concedes that the five-day suspension Mr. Ward received and his subsequent termination each constitute

adverse actions. ECF Nos. 56 at 8. But the Complaint alleges that, in addition to disciplining and terminating Mr.

Ward, Universal took additional adverse action against him, such as “forc[ing]” Mr. Ward “to work additional hours

. . . under unsafe conditions.” ECF No. 1. ¶ 101. The Court agrees with Universal that the record does not contain

evidence which would allow a reasonable jury to conclude that Universal forced Mr. Ward to work beyond his

scheduled hours or in unsafe conditions. For example, Mr. Ward testified at his deposition that, at some time in “late

2020 and ’21 [and] [p]robably a little bit of ’22 too[,]” he was forced to work beyond his scheduled stop time on at

least one occasion when a less senior colleague, whose identity he does not recall, was allowed to leave. DSOMF ¶

99–101. Even if such “‘vague, self-serving statements’ which are unsupported by specific facts in the record” were

sufficient for a reasonable juror to find Universal forced Mr. Ward to work additional hours, which they are not, Mr.

Ward would still fail to show that these actions occurred under circumstances supporting an inference of intentional

discrimination, for the reasons set forth below. Additionally, Mr. Ward’s briefing focuses on the circumstances

surrounding his five-day suspension and termination and offers no arguments regarding a causal connection between

these other alleged adverse actions and his membership in a protected class. Accordingly, the Court will not consider

these alleged adverse actions further. See Wingard v. Pennsylvania State Police, No. 12-cv-1500, 2013 WL 3551109,

at *7 (W.D. Pa. July 11, 2013) (Bissoon, J.) (“The Court need not consider arguments that have not been developed

by the party advancing them.”).

(1) introduce evidence of comparators (i.e., similarly situated

employees who (a) were not members of the same protected class

and (b) were treated more favorably under similar circumstances);

or (2) rely on circumstantial evidence that otherwise shows a causal

nexus between his membership in a protected class and the adverse

employment action.

Drummer v. Hospital of Univ. of Pennsylvania, 455 F. Supp. 3d 160, 168 (E.D. Pa. 2020) (citing

Greene v. Virgin Islands Water & Power Auth., 557 F. App’x 189, 195 (3d Cir. 2014)). Here, Mr.

Ward points both to evidence of a comparator and to circumstantial evidence. ECF No. 67 at 4–

5, 14–15. Universal contends that the purported comparator is not similarly situated to Mr. Ward

and that Mr. Ward’s circumstantial evidence is insufficient to show a causal nexus between his

discipline and termination and his membership in a protected class. ECF No. 56 at 12–15.

Mr. Ward proffers Dylan Pareso as a comparator. In support, Mr. Ward asserts that Mr.

Pareso, a white employee, refused to operate plant equipment due to safety concerns in June 2022.

ECF No. 67 at 12–13; PSOMF ¶ 239. Mr. Ward further asserts that, while Universal initially

issued Mr. Pareso a write-up for insubordination for his refusal to operate the equipment, Universal

later withdrew the write-up and apologized to Mr. Pareso. PSOMF ¶ 240. According to Mr. Ward,

Mr. Pareso was also later involved in a physical altercation with another employee but was not

terminated or disciplined.7 ECF No. 67 at 13; PSOMF ¶ 243.

The record demonstrates that there was an occasion on which Mr. Pareso refused to operate

a shear at the Bridgeville facility over concerns the shear was malfunctioning and, thus, unsafe to

operate. DSOMF ¶¶ 127–131; ECF No. 57-5 at 71. The record also shows that, after Mr. Pareso

raised his concerns to management, management consulted with the relevant safety and

maintenance employees. DSMOF ¶¶ 131–134; ECF No. 57-5 at 72. After examining the shear,

7 Mr. Ward’s brief also references “another white comparator, Dan Gately,” who allegedly “told management to ‘fuck

off’ and was not fired[.]” ECF No. 67 at 13. But Mr. Ward provides no further information to suggest that Mr. Gately

was similarly situated to Mr. Ward.

the safety and maintenance employees determined it was safe for use and Mr. Pareso resumed

operating the shear. DSOMF ¶¶ 131-134; ECF No. 57-5 at 73–74.

While a comparator need not be “identically situated” to the plaintiff, “the comparator must

be similar in all relevant respects.” Durst v. City of Philadelphia, 798 F. App’x 710, 713 (3d Cir.

2020) (quoting Johnson v. Kroger Co., 319 F.3d 858, 867 (6th Cir. 2003)). Mr. Pareso, like Mr.

Ward, was qualified as a shearman. DSMOF ¶ 107. Mr. Pareso, like Mr. Ward, also refused to

operate a charging buggy that he was concerned was unsafe to use. Id.¶¶ 38–40. And when Mr.

Ward expressed his concern to management, management consulted with the relevant safety and

maintenance personnel, just as it did when addressing Mr. Pareso’s safety concerns. Id. ¶¶ 41–45.

But, unlike Mr. Pareso, Mr. Ward continued to refuse to operate equipment after it had been

deemed safe for use. Id. ¶¶ 46–51. Mr. Ward is thus not similarly situated to Mr. Pareso. Durst,

798 Fed. App’x at 713 (finding that comparator was not similarly situated where their alleged

misconduct was not similar to plaintiff’s); Dennison v. Ind. Univ. Pa., No. 20-cv-1563, 2022 WL

3213657, at *9 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 9, 2022) (Horan, J.) (explaining that comparators must be

“sufficiently comparable[,]” and they are not so when the facts and circumstances leading to the

discipline are different for the comparators).

Turning next to the circumstantial evidence supporting a causal nexus, the Court finds that

Mr. Ward fails to identify evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to conclude that there was

a causal nexus between his discipline and termination and his membership in a protected class.

Mr. Ward’s briefing argues that “the record reveals a workplace environment in which racial

discrimination was normalized, tolerated, and left unaddressed by both Human Resources and

management.” ECF No. 67 at 3. But, despite such sweeping and conclusory statements, Mr. Ward

only offers one concrete example of an incident in which he claims an employee, supervisor Mike

Harmon, was accused of using discriminatory language. Mr. Ward argues the record contains

evidence that Mr. Harmon, one of Mr. Ward’s supervisors, was accused by Brian Jackson, an

African American employee at the plant, of using the N-word. ECF No. 67 at 4–5, 14. Mr. Ward

claims Mr. Jackson made this allegation about Mr. Harmon during a conflict resolution between

Messrs. Jackson and Harmon in late 2022 or in 2023, after Mr. Ward’s termination. Id.; PSOMF

¶ 92.

Universal disputes whether the record supports Mr. Ward’s contention that Mr. Jackson

accused Mr. Harmon of using the n-word during the conflict resolution meeting. ECF No. 72 at

2. But even if the allegation against Mr. Harmon was well-supported in the record, which the

Court finds doubtful at best,8 it would not be enough to show a causal nexus between Mr. Ward’s

discipline and termination and his race. First, this supposed allegation was made after Mr. Ward

left Universal. Second, and more importantly, the allegation does not in any way relate to Mr.

Ward or his termination. See Goodson v. Cigna Ins. Co., No. 85-0476, 1988 WL 52086, at *9

(E.D. Pa. May 20, 1988) (“One way in which the plaintiff has tried to prove discrimination is

through indirect or circumstantial evidence. It is possible to do so, provided that the evidence bears

some connection to the alleged discrimination.”) (emphasis added). Indeed, this single, unfounded

allegation against Mr. Harmon amounts to even less than “a collection of stray remarks and

8 Universal argues that Jeff Astle did not testify that Mr. Jackson accused Mr. Harmon of using the N-word. ECF No.

72 at 2. Rather, Universal argues Mr. Astle testified that he “inferred” this allegation. Id. The Court reviewed the

transcript of Mr. Astle’s deposition, and Mr. Astle testified that, during the conflict resolution meeting, which Mr.

Astle was present for, Mr. Harmon first told Mr. Jackson that “I really don’t like it when you call me the N-word.”

Mr. Astle testified that Mr. Jackson then responded to Mr. Harmon by stating that, “well, you know, that’s a two-way

street.” ECF No. 74-2 at 89. Mr. Astle understood this as an allegation that Mr. Harmon had previously used the N-

word. Mr. Ward also claims in his briefing that Mr. Crosby and HR manager Katrina Caldwell testified that they were

aware of Mr. Jackson’s allegation against Mr. Harmon. ECF No. 67 at 14–15. The Court has reviewed the cited

portions of both deposition transcripts, which do not support Mr. Ward’s assertions. Mr. Crosby testified that he

“wasn’t involved” in the conflict resolution meeting between Messrs. Jackson and Harmon. ECF No. 69-9 at 285–

87. Nowhere in the cited portion of the deposition transcript does Mr. Crosby testify that he had any knowledge of

this alleged incident. And Ms. Caldwell explicitly testified that she did not remember Mr. Jackson or any grievance

related to Mr. Jackson’s supposed allegation against Mr. Harmon. ECF No. 69-5 at 78–79. The Court is dismayed

that counsel has misrepresented the deponents’ testimony to the Court.

unconnected, coincidental circumstances” that “does not a causal nexus make.” Greene, 557 F.

App’x at 196. Accordingly, Mr. Ward cannot point to any evidence from which a reasonable jury

could conclude that the circumstances surrounding his termination and discipline support an

inference of intentional discrimination.

2. Mr. Ward Cannot Establish That Universal’s Proffered Reasons

Were a Pretext for Discrimination.

But even if Mr. Ward could establish a prima facie case of discrimination, Universal offers

a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the decision to impose a 5-day suspension and to

terminate his employment—Mr. Ward’s repeated insubordination.9 See Maurizio v. Fox Chapel

Foods, Inc., No. 02: 04CV1168, 2006 WL 2571397, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 5, 2006) (McVerry, J.)

(“Insubordination and/or misconduct is a legitimate, non-discriminatory cause for termination.”).

It is undisputed that Mr. Ward was repeatedly insubordinate. First, it is undisputed that on August

2, 2022, Mr. Ward refused a directive from Andrew Matthews to operate the Pegasus charger

buggy and subsequently received a five-day suspension for insubordination.10 DSOMF ¶¶ 54–55.

That refusal led Mr. Crosby to issue a five-day suspension against Mr. Ward. Id. ¶ 54. Second, it

is undisputed that, on September 8, 2022, Mr. Ward repeatedly refused a directive to train another

employee on the shear and, using profanity, broadcast his refusal over the plant’s intercom.

DSOMF ¶ 77–80; PSOMF ¶ 234; ECF No. 57-7 at 61–62, 67–69. Thus, Universal has sufficiently

proffered a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for suspending and terminating Mr. Ward.

9Although Mr. Ward expressly states in his briefing that he “does not concede that Universal has identified a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for [his] termination[,]” ECF No. 67 at 18, he acknowledges that he engaged in nearly all

of the underlying conduct.

10 Mr. Ward disputes whether his conduct on August 2, 2022 constituted insubordination. ECF No. 67 at 7–8.

Specifically, Mr. Ward asserts that, while Mr. Matthews instructed Messrs. Ward and Upshaw to resume operating

the Pegasus charger buggy after it was cleared for use, Mr. Matthews did not inform the employees that the instruction

to operate the Pegasus had been given to Mr. Matthews by Mr. Crosby. Id. But Mr. Ward does not dispute that Mr.

Matthews was his supervisor, DSOMF ¶¶ 12, 14–15, or that he refused Mr. Matthews’ directive to resume operating

the Pegasus after it was cleared for use by maintenance and safety. Id. ¶¶ 47–51; ECF No. 57-7 at 42–44. Refusing

Mr. Matthews’ directive was therefore, by definition, insubordination.

Furthermore, Mr. Ward cannot establish that Universal’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reason was pretext for discrimination. To show an employer’s proffered reasons for acting against

an employee were pretext for discrimination, a plaintiff must offer some direct or circumstantial

evidence from which a factfinder could reasonably (i) disbelieve the employer’s stated reasons for

their action, or (ii) believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a

motivating or determinative cause of the employer’s action. In re Tribune Media Co., 902 F.3d at

402; Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d at 764. A plaintiff can show that an invidious discriminatory

reason was more likely than not a motivating factor where “the employer treated other . . . similarly

situated persons not of [his] protected class more favorably.” In re Tribune Media Co., 902 F.3d

at 403.

Here, nothing in the record would allow a reasonable factfinder to disbelieve Universal’s

stated reason for Mr. Ward’s termination. As explained, Mr. Ward repeatedly was insubordinate.

And nothing in the record suggests an invidious discriminatory reason, rather than that repeated

insubordination, was the reason Universal disciplined and terminated Mr. Ward. Mr. Ward’s

attempt to characterize Dylan Pareso as a comparator fails to establish pretext, because Mr. Pareso

did not refuse an order to operate equipment that management deemed safe for use. DSOMF ¶

132. And Mr. Ward’s allegation regarding the conflict resolution meeting between Mr. Harmon

and Mr. Jackson also fails to establish pretext, because it lacks support in the record, occurred after

Mr. Ward’s employment at Universal ended, and is entirely unrelated to Mr. Ward and the

circumstances surrounding his termination. See Cridland v. Kmart Corp., 929 F. Supp. 2d 377,

389 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (“Under Third Circuit precedent, ‘stray remarks’ unconnected from an adverse

employment decision are insufficient to show invidious purpose.”) (quoting Hodczak v. Latrobe

Specialty Steel Co., 451 F. App’x 238, 241 (3d Cir. 2011)). Thus, even if Mr. Ward could establish

a prima facie case of disparate treatment, he cannot point to evidence that would support a

reasonable finding that Universal’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for disciplining and

firing him was a pretext for discrimination.11

C. Universal is Entitled to Summary Judgment on Mr. Ward’s Retaliation Claim

(Count III)

Mr. Ward asserts that Universal terminated him on September 9, 2022 in retaliation for his

complaints about the discriminatory treatment of African American employees at the Bridgeville

facility. ECF No. 1. Universal argues Mr. Ward cannot establish a prima facie case of retaliation

and that, even if he could, he cannot establish that Universal’s reasons for firing him were

pretextual. ECF No. 56.

1. Mr. Ward Cannot Establish a Prima Facie Case

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show that (a) he engaged in

a protected activity, (b) the employer took materially adverse action against him, and (c) there was

a causal connection between the protected activity and the employer’s action. Young v. City of

Phila. Police Dept., 651 F. App’x 90, 95 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing Moore v. City of Phila., 461 F.3d

331, 340–42 (3d Cir. 2006)). Here, the parties dispute the first and third elements—whether Mr.

Ward engaged in protected activity and whether there was a causal connection between the

protected activity and his termination.

a. Mr. Ward Engaged in a Protected Activity by Alleging

Disparate Treatment of African American Employees

11 Mr. Ward also contests whether the appropriate personnel cleared the Pegasus for use and claims that Mr. Matthews

initially opposed imposing the five-day suspension on Mr. Ward, but that Mr. Matthews was overridden by Mr.

Crosby. ECF No. 67 at 7–8. But merely critiquing the wisdom of Universal’s decision to discipline Mr. Ward cannot

establishment pretext. See Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 765 (“To discredit the employer’s proffered reason, however, the

plaintiff cannot simply show that the employer’s decision was wrong or mistaken, since the factual dispute at issue is

whether discriminatory animus motivated the employer, not whether the employer is wise, shrewd, prudent, or

competent.”).

Universal contests whether Mr. Ward’s complaint at the August 23, 2022 disqualification

meeting that he was experiencing discriminatory treatment was sufficiently specific to constitute

a protected activity under Title VII, the PHRA, and § 1981. ECF No. 56 at 15–16. Mr. Matthews

testified that, during the disqualification meeting, Mr. Ward “more or less loudly exclaimed that

he felt he was being treated differently because of his race.” DSOMF ¶ 122.

The Third Circuit has held that “protected activity includes not only formal charges of

discrimination, but also ‘informal protests of discriminatory employment practices, including

making complaints to management.’” Mammen v. Thomas Jefferson Univ., 523 F. Supp. 3d 702,

714 (E.D. Pa. 2021) (quoting Curay-Cramer v. Ursuline Acad. of Wilmington, Del., 450 F.3d 130,

135 (3d Cir. 2006)). However, “[c]omplaints must be specific enough to notify the employer of

the particular type of discrimination being opposed, and allow the employer to discern that the

employee opposes an unlawful practice.” Caplan v. L Brands/Victoria’s Secret Stores, LLC, 210

F. Supp. 3d 744, 754 (W.D. Pa. 2016), aff’d sub nom. Caplan v. L Brands/Victoria’s Secret Stores,

704 F. App’x 152 (3d Cir. 2017).

The Court finds that a reasonable jury could conclude that Mr. Ward’s statement at the

disqualification meeting was sufficiently specific to put Universal on notice of the type of

discrimination Mr. Ward opposed—the disparate treatment of African American employees.

Accordingly, Mr. Ward can show that he engaged a protected activity.12

12 Mr. Ward’s Complaint alleges Universal terminated him for making complaints of racial discrimination and for

making safety complaints, including filing an OSHA report. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 51–52, 63. However, complaints about

alleged safety violations are “not protected activities under Title VII, the PHRA, and § 1981.” Fields v. Am. Airlines,

Inc., 696 F. Supp. 3d 66 (E.D. Pa. 2023), aff’d No. 23-2962, 2024 WL 3534478, at *2 (3d Cir. July 25, 2024).

Accordingly, Mr. Ward cannot proceed on a retaliation claim based on those complaints. Additionally, Mr. Ward

alleges that he made “numerous” complaints about race discrimination at the plant to human resources manager Lecia

Caldwell prior to his complaint at the disqualification meeting. ECF No. 67 at 5. But Mr. Ward offers no details

about the timing or content of these alleged prior complaints of race discrimination, let alone any arguments regarding

a causal connection between the alleged prior complaints and his subsequent discipline and termination. Accordingly,

the Court will not consider these alleged complaints further.

b. Mr. Ward Cannot Establish a Causal Connection Between the

Protected Activity and His Termination

A plaintiff may point to “a broad array of evidence” to demonstrate a causal link between

the protected activity and the adverse action, including a “temporal proximity between the

protected activity and the adverse action [that] is unusually suggestive” or evidence of “intervening

antagonism or retaliatory animus, inconsistencies in the employer’s articulated reasons for

terminating the employee, or any other evidence in the record sufficient to support the inference

of retaliatory animus.” LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass’n, 503 F.3d 217, 232–33 (3d

Cir. 2007) (cleaned up).

Universal argues that Mr. Ward cannot show a causal connection between his complaint of

discriminatory treatment and his termination, because the ultimate decisionmaker behind Mr.

Ward’s termination, Wendell Crosby, was unaware that Mr. Ward had complained of

discriminatory treatment during the disqualification meeting. ECF No. 56 at 17. Mr. Ward

contends he can show a causal connection under a “cat’s paw” theory of liability, in which Mr.

Crosby “relied on the tainted input of biased subordinates” who were aware of Mr. Ward’s

complaint. ECF No. 67 at 18.

Universal acknowledges that Mr. Matthews was aware of Mr. Ward’s complaint about

discriminatory treatment when Mr. Matthews recommended that Mr. Ward be terminated

following the incident on the intercom. DSOMF ¶¶ 90, 123. But Mr. Crosby first learned about

Mr. Ward’s outburst on the intercom from hourly employees who were confused why the plant

was not operating. Id. ¶ 84; ECF No. 57-3 at 80. Furthermore, Mr. Matthews was not the only

supervisor who was in favor of terminating Mr. Ward. Mr. Ward’s direct supervisor, Mike

Harmon, also favored termination. DSOMF ¶¶ 82–83. And while Mr. Ward must show that the

decisionmakers behind his termination were aware of his complaint of discriminatory treatment to

establish a causal connection between the complaint and his termination, see Daniels v. Sch. Dist.

of Phila., 776 F.3d 181, 196 (3d Cir. 2015) (“The plaintiff . . . cannot establish . . . a causal

connection without some evidence that the [decisionmakers] knew of the plaintiff's protected

conduct at the time they acted.”), such a showing is not sufficient to establish a causal connection.

In other words, even if the key decisionmakers knew of Mr. Ward’s past complaint of racial

discrimination at the time they decided to terminate him, Mr. Ward would still need to point to

facts that would allow a reasonable jury to conclude those decisionmakers terminated him because

of his past complaint. But Mr. Ward lacks any evidence that he was terminated because of his

complaint of race-based discrimination. As explained, Mr. Ward’s proffered comparator, Dylan

Pareso, was not similarly situated to Mr. Ward, and the supposed allegation regarding Mr. Harmon

bears no temporal or circumstantial connection to Mr. Ward or his termination. Because the record

clearly shows Mr. Ward was terminated because of his outburst on the intercom on September 8,

2022, and not because of his complaint of racial discrimination, Mr. Ward has failed to establish a

prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, the PHRA, or § 1981.

2. Mr. Ward Cannot Establish That Universal’s Proffered Reasons

Were a Pretext for Discrimination.

Even assuming arguendo that Mr. Ward could show a prima facie case of retaliation,

Universal offers a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for Mr. Ward’s termination—his repeated

insubordination. And, as noted, it is undisputed that Mr. Ward was repeatedly insubordinate. ECF

No. 57-7 at 42–44, 61–62. Accordingly, to establish pretext, Mr. Ward must point to evidence that

would allow a reasonable jury to “either (1) disbelieve the employer’s articulated legitimate

reasons; or (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a

motivating or determinative cause of the employer’s action.” Kautz v. Met-Pro Corp., 412 F.3d

463, 465 (3d Cir. 2005).

As explained, Mr. Ward can point to neither. His attempt to invoke Dylan Pareso as a

comparator and his argument regarding Mr. Harmon are insufficient for a reasonable jury to

conclude Universal’s proffered reason for Mr. Ward’s termination was pretextual.

V. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Universal’s Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Statement of

Material Facts and Motion for Summary Judgment will be GRANTED. Accordingly, Mr. Ward’s

Title VII, PHRA, and § 1981 claims will be dismissed, and judgment will be entered in Universal’s

favor.

DATED this 25th day of March, 2026.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Christy Criswell Wiegand

CHRISTY CRISWELL WIEGAND

United States District Judge

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