Jones

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

SHREVEPORT DIVISION

ROBERT CLINTON JONES CIVIL ACTION NO. 24-1793-P

VERSUS JUDGE VAN HOOK

BOSSIER CITY, ET AL. MAGISTRATE JUDGE HORNSBY

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

In accordance with the standing order of this court, this matter was referred to the

undersigned Magistrate Judge for review, report and recommendation.

STATEMENT OF CLAIM

Before the court is a civil rights complaint filed in forma pauperis by pro se plaintiff

Robert Clinton Jones (“Plaintiff”), pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This complaint was

received and filed in this court on December 26, 2024. Plaintiff is detained at the Bossier

Maximum Security Center in Plain Dealing, Louisiana. He names Bossier City, the Bossier

City Police Department, Officer Mims, Officer Pollit, Sheriff J. Whittington, Assistant

District Attorney Jessica Davis, the Bossier Parish Indigent Defender Board, Attorney

Alonzo Jackson, John Doe, the Street Crime Interdiction Unit, the Parish of Bossier, the

Bossier Parish Sheriff Office, Unknown Jailers, J. Schuyler Marvin, and the State of

Louisiana as defendants.

Plaintiff claims that on December 28, 2023, he was arrested after a routine traffic

stop that resulted in an unreasonable search and seizure. The traffic stop was initiated by

Bossier City Police Department Street Crime Interdiction Unit Officers Mims and Pollit

for a broken taillight-improper equipment. He claims the police officers did not have a

warrant or probable cause and relied on an automobile exception to the warrant

requirement.

Plaintiff claims that pursuant to the Reporting Officer Narrative, contact was made

with him and as he was exiting the vehicle he was advised of the reason for the traffic stop.

Plaintiff responded that someone hit his vehicle and caused damage to the light. The officer

advised Plaintiff that he understood but it was still a violation because of the white light

illuminating from the rear of the vehicle. He continued to argue, became frustrated, and

stated that his rights were being violated. Plaintiff was nervous, talking excessively,

pacing, and arguing. The officer then conducted a pat down of Plaintiff for officer safety.

The officer also conducted a warrant check and advised Plaintiff that he had active warrants

through the Smith County Sherriff Office, and they would extradite.

The officer then asked Plaintiff if there was anything illegal inside the vehicle and

he responded no. Plaintiff denied the officer consent to search the vehicle. Officer Pollit

and his K9 were on the scene and conducted a plain air smell of the exterior of the vehicle.

Plaintiff was advised that the dog alerted that there were narcotics inside the vehicle or had

been inside the vehicle. The officer searched the vehicle and located a black backpack on

the passenger seat next to where Plaintiff was sitting. The officer found three firearms in

the backpack but did not find narcotics. Plaintiff was advised of his Miranda rights, and

he then stated that the firearms belonged to a friend who he had given a ride. The officer

asked Plaintiff for the friend’s name and Plaintiff paused for a long time as if he was trying

to think of a name to provide. The officer then checked to see if the firearms were stolen,

and he was advised they were not.

Plaintiff argues that he was unreasonably searched and seized without probable

cause. He further argues that the oath on the arrest report narrative is chronologically

inaccurate, highly prejudicial, and written to support unfounded suspicion. Plaintiff admits

there was an objectively reasonable basis for the stop but argues the actions of the officers

were not justified and not reasonably related in scope to what justified the stop. He further

argues that the officer’s unparticularized hunches or generalized suspicions did not support

any reasonable inferences of separate illegal activity and were dispelled when no narcotics

were found. He claims he did not own the backpack and did not knowingly possess the

firearms.

Plaintiff claims he was not given a timely 48-hour hearing. He states he was arrested

on December 28, 2023, and the affidavit of probable cause was not signed until December

31, 2023. Plaintiff claims he appeared at a 72-hour hearing for the setting of bond and

appointment of counsel. Plaintiff claims he is statutorily entitled to release and has a claim

for damages resulting from the violation. He argues that the 72-hour hearing does not cure

the defect of untimeliness, nor does it waive his right to a preliminary examination before

a bill of information.

Plaintiff claims he is in custody based upon an affidavit that contains incorrect

information and rests upon unfounded suspicion. He claims the judge lacked the requisite

facts within the four corners of the affidavit to detain him for further proceedings without

releasing him on his own recognizance pending a full adversarial preliminary examination.

He claims the judge combined the 48-hour and 72-hour hearings.

Plaintiff claims that the hearsay evidence provided by the officer conflicts with the

evidence. He argues that a vehicle is an extension of a person’s home and people

commonly leave their possessions in another person’s vehicle. He claims the firearms have

not been declared contraband. He further claims the firearms have been seized, so there is

no risk of a crime being committed before a probable cause determination can be made.

He argues that the State lacks requisite facts within the four corners of the affidavit to hold

him in custody until a preliminary examination can be held. He claims that if probable

cause is then found, he can be rearrested, and a bond can be set.

Plaintiff argues that upon reading the affidavit, it is clear the officer’s suspicions

were unfounded and were quickly dispelled. He claims no narcotics were found and the

firearms have not been declared contraband. Plaintiff claims he has been in custody for an

extended period and the time-period for filing pretrial motions has expired.

Plaintiff argues that at a preliminary examination before the bill of information, he

could have subjected the officer’s testimony to cross-examination. He also argues that the

owner of the firearms could have been subpoenaed. He further argues that the hearing

could have preserved a transcript for a timely motion to suppress.

Plaintiff argues that he stated the backpack belonged to a friend, but the officer

stated he said the firearms belonged to a friend. He states that the officer’s narrative states

that an inventory search was conducted on the vehicle for Plaintiff’s protection of loss of

items. He argues that the backpack was in the passenger seat where a passenger might

have left it. He next argues that the firearms came back clean, thus the subpoenaed

testimony may have resolved the issue. Plaintiff lastly argues that a transcript of testimony

for a timely motion to suppress could have been preserved.

Plaintiff states that the time for filing pretrial motions has expired. He claims the

time-period for filing pretrial motions to suppress is 30 days after the receipt of discovery.

Plaintiff states he appeared for arraignment on March 7, 2024. He claims the attorney of

record Alonzo Jackson waived the formal reading of the bill of the information without

speaking to him. He claims the attorney informed him of a plea offer without discussing

whether there was probable cause. He claims the attorney received a copy of the discovery

on February 27, 2024. Plaintiff claims that after he refused the plea agreement, he asked

the attorney for a copy of the discovery and to file a motion to suppress. He claims a

motion to suppress should have been filed not later than March 27, 2024 for a timely

hearing to be held on the next court date which was April 22, 2024. Plaintiff claims that

after several failed attempts at communication, he filed two pro se motions to preserve his

objection to the admissibility of evidence. He filed a motion for copy of discovery and

motion to act as co-counsel for the preparation and filing of pretrial motions.

Plaintiff claims that on April 22, 2024, the attorney was present without a motion to

suppress, and no timely or meaningful hearing was held. He claims the matter was reset

for July 2, 2024. He claims that on April 24 or 25, 2024, the Judge denied both of his pro

se motions. Plaintiff claims that on July 2, 2024, the judge instructed the attorney to file a

motion for preliminary examination and set the matter for a hearing on August 5, 2024.

Plaintiff states he met with the attorney for the first time during the week before

August 5, 2024. He claims he discussed with the attorney the merits of the claims and

asked the attorney to present them. He claims he also explained to the attorney that he

asked that a motion to suppress be filed and that the motion would now be untimely. He

claims the attorney did not file the motion as instructed on July 2, 2024, and refused to

present the merits of the claim. He states that on August 5, 2024, the attorney was not

present, and the matter was reset for a conference on October 3, 2024, and a trial on

February 3, 2025.

Plaintiff states that on October 3, 2024, the attorney had the matter set for a status

conference. He claims a preliminary examination and hearing were not held. He claims

he attempted to explain the merits of his position and to present the affidavits to support

his release on ROR. He claims the judge asked the attorney if he would adopt and present

the merits and the attorney refused. He states the matter was reset for October 24, 2024.

Plaintiff states that on October 24, 2024, the attorney filed a motion for a sanity

commission instead of adopting and presenting the merits of his case. He claims the

attorney argued that he lacked mental capacity at the time the crime was committed, that

he had a medical condition which caused him extreme difficulty communicating at the time

immediately following his arrest, and he did not appear to understand the proceedings

against him because of hallucinations and ulterior projections. Plaintiff argues that he

should have been relieved of his bond obligation until the reports were complete. He claims

the attorney left him in custody to cause duress in order to aid the State in convicting him.

Plaintiff states that on December 6, 2024, he met with two doctors. He states that

on December 9, 2024, the judge, based upon the reports and without objection from the

District Attorney, declared him competent to proceed. The matter was set for a status

conference on January 13, 2025.

Plaintiff states that on January 2, 2025, he filed an application for writ of habeas

corpus ad prosequendum in the Louisiana Twenty-Sixth Judicial District Court. On

January 13, 2025, Plaintiff received a ruling. He states that the attorney of record Alonso

Jackson refused to adopt and present the merits of the claims. Plaintiff claims the State

had body wear cam and a motor vehicle system in use. He claims he briefed his writ

without the use of the videos. He claims the attorney allowed the State to sandbag

discovery. He claims a trial date was set for February 3, 2025.

Plaintiff states that on February 3, 2025 the attorney was present in court. He claims

the attorney had not communicated with him and had not prepared. He claims the attorney

had not contacted the owner of the firearms and intended to allow inadmissible evidence

to be presented. He claims the attorney made a preliminary plea and asked for a six-month

continuance. He claims the plea suspended the running of the time limits upon trial.

Plaintiff claims that on February 20, 2025, the judge ruled on the January 13, 2025

notice of intent and set a return date. He claims the judge did not order the clerk to provide

the requested information to comply with the uniform rules of the court of appeals. He

claims that because of this, the Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeals returned the

writ application unfiled. Plaintiff then filed a motion for extension of time and a request

for court minutes. He claims the judge failed to promptly respond in order to delay the

proceedings and deprive him of due process. Plaintiff states that on May 23, 2025, he

received a ruling from the judge denying his request for an extension of time and a return

date and granting him a copy of the court minutes. Plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider

on May 27, 2025, which was denied on June 13, 2025. Plaintiff states that as of June 1,

2025, he is represented by court appointed attorney Rudy Lewis.

Plaintiff claims the search and seizure were unreasonable and the evidence should

be excluded at trial. He argues the search occurred before he was arrested. He further

claims that at the time of the seizure, he was 20 feet from the vehicle and in the presence

of two officers and a K9, therefore it would be unreasonable to believe he could have or

would have gained access to a weapon.

Plaintiff claims that nervousness alone is not reasonable suspicion. He argues that

the officer’s two articulated reasons do not support any reasonable inferences of separate

illegal activity. He argues that if the active warrants were found at that time, the vehicle

was no longer mobile.

Plaintiff claims the officer’s actions after the reasonable basis for the traffic stop

were not reasonably related in scope and were not justified. He claims that once the active

warrants were located, the mission of the stop was complete. He claims the officer’s two

articulated reasons did not support detaining him to conduct a dog sniff. He claims that

after the dog alerted, no narcotics were found. He claims the affidavits should be rejected

in their entirety as highly prejudicial, chronologically inaccurate, and based on unfounded

suspicion. He argues the traffic stop was used to rummage through his property and the

evidence is being used against him in violation of his rights and causing the loss of life,

security, liberty, property, and privacy.

Plaintiff claims he has been denied effective assistance and his right to a speedy

trial. He claims that during his arraignment, his attorney waived the formal reading of the

bill and without any consultation asked him to accept a plea agreement. Plaintiff refused

the plea agreement and asked for a copy of the discovery and to file a motion to suppress.

He claims his attorney waived his right to a preliminary examination. Plaintiff filed a

motion to act as co-counsel and a motion for a copy of the discovery to preserve his

objection to the admissibility of the evidence. He claims the attorney breached his contract

of employment by failing to fulfill his duties. He also claims the attorney breached his

fiduciary duty.

Plaintiff states that the judge denied him access to the court due to the appointment

of counsel. He claims the IDB Board and attorney Alonzo Jackson denied him his Sixth

Amendment rights, breached their fiduciary duty, breached their contract, misrepresented

him, falsely imprisoned him, and neglected a matter entrusted to them.

Plaintiff argues he is being maliciously prosecuted. He claims he was arrested and

imprisoned without probable cause. He claims the warrants from the Smith County Sheriff

Office were not found until after the firearms came back clean. He argues the dog did not

alert because no narcotics were present.

Plaintiff was charged with three counts of possession of a firearm or carrying a

concealed weapon by a convicted felon, one count of operating a vehicle with an expired

driver’s license, and one count of operating a vehicle without proper required equipment.

Accordingly, Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, compensatory,

punitive, and exemplary damages, interest, fees, costs, and any additional relief which is

just, proper, and equitable.

Plaintiff filed an Updated Information in Support of Motion for Declaratory and

Injunctive Relief, and Request for TRO (Complaint) (Doc. 20). In said filing, Plaintiff

repeats claims in his previous complaints, amended complaints, and memorandums in

support of his filings. He challenges his ongoing criminal proceedings in the state trial

court.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

Heck Claims

Plaintiff was arrested and charged with three counts of possession of a firearm or

carrying a concealed weapon by a convicted felon, one count of operating a vehicle with

an expired driver’s license, and one count of operating a vehicle without proper required

equipment. If Plaintiff is ultimately convicted of the pending charges, a favorable ruling

on his claims could call into question the validity of his convictions. Plaintiff would not

be entitled to seek relief for these claims until such time as the convictions in question have

been declared invalid. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).1 However, since the

criminal prosecution in Plaintiff’s case remains pending, Heck does not apply at this time.

See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007) (the Heck rule applies only when there has been

a conviction or sentence that has not been invalidated, not to pending criminal charges).

In cases such as Plaintiff’s, where charges remain pending, federal courts have been

authorized to stay civil rights claims attacking the legality of a detainee’s arrest,

prosecution, and detention until such time as the allegedly improper state prosecution has

been concluded. See Wallace, 549 U.S. at 393-94.

In Wallace, the Court stated, “if a plaintiff files a false arrest claim before he has

been convicted (or files any other claim related to rulings that will likely be made in a

pending or anticipated criminal trial), it is within the power of the district court ... to stay

the civil action until the criminal case ... is ended.” Id. at 393-94. The Fifth Circuit has

noted that, in such cases, the court “may - indeed should - stay proceedings in the section

1983 case until the pending criminal case has run its course. . ..” Mackey v. Dickson, 47

F.3d 744, 746 (5th Cir. 1995); see also Busick v. City of Madison Miss., 90 Fed. Appx.

713, 713–714 (5th Cir. 2004).

1 In Heck, the Supreme Court held that, in order to recover damages for an allegedly

unconstitutional imprisonment or other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render

a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has

been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal

authorized to make such a determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a

writ of habeas corpus. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).

Plaintiff’s civil rights complaint should be stayed pending the outcome of the

criminal charges. Thereafter, in the event Plaintiff is convicted, he may pursue this § 1983

claim only upon a showing that the suit is not barred by Heck.

Motion for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Request for TRO(Complaint)

Plaintiff filed an Updated Information in Support of Motion for Declaratory and

Injunctive Relief and Request for TRO(Complaint) (Doc. 20). In said motion, Plaintiff

seeks declaratory and injunctive relief against the Defendants named in his complaint and

a temporary restraining order. In support of his motion, he incorporates allegations

contained in his complaint, amended complaints, and memorandum orders. He claims the

prosecution against him is in bad faith. He claims his detention is illegal and the time-

period for filing pretrial motions has expired. He seeks to have the Defendants restrained

from prosecuting him, his immediate release, and damages for the violations of his civil

rights. He also seeks to have the evidence declared inadmissible.

Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in pertinent part, as

follows:

(b) A temporary restraining order may be granted without written or oral

notice to the adverse party or that party’s attorney only if (1) it clearly

appears from specific facts shown by affidavit or by the verified compliant

that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the

applicant before the adverse party’s attorney can be heard in opposition...

In order for Plaintiff to obtain a preliminary injunction, he would have to show (1)

a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, (2) a substantial threat of irreparable injury

absent an injunction, (3) that the threatened injury would exceed any harm that would flow

from the injunction and (4) that the injunction would not undermine the public interest.

Walgreen Co. v. Hood, 275 F.3d 475, 477 (5th Cir. 2001). Plaintiff must prove all four

elements and any failure to prove any one element will result in the denial of the motion.

Enterprise Intern., Inc. v. Corporacion Estatal Petrolera Ecuatoriana, 762 F.2d 464, 472

(5th Cir.1985).

The allegations in this complaint do not present a substantial threat of irreparable

injury absent a restraining order or injunction. The claims are capable of ready resolution

through the ordinary litigation process. The allegations in this motion do not present a

substantial likelihood of success on the merits at this time. They are the same or similar to

the allegations in his complaint. The court further notes that a motion for temporary

restraining order and/or preliminary injunction is not the proper vehicle to challenge

pretrial detention.

Accordingly, it is recommended that the Updated Information in Support of

Motion for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Request for TRO(Complaint)(Doc.20)

be denied.

CONCLUSION

Therefore, IT IS RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s civil rights complaint be

STAYED until the criminal proceedings against Plaintiff are completed, subject to the

following conditions:

Within thirty (30) days of the date the state court criminal proceedings have

concluded, Plaintiff SHALL FILE a motion asking this court to lift the stay.

The action will proceed at that time, absent some other bar to suit. See Wallace

v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007).

If the stay is lifted and the court finds Plaintiff’s claims would impugn the

validity of his conviction, the action will be dismissed under Heck; if no such

finding is made, the action will proceed at that time, absent some other bar to

suit.

In light of the stay, Plaintiff SHALL NOT file any more documents in this

action until the state court proceedings have concluded.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Updated Information in Support of

Motion for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Request for TRO(Complaint)(Doc. 20)

be DENIED.

OBJECTIONS

Under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), parties

aggrieved by this recommendation have fourteen (14) days from service of this Report and

Recommendation to file specific, written objections with the Clerk of Court, unless an

extension of time is granted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b). A party may respond to another

party’s objection within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Counsel

are directed to furnish a courtesy copy of any objections or responses to the District Judge

at the time of filing.

A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions and

recommendations set forth above, within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy

shall bar that party, except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking, on appeal, the

proposed factual findings and legal conclusions that were accepted by the district court and

that were not objected to by the aforementioned party. See Douglas v. U.S.A.A., 79 F.3d

1415 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).

THUS DONE AND SIGNED in chambers in Shreveport, Louisiana, this 19th day

of February 2026.

Mark L. Hornsby

U.S. Magistrate Judge

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