Fontenot

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

TYKE FONTENOT CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 24-907-SDD-SDJ

COMMISSIONER OF

SOCIAL SECURITY

NOTICE

Please take notice that the attached Magistrate Judge’s Report has been filed with the Clerk

of the U.S. District Court.

In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), you have 14 days after being served with the

attached report to file written objections to the proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and

recommendations set forth therein. Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings,

conclusions, and recommendations within 14 days after being served will bar you, except upon

grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and

legal conclusions accepted by the District Court.

ABSOLUTELY NO EXTENSION OF TIME SHALL BE GRANTED TO FILE

WRITTEN OBJECTIONS TO THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT.

Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on March 6, 2026.

S

SCOTT D. JOHNSON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

TYKE FONTENOT CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 24-907-SDD-SDJ

COMMISSIONER OF

SOCIAL SECURITY

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Tyke Fontenot brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for judicial review

of the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, terminating his

disability insurance benefits.1 Plaintiff has filed a Brief in Support of Appeal (R. Doc. 13), and

the Commissioner has filed a Memorandum in Opposition (R. Doc. 14). Plaintiff filed a Reply

Memorandum in Support of Appeal (R. Doc. 15). Based on the applicable standard of review under

42 U.S.C. § 405(g), substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s decision, and the

Administrative Law Judge applied the correct legal standards. Accordingly, it is recommended

that the Commissioner’s decision be affirmed.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On January 14, 2020, Plaintiff filed an application for DIB, alleging disability beginning

on August 1, 2019.2 In a determination dated March 4, 2020, Plaintiff was found disabled

beginning on August 1, 2019.3 This is the most recent favorable medical decision and is known as

the “comparison point decision” or CPD.4 On February 8, 2022, Plaintiff received a Notice of

1 R. Doc. 1 at 1.

2 R. Doc. 8-6 at 2.

3 R. Doc. 8-4 at 2.

4 R. Doc. 8-3 at 16.

Disability Cessation, informing him that he was no longer disabled as of February 3, 2022.5 This

determination was upheld upon reconsideration after a disability hearing by a state agency

Disability Hearing Officer.6 Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a written request for a hearing before an

Administrative Law Judge.7 Plaintiff appeared by telephone and testified at a hearing held on

March 5, 2024.8 Plaintiff’s main representative was Christina Crotwell, a non-attorney

representative with attorney Loyd Thomas Bourgeois, Jr’s office.9 Christi Lamandre McCaffery,

an impartial vocational expert, also appeared and testified by telephone at the hearing.10 After

reviewing all of the evidence of record, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s disability did indeed end on

February 3, 2022, and that Plaintiff had not become disabled again since that date.11 Plaintiff

sought review of that decision by the Appeals Counsel.12 On September 18, 2024, the Appeals

Counsel denied Plaintiff’s request for review.13

On November 1, 2024, Plaintiff timely filed his Complaint with this Court.14 Accordingly,

Plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies before filing this action for judicial review, and the

Appeals Council’s decision is the Commissioner’s final decision for purposes of judicial review.15

5 R. Doc. 8-5 at 3.

6 R. Doc. 8-5 at 35.

7 R. Doc. 8-5 at 52.

8 R. Doc. 8-3 at 46.

9 R. Doc. 803 at 50; R. Doc. 8-5 at 112.

10 R. Doc. 8-3 at 47.

11 R. Doc. 8-4 at 46.

12 R. Doc. 8-5 at 141.

13 R. Doc. 8-3 at 2.

14 R. Doc. 1.

15 See 20 C.F.R. § 404.981 (“The Appeals Council may deny a party’s request for review or it may decide to review a

case and make a decision. The Appeals Council’s decision, or the decision of the administrative law judge if the

request for review is denied, is binding unless you or another party file an action in Federal district court, or the

decision is revised. You may file an action in a Federal district court within 60 days after the date you receive notice

of the Appeals Council’s action.”).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The function of a district court on judicial review is limited to determining whether there

is “substantial evidence” in the record, as a whole, to support the final decision of the

Commissioner as trier of fact, and whether the Commissioner applied the appropriate legal

standards to evaluate the evidence. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Brown v. Apfel, 192 F.3d 492, 496 (5th

Cir. 1999); Martinez v. Chater, 64 F.3d 172, 173 (5th Cir. 1995); Carriere v. Sullivan, 944 F.2d

243, 245 (5th Cir. 1991). If the Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial evidence,

this Court must affirm them. Martinez, 64 F.3d at 173.

“Substantial evidence” is that which is relevant and sufficient for a reasonable mind to

accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401(1971);

Masterson v. Barnhart, 309 F.3d 267, 272 (5th Cir. 2002). It is more than a scintilla but may be

less than a preponderance. Spellman v. Shalala, 1 F.3d 357, 360 (5th Cir. 1993). A finding of no

substantial evidence is appropriate only if no credible evidentiary choices or medical findings exist

to support the Commissioner's decision. See Boyd v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 698, 704 (5th Cir. 2002).

A district court may not try the issues de novo, re-weigh the evidence, or substitute its own

judgment for that of the Commissioner. Carey v. Apfel, 230 F.3d 131, 135 (5th Cir. 2000); Ripley

v. Chater, 67 F.3d 552, 555 (5th Cir. 1995); Spellman, 1 F.3d at 360. The Commissioner is entitled

to make any finding that is supported by substantial evidence, regardless of whether other

conclusions are also permissible. See Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 112-13 (1992).

Conflicts in the evidence are for the Commissioner to resolve, not the courts. Carey, 230 F.3d at

135. Any of the Commissioner's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence are

conclusive. Ripley, 67 F.3d at 555. Despite this Court's limited function on review, the Court must

scrutinize the record in its entirety to determine the reasonableness of the decision reached and

whether substantial evidence exists to support it. Anthony v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 289, 295 (5th Cir.

1992); Villa v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d 1019, 1022 (5th Cir. 1990).

I. TERMINATION OF BENEFITS

The Fifth Circuit has explicitly addressed the scope of this Court's review of the termination

of a Plaintiff’s benefits. See Taylor v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 253, 256 (5th Cir. 1984) (citing Buckley

v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1047, 1048-49 (5th Cir. 1984)). As noted in Buckley, even though the burden

of proving disability is on a Social Security claimant, “once evidence has been presented which

supports a finding that a given condition exists it is presumed in the absence of proof to the contrary

that the condition has remain unchanged.” 739 F.2d at 1049 (citing Rivas v. Weinberger, 475 F.2d

255, 258 (5th Cir. 1973)). In other words, once benefits have been awarded, the Plaintiff is afforded

a “presumption of continuing disability that requires the Secretary to provide evidence” that the

Plaintiff’s condition has improved. Taylor, 742 F.2d at 255. “[A] claimant's benefits may be

terminated only if substantial evidence demonstrates both that ‘there has been any medical

improvement’ and that ‘the individual is now able to engage in substantial gainful activity.’”

Hallaron v. Colvin, 578 F. App'x 350, 353 (5th Cir. 2014). “Agency regulations define ‘medical

improvement’ as ‘any decrease in the medical severity of [a recipient's] impairment(s) which was

present at the time of the most recent favorable medical decision that [she was] disabled or

continued to be disabled.’ ” Id. at 351-52 (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(b)(1)).

The Social Security Administration may terminate benefits if the agency concludes, after

reviewing a Plaintiff’s case, that the Plaintiff’s impairment “has ceased, does not exist, or is not

disabling....” 42 U.S.C.A. § 423(f). In a typical social security case, where the issue is whether a

Plaintiff is disabled and should therefore be granted Social Security benefits in the first place, the

Commissioner (through the ALJ) applies a five-step sequential evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.1520, 416.920. In cases such as this, however, when the Commissioner is deciding whether

to terminate existing benefits due to an alleged medical improvement, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(f)

prescribes an eight-step evaluation process to determine: (1) whether the Plainitiff is engaging in

substantial gainful activity; (2) if not gainfully employed, whether the Plaintiff has an impairment

or combination of impairments which meets or equals a listing; (3) if impairments do not meet a

listing, whether there has been medical improvement; (4) if there has been medical improvement,

whether the improvement is related to the Plaintiff’s ability to do work; (5) if there is improvement

related to Plaintiff’s ability to do work, whether an exception to medical improvement applies; (6)

if medical improvement is related to the Plaintiff’s ability to do work or if one of the first groups

of exceptions to medical improvement applies, whether the Plaintiff has a severe impairment; (7)

if the Plaintiff has a severe impairment, whether the Plaintiff can perform past relevant work; and

(8) if the Plaintiff cannot perform past relevant work, whether the Plaintiff can perform other work.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(f).

II. THE ALJ’S DECISION

After careful consideration of the record, the ALJ followed the eight-step evaluation

process to make the determination that Plaintiff’s disability ended on February 3, 2022, and

Plaintiff had not become disabled since that date.16

At the first step, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity

since August 1, 2019, the alleged onset of disability.17 The ALJ determined that since February 3,

2022, the Plaintiff has had the following medically determinable impairments: degenerative disc

disease and facet arthropathy of the lumbar spine, immunosuppression status post liver transplant,

16 R. Doc. 8-3 at 27.

17 R. Doc. 8-3 at 16; In a determination dated March 4, 2020, Plaintiff was found disabled beginning on August 1,

2019. The ALJ relied on this decision as the “comparison point decision” or CPD.

chronic idiopathic urticaria, obesity, hemorrhoids, major depressive disorder, generalized anxiety

disorder, aortic calcification, asthma and essential hypertension.18

At the second step, the ALJ found that since February 3, 2022, the Plaintiff has not had an

impairment or combination of impairments which met or medically equaled the severity of an

impairment listed in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1525 and 404.1526).19

To support this conclusion, the ALJ stated that “there is no evidence of impairment-related

physical limitation of musculoskeletal functioning as described in the listings in section 1.00.

Records confirm normal pulmonary effort, no respiratory distress, normal breath sounds and no

wheezing, with no evidence of respiratory impairment as described within the 3.00 listings

(CDR17F/9).”20 Additionally, the ALJ stated that “there is no evidence of gastrointestinal

impairment as described within the listings in section 5.00.”21 Lastly, the ALJ concluded that the

Plaintiff “does not have a severe mental impairment or combination of mental impairments.”22

The ALJ provided a detailed analysis of the “four broad functional areas set out in the disability

regulations for evaluating mental disorders and in section 12.00C of the Listing of Impairments

(20 CFR, Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1). These four broad functional areas are known as the

"paragraph B" criteria.”23

At the third step, the ALJ determined that a medical improvement occurred on February 3,

2022.24 At the fourth step, the ALJ determined that the medical improvement is related to the

ability to work because, by February 3, 2022, the Plaintiff’s CPD impairment(s) no longer met or

18 R. Doc. 8-3 at 16.

19 R. Doc. 8-3 at 16.

20 R. Doc. 8-3 at 17.

21 R. Doc. 8-3 at 17.

22 R. Doc. 8-3 at 17.

23 R. Doc. 8-3 at 17; the four broad functional areas discussed by the ALJ are 1) understanding, remember or applying

information; 2) interacting with others; 3) concentrating, persisting or maintaining pace; and 4) adapting or managing

oneself.

24 R. Doc. 8-3 at 17.

medically equaled the same listings that were met at the time of the CPD (20 CFR

404.1594(c)(3)(i)).25

At the sixth step,26 the ALJ determined that since February 3, 2022, the Plaintiff has

continued to have a severe impairment or combination of impairments (20 CFR 404.1594(f)(6)).27

At the seventh step, the ALJ determined that, based on the impairments present since February 3,

2022, the Plaintiff has had the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20

CFR 404.1567(b) except he can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; he can occasionally climb

ramps and stairs, kneel, crouch, crawl, and stoop; he can never work in the presence of hazardous

machinery with fast moving parts, at unprotected heights, or be required to operate a motor vehicle

as part of the job duties; the Plaintiff can never work in the presence of concentrated exposure to

extreme cold, extreme heat, or vibration; he can never work in the presence of concentrated

exposure to fumes, noxious odors, dusts, mists, gases, and poor ventilation.28 Importantly, the ALJ

concluded that:

“the claimant's paragraph B limitations are so slight that they do not cause any

measurable loss of function in the mental abilities to understand, remember, or

carry out instructions; to make work related decisions; or to respond appropriately

to supervisors, coworkers, the public, to usual work situations, to changes in work

setting, or to work pressures in a work setting. Thus, the residual functional capacity

assessment does not reflect any limitation in mental abilities.”29

The ALJ determined that since February 3, 2022, the Plaintiff has been unable to perform

past relevant work.30 At the eighth step, the ALJ determined that since February 3, 2022,

considering the Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity based

25 R. Doc. 8-3 at 19.

26 The ALJ did not explicitly address the fifth step; the ALJ did not explicitly state whether an exception to the medical

improvement applies.

27 R. Doc. 8-3 at 19.

28 R. Doc. 8-3 at 21.

29 R. Doc. 8-3 at 18-19.

30 R. Doc. 8-3 at 21.

on the impairments present since February 3, 2022, the Plaintiff has been able to perform a

significant number of jobs in the national economy (20 CFR 404.1560(c) and 404.1566).31

IV. PLAINTIFF’S ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

On appeal, the Plaintiff argues the following assignments of error: (1) the ALJ’s RFC and

step eight determination lacked the support of substantial evidence because the ALJ did not include

social limitations; and (2) the ALJ’s step eight decision and analysis did not provide Plaintiff with

due process.32

V. LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard

Substantial evidence is that which is relevant and sufficient for a reasonable mind to accept

as adequate to support a conclusion. Greenspan v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 232, 236 (5th Cir. 1994). It is

more than a mere scintilla and less than a preponderance. Carey 230 F.3d at 135. A finding of no

substantial evidence is appropriate only if no credible evidentiary choices or medical findings

support the decision. Boyd v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 698, 704 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Harris v. Apfel,

209 F.3d 413, 417 (5th Cir. 2000)). Conflicts in the evidence are for the Commissioner to decide,

and if substantial evidence is found to support the decision, the decision must be affirmed even if

there is evidence on the other side. Masterson, 309 F.3d at 272; Selders v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 614,

617 (5th Cir. 1990). In applying the substantial evidence standard, the court must review the entire

record as whole, but may not reweigh the evidence, try the issues de novo, or substitute its

judgment for that of the Commissioner, even if the evidence weighs against the Commissioner’s

decision. Newton v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 448, 452 (5th Cir. 2000).

31 R. Doc. 8-3 at 26.

32 R. Doc. 13 at 2; R. Doc. 14 at 3.

B. Discussion

1. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC assessment.

The ALJ properly assessed Plaintiff’s RFC and ultimately found him not disabled since

February 3, 2022, by considering and exhaustively detailing the medical records, including

devoting over four pages of her decision to her review of the medical evidence and Plaintiff’s own

testimony.33 The ALJ determined that, since February 3, 2022, Plaintiff had the RFC to perform

light work34 as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b) except he could never climb ladders, ropes, or

scaffolds; could occasionally climb ramps and stairs, kneel, crouch, crawl, and stoop; could never

work in the presence of hazardous machinery with fast moving parts, at unprotected heights, or be

required to operate a motor vehicle as part of the job duties; could never work in the presence of

concentrated exposure to extreme cold, extreme heat, or vibration; and he could never work in the

presence of concentrated exposure to fumes, noxious odors, dusts, mists, gases, and poor

ventilation.35 The ALJ’s exhaustive consideration of the medical evidence supports this RFC

finding. Plaintiff disagrees and argues that the ALJ should have limited his social interaction.36

Plaintiff bases this argument on the December 2, 2021 psychological consultative examination

conducted by Seth Kunen, Ph.D.37 Plaintiff argues that Dr. Kunen’s opinion is consistent with a

consultative physician’s opinion that he has a limitation in mentation.38 However, Dr. Kunen did

not find that Plaintiff had a limitation in mentation.39

33 R. Doc. 8-3 at 17-21.

34 Light work is defined as the ability to occasionally lift and/or carry and push and/or pull 20 pounds and frequently

lift and/or carry and push and/or pull 10 pounds; stand and/or walk for a total of six hours in an eight-hour workday;

and sit for a total of six hours in an eight-hour workday. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b).

35 R. Doc. 8-3 at 21.

36 R. Doc. 13 at 12-15.

37 R. Doc. 13 at 12-15.

38 R. Doc. 13 at 13.

39 R. Doc. 8-9 at 932.

At his evaluation with Dr. Kunen, Plaintiff reported that he was on immunosuppressant

medications, and had hemorrhoids, lacking the physical strength to perform his work duties.40 He

also reported that he was easily fatigued, had shortness of breath, nerve pain in the shoulder, brain

fog, and back pain.41 He reported irritable mood, poor appetite, poor sleep, poor attention and

concentration, and low energy.42 He said that he could take care of his daily activities but was

frequently tired.43 During the assessment, Plaintiff knew the answers to 25 out of 26 questions; he

was able to solve seven out of eight basic computation problems; he understood similarities; and

he understood three out of five proverbs.44 He was unable to respond to logical problem-solving

questions and had significant problems with them; and he was asked five questions regarding

socially responsible behavior, and gave one socially irresponsible answer.45

Dr. Kunen reported that Plaintiff’s questionnaire scores were consistent with depression

and anxiety; he was anxious, but also alert, oriented, and able to maintain composure; he presented

adequate attention and effort; his memory was good; his language was adequately developed; as

was his fund of general knowledge and math ability.46 Finally, Dr. Kunen stated, regarding

depression and anxiety, that although depression and anxiety could contribute to Plaintiff’s

difficulties with logical problem-solving questions, they are likely secondary to his liver cancer,

medications, and liver transplant.47 Dr. Kunen also stated that Plaintiff could not risk being around

people or toxic chemicals at the plant because of his compromised immune system.48

40 R. Doc. 8-3 at 21; R. Doc. 8-9 at 928.

41 R. Doc. 8-3 at 21; R. Doc. 8-9 at 928.

42 R. Doc. 8-3 at 21; R. Doc. 8-9 at 931.

43 R. Doc. 8-3 at 21; R. Doc. 8-9 at 931.

44 R. Doc. 8-3 at 21.

45 R. Doc. 8-3 at 21.

46 R. Doc. 8-3 at 21; R. Doc. 8-9 at 932.

47 R. Doc. 8-3 at 21; R. Doc. 8-9 at 932.

48 R. Doc. 8-3 at 21; R. Doc. 8-9 at 932.

The ALJ considered Dr. Kunen’s opinion and found it not persuasive because it was

supported only by Plaintiff’s self-report, it was not an opinion of mental limitations due to a mental

condition, and it was not supported by the objective medical evidence of record which consistently

documented denial of psychological symptoms and no abnormal mental status examinations.49 The

ALJ found that the opinion was also inconsistent with the overall record showing no treatment for

mental health throughout the relevant period of review.50 The ALJ ultimately determined that

because the Plaintiff’s “mental impairment causes no more than ‘mild’ limitation in any of the

functional areas and the evidence does not otherwise indicate that there is more than a minimal

limitation in the [Plaintiff’s] ability to do basic work activities, as described above, it is nonsevere

(20 CFR 404.1520a(d)(1).”51

As the ALJ pointed out, the record contains multiple notes that Plaintiff was alert and

oriented.52 The overall record shows a pattern of normal or appropriate mood, affect, behavior,

thought content, judgment, and orientation, both before and after his liver transplant.53 The overall

record shows no significant educational, linguistic, mental, emotional, intellectual, or cognitive

limitations, and Plaintiff testified that he was getting no treatment for mental health.54 The ALJ

acknowledged that Plaintiff is on chronic immunosuppressive medications status post liver

transplant. However, none of his treating physicians indicated to him or mentioned in their records

that he had social limitations of any kind. The ALJ’s analysis reveals a thorough consideration of

the medical evidence and an appropriate assessment of Plaintiff’s impairments and RFC based on

substantial evidence.

49 R. Doc. 8-3 at 21.

50 R. Doc. 8-3 at 21.

51 R. Doc. 8-3 at 21.

52 R. Doc. 8-3 at 17-21.

53 R. Doc. 8-3 at 17-21.

54 R. Doc. 8-3 at 15.

2. The ALJ’s analysis of the step eight finding did not lack the necessary specificity

to provide Plaintiff with due process as the vocational expert identified a significant number

of jobs that Plaintiff can perform.

Plaintiff argues that the Vocational Expert “played fast and loose with the information in

estimating the work that was available to a person comparable to Plaintiff.”55 During the hearing,

the ALJ asked the vocational expert whether a hypothetical person, the same age as Plaintiff, with

the same educational background, work history, and RFC could perform jobs that exist in the

national economy. The vocational expert testified that this individual could perform jobs as a:

1. Cashier (Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) No. 211.462-010): 1,233,989

jobs in the national economy;

2. Receptionist and Information Clerk (DOT No. 237.367-018): 94,117 jobs in the

national economy; and

3. Usher/Lobby Attendant/Ticket Taker (DOT No. 344.677-010): 90,131 jobs in

the national economy (Tr. 69).56

Based on this testimony, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could make a successful adjustment

to work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy.57 Plaintiff, relying on Cantrell

v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 4:22-CV-229-P, 2023 WL 2576447, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 28,

2023), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Cantrell v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., No.

4:22-CV-0229-P, 2023 WL 2574032 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 20, 2023), argues that the vocational

expert’s testimony did not provide the ALJ with substantial evidence on the number of jobs

available for Plaintiff in the national economy. Plaintiff argues that Standard Occupation

Classification (SOC) codes do not provide numerical data for specific DOT codes within the SOC

code.58

55 R. Doc. 13 at 16.

56 R. Doc. 8-3 at 27.

57 R. Doc. 8-3 at 27.

58 R. Doc. 13 at 15.

At the hearing, Plaintiff’s counsel asked the vocational expert how she arrived at the

number of jobs available.59 The vocational expert testified that she utilized the Occupational

Employment Quarterly.60 She further testified that the job numbers were specific to the Standard

Occupation Classification (SOC) group, and she explained her methodology for arriving at the job

numbers.61 Plaintiff’s counsel did not object at the hearing to the vocational expert’s job number

estimates.

As the Commissioner stated in opposition, the Plaintiff essentially takes issue with the use

of data aggregation, arguing in essence that, if multiple DOT codes map to a single SOC Code that

has significant positions available, data about the SOC code can provide no useful information

about how many positions each of the individual DOT codes contributed to the total.62 However,

providing relevant information from available vocational resources is exactly why vocational

expert testimony is obtained in the administrative process. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1566(e) (vocational

expert testimony may be used to obtain information about “specific occupations”); see also

Vaughan v. Shalala, 58 F.3d 129, 132 (5th Cir. 1995) (“The value of a vocational expert is that he

is familiar with the specific requirements of a particular occupation, including working conditions

and the attributes and skills needed.”).

In the Fifth Circuit, it is well settled that a vocational expert’s testimony, based on a

properly phrased hypothetical question, constitutes substantial evidence. “A vocational expert is

called to testify because of his familiarity with job requirements and working conditions. ‘The

value of a vocational expert is that he is familiar with the specific requirements of a particular

occupation, including working conditions and the attributes and skills needed.’” Vaughan, 58 F.3d

59 R. Doc. 8-3 at 72.

60 R. Doc. 8-3 at 72.

61 R. Doc. 8-3 at 72.

62 R. Doc. 13 at 15-16.

at 132. “If the vocational expert can enumerate a significant number of jobs existing in one or more

occupations that Plaintiff can perform, the ALJ’s decision should be affirmed. See Carey, 230 F.3d

at 135. Plaintiff has not presented any evidence to contradict the vocational expert’s testimony

regarding the number of jobs available at step eight, and Plaintiff’s speculation that there are less

jobs available is insufficient to overcome the testimony of the vocational expert. Substantial

evidence supports the ALJ’s decision, and thus, the decision should be affirmed.

VI. RECOMMENDATION

The analysis above demonstrates that the Plaintiff’s claim of reversible error is without

merit. The record considered as a whole supports the finding that the ALJ applied the proper legal

standards, and substantial evidence supports the determination that the Plaintiff has not been

disabled since February 3, 2022. Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that under sentence four

of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the final decision of the Acting Commissioner of Social Security be

AFFIRMED, and this action be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on March 6, 2026.

SCOTT D. JOHNSON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE