Galloway

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION AT COLUMBUS

CHRISTOPHER-MICHAEL WILLIAMS, : Case No. 2:25-cv-1410

:

Plaintiff, :

: District Judge James L. Graham

vs. :

Magistrate Judge Kimberly A. Jolson

:

GARY L. GALLOWAY, et al., :

:

Defendants. :

:

ORDER AND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, an individual currently incarcerated at Chillicothe Correctional Institution

(“CCI”) and proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Before the

Court is Plaintiff’s Complaint, in which he alleges that he was denied participation in a Family

Day event with R.A.M. Gavel Club (“Family Day”) at CCI because of his sex-crime convictions

against children. (Doc. 1-1 at 2–17). Plaintiff names five Defendants: CCI Warden Gary L.

Galloway, CCI Secretary and R.A.M. Gavel Club Advisor Erin Cottril, CCI Unit Manager Angela

Ivey, CCI Chaplain Alfred Harvester Marcus, and Staff Counsel Margret Moore with Ohio

Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections (“ODRC”). (Id. at 1–3). By separate Order, Plaintiff

has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.

This matter is before the Court for a sua sponte review of the Complaint to determine

whether the Complaint or any portion of it should be dismissed because it is frivolous, malicious,

fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant

who is immune from such relief. See Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 § 804, 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B).

I. STANDARD

A complaint may be dismissed as frivolous when the plaintiff cannot make any claim with

a rational or arguable basis in fact or law. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328–29 (1989);

Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196, 1198 (6th Cir. 1990). An action has no legal basis when the

defendant is immune from suit or when a plaintiff claims a violation of a legal interest which

clearly does not exist. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327 (citation omitted). An action has no factual basis

when the allegations are delusional or rise to the level of the irrational or “wholly incredible.”

Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32–33 (1992). See also Lawler, 898 F.2d at 1199. The Court

need not accept as true factual allegations that are “fantastic or delusional” in reviewing a

complaint for frivolousness. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 471 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Neitzke,

490 U.S. at 327–28). Congress has authorized the sua sponte dismissal of complaints that fail to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). A complaint filed

by a pro se plaintiff must be “liberally construed” and “held to less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). By the same token, however, the complaint “must

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 570 (2007)). See also Hill, 630 F.3d at 470–71 (“dismissal standard articulated in Iqbal and

Twombly governs dismissals for failure to state a claim” under §§ 1915A(b)(1) and

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).

The screening procedures established by § 1915 apply to complaints filed by prisoners

against governmental entities, officials, or employees regardless of whether the plaintiff has paid

the filing fee or is proceeding in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a); Hyland v. Clinton, 3

F. App’x 478, 479 (6th Cir. 2001); Bell v. Rowe, No. 97-4417, 1999 WL 196531, at *1 (6th Cir.

Mar. 22, 1999) (citing McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 608–09 (6th Cir. 1997)).

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The Court must accept all well-pleaded

factual allegations as true but need not “accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual

allegation.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)).

Although a complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” it must provide “more than

an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A pleading that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citation

omitted). Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders “naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual

enhancement.” Id. at 557. The complaint must “give the defendant fair notice of what

the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93 (citations omitted).

II. COMPLAINT

Plaintiff’s Complaint is organized into factual allegations and three broader claims,

alleging that Defendants violated his constitutional rights when they denied his participation in

Family Day based on his criminal convictions. (Doc. 1-1 at 1–17).

A. Factual Allegations

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Cottril, Staff Advisor for the Gavel Club, informed Plaintiff

that he would not be allowed to participate in Family Day because of his criminal charges, a

decision made by Cottril and Defendant Ivey. (Id. at 2, 5). This conversation occurred right after

Plaintiff and his family participated in a marathon fundraiser event at CCI to raise money for a

drug prevention program on September 19, 2025. (Id. at 5). Plaintiff alleges that Cottril referred

to the Family Day application, which cautioned inmates that “no one with crimes against children

will be permitted to attend.” (Id. at 5–6). He alleges that he was not permitted to participate in

Family Day, despite attending previous family programs at CCI, depriving him of the right to

participate in Family Day like other inmates. (Id. at 6).

Plaintiff alleges that Cottril had discriminatory intent, violating his right to equal protection

and that Cottril subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment. (Id.). Other inmates participated

in Family Day who were similarly situated to Plaintiff, he alleges. (Id.). Plaintiff lists CCI inmates

who had permission to attend Family Day and alleges that these inmates are similarly situated

because they all are level two inmates incarcerated at CCI who have exemplary behavior like him.

(Id.). Plaintiff also alleges that many of the inmates in attendance were convicted of violent crimes

and “some may be revealed to have victims who were children.” (Id.).

On October 3, 2025, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Ivey, as the “overseer” of prison

programs, answered his grievance about the Family Day denial and referenced the warning on the

application. (Id. at 2–3, 7). Plaintiff alleges that these facts prove discriminatory intent against

inmates convicted of certain crimes. (Id.). He also alleges that Ivey supported an unwritten custom

that prevented inmates convicted of sex crimes or crimes against children from participating in

Family Day, which he was unaware of before joining the Gavel Club. (Id. at 7–8). Plaintiff alleges

that Ivey could override subordinate Cottril’s decision but failed to do so. (Id. at 8).

Plaintiff further alleges that Ivey discussed the issue with Defendant Marcus, Institutional

Chaplain and “overseer” of programs held in the CCI chapel. (Id. at 4, 7). Plaintiff alleges that

Ivey and Marcus both agreed to deny Plaintiff’s participation in Family Day. (Id. at 7). Plaintiff

alleges that Marcus conspired with the other Defendants to discriminate against Plaintiff. (Id. at

8).

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Moore, Staff Counsel for ODRC and “overseer and

initiator” of prison program policies, initiated the conspiracy against Plaintiff through Moore’s

statement about prison policies. (Id. at 4, 8). CCI never provided information nor gave reasonable

notice about the “secret unwritten policy” that his crimes would prevent him from participating in

Family Day, Plaintiff alleges. (Id. at 8). Plaintiff also alleges that this policy creates an “arbitrary

deciding factor” to let groups discriminate against certain inmates by adding the discriminatory

clause, while other groups do not include the limitation. (Id.).

Defendant Galloway supported the other Defendants’ discriminatory conduct by

representing an unwritten custom as an official policy, Plaintiff alleges. (Id. at 9). He also alleges

that Galloway “did acquiesce[], ratify, agree, permit, and allow” his subordinates to discriminate

against Plaintiff. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that Galloway is responsible for the other Defendants’

actions and that Galloway treated him differently than similarly situated inmates. (Id. at PageID

18-19). Plaintiff alleges that Galloway discriminated against him based on his convicted crimes,

which “lacks a rational basis.” (Id. at 2).

B. Alleged Constitutional Violations

In his first claim, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his First Amendment right to

the freedom of association when they denied him the opportunity to participate in Family Day with

his children. (Id. at 12). Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants had “no legitimate reason” to deny

his Family Day application, violating his established rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.

(Id.). Plaintiff alleges that inmates convicted of crimes against children were denied participation

in Family Day but “inmates who are similarly situated in every relevant way” were allowed to

participate. (Id.).

Discriminatory intent is evident, Plaintiff alleges, in the Family Day application and in the

answers to his grievances. (Id.). Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants had no legitimate

penological interest in denying him Family Day when his children were allowed to visit him in the

past. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants effectuated this discrimination by implementing an

unwritten policy that was initiated by the CCI warden, Defendant Galloway. (Id. at 13). Plaintiff

also alleges that he was discriminated against as a “class of one.” (Id. at 2 (citing Willowbrook v.

Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000))).

In his next claim, Plaintiff again alleges that Defendants violated his Fourteenth

Amendment rights to Equal Protection without having a legitimate penological interest in denying

his Family Day application. (Id. at 14). Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants violated a

fundamental right to the “integrity of the family unit,” a right secured by the Due Process Clause

under the Fourteenth Amendment. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that inmates who are similarly situated

were allowed to participate in Family Day, including inmates convicted of violent crimes. (Id. at

14–15). Defendants were unreasonable to treat him disparately, Plaintiff alleges. (Id.).

In his last claim, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants discriminated against him based on an

unwritten policy created by Defendant Moore. (Id. at 15). Plaintiff alleges that this custom was

“accepted as official policy” as an agreement between Defendants. (Id.). Defendants initiated a

single plan and shared a conspiratorial objective to violate his rights, Plaintiff alleges. (Id. at 15–

16). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ conduct caused him mental anguish and that he “continues

to suffer injuries and damages, both emotionally and legally.” (Id. at 14, 16).

Plaintiff seeks declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. (Id. at 16–17).

III. DISCUSSION

The Undersigned understands Plaintiff to be raising the following claims:

1. Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection claims against all Defendants for the alleged

discrimination toward Plaintiff as an inmate convicted of sex crimes against children;

2. Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment claims against all Defendants for

denying Plaintiff’s participation in Family Day;

3. First Amendment Freedom of Association claims against all Defendants for allegedly

infringing on his right to visit with and parent his children; and

4. Conspiracy claims against all Defendants for collectively planning to block Plaintiff

from participating in Family Day.

At this stage of the proceedings and without the benefit of further briefing by the parties,

the Undersigned concludes that Plaintiff MAY PROCEED at this juncture with his Equal

Protection and Freedom of Association claims against Defendants Galloway, Cottril, Ivey, Marcus,

and Moore. These claims include the further development of allegations against Galloway and

Ivey in both their personal roles and their roles as supervisors. (See Doc. 1-1 at 8–9). The

Undersigned ADVISES Plaintiff that this is only a preliminary determination. The Undersigned

has not made a determination as to the merits of the claims being allowed to proceed, nor

considered any potential defenses. Defendants are not precluded from filing a motion to dismiss,

a motion for a more definite statement, or other appropriate motions under the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. See, e.g., Wiley v. Austin, No. 8:20-cv-220, 2020 WL 6204382, at *3 (D. Neb.

Oct. 22, 2020).

As explained below, however, Plaintiff’s remaining allegations should be DISMISSED for

the failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

1. Official Capacity Claims for Monetary Damages

Although Plaintiff may proceed with his Equal Protection and Freedom of Association

claims, any official capacity claims for monetary relief fail to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted. Absent an express waiver, a state is immune from damages suits under the Eleventh

Amendment. See Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144

(1993) (and cases cited therein); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974). The State of Ohio

has neither constitutionally nor statutorily waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity in the federal

courts. See Smith v. DeWine, 476 F. Supp. 3d 635, 652 (S.D. Ohio 2020) (citations omitted); Johns

v. Supreme Court of Ohio, 753 F.2d 524 (6th Cir. 1985). The Eleventh Amendment bar extends to

actions where the state is not a named party but where the action is essentially one for the recovery

of money from the state. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 663 (citations omitted); Ford Motor Co. v. Dep’t

of Treasury of State of Indiana, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945). A suit against Defendants in their official

capacities would be in a way pleading the action against the entity of which Defendants are

agents. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). Thus, actions against

state officials in their official capacities are included in this bar. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police,

491 U.S. 58, 70-71 (1989); Colvin v. Caruso, 605 F.3d 282, 289 (6th Cir. 2010) (“[A]n official-

capacity suit against a state official is deemed to be a suit against the state and is thus barred by

the Eleventh Amendment, absent a waiver.” (citation and ellipsis omitted)).

Plaintiff indicates that he is suing Defendants, employees of ODRC and CCI, in both their

individual and official capacities, and he seeks monetary relief. (Doc. 1-1 at 3–4, 17). Defendants,

as agents of the State of Ohio, are immune from suit in their official capacities to the extent Plaintiff

seeks monetary relief and any such claims should be DISMISSED.

2. Due Process Claims

Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendants violated his due process rights also fail to state a

plausible claim for relief. The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause protects individuals

against the deprivation of “life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” U.S. Const.

amend. XIV. One of these protected interests must be at stake to implicate a due process violation.

Miles v. Helinski, No. 20-1279, 2021 WL 1238562, at *4 (6th Cir. Jan. 29, 2021) (quoting

Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005)). A prisoner’s liberty interests may be at stake when

a prison regulation or restriction “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in

relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” See Finley v. Huss, 102 F.4th 789, 812–13 (6th

Cir. 2024) (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995)) (considering an inmate’s liberty

interest in avoiding administrative segregation). A permanent restriction on a prisoner’s family

visits “may present an atypical and significant hardship even in the prison context.” Honzu v. Doe,

No. 2:22-cv-292, 2023 WL 3506155, at *9 (S.D. Ohio May 17, 2023), report and recommendation

adopted, 2023 WL 5951768 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 13, 2023), (citing Damron v. Harris, No. 21-3877,

2022 WL 4587625, at *2-3 (6th Cir. July 28, 2022)) (concluding that an inmate’s due process claim

could proceed for further development where the defendants imposed a permanent restriction on

the inmate’s visitations with his fiancée). That said, inmates do not have a constitutionally

protected interest in “unfettered visitation.” Johnson v. Chambers-Smith, No. 3:24-cv-44, 2024

WL 2882058, at *3 (N.D. Ohio June 7, 2024) (citing Bazzetta v. McGinnis, 430 F.3d 795, 804–05

(6th Cir. 2005)) (additional citations omitted).

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants disrupted his right to family relations by denying his

Family Day application. (Doc. 1-1 at 14). Plaintiff alleges that he and his children have become

accustomed to their visits, and he alleges that Defendants’ denial caused him mental anguish. (Id.

at 5, 10, 14). Plaintiff’s allegations, however, fall short of establishing that the denial was an

“atypical and significant hardship” because limitations on family visits are an ordinary expectation

of incarceration. See McGinnis, 430 F.3d at 804–05; Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484. Plaintiff does not

allege that Defendants implemented a permanent restriction on his visitation rights. See Honzu,

2023 WL 3506155, at *9 (citing Damron, 2022 WL 4587625, at *2–3). And to the extent that

Plaintiff alleges he has a constitutional right to attend prison programs, such an interest does not

exist. Smith v. Weers, No. 1:15-cv-42, 2015 WL 6738668, at *3 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 4, 2015)

(collecting cases) (finding that inmates do not have a “constitutionally protected liberty interest in

prison vocational, rehabilitation, and educational programs”). In sum, Plaintiff does not have a

protected interest in unrestricted visits nor the right to attend prison programs. Accordingly,

Plaintiff’s due process claims should be DISMISSED.

3. Cruel and Unusual Punishment Claims

Plaintiff’s allegation that being denied participation in Family Day constitutes cruel and

unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment fails to state a plausible claim for relief as well.

The Eighth Amendment protects inmates from cruel and unusual punishment. U.S. CONST. amend.

VIII. In other words, inmates are protected from the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.”

Barker v. Goodrich, 649 F.3d 428, 434 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312,

319 (1986)). To establish a conditions-of-confinement claim under the Eighth Amendment, a

plaintiff must show that a defendant had “deliberate indifference” toward the plaintiff. Id. (quoting

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842 (1994)). The alleged deprivation must result “in the denial

of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Id. (quoting Spencer v. Bouchard, 449 F.3d

721, 728 (6th Cir. 2006)). Only “deprivations of essential food, medical care or sanitation” or

“other conditions intolerable for prison” are implicated by the Eighth Amendment. Flanory v.

Bonn, 604 F.3d 249, 253 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348 (1981)).

And the Sixth Circuit has found that prohibiting a prisoner from visitation is not an Eighth

Amendment violation. Bazzetta v. McGinnis, 902 F. Supp. 765, 771 (6th Cir. 1995) (citing Bellamy

v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416 (6th Cir. 1984)).

Eighth Amendment claims include both an objective and a subjective component. Cordell

v. McKinney, 759 F.3d 573, 580 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Santiago v. Ringle, 734 F.3d 585, 590 (6th

Cir. 2013)); Rouster v. Cnty. of Saginaw, 749 F.3d 437, 446 (6th Cir. 2014). The subjective

component requires a plaintiff to allege that a defendant “subjectively perceived facts from which

to infer substantial risk to the prisoner,” that the defendant drew such an inference, and then

“disregarded the risk.” Id. (quoting Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 703 (6th Cir. 2001)).

The objective component requires that the deprivation was “sufficiently serious.” See Rouster,

749 F.3d at 446 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834) (considering whether an inmate’s medical needs

were “sufficiently serious”).

Plaintiff’s allegations do not meet these requirements. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants

denying his Family Day application while ignoring the resulting mental harm amounted to cruel

and unusual punishment without any further factual allegations. (Doc. 1-1 at 2, 6, 10, 14). Such

threadbare assertions are insufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007)). At any

rate, being denied participation in Family Day does not rise to the level of cruel and unusual

punishment. See Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950, 954 (6th Cir. 1987) (finding that “[n]ot every

unpleasant experience a prisoner might endure while incarcerated constitutes cruel and unusual

punishment under the Eighth Amendment”). Although Plaintiff alleges that his mental health has

suffered from the denial, being denied visitation for a prison program is not a deprivation of an

essential need, because as explained above, prisoners do not have an unfettered right to visitation.

Johnson, 2024 WL 2882058, at *3 (citing McGinnis, 430 F.3d at 804–05). This denial is not

“sufficiently serious” and does not amount to cruel and unusual punishment. See Overton v.

Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 136-37 (2003) (finding that a temporary restriction on a prisoner’s

visitations, while making “confinement more difficult to bear,” did not amount to cruel and unusual

punishment because the “withdrawal of privileges” is expected with incarceration). Plaintiff’s

Eighth Amendment claims should be DISMISSED.

4. Civil Conspiracy Claims

Plaintiff’s conspiracy allegations also fail to state a plausible claim for relief. Civil

conspiracy claims under § 1983 require an “agreement between two or more persons to injure

another by unlawful action.” Spadafore v. Gardner, 330 F.3d 849, 854 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting

Hooks v. Hooks, 771 F.2d 935, 943–44 (6th Cir. 1985)). Conspiracy claims warrant relief when a

plaintiff shows that (1) a “single plan” existed; (2) the alleged co-conspirators had a shared

objective; (3) an “overt act was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy”; and (4) he suffered

an injury. Id. (quoting Hooks, 771 F.2d at 944). And it is well-settled in the Sixth Circuit that

“conspiracy claims must be pled with some degree of specificity and that vague and conclusory

allegations unsupported by material facts will not be sufficient to state such a claim under § 1983.”

Id. (quoting Gutierrez v. Lynch, 826 F.2d 1534, 1538 (6th Cir. 1987)); Moldowan v. City of Warren,

578 F.3d 351, 395 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted) (affirming dismissal of conspiracy claims

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because the plaintiff failed to plead sufficient material facts).

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants conspired to prevent him from participating in Family Day

by adopting Moore’s unwritten policy that allows discrimination toward inmates convicted of sex

offenses against children. (Doc. 1-1 at 8, 15–16). Plaintiff’s allegations are too conclusory and

lack the requisite specificity to state a plausible claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Moldowan,

578 F.3d at 395 (citing Gutierrez, 826 F.2d at 1538). Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendants shared

a “single plan” to deprive Plaintiff of his constitutional rights without providing further material

facts are insufficient to suggest a conspiracy existed against him. And Plaintiff fails to allege facts

to show the basis of his knowledge that Defendants engaged in such a single, conspiratorial plan.

Labeling Defendants’ actions as a conspiracy is mere speculation and therefore not enough to

establish that there was a shared plan against Plaintiff to prevent him from attending Family Day.

See Regets v. City of Plymouth, 568 F. App’x 380, 391 (6th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted); Moore v.

City of Paducah, 890 F.2d 831, 834 (6th Cir. 1989)) (finding that circumstantial evidence can

“establish an agreement between the coconspirators” but “mere speculation and conjecture are

insufficient”). Plaintiff’s conspiracy claims should be DISMISSED.

IV. SERVICE

Normally, the next step is for the Court to order service on the proceeding Defendants.

However, Plaintiff’s summons forms are deficient. (See Doc. 1-6). Specifically, Plaintiff did not

fill out his name and address as directed so that the served party can know where to send an answer

or motion. (Id.). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail Plaintiff back these forms. Plaintiff is

ORDERED to complete and return them within ten (10) days. For more guidance on how to

correctly fill out the summons forms, Plaintiff may look to pages 9–10 and 30–32 of the Southern

District of Ohio’s Guide for Pro Se Civil Litigants.

Additionally, Plaintiff did not submit service copies of his Complaint for each Defendant.

Despite proceeding in forma pauperis, that is still his responsibility. Therefore, Plaintiff is

ORDERED to file five service copies of his Complaint within ten (10) days.

Plaintiff is WARNED that the Court will not order service until he has completed both of

these tasks.

V. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s Equal Protection and Freedom of Association claims

MAY PROCEED for further development against all Defendants in their individual capacities,

and in their official capacities to the extent that Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief.

Because Plaintiff’s other allegations fail to state a plausible claim for relief, the Undersigned

RECOMMENDS that the Court DISMISS his remaining claims.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT:

1. Plaintiff’s cruel and unusual punishment claims, Due Process claims, civil conspiracy

claims, and any official capacity claims for monetary damages against Defendants

Galloway, Cottril, Ivey, Marcus, and Moore be DISMISSED. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)

and 1915A(b)(1).

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT:

1. Plaintiff may proceed at this juncture on his Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection

claims and his First Amendment Freedom of Association claims against Defendants

Galloway, Cottril, Ivey, Marcus, and Moore for allegedly discriminating against Plaintiff

by denying his Family Day application based on his criminal conviction and therefore

impeding on his right to visit with his children, without a legitimate penological interest.

2. The Clerk shall mail Plaintiff’s summons forms back to him to be completed. The Clerk

shall also mail Plaintiff a copy of the Southern District of Ohio’s Guide for Pro Se Civil

Litigants.

3. Plaintiff shall complete the summons forms and return them, as well as service copies of

the Complaint for each Defendant, within ten (10) days. The Court will not direct service

until he has done so.

4. Plaintiff shall serve upon Defendants or, if appearance has been entered by counsel, upon

Defendants’ attorney(s), a copy of every further pleading or other document submitted for

consideration by the Court. Plaintiff shall include with the original paper to be filed with

the Clerk of Court a certificate stating the date that a true and correct copy of any document

was mailed to Defendants or Defendants’ counsel. Any paper received by a district judge

or magistrate judge which has not been filed with the Clerk or which fails to include a

certificate of service will be disregarded by the Court.

5. Plaintiff is reminded that he must keep this Court informed of his current address and

promptly file a Notice of New Address if he is released or transferred.

Date: February 17, 2026 /s/ Kimberly A. Jolson

KIMBERLY A. JOLSON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

NOTICE REGARDING OBJECTIONS

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written objections

to this Report & Recommendation (“R&R”) within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served

with a copy thereof. That period may be extended further by the Court on timely motion by either

side for an extension of time. All objections shall specify the portion(s) of the R&R objected to

and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in support of the objections. A party shall

respond to an opponent’s objections within FOURTEEN DAYS after being served with a copy of

those objections. Failure to make objections in accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights

on appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th

Cir. 1981).