Abdullaev

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

WESTERN DIVISION

______________________________________________________________________________

TEMUR ABDULLAEV,

Petitioner,

v. Case No. 2:26-cv-02250-BCL-atc

CHRISTOPHER BULLOCK,

Field Office Director of U.S. Immigration

and Customs Enforcement, New Orleans

Field Office,

Respondent.

______________________________________________________________________________

ORDER DENYING § 2241 PETITION

______________________________________________________________________________

Petitioner Temur Abdullaev has filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241,

by which he challenges his detention without a bond hearing. Doc. 1, at 9.

As a preliminary housekeeping matter, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth

Circuit has held that the “district director”—now the Field Office Director—for the place of

confinement is the proper respondent to a Section 2241 petition filed by an alien challenging his

confinement. See Roman v. Ashcroft, 340 F.3d 314, 320–21 (6th Cir. 2003). Here, that is now

Christopher Bullock, Field Office Director for the New Orleans Field Office, United States

Immigration and Customs Enforcement. The Clerk is therefore DIRECTED to modify the docket

to replace Trinity Minter with Christopher Bullock. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).

As to the merits of the Petition for habeas corpus, the Petition (Doc. 1) is DENIED for the

reasons that follow.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner, a citizen of Uzbekistan, entered the United States in September of 2023. Doc.

1-2, at 3. When Petitioner entered the country, he was inspected by a border patrol agent and served

with a notice to appear for an immigration review. The notice informed him he was subject to

removal under Section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, because he was an

“alien present in the United States without being admitted or paroled, or who arrived in the United

States at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General.” Id. On December 5,

2025, Immigration and Customs Enforcement officers arrested Petitioner and placed him in

custody at the West Tennessee Detention Facility in Mason, Tennessee. Doc. 1, at 10.

Since then, Petitioner has been detained in ICE custody. Id. Petitioner filed a motion for

bond redetermination on December 24, 2025, which the immigration court denied. Doc. 1-2, at 15.

Petitioner filed a renewed motion for custody redetermination, which the immigration court again

denied. Id. at 25. Petitioner seeks release or an individualized bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. §

1226(a). Doc. 1, at 14.

LEGAL STANDARD

Section 2241 authorizes a court to issue a writ of habeas corpus when an individual “is in

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2241(c)(3). An alien seeking to challenge his detention relating to removal proceedings may in

some circumstances seek relief through a Section 2241 petition. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533

U.S. 678, 687 (2001). Section 2243 directs the judge entertaining an application for a writ of habeas

corpus to “forthwith award the writ or issue an order directing the respondent to show cause why

the writ should not be granted, unless it appears from the application that the applicant or person

detained is not entitled thereto.” 28 U.S.C. § 2243. The last clause of Section 2243 imposes “a

duty to screen out a habeas corpus petition which should be dismissed for lack of merit on its face,”

as where “the necessary facts can be determined from the petition itself without need for

consideration of a return.” Allen v. Perini, 424 F.2d 134, 141 (6th Cir. 1970).

ANALYSIS

The Court denies the Petition. The exhaustion doctrine bars review of Petitioner’s statutory

claims. Moreover, Petitioner’s detention without a bond hearing violates neither the Immigration

and Nationality Act nor the Constitution.

I. Petitioner’s Claims challenging application of 8 U.S.C. § 1225 fail.

A. The Exhaustion Doctrine bars review of Petitioner’s statutory claims.

The Supreme Court “long has acknowledged the general rule that parties exhaust

prescribed administrative remedies before seeking relief from the federal courts.” McCarthy v.

Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992). That requirement makes obvious sense when Congress

requires exhaustion. It arguably makes less sense when, as in Section 2241, Congress has not done

so. Perhaps the so-called prudential exhaustion doctrine—a matter of “sound judicial discretion,”

id.—can be explained as an aspect of ripeness, the idea being that there is no ripe dispute if the

Executive Branch has not had its final say. Or perhaps it is a shirking of the federal courts’

“virtually unflagging” duty to exercise jurisdiction in cases properly before them. Lexmark Int’l,

Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 126 (2014) (quoting Sprint Commc’ns, Inc.

v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 77 (2013)).

In any event, both the Supreme Court and the Sixth Circuit have embraced the doctrine,

which is thus binding on this Court. See, e.g., McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 144; see also Shearson v.

Holder, 725 F.3d 588, 593–94 (6th Cir. 2013). Exhaustion gives an agency “the opportunity to

correct its own mistakes with respect to the programs it administers”; “discourages disregard of

the agency’s procedures”; promotes efficiency because “[c]laims generally can be resolved much

more quickly and economically before an agency”; and “may produce a useful record for

subsequent judicial consideration.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 89 (2006) (quotation marks and

citations omitted).

True, the exhaustion requirement can be excused if exhaustion would be futile. But, as the

Sixth Circuit has recently explained, in determining whether exhaustion would be futile, “the

crucial inquiry [is] whether the agency can provide the relief requested if the argument succeeds,

not whether it is likely to succeed.” Smith v. United States Securities & Exchange Commission, -

-- F.4th --, 2026 WL 850806, at *7 (6th Cir. 2026).1 And, here, the Immigration Judge or Board

of Immigration Appeals could certainly grant petitioner a bond hearing or release on bond if he

were to prevail on his claims; indeed, the whole theory of his claims is that the law compels the IJ

to give him such a hearing (and not, say, that the federal courts should be stepping in to run bond

proceedings on a categorical basis). Petitioner’s statutory claims are thus barred by the exhaustion

doctrine. However, Petitioner’s constitutional claims are not barred by the exhaustion requirement

because “the BIA cannot adjudicate the constitutionality of the statutes it administers.” (citing

Bangura v. Hansen, 434 F.3d 487, 494 (6th Cir. 2006)).

In sum, Petitioner’s statutory claims are barred by the exhaustion doctrine, and are due to

be rejected for that reason alone.

1 Smith addressed the futility exception in the context of an express exhaustion requirement

that excepted situations in which “there was reasonable ground for … failure to” exhaust. Id. at *5

(quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78y(c)(1)). That makes no difference: There is no logical reason for treating

the concept of futility differently in the context of a prudential rule than in the context of a statute

with a generally worded exception that encompasses the concept of futility.

B. Under the governing statutes, Petitioner is an “applicant seeking

admission” subject to mandatory detention.

Even if they were not barred by the exhaustion doctrine, Petitioner’s statutory claims fail

on the merits. Petitioner’s statutory eligibility for a bond hearing is determined by whether his

detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) or 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Section 1225(b)(2) provides:

Subject to subparagraphs (B) and (C), in the case of an alien who is an applicant

for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien

seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the

alien shall be detained for a proceeding under section 1229a of this title.

8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). In contrast, Section 1226(a) provides, in relevant part:

On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained

pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.

Except as provided in subsection (c) and pending such decision, the Attorney

General--

(1) may continue to detain the arrested alien; and

(2) may release the alien on--

(A) bond of at least $1,500 with security approved by, and containing

conditions prescribed by, the Attorney General; or

(B) conditional parole . . . .

8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1)–(2). Petitioner argues that he is entitled to an individualized bond hearing

under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Doc. 1, at 11-12.

The Court disagrees. “Congress defined ‘applicant for admission’ broadly in Section

1225(a)(1) to include all ‘alien[s] present in the United States who have not been admitted.’”

Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494, 504 (5th Cir. 2026); see 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1) (“An

alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States

(whether or not at a designated port of arrival and including an alien who is brought to the United

States after having been interdicted in international or United States waters) shall be deemed for

purposes of this chapter an applicant for admission.”).2 That definition encompasses Petitioner

because he has been found to be an “applicant for admission” to the United States without ever

having been legally admitted. See Doc. 1-2, at 16; Avila v. Bondi, No. 25-3248, 2026 WL 819258,

at *4 (8th Cir. Mar. 25, 2026). The passage of time makes no difference. Unless and until Petitioner

is granted authorization and lawfully admitted into the United States, he remains an “applicant for

admission.”

Petitioner cannot avoid mandatory detention on the ground that he is not at the border and

thus is not an “arriving alien.” That argument fails because Section 1225(b)(2) does not use the

phrase “arriving alien.” Congress surely would have done so if it had intended Section 1225(b)(2)

to apply only to arriving aliens, a point highlighted by Congress’ use of that phrase elsewhere in

Section 1225. Buenrostro-Mendez, 166 F.4th at 504.2.

As such, the Petitioner’s detention during removal proceedings is mandatory under Section

1225(b)(2) because Petitioner is an “applicant for admission.” Petitioner’s challenge to that

detention therefore fails.

II. The Central District of California’s decision in Maldonado Bautista cannot

justify deviating from the statutory mandate.

Petitioner appears to contend that, no matter whether Section 1225 mandates detention, he

is entitled to a bond hearing because the Central District of California in Maldonado Bautista v.

Ernesto Santacruz, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, 2025 WL 3289861, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 20,

2025), vacated the BIA decision (Matter of Yajure-Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 445 (BIA 2022)) on

2 Statutory language underscores the point in providing that “‘admission’. . . mean[s], with respect to an

alien, the lawful entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and authorization by an

immigration officer.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13) (emphasis added). Until his entry into the United States is

lawful, Petitioner remains an “applicant for admission,” and thus his detention during removal proceedings

is mandatory under Section 1225(b)(2). See Avila v. Bondi, No. 25-3248, 2026 WL 819258, at *2 (8th Cir.

Mar. 25, 2026).

which the Immigration Judge relied in denying his request for bond. Of course, a district court’s

decision—even one disagreeing with an agency decision on which an agency representative relied

in the litigant’s case—cannot in and of itself trump a statutory mandate. So, without more, Section

1225(b)’s mandate of detention still applies even if the Central District of California disagrees.

But—and this is not clear—perhaps Petitioner means to argue that he was a member of the

class in Maldonado Bautista and therefore is entitled to release based on that decision. Assuming

that is Petitioner’s argument, it fails. The Central District made clear that it did not order “habeas

relief for all class members across the nation.” Maldonado Bautista, 2025 WL 3713987, at *29.

Indeed, the district court in Maldonado Bautista acknowledged that it could not order release of

detainees held outside of the Central District of California. Id. at *30 (“To the extent Petitioners

seek habeas relief for class members in immigration detention outside of this judicial district, the

Court reiterates such an action would be ultra vires; there is no habeas jurisdiction to do so.”). The

Maldanado Bautista decision is not binding here and, as noted, cannot justify deviating from

Section 1225’s mandate of detention. See Akilimali v. Daley, No. 2:25-CV-00194-SCM, 2026 WL

751893, at *6 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 17, 2026) (Meredith, J.).

III. Subjecting Petitioner to mandatory detention as required by a faithful

interpretation of Section 1225 does not violate the Due Process Clause.

Petitioner also claims that his detention without a bond hearing violates the Due Process

Clause. Doc. 1, at 13-14. “[T]he Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in

deportation proceedings.” Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993) (citing The Japanese

Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86, 100–101 (1903)). But, when a noncitizen has not been lawfully

admitted to the United States, “the decisions of executive or administrative officers, acting within

powers expressly conferred by Congress, are due process of law” because such noncitizens have

“only those rights regarding admission that Congress has provided by statute.” Dep’t of Homeland

Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 138, 140 (2020). This is the result of “the so-called ‘entry

fiction’ theory of immigration law,” under which “[a]liens who have not ‘entered the United States

within the meaning of the law,’ i.e., who were never lawfully admitted and do not have leave to

remain, are ‘still in theory of law at the boundary line,’” Gonzalez v. Ladwig, No. 2:26-cv-02017-

MSN-atc, 2026 WL 413602, at *11 (W.D. Tenn. 2026) (Norris, J.) (quoting Kaplan v. Tod, 267

U.S. 228, 230–31 (1925)), where they have only those rights provided by Congress. See

Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 140. And, here, Congress did not provide a right to a bond hearing.

8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).

Neither the governing statutes nor the Constitution guarantee Petitioner an individualized

bond hearing in connection with removal proceedings. Those claims therefore cannot support the

Petition. Accordingly, it is apparent from the application that Petitioner is not entitled to the writ.

28 U.S.C. § 2243.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) is DENIED.

The Clerk is DIRECTED TO CLOSE THIS CASE.

IT IS SO ORDERED, this 3rd day of April, 2026.

s/ Brian C. Lea

BRIAN C. LEA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE