Opinion

Watkins

Court
District Court, E.D. Arkansas
Filed
Feb 11, 2026
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 40.0%

affirming summary judgment where plaintiff did not allege facts connecting defendants to the challenged actions

How later courts described this case

  • affirming summary judgment where plaintiff did not allege facts connecting defendants to the challenged actions

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

NORTHERN DIVISION

EDDIE S. WATKINS, III, PLAINTIFF

ADC # 084056

v. 3:26CV00011-DPM-JTK

BEN SLOCUM, et al. DEFENDANTS

ORDER

Eddie S. Watkins, III (“Plaintiff”) is an inmate at Grimes Unit of the Arkansas Division of

Correction (“ADC”). Plaintiff filed a pro se complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. No.

2). Plaintiff also filed a Motion to Proceed in forma pauperis, which the Court granted. (Doc.

Nos. 4, 5). The Court must screen Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act

(“PLRA”).

I. Screening

The PLRA requires federal courts to screen prisoner complaints seeking relief against a

governmental entity, officer, or employee. 28 U.S.C. ' 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a

complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that: (a) are legally frivolous or

malicious; (b) fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (c) seek monetary relief

from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. ' 1915A(b).

An action is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v.

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Whether a plaintiff is represented by counsel or is appearing

pro se, his complaint must allege specific facts sufficient to state a claim. See Martin v. Sargent,

780 F .2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir.1985).

An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough

facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 570 (2007). In reviewing a pro se complaint under ' 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court must

give the complaint the benefit of a liberal construction. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520

(1972). The Court must also weigh all factual allegations in favor of the plaintiff, unless the facts

alleged are clearly baseless. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992).

II. Facts and Analysis

Plaintiff’s Complaint is the operative pleading in this case. Plaintiff named as Defendants

in their personal and official capacities the following individuals: Ben Slocum, CEO/President,

Wellpath Heath; Kerstein, Dr., Grimes Unit, ADC; D. Delgoto, CNA, Wellpath, Grimes Unit,

ADC; Howard, Wellpath, Grimes Unit, ADC; L. Teague, Medical Administrator, Wellpath,

Grimes Unit, ADC; and A. Jackson, Director of Nurses, Wellpath, Grimes Unit, ADC. (Doc. No.

2 at 1-3).

Plaintiff arrived at the Grimes Unit on October 1, 2025. (Id. at 5). On or around October

7, 2025, Plaintiff had a telehealth visit scheduled with Defendant Kerstein. (Id.). Plaintiff

explains that he filed a grievance against Defendant Kerstein “years prior.” (Id.). When Plaintiff

realized he would be seeing Defendant Kerstein during the telehealth visit, Plaintiff refused the

visit and informed Defendant Delgoto of his decision. (Id.). Defendant Kerstein then directed

that Plaintiff’s medications and scripts “all be taken.” (Id.). Plaintiff asserts that Defendant

Kerstein acted in retaliation for Plaintiff’s earlier grievance. (Doc. No. 2 at 6).

Plaintiff alleges that the Wellpath CEO Ben Slocum informed Defendants “to take away

much stuff to inmates, due to them saving the company money at the reckless and dangerous

expense of myself and other inmates.” (Id. at 7).

On November 11, 2025, Plaintiff saw a provider who reinstated Plaintiff’s script for a cane,

medical shoes, and lower bunk. (Id. at 8). But Plaintiff “had to put back in to be seen” to be

placed back on his medications. (Id.). Despite Plaintiff’s requests to see someone other than

Defendant Kerstein, Plaintiff learned he had been scheduled for an appointment with Defendant

Kerstein. (Id.). Plaintiff again refused the visit. (Id.). The following day, Defendant Delgoto

told Defendant Kerstin to take Plaintiff’s cane, because Defendant Kerstein had taken the cane for

case a month earlier. (Doc. No. 2 at 8). Plaintiff maintains “this was clearly the[m] conspiring

in retaliation and deliberate indifference.” (Id.). Plaintiff further alleges all Defendants were

deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. (Id. at 5-9). Plaintiff seeks damages,

among other relief. (Id. at 9-10).

A. Personal Capacity Claims

Plaintiff brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Liability under § 1983 requires a causal

link to, and direct responsibility for, the alleged deprivation of rights.” Madewell v. Roberts, 909

F.2d 1203, 1208 (8th Cir. 1990). “Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a

plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual

actions, has violated the Constitution.” Parrish v. Ball, 594 F.3d 993, 1001 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009)). Bare allegations void of factual enhancement are

insufficient to state a claim for relief under § 1983. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Plaintiff’s claims revolve around Defendant Kerstein. According to Plaintiff, he filed a

grievance against Defendant Kerstein when Plaintiff was serving time for an earlier sentence. The

more time that passes between the protected activity and the retaliatory conduct, the inference of

retaliation becomes weaker. Tyler v. Univ. of Arkansas Bd. of Trs., 628 F.3d 980, 986 (8th Cir.

2011). “The inference vanishes altogether when the time gap between the protected activity and

the adverse . . . action is measured in months.” Id. (and cases cited therein). Here, Plaintiff says

he filed his earlier grievance years before. Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendant Kerstein are

too remote to state a claim.

Plaintiff claims all other Defendants who worked at the Grimes Unit had access to his

medical records and grievances and as a form of retaliation denied him medical care. (Doc. No.

2 at 6). What Plaintiff has alleged is not enough to establish retaliatory animus. Antonelli v.

Tipton, Case No. 08-3123, 2009 WL 4825169 at *904 (8th Cir. Dec. 16 2009) (per curiam)

(plaintiff “failed to state a retaliation claim because he . . . failed to allege which defendants were

involved in or affected by his grievances.”). Nothing in Plaintiff’s Compliant indicates any reason

for retaliatory animus on the part Defendants Delgoto, Howard, Teague, or Jackson—it is not clear

why any of these Defendants would be antagonistic towards Plaintiff for a grievance filed years

earlier against Defendant Kerstein. See Atkinson v. Bohn, 91 F.3d 1127, 1129 (8th Cir. 1996).

See also Bitzan v. Bartruff, 916 F.3d 716, 717 (8th Cir. 2019) (affirming summary judgment where

plaintiff did not allege facts connecting defendants to the challenged actions).

The Court also notes that Plaintiff made allegations against “Defendants” as a group. The

Court cannot determine each individual’s actions when allegations are made against a group of

people. And liability under § 1983 is based on individual actions.

Further, Plaintiff acknowledges he refused to see Defendant Kerstein. Gibson v. Weber,

433 F.3d 642, 646 (8th Cir. 2006). (prisoner’s “decision to decline medical treatment” relevant);

Long v. Nix, 86 F.3d 761, 765-66 (8th Cir.1996) (no deliberate indifference where prisoner

refused medical care). This acknowledgement appears fatal to Plaintiff’s claims without

something more.

Plaintiff alleged Wellpath CEO Ben Slocum directed Defendants “to take away much stuff

to inmates” as a means to save the company money. (Doc. No. 2 at 7). These allegations are

conclusory.

Additionally, Plaintiff says he told “the Grimes Unit Administrator,” “DON,” and CNA

that he wanted to be seen by a different doctor, to no avail. (Id.). Without a basis for retaliation,

this claim also fails. The Court also notes that it is not entirely clear who these individuals are

because Plaintiff did not refer to them by name.

Plaintiff will be given the chance to submit an Amended Complaint to cure the defects in

his pleading.

D. Superseding Amended Complaint

Plaintiff may amend his Complaint to cure the defects explained above. If Plaintiff

decides to amend, Plaintiff should submit to the Court, within thirty (30) days of the entry date of

this Order, a superseding Amended Complaint that contains in a single document his claims against

all Defendants he is suing. Plaintiff is cautioned that an Amended Complaint renders his

Complaint without legal effect.1 Only claims properly set out in the Amended Complaint will be

allowed to proceed. Therefore, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint should: 1) name as a Defendant

each party he believes deprived him of his constitutional rights and whom he wishes to sue

in this action; 2) provide specific facts against each named Defendant in a simple, concise,

and direct manner, including dates, times, and places if possible; 3) indicate whether he is

suing each Defendant in his/her individual or official capacity, or in both capacities;

1 “An amended complaint ‘ordinarily supersedes the original and renders it of no legal

effect.’” In Home Health, Inc. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 101 F.3d 600, 603 (8th Cir. 1996),

quoting International Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 556 F.2d 665, 668 (2d Cir. 1994) (other citations

omitted).

4) explain the reasons for an official capacity claim, if he makes one; 5) explain how each

defendant’s actions harmed him personally; 6) explain the relief he seeks; and 7) otherwise

cure the defects explained above and set out viable claims.

If Plaintiff does not submit an Amended Complaint, I may recommend that his Complaint

be dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Loc. R. 5.5(c)(2).

IV. Conclusion

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that:

1. If Plaintiff wishes to submit a Second Amended Complaint for the Court’s review,

he must file the Second Amended Complaint consistent with the above instructions within thirty

(30) days from the date of this Order. If Plaintiff does not submit an Amended Complaint, I may

recommend that his Amended Complaint be dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Loc. R.

5.5(c)(2).

2. The Clerk of the Court is directed to mail Plaintiff a blank 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Complaint form.

Dated this 11" day of February, 2026.

JEROMET.KEARNEY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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