The opinion
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
2026 MSPB 4
Docket No. AT-0432-16-0588-P-1
Ann Murray,
Appellant,
v.
National Aeronautics and Space
Administration,
Agency.
April 2, 2026
Archibald J. Thomas III , Esquire, Jacksonville Beach, Florida,
for the appellant.
Samantha Cochran , Esquire, Kennedy Space Center, Florida,
for the agency.
BEFORE
Henry J. Kerner, Vice Chairman
James J. Woodruff II, Member
OPINION AND ORDER
¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review and the agency has filed
a cross petition for review of the addendum initial decision, which denied her
motion for a tax offset payment and awarded her $22,000 in nonpecuniary
compensatory damages. For the reasons discussed below, we GRANT the
petition for review and DENY the cross petition for review. We REVERSE the
administrative judge’s finding that the Board lacks the authority to award
pecuniary compensatory damages for the adverse tax consequences of a lump sum
back pay award. We FIND instead that pecuniary compensatory damages may be
2
awarded when there has been a finding of discrimination, compensatory damages
are authorized by law, and the appellant has proven that she suffered adverse tax
consequences due to a lump sum back pay award. We AFFIRM the
administrative judge’s decision to award $22,000 in nonpecuniary compensatory
damages. We REMAND the case to the regional office for further adjudication in
accordance with this Opinion and Order.
BACKGROUND
¶2 In Murray v. National Aeronautics and Space Administration , MSPB
Docket No. AT-0432-16-0588-I-1, Final Order, ¶¶ 1, 6, 8-20 (June 22, 2023), the
Board found that the appellant proved her claim of failure to accommodate
disability discrimination and reversed the removal action. The Board ordered the
agency to cancel the removal and restore the appellant to duty, effective May 10,
2016, and to pay her back pay, interest on back pay, and other benefits. Id.,
¶¶ 21-22. The order also informed the appellant of her right to request
compensatory damages.
¶3 The appellant filed a motion for compensatory damages. Murray v.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, MSPB Docket No. AT-0432-16-
0588-P-1, Appeal File (P-1 AF), Tab 2. The agency filed a response. P-1 AF,
Tab 8. The appellant filed a motion for a tax offset payment for an adverse tax
consequence, which she claimed would result from receiving several years of
back pay in a lump sum payment in a single tax year. P-1 AF, Tab 7. The
appellant noted that she was unable to compute the amount of the tax impact until
she filed her 2023 tax return, but she estimated that the tax impact would be in
excess of $100,000. Id. at 4. The agency filed a response to this motion. P-1
AF, Tab 9.
¶4 The administrative judge issued an addendum initial decision in
which he granted in part the motion for compensatory damages. P-1 AF, Tab 10,
Addendum Initial Decision (AID). In pertinent part, the administrative judge
3
denied the appellant’s motion for a tax offset payment and found that her
expenses for travel for job hunting and visits to her attorney were more
appropriately considered as part of an award of attorney fees and costs (which
was then pending), 1 but he determined that she was entitled to nonpecuniary
compensatory damages in the amount of $22,000. AID at 4, 6-9. The
administrative judge also found that the agency did not prove that it made a good
faith effort to accommodate the appellant’s disability. 2 AID at 9-12.
¶5 The appellant has filed a petition for review, the agency has filed a
response, and the appellant has filed a reply. Petition for Review (PFR) File,
Tabs 1, 3, 5. The agency also has filed a cross petition for review, and the
appellant has filed a response. PFR File, Tabs 3, 6.
ANALYSIS
¶6 Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, an employee may recover
compensatory damages from a Federal agency that engaged in unlawful and
intentional discrimination against her on the basis of her disability. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981a(a)(2)-(3); Edwards v. Department of Transportation, 117 M.S.P.R. 222,
¶ 9 (2012); see Danzie v. Department of the Army, EEOC Appeal No. 01A42575,
2004 WL 1763834 at *2 (July 28, 2004) (stating that compensatory damages are
available for violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., or Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
(Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 791, et seq.). The Board may order
the payment of compensatory damages when there has been a finding that such
discrimination occurred. Edwards, 117 M.S.P.R. 222, ¶ 9; 5 C.F.R.
§ 1201.202(c). The Board may consider decisions from the Equal Employment
1
The appellant does not challenge the administrative judge’s finding that she was not
entitled to recover such costs in her compensatory damages appeal. We affirm the
addendum initial decision in this regard.
2
The agency does not challenge this finding in its cross petition for review. Petition
for Review File, Tab 3 at 10-11. We affirm the addendum initial decision in this
regard. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(3).
4
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) regarding entitlement to and the amount of
compensatory damages, but it conducts its own analysis of these issues. See
Gilewicz v. Department of Homeland Security, 2024 MSPB 7, ¶ 8 (finding that, to
achieve consistency with the amount of nonpecuniary compensatory damages
awarded in similar cases, it is appropriate to consider EEOC decisions that
present similar factual scenarios); Heffernan v. Department of Health and Human
Services, 107 M.S.P.R. 97, ¶¶ 12-13 (2007) (citing EEOC decisions with facts
similar to that Board appeal to help determine the correct amount of
compensatory damages).
¶7 Section 102(a) of the Civil Rights Act authorizes the award of
compensatory damages for pecuniary losses and for nonpecuniary losses, such as,
but not limited to, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, and
loss of enjoyment of life, injury to character and reputation, and loss of health.
Edwards, 117 M.S.P.R. 222, ¶ 10; Heffernan, 107 M.S.P.R. 97, ¶ 6; see 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981a(a)-(b). Compensatory damages do not include back pay, interest on back
pay, or any other type of equitable relief authorized by the enforcement
provisions of Title VII. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981a(b)(2), 2000e-5(g); Edwards,
117 M.S.P.R. 222, ¶ 10. To receive an award of compensatory damages, an
appellant must demonstrate that she has been harmed as a result of the agency’s
discriminatory action and must establish the extent, nature, and severity of the
harm, as well as the duration or expected duration of the harm. Edwards,
117 M.S.P.R. 222, ¶ 10.
The appellant may be entitled to an award of pecuniary compensatory damages if
she can prove that she suffered adverse tax consequences stemming from a lump
sum back pay award because of the agency’s discriminatory conduct.
¶8 Pecuniary damages are available for out-of-pocket expenses shown
to be related to the discriminatory conduct. Edwards, 117 M.S.P.R. 222, ¶ 12
(citing Minardi v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01981955, 2000 WL
33542026 at *2 (Oct. 3, 2000) ). Typically, these damages include reimbursement
5
for medical expenses, job hunting expenses, moving expenses, and other
quantitative out-of-pocket expenses. Edwards, 117 M.S.P.R. 222, ¶ 12 (internal
citations omitted). In the addendum initial decision, the administrative judge
denied the appellant’s motion for a tax offset payment, explaining that the Board
does not get involved with the tax consequences of a back pay award. AID at 4
(citing Johnston v. Department of the Treasury, 100 M.S.P.R. 196 (2005), and
Holtgrewe v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation , 65 M.S.P.R. 137, 140
(1994)).
¶9 In her petition for review, the appellant contends that Johnston and
Holtgrewe did not involve violations of discrimination law, and any Board cases
indicating that the Board lacks authority to award compensatory damages for this
reason predated the enactment of 42 U.S.C. § 1981a. 3 PFR File, Tab 1 at 9. She
also asserts that the EEOC has recognized that an agency is liable for any
increased tax liability resulting from a receipt of a lump sum payment of back pay
in a single tax year. Id. at 9-10 (citing Mohar v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC
Appeal No. 0720100019, 2011 WL 4343960 (Aug. 29, 2011), Lorenzo v.
Department of Defense (Education Activity), EEOC Petition No. 04A40035,
2005 WL 2492749 (Sept. 29, 2005), and Goetze v. Department of the Navy, EEOC
Appeal No. 01991530, 2001 WL 991923 (Aug. 22, 2001)). 4
¶10 In its response, the agency acknowledges that the EEOC “regularly
awards tax offset payments related to the award of back pay in discrimination
claims,” but asserts that it “does so explicitly as an equitable remedy, not an
award of compensatory damages.” PFR File, Tab 3 at 9 (citing Goetze, EEOC
3
We agree with the appellant that Johnston and Holtgrewe did not involve findings of
discrimination.
4
It appears that this language and the corresponding case citations come from the Equal
Employment Opportunity Management Directive 110 (EEO MD-110), ch. 11, Remedies.
EEOC, EEO MD-110, ch. 11 (Aug. 5, 2015). The paragraph that references Mohar,
Lorenzo, and Goetze does not seem to support the appellant’s position because it
discusses the tax consequences of a lump sum payment of back pay under the heading
of “Back Pay,” and not the heading of “Compensatory Damages.”
6
Appeal No. 01991530, 2001 WL 991923, and Alcala v. Department of the
Treasury, EEOC Appeal No. 01A14299, 2002 WL 31153182 (Sept. 18, 2002)).
The agency also questions whether the back pay award was made pursuant to the
Back Pay Act or Title VII. Id. at 10. For example, if the award was made
pursuant to the Back Pay Act, which the agency asserts that it was, the Board has
consistently held that the Act does not provide for reimbursement of negative tax
consequences or other consequential expenses incurred as a result of an improper
agency action. Id. (citing, among other cases, Johnston, 100 M.S.P.R. 196, and
Holtgrewe, 65 M.S.P.R. 137). Alternatively, the agency asserts that any
compensatory damages award is premature because the appellant has the burden
to prove the amount to which she claims entitlement, and she has not done so. Id.
¶11 To resolve the question before us, we have considered case law from
the Board and the EEOC. We agree with the agency that the Board has
consistently held that it lacks the authority to remedy the tax consequences of a
back pay award. See, e.g., Alford v. Department of Defense, 113 M.S.P.R. 629,
¶ 23 (2010); Kinney v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 103 M.S.P.R. 602, ¶ 16
(2006); Hopkins v. Department of the Navy, 86 M.S.P.R. 11, ¶ 2 (2000); Harris v.
Department of Agriculture, 53 M.S.P.R. 78, 82 (1992), aff’d, 988 F.2d 130 (Fed.
Cir. 1993) (Table); Wilson v. U.S. Postal Service, 38 M.S.P.R. 156, 159 (1988).
Notably, each of these cases arose in the context of a petition for enforcement,
and only Wilson involved a finding of discrimination. In Wilson, a decision
which predated the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the Board found that, absent any
explicit statutory authority to award damages, it lacked the authority under
Title VII or any other law to award compensation for an increase in income tax
liability. 38 M.S.P.R. at 159; see also Gay v. U.S. Postal Service, 41 M.S.P.R.
476, 482 (1989) (citing Wilson, 38 M.S.P.R. 156, in a pre-1991 decision finding
that the Board lacked authority to order any remedy for the tax consequences of
back pay resulting from a discrimination finding). The parties have not cited, and
we have not found, any precedential decisions from the Board or the U.S. Court
7
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in which the Board’s authority to award an
appellant compensation for the adverse tax consequences of a lump sum back pay
award has been discussed in the context of a finding of unlawful discrimination
and consideration of compensatory damages following the enactment of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991.
¶12 However, the EEOC has held that the purpose of compensatory
damages is to compensate an employee for the proximate injury caused by the
employment discrimination, and compensation for the adverse tax consequences
of receiving a lump sum back pay award meets this criterion. Holler v.
Department of the Navy, EEOC Appeal Nos. 01990407 and 01982627, 2001 WL
991924 at *3 (Aug. 22, 2001); Van Hoose v. Department of the Navy, EEOC
Appeal Nos. 01990455 and 01982628, 2001 WL 991925 at *3 (Aug. 22, 2001);
see Kyle S. v. Department of Agriculture, EEOC Petition No. 202204525,
2024 WL 3507323 at *11 (July 9, 2024) (citing Holler for the proposition that
petitioners may recover the additional tax liability from a lump sum payment of
back pay); Marquis K. v. Department of Homeland Security , EEOC Appeal No.
0120162675, 2017 WL 3911865 at *2 n.2 (Aug. 23, 2017) (citing Holler for the
proposition that payments for increased tax liability stemming from a lump sum
back pay award may be ordered as part of “consequential pecuniary compensatory
damages”); Petitioner v. Department of Homeland Security, EEOC Petition No.
0420140001, 2014 WL 7005926 at *3 (Dec. 5, 2014) (same). In Marquis, EEOC
Appeal No. 0120162675, 2017 WL 3911865 at *2 n.2, the EEOC noted that a
settlement agreement provided the complainant with compensatory damages, but
it did not provide for any other relief regarding tax consequences. Therefore, the
complainant was not entitled to “any such pecuniary damages.” Id. In Petitioner,
EEOC Petition No. 0420140001, 2014 WL 7005926 at *4, the EEOC construed
the claim for payment for the adverse tax consequences of receiving the
2007 lump sum back pay award as a request for pecuniary compensatory damages.
The EEOC found that the petitioner was not entitled to compensatory damages
8
because its prior orders did not find that he proved he was subjected to
employment discrimination, and the settlement agreement that resolved his equal
employment opportunity complaint did not include compensatory damages as part
of the remedy in the event of a breach. Id.
¶13 We agree with the EEOC’s analysis of this issue. Accordingly, we
find that, in cases involving findings that the agency committed prohibited
discrimination pursuant to Title VII and/or the Rehabilitation Act, the Board may
award as compensatory damages payment for the proven adverse tax
consequences of a receipt of a lump sum back pay award. 5
¶14 Here, however, the appellant has not, to date, submitted any evidence
that she filed her 2023 Federal tax return or suffered any adverse tax
consequences. The appellant bears the burden to establish the amount of her
increased tax liability. Goetze, EEOC Appeal No. 01991530, 2001 WL 991923
at * 4; Taylor G. v. Department of the Army, EEOC Appeal No. 0120170778,
2018 WL 1990472 at *2 (Apr. 11, 2018). Therefore, we remand the appeal to the
regional office for the appellant to submit evidence and argument on the amount
of her increased tax liability due to the lump sum payment of back pay. The
appellant shall submit detailed calculations showing the tax liability that she
actually incurred for each year of the back pay period, the tax liability that she
5
The EEOC has repeatedly stated that, under both legal and equitable theories, an
award to cover additional tax liability from a lump sum payment of back pay is
available to complainants. E.g., Vaughn C. v. Department of the Air Force, EEOC
Petition No. 0420170022 and 0420160004, 2017 WL 5564319 at *5 (Nov. 3, 2017);
Darlene F. v. Social Security Administration, EEOC Petition No. 0420140010,
2016 WL 1554570 at * 9 (Apr. 8, 2016); Reynolds v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Appeal
No. 0120111944, 2013 WL 5295919 at *9 (Sept. 13, 2013); Mohar, EEOC Appeal No.
0720100019, 2011 WL 4343960 at *8. However, the EEOC has also stated that it need
not categorize whether the potential award to a complainant for adverse tax
consequences of receiving a lump sum back pay is a legal or equitable remedy since it
was available under at least one of these theories. Holler, EEOC Appeal No. 01990407
and 01982627, 2001 WL 991924 at *4; Van Hoose, EEOC Appeal No. 01990455 and
01982628, 2001 WL 991925 at *3-4. Because the appellant’s motion for compensatory
damages is the only issue before us, we make no findings on whether the requested
relief is also available as an equitable remedy.
9
would have incurred in each of those years if she had received the back pay in the
form of a regular salary, and the tax liability that she incurred solely as a result of
her receipt of the lump sum back pay award. Deon C. v. Department of
Commerce, EEOC Appeal No. 2021000877, 2023 WL 2238867 at *4-5 (Feb. 8,
2023) (citing Israel F. v. Department of Homeland Security, EEOC Petition No.
0420120010, 2016 WL 4425779 at *4 (Aug. 3, 2016)). The agency shall be given
an opportunity to respond to the appellant’s evidence and argument. The
administrative judge shall issue a new initial decision on the appropriate amount
of pecuniary compensatory damages, if any, for the adverse tax consequences of
her receipt of a lump sum payment of back pay.
We affirm the administrative judge’s decision to award $22,000 in nonpecuniary
compensatory damages.
¶15 Nonpecuniary damages constitute the sums necessary to compensate
an injured party for actual harm, even where the harm is intangible. Edwards,
117 M.S.P.R. 222, ¶ 21. Nonpecuniary losses are losses that are not subject to
precise quantification, including emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental
anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, injury to professional standing, injury to
character and reputation, injury to credit standing, and loss of health. Id. An
award of compensatory damages for nonpecuniary losses should reflect the extent
to which the agency directly or proximately caused the harm and the extent to
which other factors also caused the harm. Id. The award should take into account
the severity and duration of the harm, although nonpecuniary damages are limited
to a maximum amount of $300,000. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(D); Edwards,
117 M.S.P.R. 222, ¶ 21. A nonpecuniary damage award amount should not be
“monstrously excessive” standing alone, should not be the product of passion or
prejudice, and should be consistent with the amount awarded in similar cases.
Edwards, 117 M.S.P.R. 222, ¶ 21 (internal citations omitted).
¶16 Before the administrative judge, the appellant explained that she was
seeking $200,000 in nonpecuniary compensatory damages. P-1 AF, Tab 5 at 10.
10
In the addendum initial decision, the administrative judge found that the appellant
was entitled to nonpecuniary compensatory damages. AID at 6-9. He discussed
the declarations submitted by the appellant and her mother and the medical
documentation in the record. AID at 6-7. The administrative judge found that the
voluminous medical documentation “generally support[ed] her sensitivity to
certain environmental conditions [and] the maladies she claimed to have suffered
as a result of exposure to them from management’s actions.” AID at 7. The
administrative judge determined that an award of $22,000 in nonpecuniary
compensatory damages was reasonable based on the extent of the appellant’s
distress, the agency’s efforts to accommodate her, and the likelihood that her
injuries were caused by the agency. AID at 8. In pertinent part, the
administrative judge noted that the facts and circumstances of this matter were
similar to those set forth in Hollingsworth v. Department of Commerce,
117 M.S.P.R. 327 (2012), in which the Board awarded $15,000 in nonpecuniary
compensatory damages. AID at 8. In this regard, the administrative judge also
noted that both the appellant and Ms. Hollingsworth were removed when the
agency did not accommodate or fully accommodate their disabilities, and they
both described similar changes in personality and emotional harm. Id. Because
Hollingsworth was decided in 2012, coupled with inflation and “the appellant’s
long wait for a decision on her petition for review,” the administrative judge
determined that a slightly higher award of $22,000 was appropriate. Id. The
administrative judge also discussed several EEOC decisions to support his
conclusion. AID at 8-9 (internal citations omitted).
¶17 Both parties challenge the administrative judge’s analysis and
conclusion regarding the award of $22,000 in nonpecuniary compensatory
damages. PFR File, Tab 1 at 6-9, Tab 3 at 10-11. For example, in her petition,
the appellant contends that the administrative judge’s award failed to properly
consider the duration of harm and that he relied upon EEOC decisions in which
the duration of harm was “substantially shorter.” PFR File, Tab 1 at 6-7. She
11
asserts that the duration of harm in her case extended from the denial of her first
request for telework as a reasonable accommodation in mid-2014, through her
reinstatement in mid-2023. Id. at 7. She states that she does not “take issue”
with the proposition that the injuries that she suffered were “similar in character
to the injuries suffered” by Ms. Hollingsworth. Id. at 8. She reiterates that an
award of “at least $200,000” would be appropriate. Id. at 8-9.
¶18 In its response to the petition for review, the agency states that the
administrative judge properly considered the duration of harm, and the appellant
did not justify an increase in nonpecuniary compensatory damages. PFR File,
Tab 3 at 5-8. The agency asserts that the original initial decision affirmed the
removal, and thus, the delay between the original initial decision and the Board’s
order of reinstatement cannot be attributed to the agency’s discrimination. Id.
at 5-6. In its cross petition for review, the agency asserts that the administrative
judge made no findings of fact, such as the extent of the appellant’s distress, the
agency’s efforts to accommodate her, or the likelihood that the injuries were
caused by the agency. Id. at 10-11. The agency also asserts that the
administrative judge did not make findings regarding the appellant’s alleged
difficulty sleeping since the underlying record indicates that she suffered from
sleep apnea in connection with her allergies, and that the Board should reduce the
award because she was not entitled to compensation for this preexisting
condition. 6 Id. at 11.
¶19 We disagree with the agency’s argument in its cross petition for
review that the administrative judge’s analysis lacked the requisite factual
findings. Reviewing the addendum initial decision as a whole, the administrative
judge found that the appellant experienced distress that was caused by the
agency’s actions. AID at 7-8. We find that the appellant, like
Ms. Hollingsworth, established that she experienced significant physical,
6
The agency does not suggest that the appellant is not entitled to any award of
nonpecuniary compensatory damages.
12
emotional, professional, and financial harm as a result of the agency’s action. See
Hollingworth, 117 M.S.P.R. 327, ¶ 21. We acknowledge that the duration of
harm in this matter is approximately 7 years from the date of removal to
reinstatement, and that this duration is substantially longer than the 13-month
duration of harm found in Hollingsworth. 7 However, over 6 years of this duration
was due to the Board’s inability to issue decisions on petition for review during
its lack of quorum and the resulting petition for review case inventory, and was
not the agency’s fault. We have also considered the fact that the appellant was
diagnosed with sleep apnea in 2008, prior to the events at issue in the underlying
appeal, which would have contributed to her “lost sleep” and “countless sleepless
nights” during the relevant time frame. 8 P-1 AF, Tab 5 at 4, 7-8, 90; see
Simmons v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Appeal No. 01A02306,
2002 WL 1232785 at *3 (May 29, 2002) (stating that an award of nonpecuniary
compensatory damages will be reduced if the evidence shows that factors other
than the agency’s actions at issue contributed to the complainant’s suffering).
¶20 Further, we find that the award sought by the appellant, “at least
$200,000,” would be excessive and inconsistent with awards in similar cases. In
cases in which the EEOC has awarded nonpecuniary damages of $100,000 and
above, the evidence of record showed that the emotional or psychological injuries
that resulted from the agency’s discrimination were so catastrophic that no
inquiry into long-term effects was necessary. McTier v. Department of the Navy,
EEOC Appeal No. 07A30016 2004, WL 483377 at *3 (Mar. 2, 2004); see
McCormick v. Department of Justice, EEOC Appeal No. 0720100040, 2011 WL
6147823 at *11 (Nov. 23, 2011) (upholding an award of $200,000 because, among
other things, the discriminatory conduct led to: emotional distress, which led to
7
Our calculation of the duration of harm—from removal to reinstatement—is consistent
with the duration of harm found in Hollingsworth, 117 M.S.P.R. 327, ¶ 23.
8
The administrative judge referenced this condition in his discussion of the agency’s
good faith defense, AID at 11, but it is unclear what, if any, impact this condition had
on his award of nonpecuniary compensatory damages.
13
permanent spasms that damaged the discs in the complainant’s back; a loss of
enjoyment of life; changes in her demeanor, outlook, and physical and mental
conditions that imperiled her marriage and hindered her ability to properly care
for her young child; and a serious and potentially permanent rift with a child in
college); Terban v. Department of Energy, EEOC Appeal No. 0720040117,
2008 WL 1847616 at *4-5 (Apr. 3, 2008) (awarding $130,000 in nonpecuniary
compensatory damages because, among other things, there was “tension in the
marriage,” the complainant was hospitalized, considered suicide, subjected to
electroshock treatment, and still takes medicine and sees a psychiatrist); Estate of
Nason v. Postmaster General, EEOC Appeal No. 01A01563, 2001 WL 725860
at *5-7 (June 21, 2001) (upholding an award of $150,000 when the complainant,
after two suicide attempts, successfully committed suicide and left behind a note
blaming the Post Office for “all the stress that they have caused [her] leading to
this action”). We do not find that the appellant’s emotional or psychological
injuries were catastrophic.
¶21 Taking all these circumstances into account, we find that the
administrative judge’s decision to award $22,000 in nonpecuniary compensatory
damages is appropriate. We have considered the parties’ remaining arguments on
nonpecuniary compensatory damages, but none warrants a different outcome.
14
ORDER
¶22 For the reasons discussed above, we award the appellant $22,000 in
nonpecuniary compensatory damages, and we remand this case to the Atlanta
Regional Office for further adjudication in accordance with this Opinion and
Order.
Gina K. Grippando
Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.