Browne

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

HAMMOND DIVISION AT LAFAYETTE

ERIN BROWNE,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 4:23-CV-064-GSL

EQUIFAX INFORMATION SERVICES

LLC,

Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

This is a case involving the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq.,

in which Plaintiff, Erin Browne (“Browne”)1, asserts that Defendant, Equifax Information Services

LLC (“Equifax”), maintained an inaccurate entry on her credit report, and continued to do so even

after she disputed it, causing her harm. The parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment

on Browne’s claims for relief. [DE 103 & 108]. The motions are briefed and ripe for ruling.2

Also ripe for ruling is Browne’s Motion to Reconsider [DE 153], filed on December 5,

2025. There, Browne is requesting that the Court reconsider its November 19, 2025, denial [DE

151] of her request to remand this matter back to state court. See [DE 153]. The Court will address

this motion below, and prior to deciding the motions for summary judgment.

1 Erin Browne was formerly known as Erin Livesay.

2 The parties have stipulated to the withdrawal of Browne’s Exhibit 11 [DE 142-7] to her response to Equifax’s motion

for summary judgment. The Court being duly advised, and noting the agreement of the parties, hereby GRANTS the

Stipulation [DE 143].

Procedural History

On April 26, 2023, Browne initiated this case in Indiana state court. [DE 4]. She alleges

that Equifax violated §§ 1681e(b) and 1681i of the FCRA by falsely and inaccurately reporting

that she owed a debt despite her multiple attempts to rectify the errors, causing her harm. [Id.].

On July 25, 2023, Equifax removed the case to this Court. [DE 1]. Shortly thereafter,

Equifax filed a Motion to Dismiss [DE 6-7] requesting that the Court either dismiss the Complaint

or allow Browne the opportunity to amend due to the lack of specific factual allegations. [DE 7 at

5]. As a result, Browne filed an Amended Complaint [DE 10] on August 21, 2023.3 While the

claims remain the same, Browne specified, inter alia, the harm she suffered explaining that

“Equifax sold a credit report with the negative tradeline … caus[ing] Ms. Browne to be denied

credit” and “[she] was stressed as a result of Equifax’s inaction[.]” [DE 10 at ¶¶10, 143]. Equifax

answered the Amended Complaint on September 5, 2023, which was later amended on July 29,

2024. [DE 13, 51]. The parties engaged in extensive discovery from then until April 2025. On

April 11, 2025, the parties filed the instant cross-motions for summary judgment. See [DE 103,

108].

Shortly thereafter, and before the motions for summary judgment were fully briefed,

Browne filed a Motion to Remand to State Court [DE 118], requesting that the Court remand this

matter back to state court because Equifax, “as the party invoking jurisdiction[,] must prove Article

III jurisdiction [and] … [it’s] recent motion for summary judgment indicates [that] it has no basis.”

[DE 119 at 1]. For the reasons as fully set forth in the Court’s November 19, 2025, Order, the

Court denied Browne’s request. See [DE 151].

3 The Court denied Equifax’s motion to dismiss as moot after Browne amended her complaint. [DE 11].

The parties’ motions for summary judgment became fully briefed on October 1, 2025.

Additionally, Browne requested that the Court reconsider its denial of her motion to remand in the

Motion to Reconsider [DE 152] filed on December 5, 2025.

Factual Background4

Equifax is a consumer reporting agency (“CRA”) that creates and maintains credit files on

millions of consumers in the United States. [DE 104-1, ¶1]. It gathers information about consumers

from various sources, including banks, collection agencies, lenders, and court records which it uses

to create credit files. [Id. at ¶ 2]. The credit files are then used to prepare consumer reports which

can be requested by subscribers when they need to evaluate whether to extend credit to a consumer.

[Id. at ¶ 3].

A consumer is free to dispute information contained in a credit file kept by a CRA, such as

Equifax. [Id. at ¶ 5]. When Equifax receives a dispute from a consumer, its process is to open a

dispute case that tracks the progress of the “reinvestigation” in a system known as its “Consumer

Management System or ‘CCMS[.]’” [Id. at ¶5]. In reviewing the dispute, if Equifax can make

updates to information contained in the consumer’s credit file, based on the information or

materials provided, Equifax’s policy is to do so immediately. [Id. at ¶ 8]. Equifax maintains a

standard known as an Independent Dispute Investigations Update Documents Standard, also

referred to as “the Acceptable Documents Standard”, which governs when it will use consumer-

submitted documents to make immediate updates to information in a consumer’s credit files. [Id.

at ¶ 9]. For example, Equifax considers bankruptcy court documents as those that may be used to

make immediate updates to information in a consumer’s credit file. [Id. at ¶ 10]. However, it does

4 The facts described in this section are undisputed. Because cross motions for summary judgment are at play, the

Court will pull undisputed facts from both parties’ statements of material facts.

not consider civil judgments to be a document that may be used to make an immediate update to a

consumer’s file without further investigation. [Id. at ¶ 12].

When further investigation of a consumer’s dispute is required, Equifax’s policy is to notify

the source, also referred to as the “data furnisher”, of the consumer’s dispute. [DE 104-1 at ¶ 15].

Equifax does so by electronically transmitting a form called an Automated Consumer Dispute

Verification (“ACDV”)5 to the source. [Id. at ¶ 17]. Equifax provides the source with all relevant

information, including that submitted by the consumer as part of the dispute, and asks the source

to investigate the dispute and advise Equifax if the account information the consumer is disputing

is inaccurate. [Id. at ¶15]. Once the reinvestigation of the disputed information is complete,

Equifax sends the consumer the results. [Id. at ¶ 20]. Equifax’s policy is to complete the

reinvestigation process within the time constraints provided by the FCRA.6 [Id. at ¶ 21].

Additionally, if Equifax receives additional information from a consumer regarding a pending or

completed dispute, its policy is to send the item to investigate status in a new case. [Id. at ¶ 56].

To comply with the FCRA, Equifax keeps a record of each time an inquiry is made to

access a credit file. [DE 104-1 at ¶ 62]. There are several types of “inquiries”, and not all result in

the preparation of consumer reports. [Id. at ¶ 63]. For example, inquires made by Equifax to

document file access undertaken as part of a reinvestigation of consumer disputes or when a

consumer requests the disclosure of information on their credit file do not result in the preparation

of a consumer report. [Id.]. However, a “hard” inquiry is one for credit information by a potential

5 The use of the ACDV process is an industry standard that is used by all three nationwide consumer reporting agencies

(Equifax, Experian, and Trans Union), and is implemented by a system called E-Oscar, which requires the data

furnisher to view the ACDV and any associated information before providing a response. [DE 104-1 at ¶18].

6 Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(1)(A), generally, a consumer reporting company has 30 days from the date in which

it receives the notice of dispute to conduct “a reasonable investigation to determine whether the disputed information

is inaccurate and record the current status of the disputed information, or delete the item from the file[.]”

creditor or employer made in connection with a consumer’s application for credit or employment,

and this type of inquiry always results in the preparation of a credit report. [Id. at ¶¶ 66-67]. “Hard”

inquires may impact a consumer’s credit score in contrast to “soft” inquiries7, which do not impact

a consumer’s credit score, and are not disclosed in subsequent consumer reports. [Id.]

Browne’s Dispute History

In October 2018, Browne entered into a one-year lease agreement with Copper Beech

Townhome Communities Eight, LLC (“Copper Beech”) set to commence in August 2019. [DE

106-1, ¶ 1]. Browne never actually occupied the leased premises due to her inability to comply

with the lease’s financial assurances. [Id. at ¶¶ 3, 13, 14-16]. Copper Beech terminated the lease

and eventually secured another occupant of the unit that Browne was intended to be assigned. [Id.

at ¶ 9]. Nonetheless, Copper Beech and its debt collector, National Credit Systems, Inc. (“NCS”),

attempted to collect rent from Browne on the terminated lease even though Copper Beech never

gave Browne possession. [Id. at ¶ 19]. Eventually, NCS reported to Equifax that it was seeking to

collect a debt, in the amount of $5,318.00, from Browne on behalf of Copper Beech. [Id. at ¶19].

Browne first disputed her Equifax credit file on June 30, 2020. [DE 104-1 at ¶ 22]8. She

claimed that the NCS collection on behalf of Copper Beech did not belong to her. [Id.]. As a result,

Equifax’s automated process sent an ACDV to NCS, the “source”, which included the account

information as it then appeared on Browne’s credit file, and a request that NCS investigate the

7 An example of a “soft” inquiry is one made by an existing creditor to view how their account information appears

on their consumer’s credit file. [104-1 at ¶ 68]. Another example of a soft inquiry is when Equifax receives an inquiry

to verify a consumer’s identification information. [Id.]. Finally, a promotional inquiry is considered a special type of

“soft” inquiry that does not result in the delivery of any account or creditor information, but rather, reflects the

inclusion of the consumer in a prescreening list purchased by a potential creditor or insurer to make a firm offer of

credit or insurance. [Id. at ¶ 70]. The only information published in response to a promotional inquiry is the

consumer’s name and address. [Id. at ¶ 71].

8 The parties do not specify what information or documents Browne submitted to Equifax as part of the June 30,

2020, dispute. Additionally, the Court thoroughly reviewed the record in this case and could not locate it.

account. [Id. at ¶ 23]. On July 2, 2020, NCS responded to Equifax’s ACDV, and verified that the

collection account belonged to Browne, and that the account should report an unpaid collection in

the amount of $5,318.00 on behalf of Copper Beech Townhome Communities. [Id. at ¶ 24]. As a

result, Equifax concluded its reinvestigation and sent Plaintiff a letter outlining the results, which

Plaintiff acknowledged receipt of. [Id. at ¶25-26].

Nine months later, on April 17, 2021, Equifax received a second dispute from Browne

regarding the same NCS account. [DE 104-1 at ¶ 27]. In the “dispute package” submitted to

Equifax, Browne detailed the situation regarding the lease agreement with Copper Beech, her

inability to comply with the financial assurances, the fact that she never moved in, and the eventual

termination of the lease. See generally [DE 109-2]. Browne also supplied Equifax with the

following documents: a detailed timeline of events, the lease agreement that she and Copper Beech

had entered into, concession addendums to the lease agreement, an email noting her application to

lease a unit from Copper Beech was accepted, email exchanges between her and Copper Beech,

and an invoice from Copper Beech showing an outstanding balance of $5,318.00 for “Lease

Termination Fees … August 2019 – July 2020 Monthly Install”. [Id.]. Equifax sent an ACDV to

NCS which included a digital image of the written dispute package, the account information as it

then appeared in Browne’s credit file, and a request that NCS investigate the account. [104-1 at ¶

29]. On April 23, 2021, NCS responded to the ACDV and verified that the collection account

belonged to Browne and that the account should report as an unpaid collection in the amount of

$5,318.00 on behalf of Copper Beech. [Id. at ¶ 30]. Equifax then sent Browne the results of the

reinvestigation which Browne received on May 1, 2021. [Id. at ¶¶ 31-32].

On or around June 19, 2021, Browne submitted a third dispute, the second with a written

dispute package, again disputing the NCS collection on behalf of Copper Beech. [DE 104-1 at ¶

33]. The contents of this dispute package were substantially like the one submitted in April 2021.

[Id. at ¶ 34]. Again, Equifax sent an ACDV to NCS with a digital image of the written dispute

package, Browne’s account information, and a request that NCS investigate the account. [Id. at ¶

35]. On July 12, 2021, NCS reported back to Equifax verifying that the collection belonged to

Browne and that the account should report as an unpaid collection in the amount of $5,318.00 on

behalf of Copper Beech. [Id. at ¶ 36]. Equifax notified Browne of the results on July 12, 2021.

[Id. at ¶ 37].

On July 26, 2021, Equifax received a fourth and final dispute package from Browne. [DE

104-1 at ¶ 39]. Included in this dispute package was an “Order on Declaratory Judgment and

Counterclaim” from the Tippecanoe County Superior Court in the case of Erin B. Livesay v.

Copper Beech Townhome Communities Eight, LLC, 79D07-2105-SC-403. [Id. at ¶ 42]. The

declaratory judgment declared that Browne owed nothing to Copper Beech and denied Copper

Beech’s counterclaim under the lease agreement.9 [DE 135-1 at ¶ 50]. Despite this additional

information, an agent for Equifax, Danisca Pinnoch, did not immediately remove the NCS

collection from Browne’s credit file without further investigation, per Equifax’s “Acceptable

Documents Standard.” [DE 104-1 at ¶ 47]. Browne admits that none of the documents contained

in the July 2021 dispute package, including the state court declaratory judgment, were of the type

that may be used to make immediate updates to the information in her credit file without further

investigation. [104-1 at ¶ 41-42; 142-1 at ¶ 41-42]. Browne also admitted that aside from the name

“Erin B. Livesay”, no other personal identifiable information was contained in the declaratory

order. [142-1 at ¶ 43].

9 On February 11, 2026, the Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of Copper Beech’s motion to

vacate the declaratory judgment. Copper Beech Townhome Communities Eight, LLC v. Livesay, 2026 WL 380019, at

*3 (Ind. Ct. App. Feb. 11, 2026).

The following day, July 27, 2021, Pinnoch set a letter to Browne requesting enlarged

photocopies of the dispute package. [104-1 at ¶ 48]. On the same day, Pinnoch sent an ACDV to

NCS which included a digital image of the written dispute package, the account information as it

then appeared in Browne’s credit file, and a request for NCS to investigate the account. [Id. at ¶

49]. On August 12, 2021, NCS responded to the ACDV verifying that the collection belonged to

Browne and that the account should report as an unpaid collection in the amount of $5,318.00 on

behalf of Copper Beech. [Id. at ¶ 51]. The response was reviewed by Equifax agent, Jenny Chaves.

[Id. at ¶ 52]. In light of Equifax’s policies and procedures, NCS’ response did not require Equifax

to take any specific action, and as a result, it accepted the account verification as relayed by NCS.

[Id. at ¶ 53]. On August 12, 2021, Equifax concluded its reinvestigation of Browne’s fourth

dispute and sent her a results letter, which she received. [Id. at ¶¶ 54-55].

Near the end of August 2021, and without any additional information from Browne herself,

Equifax received an instruction from NCS to delete the $5,318.00 on behalf of Copper Beech from

Browne’s credit file. [DE 104-1 at ¶¶57, 59]. Browne was notified of the deletion from her Equifax

credit file on or around September 2, 2021, when Credit Karma sent her a credit monitoring alert.

[Id. at ¶ 61]. To date, the NCS collection remains removed from her file. [Id. at ¶ 73].

Equifax records show that during 2021, that the only inquiries made were “promotional”

in nature. [DE 104-1 at ¶ 69; DE 142-1 at ¶ 69]. And, since the NCS collection has not reappeared

on her credit file after August 2021, no other consumer reports pertaining to Browne, published

by Equifax, would have included that information. [DE 104-1 at ¶ 74].

I. Browne’s Motion to Reconsider

A. Background

Browne moved to remand this matter back to state court on May 27, 2025. [DE 118]. She

argues that this Court no longer had standing to hear this matter because Equifax, “as the party

invoking jurisdiction[,] must prove Article III jurisdiction [and] … [it’s] recent motion for

summary judgment indicates [that] it has no basis.” [DE 119 at 1]. More specifically, Browne

claimed that since Equifax was the removing party, and that it argued in its motion for summary

judgment that she “has incurred no damages – either economic or emotional distress damages[,]

[Equifax] should be required to establish jurisdiction [in this Court].” [Id. at 6].

The Court denied Browne’s request that this matter be remanded, noting that while the

Supreme Court has instructed that the “mere presence” of an inaccuracy in an internal credit file,

or the risk of future harm does not create a concrete injury for purposes of Article III standing,

disclosures of inaccurate information contained in a credit file does. See generally TransUnion

LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 423–24 (2021). Browne’s Amended Complaint alleges that her

inaccurate report was received by various potential creditors, thereby asserting the inference it was

improperly “disclosed” by Equifax, as well as testifying at her deposition that she was “denied

housing and credit” due to Equifax’s conduct. See generally [DE 151] (internal quotations

omitted). In other words, Browne’s Amended Complaint, as well as her deposition testimony,

adequately alleged facts that established an “injury-in-fact” sufficient for Article III standing.

Browne is now requesting that the Court reconsider this ruling because (1) the housing

denial took place before any dispute of Equifax’s credit report, and therefore the denial could not

have been caused by Equifax, causing no cognizable harm for federal jurisdiction, and (2) that the

Supreme Court has “effectively overruled” cases that this Court relied on in finding that “a lowered

credit score suffices for article III jurisdiction[.]” [DE 153 at 1].

Equifax opposes this motion arguing that Browne’s deposition testimony regarding her

claimed inability to obtain housing was not purely limited to the alleged 2020 occurrence, as she

also testified in her deposition that in 2021, she wanted to apply for housing but could not say if

she did so. [DE 154 at 2]. Equifax also argues that Browne’s response in opposition to its motion

for summary judgment alleges that she “has presented sufficient evidence of damages to proceed

to trial[.]” [Id. at 3] (internal citation omitted).

B. Legal Standard

Under Rule 59(e), a party may file a motion to reconsider within 28 days of entry of the

judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). However, “relief under Rules 59(e) and 60(b) are extraordinary

remedies reserved for the exceptional case …” Foster v. DeLuca, 545 F.3d 582, 584 (7th Cir. 2008).

These types of motions “serve a limited function, to be used ‘where the Court has patently

misunderstood a party, or has made a decision outside the adversarial issues presented to the Court by

the parties, or has made an error not of reasoning but of apprehension.’” Davis v. Carmel Clay Sch.,

286 F.R.D. 411, 412 (S.D. Ind. 2012) (quoting Bank of Waunakee v. Rochester Cheese Sales, Inc., 906

F.2d 1185, 1191 (7th Cir.1990)). Specifically, “[a] Rule 59(e) motion will be successful only where

the movant clearly establishes ‘(1) that the court committed a manifest error of law or fact, or (2) that

newly discovered evidence precluded entry of judgment.’” Cincinnati Life Ins. Co. v. Beyrer, 722 F.3d

939, 954 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Blue v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 698 F.3d 587, 598 (7th

Cir.2012)).

C. Discussion

First, Browne’s assertion that this Court relied on case law that has been “effectively overruled

by the Supreme Court,” is incorrect. The Court stated that “the Seventh Circuit has accepted risk of

financial harm as a result of credit reporting agencies lowering their credit score as sufficient to

confer Article III standing[,]” but then immediately explained that “a risk of future harm, without

more, is insufficiently concrete to permit standing to sue for damages in federal court.” See [DE

151 at 4] (internal quotations omitted). The Court further discussed how the “mere presence of an

inaccuracy in an internal credit file or the risk of future harm does not create a concrete injury for

purposes of Article III standing, [but] disclosures of inaccurate information contained in a credit

file does.” [Id. at 5]. The Court acknowledged that a risk of financial harm, “without more” would

not be enough to establish an injury-in-fact for purposes of Article III standing. More importantly,

the Court did not deny the request remand based only on a “risk” of financial harm to Browne. It

denied remand because Browne herself testified that:

A: … I was denied housing … So after further investigation, I called

the apartment complex. I said what’s going on? Why am I being denied?

They said that it was because of this, this statement from National Credit

Systems on my credit report saying that I owed $5,318 …

***

Q: More generally, are there any other … denials like insurance denials

or employment denials … that is kind of an economic denial apart from

credit, per se?

A: … I was denied housing and credit and it hurt my credit score.

[DE 104-15, pg. 5, 15]; [DE 151 at 5-6] (emphasis added).

Browne also argues that the housing denial took place before any dispute of the

information contained in Equifax’s credit report, and therefore the denial could not have been

caused by Equifax. Because of this, Browne claims that reconsideration is warranted. However, as

Equifax correctly points out, Browne’s deposition covers more than just the 2020 housing denial.

See [DE 154 at 2]. Browne also testified that she wanted to apply for housing in 2021 but could

not say whether she did so at the time of her deposition. [Id.]; [DE 104-15 at 6]. Browne claims

that “Equifax made no argument and provided no evidence that the housing referred to in the

deposition testimony arose as a result of the Equifax’s alleged violations of the FCRA.” [DE 153

at 5]. She goes on to say that “the FRCA requires all consumer reporting agencies to maintain a

listing of any inquiries into the consumer’s credit file … [therefore,] [h]ad Equifax published a

report which would support this court’s jurisdiction, it could have readily provided such evidence

from its own records to support this Court’s jurisdiction.” [Id. at 5].

Browne supports this argument by citing to Seventh Circuit case law that explains that at

this point in the proceedings, it is Equifax’s burden to “set forth by affidavit or other evidence

specific facts supporting their standing to sue.” [DE 153 at 5] (internal citations omitted).

“In the absence of any specific facts supporting a housing denial, this Court may not rest its

assertion of jurisdiction upon a denial of housing at the summary judgment stage of these

proceedings.” [Id. at 6].

The Court disagrees with Browne’s contention that Equifax failed to set forth specific facts

supporting their standing to sue. Equifax pointed to Browne’s deposition testimony where she

testified that she was denied housing and credit, on what appears to be multiple occasions,

including “possibly” 2021. See Persinger v. Southwest Credit Systems, L.P., 20 F.4th 1184, 1190-

91, (7th Cir. 2021) (finding the plaintiff’s deposition testimony of her alleged harms sufficient to

establish a concrete harm for purposes of Article III standing: “[plaintiff] has standing to sue. She

testified that Southwest invaded her privacy when it reviewed her credit information”) (emphasis

added). Browne’s theory in her motion to remand, and now again in this motion to reconsider,

that Equifax must prove that she was damaged to establish standing is incorrect.

D. Conclusion

For the forgoing reasons, the Motion to Reconsider [DE 153] is DENIED.

II. Motions for Summary Judgment

A. Legal Standard

A court shall grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is material if, under the relevant substantive law, it is outcome determinative.

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute over a material fact is genuine if

“the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.

The movant “bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion

and identifying those portions of” the evidence that “demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue

of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). To survive a properly

supported motion for summary judgment, “the nonmoving party must present evidence sufficient

to establish a triable issue of fact on all elements of its case.” McAllister v. Innovation Ventures,

LLC, 983 F.3d 963, 969 (7th Cir. 2020).

In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court may “not weigh conflicting

evidence, resolve swearing contests, determine credibility, or ponder which party's version of the

facts is most likely to be true.” Stewart v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 14 F.4th 757, 760 (7th

Cir. 2021). Instead, the court’s only task is “to decide, based on the evidence of record, whether

there is any material dispute of fact that requires a trial.” Id. (internal citation omitted). If there is

no genuine dispute of material fact, then summary judgment is appropriate, and the movant is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.

When cross-motions for summary judgment are filed, the court “look[s] to the burden of

proof that each party would bear on an issue of trial[, and] then require[s] that party to go beyond

the pleadings and affirmatively establish a genuine issue of material fact.” Diaz v. Prudential Ins.

Co. of America, 499 F.3d 640, 643 (7th Cir. 2007). In cross-moving for summary judgment, a party

is not “relieve[d] of [its] burden as the nonmovant[] relative to the [movants] motion for summary

judgment[,] … [therefore the nonmovant is still] required to set forth specific facts showing why

summary judgment on behalf of the [movant] [i]s not appropriate.” Ryan v. Chromalloy American

Corp., 877 F.2d 598, 603 (7th Cir. 1989). However, it is worth noting that, “[t]he contention of

one party that there are no issues of material fact sufficient to prevent the entry of judgment in its

favor does not bar that party from asserting that there are issues of material fact sufficient to

prevent the entry of judgment as a matter of law against it.” M.O. v. Indiana Dep't of Educ., 635

F. Supp. 2d 847, 850 (N.D. Ind. 2009).

B. Discussion

Browne alleges that Equifax negligently and willfully violated §§ 1681e(b) and 1681i of

the FCRA.10 However, in her response to Equifax’s motion for summary judgment, she

“abandon[ed] her request for relief under § 1681e(b).” [DE 142-8 at 6]. Therefore, all that remains

is Equifax’s alleged violation of § 1681i and claim for punitive damages.

“Congress enacted the Fair Credit Reporting Act, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., to

ensure fair and accurate credit reporting, promote efficiency in the banking system, and protect

consumer privacy.” Chaitoff v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 79 F.4th 800, 809 (7th Cir. 2023)

(internal quotations omitted). If a consumer believes that her credit report is inaccurate, she “can

10 Browne did not specify in her Amended Complaint whether she is alleging that Equifax committed a negligent or

willful violation. However, in her motion for summary judgment she argues that Equifax’s alleged violations were

both negligent and willful but only discusses in detail how they were negligent in nature. See [DE 106 at 1, 16, 18-19,

23].

dispute [her] report with the CRA that prepared it. The CRA is then obligated to conduct a

reasonable reinvestigation to determine whether the disputed information is inaccurate[.]” Id.

15 U.S.C. § 1681i of the FCRA covers procedures in cases of disputed accuracy. See

generally 15 U.S.C. § 1681i. To prevail on a claim pursuant to this subsection, Browne must show

that (1) her consumer file contained inaccurate information; (2) the inaccuracy was due to

Equifax’s failure to follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum accuracy; (3) that she was

injured; and that (4) her injury was caused by the inclusion of the inaccurate entry. Mason v.

Equifax Information Services LLC, 2024 WL 3373439, at *2 (N.D. Ind. July 10, 2024).

Additionally, such violations can be negligent, willful, or both. Persinger, 20 F.4th 1184 at 1194.

“A negligent violation entitles a consumer to actual damages,” while “[a] willful violation entitles

a consumer to actual damages or statutory damages, with punitive damages left to the court's

discretion.” Id. (internal citations omitted).

Both Browne and Equifax argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

Equifax presents the following arguments: Browne’s July 2020, April 2021, and June 2021

disputes did not present a cognizable claim of inaccuracy; Equifax’s reinvestigation of Browne’s

July 2021 dispute was reasonable; Browne cannot establish actual damages as a result of Equifax’s

reinvestigation of the July 2021 dispute; and the available evidence belies any claim that Browne

suffered emotional distress. In contrast, Browne claims that she is entitled to summary judgment

on the § 1681i claim because Equifax had an independent duty, as required by law, to conduct a

reasonable reinvestigation to determine the accuracy of the NCS tradeline and it failed to do so.

1. Accuracy of Equifax’s Consumer Report

“A threshold requirement for claims under [§ 1681i] is that there must be an inaccuracy in

the consumer's credit report.” Chuluunbat v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 4 F.4th 562, 567 (7th Cir.

2021). By inaccurate information, the Seventh Circuit “... mean[s] factually inaccurate

information, as consumer reporting agencies are neither qualified nor obligated to resolve legal

issues.” Id. A factual inaccuracy includes “the amount a consumer owes, and what day a consumer

opened an account or incurred a payment.” Id. at 568. Whereas a dispute regarding a legal

inaccuracy, would occur when a consumer “does not dispute whether a debt existed or its amount,

but instead contend[s] he [i]s not required to pay the debt because it was “legally invalid.” Id.

This guidance from the Seventh Circuit clearly shows that Browne’s first three disputes,

occurring in July 2020, April 2021, and June 2021, do not meet the threshold requirement for

inaccuracy as the information she submitted required Equifax to interpret the lease agreement,

something that it is not qualified to do. Browne argues that the holding in Chaitoff supports the

premise that Equifax could have interpreted the lease agreement attached to her first three disputes.

[DE 142-8 at 7-8]. However, Chaitoff is not analogous to the facts here, as the Seventh Circuit

held there that “taking notice of previously resolved legal disputes involves some knowledge of

the legal impact of court decisions, [but] it does not require the consumer reporting agency to make

any legal determinations.” Chaitoff v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 79 F.4th 800, 815 (7th Cir. 2023)

(emphasis added). The dispute between Browne and Copper Beech in Indiana state court was

ongoing at the time she submitted the July 2020, April 2021, and June 2021 disputes. Therefore,

the Court finds that, as a matter of law, Browne has failed to prove an inaccuracy in the Equifax

credit report at the time of her July 2020, April 2021, and June 2021 disputes. See Chuluunbat v.

Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 4 F.4th 562, 567 (7th Cir. 2021) (holding that a “threshold requirement

for claims under [§ 1681i] is that there must be an inaccuracy in the consumer's credit report”).

Accordingly, she is not entitled to relief as it pertains to any potential harm arising from those

disputes.

Equifax has presented no argument regarding Browne’s final dispute, occurring in July

2021, and whether she presented a cognizable claim of inaccuracy. Rather, it argues that it has not

violated the FCRA because its reinvestigation of the July 2021 dispute was reasonable

notwithstanding the fact that Browne has not and cannot establish any damages suffered from the

alleged violation. See generally [DE 104 at 16-25]. Therefore, the Court will assume that Equifax

is conceding to the inaccurate information element for the July 2021 dispute and will move on to

analyzing the remaining § 1681i elements.

2. Harm Caused by the July 2021 Dispute

Before determining the reasonableness of Equifax’s reinvestigation of Browne’s July 2021

dispute, the Court must determine whether Browne has provided evidence that she has suffered a

legally discernable harm. If the essential element of harm is not proven, whether Equifax’s conduct

was reasonable, is inconsequential. See Aldaco v. RentGrow, Inc., 921 F.3d 685, 689 (7th Cir.

2019).

Browne has moved for partial summary judgment, leaving the issue of damages for trial.

However, she asks the Court to establish that Equifax violated § 1681i. In doing so, she fails to

address the element of harm and how Equifax’s actions caused her injury. “[T]he [FCRA] does

not create liability without causation. To bring a successful claim, the consumer must also show

that she suffered injury as a result of any inaccurate information.” See Aldaco, 921 F.3d 685 at

689 (emphasis added); Ruffin-Thompkins v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., 422 F.3d 603,

608 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that “[b]efore any discussion of the reasonableness of the

reinvestigation is necessary, however, [a plaintiff] must show that she suffered damages as a result

of the inaccurate information”); Crabill v. Trans Union, L.L.C., 259 F.3d 662, 664 (7th Cir.2001)

(explaining that “[w]ithout a causal relation between the violation of the statute and the loss of

credit, or some other harm, a plaintiff cannot obtain an award of actual damages”).

While failure to address an essential element of her claim in moving for summary judgment

could be considered futile, Equifax has moved for summary judgment as well and has fully

developed the argument regarding Browne’s inability to establish causation of harm and damages.

Accordingly, Equifax bears the initial responsibility to “demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue

of material fact” as to element of harm. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. 317 at 323. Browne then “must

present evidence sufficient to establish a triable issue of fact” on the same element. McAllister,

983 F.3d 963 at 969.

Equifax argues that Browne’s claimed two credit denials11 cannot be attributed to it.

Equifax contends that Browne’s claim for “possibly” applying for housing in 2021, if done, was

not done with the use of Equifax generated credit reports12, and her alleged emotional harms fail

to meet the strict standard as set forth by the Seventh Circuit. In response, Browne claims that she

has presented ample evidence of “wasted time” and “emotional distress” and that the same

evidence presents a question of fact. [DE 142-8 at 23].

As to wasted time, Browne points to the time spent seeking legal help, commencing legal

action in state court against Copper Beech, obtaining and reviewing credit reports and drafting

disputes, and researching how to secure the removal of the NCS account from her credit file. [Id.

at 23-24]. She further alleges that time spent doing the above, caused her lost time with family

11 The Amended Complaint contained allegations of Browne being denied credit due to the negative NCS tradeline on

her credit report, but she has conceded that those denials were based on credit reports provided by TransUnion.

Therefore, there is no causal relation between Equifax and those credit denials. [DE 104-1 at ¶¶ 75-77].

12 Browne testified at her deposition that she wanted to apply for housing in 2021 but could not say whether she did.

[DE 104-15 at 6]. Equifax has provided undisputed evidence that if she did apply for housing in 2021, she was not

denied based on any action of Equifax because “during the entire year of 2021, there were no ‘hard’ inquiries at all to

[Browne’s] credit file.” [104-1 at ¶65]. Browne also admitted in the summary judgment briefing that she “did not seek

out independent housing [] out of fear of being rejected[.]” [DE 142-8 at 28].

and friends and required her to take time off work. In support, Browne has cited nonbinding case

law where district courts, outside of the Seventh Circuit, have recognized that wasted time may be

recoverable as an element of damages. See [DE 142-8 at 22]. Yet, Browne has provided no

evidence that this alleged wasted time was caused by the July 2021 dispute.

It is undisputed that the suit against Copper Beech commenced and was resolved ahead of

the submission of the July 2021 dispute, therefore that “wasted time” cannot be attributable to

Equifax. [DE 104-1 at ¶ 42]. Also, she was represented by Attorney Duran Keller at the time she

submitted the July 2021 dispute package, and he submitted it on her behalf. [Id. at 39]. Her claim

for taking time off work is supported only by a single statement that her boyfriend, Clay Trout,

made in his deposition: “I’m sure she’s had to take time off work and away from making money

in other regards to deal with this matter.” [DE 138-6 at pg. 17]. This is far too speculative to be

recoverable. See Foster v. PNC Bank, National Association, 52 F.4th 315, 320 (7th Cir. 2022)

(holding that “mere speculation cannot be used to manufacture a genuine issue of fact” at summary

judgment) (internal quotations omitted). Because of this, and her failure to present sufficient

evidence of “wasted time” during the relevant timeframe, the Court finds that there is no

outstanding question of fact as to her alleged injury of “wasted time”.

Next, Browne claims that she has suffered emotional distress caused by Equifax’s actions.

The Seventh Circuit has explained that “emotional distress [suffered by a plaintiff] … must be

described in reasonable detail – conclusory statements are insufficient.” Persinger, 20 F.4th 1184

at 1194. Equifax argues that Browne “has no evidence, apart from self-serving statements, that she

actually experienced emotional distress as a result of her receipt of Equifax’s August 12, 2021,

reinvestigation results letter, and the contemporaneous evidence belies any such claim.” [DE 104-

1 at ¶ 92]; [DE 102 at 21-24]. Equifax claims that the testimony of Browne’s mother and boyfriend

“can charitably described as parroting [Browne’s] own deficient statements[,]” and that the

medical records summarizing treatment of her anxiety and depression during the time at issue, fare

no better. [DE 102 at 23].

Browne argues, and the Court agrees, that her testimony alone can be sufficient to show

emotional injury, so long as it is explained in reasonable detail. [DE 142-8 at 25]; see also Tullis

v. Townley Eng’g & Mfg. Co., 243 F.3d 1058, 1068 (7th Cir. 2001). She further argues that “she

knew what stress felt like in her body and attributed th[o]se feelings directly to the issues with

Equifax.” [DE 142-8 at 27]. In support of this argument, she cites to various parts of her deposition

testimony as well as the testimony of her mother and boyfriend. [Id.].

A review of the cited portions of the deposition testimony reveals the following: Browne’s

was “incredibly anxious all of the time”, “embarrassed”, “losing sleep”, and “distracted at work”

because of being denied housing in the fall of 2020 due to the negative credit line on her credit

report. [E. Browne Depo Vol I at pg. 28-31]. She explained that her anxiety at that time, manifested

physically with “pain in [her] stomach and tension headaches,” as well as “loss of appetite and []

loss of sleep in general.” [Id. at 31]. She was also “obsess[ed] [with] getting [the negative

tradeline] off [her] credit.” [Id. at 31]. She appears to link this stress and anxiety to “dirty Copper

Beech Apartment complex that was scamming [her] out of money[,]” while also mentioning “a

dirty credit reporting agency that didn’t verify the debt in the first place.” [Id.] As to Equifax

specifically, she testified that she “felt anxious and panicky and, like, twisting in [her] stomach …

got headaches … [was] stressed at work … [and] lost sleep over thinking [about] what [she was]

going to do.” [Id. at 116].

When asked “in what ways did the emotional harms that you are claiming were caused by

Equifax interfere with your daily living activities,” Browne responded that it caused her to be

“preoccupied … distracted at work … not mentally present all of the time … tired … lost sleep …

irritable … [and have] less time to do things that [she] enjoy[ed] …” [Id. at 119-121]. Browne’s

testimony is devoid of how the July 2021 dispute caused her emotional distress. If the only

evidence before the Court was Browne’s testimony, her claim would undoubtedly fail as it appears

to be what the Seventh Circuit forbids, “self-serving conclusory statements about her emotional

distress” that fail to “explain the circumstances of h[er] injury in reasonable detail.” Bagby v.

Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 162 Fed. App’x 600, 605 (7th Cir. Jan. 4, 2006); Huzier, 2025 WL

3181687, at * 14; see also Sarver v. Experian Info. Sols., 390 F.3d 969, 971 (7th Cir. 2004)

(explaining that “[w]e[,] [the Seventh Circuit,] have required that when the injured party's own

testimony is the only proof of emotional damages, he must explain the circumstances of his injury

in reasonable detail; he cannot rely on mere conclusory statements”) (internal quotations omitted)

and Laura v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 2022 WL 823853, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 18, 2022) (holding

that the plaintiff “has not met her burden to produce evidence of damages for emotional distress

… [as she] relies on the conclusory assertions that she experienced frustration, despair, and

hopelessness after Experian's alleged inaccurate reporting[,] … [and] [s]he offers only her own

testimony as proof of her damages. Her mention of her credit issues to her psychiatrist does not

bolster her claims as she admits that she did not seek psychological treatment for the emotional

distress [the CRA] allegedly caused”).

However, Browne has also provided treatment records of counseling she received by Dr.

Sharon D. Samsell. [DE102-3]. In a discharge summary authored by Dr. Samsell, she indicated

that she first began counseling Browne in February 2021 and terminated care in April 2022. [DE

102-3 at 17]. Dr. Samsell reported that she would see Browne 2-3 times per month for issues

involving “anxiety, spirituality, relationship with her boyfriend, stress of the pandemic and housing

… [and] [d]ue to some unusual circumstances involving credit reporting[,] she was not allowed to

live where she wanted.” [DE 102-3 at 17]. Looking to the treatment records for visits that occurred

between July 26, 2021, and September 2, 2021, the relevant time, there is no mention of Equifax

or how it was the cause of her anxiety. [DE 102-3 at 13-14]. Dr. Samsell does however note, that

during the August 4, 2021, visit, that Browne “has lead on possible ap[artment] … [and] overall

doing well.” [Id. at 13]. During the August 11, 2021, visit, Browne told Dr. Samsell that she had

a “solution to housing ‘for now[.]’” [Id.].

Browne was also treated by Dr. Douglas Mulinix during the relevant time frame, and before

and after as well. See [DE 102-5]. A review of those medical records show that Browne did not

attend any medical appointments with Dr. Mulinix during the relevant time frame. [Id.] However,

she was examined by him on September 22, 2021, and his notes do not address anything related to

Equifax or the credit dispute. See [Id. at 33]. In fact, her psychiatric review during that visit was

“significant for [] school performance concerns.” [Id.]. In her response in opposition to Equifax’s

motion for summary judgment, Browne does not address Dr. Samsell or Dr. Mulinix’s records

directly, but rather points to the fact that her mother, Kim Livesay, can “corroborate[]” the fact

that she “sought counseling, in part, to help navigate the stress of dealing with the false credit

reporting.” See [DE 142-8 at 26].

In Huizar v. TransUnion LLC, 2026 WL 45203, at *13 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 7, 2026)13, the

district court found that the plaintiff had described his injury in reasonable enough detail to create

a triable issue of fact as to the harm element of his FRCA claim. More specifically, it held that the

plaintiff “provided detailed deposition testimony regarding the stress TransUnion's allegedly

inaccurate reporting caused him, the anxiety medication he takes, and the embarrassment he has

13 Counsel for Browne was also counsel of record for the plaintiff in Huziar. Huizar, 2026 WL 45203, at *1.

suffered from not being able to purchase a home like his peers and co-workers. Id. The stark

contrast between Browne’s situation and the plaintiff in Huzier is that there, the plaintiff was

denied a mortgage several times based on his credit report. Id. While the court explained that the

plaintiff would still have to “tie[] the denial of his mortgage applications to TransUnion's credit

score reporting specifically …” he was able to furnish evidence that supported a causal relation

between the mortgage denials and Trans Union’s conduct. Id. at *12. All Browne has done here is

supply deposition testimony, with treatment records that do not corroborate, that the July 2021

dispute with Equifax caused her to feel stressed, anxious, and distracted. These are conclusory

statements that fail to describe the circumstances of her injury, allegedly caused by Equifax, in

reasonable detail. Sarver, 390 F.3d at 971. Accordingly, Browne’s § 1681i claim, and the

accompanying claim for punitive damages, fail. See Ayala v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 2024 WL

1328827, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 28, 2024) (holding that “Plaintiff’s § 1681i(a) claim fails because

…[he] cannot point to any evidence that [the CRA] reported inaccurate information that was the

subject of Plaintiff's dispute or that any such report caused him harm”).

CONCLUSION

For the forgoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that:

(1) Browne’s Motion to Reconsider [DE 152] is DENIED;

(2) the Parties Stipulation [DE 143] is GRANTED;

(3) Browne’s Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 108] is DENIED;

(4) Equifax’s Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 103] is GRANTED; and,

(5) the Clerk is DIRECTED to enter Judgment against Browne and in favor of

Equifax. Browne takes nothing by her Amended Complaint.

SO ORDERED.

ENTERED: March 16, 2026.

/s/ GRETCHEN S. LUND

Judge

United States District Court