Sallaj

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

NASHVILLE DIVISION

JOSEPH SALLAJ, )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 3:25-cv-00607

) Judge Trauger/Frensley

MIDDLE TENNESSE STATE )

UNIVERSITY, et al., )

Defendants. )

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This pro se discrimination matter is before the court on defendants’ motion to dismiss the

amended complaint. Docket. No. 26. Also before the court is Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary

injunction. Docket No. 6. The motions are briefed and ready for disposition. The undersigned

recommends defendants’ motion be granted and the complaint be dismissed for lack of standing.

Plaintif’s motion for a preliminary injunction should be denied as moot.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Joseph Sallaj is a graduate student at Middle Tennessee State University

(University), a public university. Proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, he alleges the following

in his amended complaint. Docket No. 13. He enrolled in the online Criminal Justice

Administration (CJA) master’s program at the University in Spring 2024 and registered with its

Disability & Access Center (DAC). Id., at p. 2. His disabilities are traumatic brain injury, seizures,

mild cognitive impairments, developmental delays, dyslexia, mild speech impairment, visual and

auditory impairments, PTSD, ADHD, and others. Id. at p. 3. The DAC granted him reasonable

accommodation, which included extended time on tests, assistive technology, alternative formats

for assignments, leniency on grammar and spelling errors, and clear instructions. Id. As soon as

he began classes that spring, he experienced a pattern of discriminatory behavior. Id. Dr. Carter

Smith discriminated against him by issuing him a grade of 50/100 on a paper, “accompanied by

over ten critical comments on minor grammar and spelling” errors on the assignment. Id. Smith’s

conduct was “arbitrary” and “infringed upon his disability rights.” Id. at p. 3

He filed a formal complaint disputing the grade and feedback he received from Smith. Id.

An investigation was conducted that also involved another professor, Dr. Harms. Id. In April 2024,

shortly after the investigation, Harms retaliated against him by removing a course offering for the

summer 2024 semester in order to impede his academic progress. Id. He was forced to enroll in

another course. Id. He took another course that summer taught by Dr. Harms. Id. In the

replacement course, Harms “refused to provide clear instructions and employed excessive

criticism on grammar and spelling in direct contravention of his disability accommodations.” Id.

at p. 4. . He filed a formal complaint against Harms after Harms falsely accused him of plagiarism.

Id. He was cleared of the accusation of plagiarism. Id. During the investigation, Harms made

inappropriate and discriminatory remarks, including referring to him as “odd” because he spoke

in the third person and stated it was “odd” for a person to receive a disability accommodation. Id.

at p. 3. He also asked Plaintiff for personal information such as addresses and next of kin that

Harms stated were to verify his identity. Id. During summer 2024, he experienced additional

discriminatory practices, including refusal to provide clear instructions, grammar and spelling

critiques, and subjective grading practices. Id. at p. 4.

He was granted thesis enrollment approval for the summer and fall 2024 semesters despite

having just started coursework. Id. On September 5, 2024, he submitted a thesis research

application to the University’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) on the topic of stress reduction

among domestic-violence survivors, research which involved human subjects. Id. at p. 6. The

research met the criteria for “exempt” or “expedited review” under 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(b)(5) but

was subjected to an unwarranted full review by the IRB. Id. Members of the IRB engaged in

misconduct by arbitrarily classifying the human subjects of his research as a “vulnerable

population,” using a foreign rather than US standard and asserting Plaintiff’s writing was not

comprehensible. Id. The IRB “excessively delayed the review process, excluded [him] from IRB

meetings, and rejected his appeals.” Id. The IRB ultimately denied his research proposal. Id. at

pp. 5-6. He raised his concern about the denial of his research proposal to Dr. Grandjean, Dean of

CJA, who failed to investigate and shifted blame to him, advising him that “there is no universally

recognized right to conduct research” and dismissing his First Amendment rights. Id. at p. 7.

He offered a second thesis on the topic of Opioid Use Disorder which was approved and

completed. Id. at pp. 5, 7. The University denied publication of the thesis despite meeting all

regulatory criteria. Id. at p. 7. By email, David Butler, Vice Provost for Research & Dean of the

College of Graduate Studies, withheld final approval for publication, effectively censoring his

research on the basis that publishing the thesis before completing all required courses would be

“improper, irregular, and irresponsible.” Id. at p. 6. The email stated in part:

Once you have completed all remaining courses successfully, I will be notified by the department,

and I will sign the thesis form, moving your progress forward and bringing your course of study

back into alignment. There is no time limit for me to sign the thesis form. It stays in my box until

acted upon.

It would be improper, irregular, and irresponsible for the university to give a false impression that

someone has fully earned a master’s degree by finalizing and publishing a thesis before all required

courses are successfully completed.

I await notification from the department of your successfully completing all remaining classes in

your program.

Docket No. 6, at pp. 50-51. 1

1 Plaintiff attached emails as exhibits to his motion for preliminary injunction. Docket No. 6, at pp.

50-51, 54-55. The Court can consider the mails without converting the motion to one for summary

judgment. FedEx Ground Package Sys. v. Route Consultant, Inc., 661 F. Supp. 3d 765, 773 (M.D.

Tenn. 2023) (citations omitted).

In Spring 2025, Lee Wade, Assistant Dean of CJA, threatened him by requiring him to

complete a new thesis within 30 days after his first thesis was denied or receive a failing grade.

Docket No. 13, pp. 4-5. He produced another thesis within two weeks which was approved by

committee members and which he subsequently defended. Id. at p. 5.

Plaintiff filed a complaint with the University for the refusal to publish his thesis. Id. Butler

cited “standard practices” to justify withholding publication. Id. He filed a complaint with Brian

P. Hinote, Provost, who deferred to Butler’s position. Id. He then filed a formal appeal to Hinote

for the grade he received on his thesis, and the appeal was denied. Id.

Plaintiff quotes the email from Hinote:

I’ve reviewed your request below (and your attachments), but you cannot appeal this grade as you

describe. As I understand the situation, your requested “P” grade is not a valid grade for the CJA

6640 course, since the grade mode for the course is S/U (i.e., those are the only two valid grades

for the course). This is documented in the MTSU Graduate Catalog.

As a result, the university cannot grant the requested steps below. Your transcript will also not

show that your degree is complete until you fulfill all degree requirements. My recollection is that

you lacked two courses in your degree, but your program advisor can clarify.

If you have additional questions about a graduate degree, then I refer you to the College of

Graduate Studies for the most accurate and up-to-date information.

Docket No. 6, pp. 54-55.

In his amended complaint Plaintiff names as defendants the University, Butler, and Sidney

McPhee, University president. He names Butler and McPhee in their official capacities.2 Docket

No. 13. Plaintiff asserts four claims. In Count I he asserts the University repeatedly denied him

his documented accommodation including extended time on tests and alternative academic

adjustments in violation of the ADA and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Id. at p. 8. He

2 Plaintiff does not cite 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as the basis for any of his claims.

alleges his complaints were summarily dismissed and met with retaliatory grading and conduct.

Id. In Count II he asserts Butler and the University infringed on his ability to conduct research,

complete and publish his academic work without censorship and retaliation, withheld approval for

this thesis and dictated publication platforms violated his First Amendment rights under the federal

and Tennessee constitution. Id. In Count III, he alleges Butler and the University deprived him

of Fourteenth Amendment due process during the investigation of his complaints with the

University by relying on “standard practices” and failing to follow school policies, state and federal

laws, rules, and regulations. Id. at p. 9. He asserts they relied on nonexistent regulations and denied

him the right to a fair hearing, to file complaints, attend meetings, and receive notices of decisions

affecting academics. Id. In Count IV, he asserts the University and Butler’s made false

representations that harmed his academic and professional reputation. Id. He cites instances of

purported false statements. He alleges defendants falsely claimed his thesis required full review

because he proposed working with a vulnerable population. Id. He alleges Smith, who is not a

party, falsely labeled him as “unqualified.” Id. He asserts that Harms, who is not a party, falsely

accused him of plagiarism. Id. at p. 9. Plaintiff finally alleges that his transcript inaccurately

reflects that no final thesis defense occurred. Id. Id. For relief, he seeks declaratory and injunctive

relief and $900,000.00 in damages. Id. at p. 10.

Defendants’ motion to dismiss followed. Docket No. 26. They argue Plaintiff lacks

standing to bring his claims because he has suffered no injury-- constitutional or otherwise--and

any complained of harm is self-inflicted and not traceable to defendants. Docket No. 27, at p. 8.

Defendants assert Plaintiff simply disagrees with academic decisions made by defendants and asks

the Court to intervene on his behalf. Id They argue his claims for monetary and injunctive relief

against the University, McPhee, and Butler are barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity. They

note Plaintiff makes no allegations of any conduct on the part of McPhee and that Plaintiff seeks

to compel Butler to publish a thesis before Plaintiff has completed required coursework. Id, at p.

9. Finally, they assert Plaintiff fails to state plausible claims for relief for any of his claims. Id. at

pp. 17-22.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standing

Defendants assert Plaintiff lacks standing to being his claims. The undersigned agrees.

Standing under Article III of the Constitution requires that a would-be litigant make a showing of

three elements: (i) an "injury in fact," which is an invasion of a legally protected interest that is

concrete, particularized and either actual or imminent; (ii) the existence of a causal connection

between the alleged injury and the conduct being challenged; and (iii) redressability, i.e., that the

injury is likely to be remedied by a favorable decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.

555, 560-61 (1992)).

“Standing is, of course, a threshold issue in every case before a federal court: If a plaintiff

lacks standing, he or she cannot invoke its jurisdiction.” Arkansas Right to Life State Political

Action Comm. v. Butler, 146 F.3d 558, 560 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 1041 (1999).

Because the elements of standing “are not mere pleading requirements but rather an indispensable

part of the plaintiff’s case, each element must be supported in the same way as any other matter

on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence

required at the successive stages of the litigation.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,

561 (1992). In cases of complaints for injunctive relief, the “injury in fact” element of standing

requires a showing that the plaintiff faces a threat of ongoing or future harm. See City of Los

Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101–05 (1983). “[I]t is the plaintiff's burden to establish standing

by demonstrating that, if unchecked by the litigation, the defendant's allegedly wrongful behavior

will likely occur or continue, and that the ‘threatened injury [is] “certainly impending .” ’ ” Friends

of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 190 (2000) (cleaned up)

(environmental compliance suit).

Injury in Fact

Defendants contend Plaintiff does not allege any concrete injuries, nor does he identify any

specific future educational harm likely to occur. Docket No. 27, at p. 10. They argue that there is

no injury under the ADA or Sec. 504 because Plaintiff’s alleged harms – receiving a poor grade

on a midterm paper, being required to enroll in different courses within the CJA program, receiving

critiques on writing assignments, and being warned about plagiarism – are not cognizable injuries

that occurred because of his disability, but are instead routine academic judgments squarely within

the discretion of faculty and administrators. Id. See Parate v. Isibor, 868 F.2d 821, 828 (6th Cir.

1989) (a “professor should retain wide discretion in his evaluation of the academic performance

of [his] students . . . [and] should remain free to decide, according to his own professional

judgment, what grades to assign and what grades not to assign.”

Plaintiff opposes the motion, asserting the systematic failure to provide accommodation is

not a mere academic judgment and reasserting the allegations in his complaint. Docket No. 28.

He argues that being penalized for grammatical errors despite an accommodation, forced into

adverse testing conditions without accommodation, being subjected to discriminatory remarks, and

refusal to provide clear instructions causes tangible harm to his academic standing and exacerbates

his disabilities. Id. Docket No. 28, at p. 11.

Although an educational institution may be required to make reasonable accommodations,

it is not required “to lower or to effect substantial modifications of standards to accommodate a

handicapped person.” Southeastern Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 413, 99 S.Ct. 2361, 60

L.Ed.2d 980 (1979). Nor is a school required to make fundamental or substantial modifications to

its programs to accommodate the disabled. Kaltenberger, 162 F.3d at 436 (citing Alexander v.

Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 300, 105 S.Ct. 712, 83 L.Ed.2d 661 (1985)). Moreover, when evaluating

the reasonable accommodation requirement, “[c]ourts must give deference to professional

academic judgments.” Id. “University faculties must have the widest range of discretion in making

judgments as to the academic performance of students and their entitlement to promotion or

graduation.” Id. ( quoting Regents of Univ. Of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 n. 11, 106 S.Ct.

507, 88 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985)). Therefore, academic decisions made by faculty in their professional

judgment must be given great respect. Id. See also Oser v. Cap. Univ. L. Sch., No. 2:09- CV-709,

2009 WL 2913919, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 8, 2009) (university is entitled to exercise professional

judgment in implementing approved accommodations, and they are not required to fundamentally

or substantially alter established academic standards to do so.)

Plaintiff makes conclusory allegations that criticisms and grading for his paper and other

academic work were based on discrimination. He offers only conclusory grievances which amount

to dissatisfaction with being treated as a graduate-level student in a master’s degree program.

Rather than accepting the academic judgment and input of his professors, Plaintiff filed over ten

formal complaints and several grade appeals. Docket No. 13, at p. 5. This case amounts to a

situation where Plaintiff’s complaints were reviewed and heard and he simply disagrees with the

outcome. His disagreements with his professors’ judgment and dissatisfaction with grades they

have awarded him are not cognizable injuries.

Nor has Plaintiff demonstrated any First Amendment injury. Plaintiff asserts that his

academic reputation and future professional prospects have been harmed by the IRB’s rejection of

his first research proposal, as well as their failure to publish his completed thesis on a second topic.

Docket No. 13, pp. 8-9. He asserts that the IRB’s rejection of his research proposal impeded his

academic progress and their failure to publish his thesis inhibits his ability to contribute to the

public good, thereby restricting the ability of others to access his research. Id. at p. 7. He asserts

this demonstrates “viewpoint discrimination.” Id. at pp. 8-9.

Notably, Plaintiff identifies no concrete future professional prospects that have been

impeded, nor does he articulate how adhering to university practice and publishing his thesis

following the completion of his coursework could plausibly harm his reputation. Neither the denial

of a research proposal nor the refusal to publish a thesis before program requirements are satisfied

discriminate against Plaintiff’s viewpoint; they are routine, reasonable regulations of university

sponsored academic activity and academic requirements applicable to all graduate students. See

e.g., Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939, 952 (9th Cir. 2002) (under the First Amendment, a thesis proposal

may be “subject to a reviewing committee’s reasonable regulation.”). Plaintiff’s alleged harms

stemming from his decision to complete his academic requirements in a nonsequential order do

not constitute a cognizable First Amendment injury.

The undersigned further concludes there is no due process injury. The deprivation of

process alone – without any concrete harm flowing from it – cannot establish an injury sufficient

to confer standing. Mikel v. Quin, 58 F.4th 252, 258 (6th Cir. 2023) (“a bare procedural violation,

divorced from any concrete harm,” is not a present or imminent injury that an injunction can

redress.), quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 341–42, 136 S.Ct. 1540, 194 L.Ed.2d 635

(2016). And “the right to a graduate school education is not deeply rooted in this nation’s history

and traditions.” Stephenson v. Cent. Michigan Univ., 897 F. Supp. 2d 556, 568 (E.D. Mich. 2012).

The relevant question “is not whether the University conformed to its own internal grievance

procedures, but [whether the plaintiff] was afforded the due process guaranteed under the

Fourteenth Amendment.” JiQiang Xu v. Michigan State Univ., 195 F. App’x 452, 457 (6th Cir.

2006) (the fact that doctoral student found university’s solutions unsatisfactory following an

investigation does not alone give rise to a due process concern.).

To the extent Plaintiff asserts the University did not strictly adhere to its own internal

procedures when reviewing his formal complaints and appeals (Docket No. 13, p. 5) he nonetheless

received all the process the Constitution requires, an opportunity to be heard. See Yoder v. Univ.

of Louisville, 526 F. App’x 537, 549 (6th Cir. 2013). The Sixth Circuit has held that due process

does not always require a “full evidentiary hearing” and that the formality and exact procedures

required can vary depending on the nature of the interests asserted. Purisch v. Tennessee

Technological Univ., 76 F.3d 1414, 1423-24 (internal citations omitted). Rather, the root of due

process requires “ ‘that an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived

of any significant property interest.’ ” Id. at 1423 (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371,

379, 91 S.Ct. 780, 28 L.Ed.2d 113 (1971)). Plaintiff here cannot claim that he was denied such an

opportunity. Plaintiff identifies no injury arising from any alleged procedural deficiency; he merely

complains that each complaint was reviewed, investigated, and resolved in a manner with which

he disagrees.

Causation

To have standing, Plaintiff must show that his alleged injuries are “fairly traceable to the

defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. However, “if the plaintiff caused

his own injury, he cannot draw a connection between that injury and the defendant’s challenged

conduct.” Buchholz v. Meyer Njus Tanick, PA, 946 F.3d 855, 866 (6th Cir. 2020). Self-inflicted

injuries break the chain of causation and are therefore not injuries in fact. Id.

Defendants argue Plaintiff’s alleged harms are not fairly traceable to them. They argue his

alleged harm is a result of his own doing because he chose to pursue his thesis out of sequence,

i.e., before completing the required coursework. The undersigned agrees. When his initial research

proposal was denied, Plaintiff chose another research topic for his thesis and completed and

defended it. Docket No. 13, p. 7. This thesis will presumably be eligible for publication upon

completion of his remaining curriculum. Whether Plaintiff completes his degree presumably is

dependent on whether he satisfactorily completes the required work. And presumably no action

on the University’s part, has or will, prevent Plaintiff from completing his degree coursework.

Redressability

Plaintiff seeks an order requiring publication of his thesis and invalidating the university’s

policies barring publication before degree requirements have been met. Docket No. 13, p. 10. For

an injury to be redressable, Plaintiff must show that it is “likely, as opposed to merely speculative,

that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (quotation

omitted). As stated earlier, Plaintiff’s alleged harms concern purely academic matters requiring

the exercise of academic judgment not appropriate for this court’s review. See Megenity v. Stenger,

27 F.3d 1120, 1125 (6th Cir. 1994) (judicial review of academic decisions is “rarely appropriate.”);

Stephenson, 897 F. Supp. 2d at 569-70 (“Federal courts are not well-suited to evaluate the

substance of academic decisions made by faculty members.”); Regents of Univ. of Michigan v.

Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 226 (1985) (citation omitted) (academic decisions often require “an expert

evaluation of cumulative information and [are] not readily adapted to the procedural tools of

judicial or administrative decision-making.”); Parate v. Isibor, 868 F.2d 821, 827 (6th Cir. 1989)

(non-tenured professor’s § 1983 suit against university; “[t]he administration of the university rests

not with the courts, but with the administrators of the institution.”).

Further, this court cannot provide relief by invalidating these academic policies. See

generally, Megenity v. Stenger, 27 F.3d 1120, 1125 (6th Cir. 1994); Parate, 868 F.2d at 827.

Courts rarely intervene in academic decisions particularly when they involve degree requirements.

See Kaltenberger v. Ohio Coll. of Podiatric Med., 162 F.3d 432, 437 (6th Cir. 1998). Moreover,

Plaintiff’s requested remedy would not provide him relief because his allegations demonstrate

complaints and disputes with various non-party faculty through which he seeks judicial

intervention. See R. K. by & through J. K. v. Lee, 53 F.4th 995, 1001 (6th Cir. 2022) (“Because

plaintiffs’ injuries are not fairly traceable to any defendant here, no remedy applicable to those

defendants (be it an injunction or a declaration) would redress the plaintiffs’ alleged injuries.”).

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s alleged harms are not redressable by this Court.

Based on the above, the undersigned concludes Plaintiff lacks standing. Accordingly, the

court lacks jurisdiction.

Ripeness

Defendants also contend Plaintiff’s claims are not ripe for adjudication. Docket No. 27, p.

15. The undersigned agrees. “A claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests upon ‘contingent

future events that may not occur as anticipated or indeed may not occur at all.’” Texas v. United

States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998) (quotation omitted). Plaintiff does not plausibly allege that

defendants caused delay, disability aggravation, career harm, or reputational injury. Docket No.

13, pp. 8-10. Each claimed harm is speculative. Again, any delays stem from Plaintiff’s decision

to pursue his coursework out of sequence and insist on publication before completing the required

coursework. The issues he raises fall within the ordinary academic authority of the university and

CJA faculty. Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege any actual infringement of his constitutional or

disability rights.

A. Eleventh Amendment Sovereign Immunity

Defendants also argue Eleventh Amendment immunity bars Plaintiff’s claims. Docket

Nos. 27, pp. 8-9; 29, pp. 1-4. Plaintiff counters, asserting the Ex parte Young allows for his claims

for prospective injunctive relief against Butler and McPhee. Docket No. 28. Plaintiff seeks an order

requiring defendants to: (1) implement his documented disability accommodations as required by

the ADA and Section 504; (2) cease their censorship and approve his committee-defended thesis

for publication as protected by the First Amendment; and (3) correct his official academic record

to accurately reflect the completion of his thesis defense, as required by due process. Id. at p. 10.

He contends his requested relief is forward-looking and does not seek to remedy a past wrong with

monetary compensation but to halt defendants’ present and continuing unlawful conduct. He

argues that defendants’ refusal to provide testing accommodation for his Fall 2025 exam is an

ongoing violation and that continued refusal to publish his thesis is an ongoing act of censorship

in violation of the First Amendment. Id. He contends his claims against Butler and McPhee, who

oversee and implement the university’s academic and graduate policies, fall within Ex parte Young

exception because they have the authority to end these ongoing violations of federal law. Id. The

unsigned disagrees and concludes that even if Plaintiff had standing, his claims are barred by

sovereign immunity.

Before considering a suit against a state, a federal court must determine whether the

Eleventh Amendment bars jurisdiction. That constitutional provision reads: "The Judicial power

of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or

prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects

of any Foreign State." U.S. Const. Amend. XI. The Eleventh Amendment grants sovereign

immunity to the states in most cases, which prevents federal courts from having jurisdiction in

lawsuits brought by private plaintiffs where the state is a defendant. See Whole Woman's Health

v. Jackson, 142 S. Ct. 522, 532, 211 L. Ed. 2d 316 (2021) (citing Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,

713 (1999)). Such immunity also extends to departments and agencies that are arms of the state,

as well as state officers acting in their official capacity. See Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782

(1978) (Eleventh Amendment bars suits against departments that are arms of the states); Will v.

Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (construing suits against a state official in his

or her official capacity as a suit against the official's office). This immunity bars suits "for

injunctive, declaratory or monetary relief." Thiokol Corp. v. Dep't of Treasury, State of Mich.

Revenue Div., 987 F.2d 376, 381 (6th Cir. 1993). Dismissal on Eleventh Amendment grounds is

not a judgment on the merits, but rather a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. Republic of Paraguay

v. Allen, 134 F.3d 622, 626 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 371 (1998).

While Plaintiff does not explicitly assert § 1983 claims, he seeks monetary damages in

connection with his First Amendment claims, along with attorney fees and costs. Docket No. 13,

pp. 1-2, 10. Monetary claims under the ADA are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Bevington

v. Ohio Univ., 93 F. App’x 748, 750 (6th Cir. 2004). And the state has not consented to allow

students to sue for monetary damages. Boyd v. Tennessee State Univ., 848 F. Supp. 111, 114 (M.D.

Tenn. 1994). Because Plaintiff has sued defendants in their official capacities, Eleventh

Amendment immunity bars his claims for damages to the extent he brings them under § 1983.

In limited circumstances, a private party may bring suit even without a valid abrogation or

waiver of immunity. Under the doctrine of Ex parte Young, a state official sued in their official

capacity may be enjoined from taking action that violates federal law. See Diaz v. Michigan Dept.

of Corrections, 703 F.3d 956, 964 (2013). In Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155-56 (1908), the

Supreme Court held that when a state official acts in violation of the Constitution or federal law,

he is acting ultra vires and is no longer entitled to the State’s immunity from suit. In effect, Ex

parte Young creates a legal fiction: a state official stops being a state official when he does

something contrary to federal law. The Ex parte Young doctrine permits only prospective

injunctive relief; no money damages are available. Trivette v. Tennessee Dept. of Corrections, 739

F. Supp. 3d 663, 691 (M.D. Tenn. 2024).

Plaintiff asserts the Ex parte Young exception allows the suit to proceed against Butler and

McPhee. Docket No. 28, p. 10. Defendants contend the exception fails because Plaintiff has failed

to allege or identify an ongoing violation of federal law by either Butler or McPhee. Docket No.

29, p. 1. They argue moreover, each of the alleged harms and requested forms of relief arises from

the University’s academic purview and judgment. Id. at p. 2.

Ex parte Young is available only when the state official being sued has taken or is about to

take--an action. See Children's Healthcare is a Legal Duty, Inc. v. Deters, 92 F.3d 1412, 1414–

1416 (6th Cir. 1996) (“Young abrogates a state official's Eleventh Amendment immunity when a

suit challenges the constitutionality of a state official's action.”). But “Young ‘does not insulate

from Eleventh Amendment challenge every suit in which a state official is the named defendant ...

Young applies only where the underlying authorization upon which the named official acts is

asserted to be illegal.’ ” Id. at 1417. In that regard, the state official sued in an Ex parte Young

action must bear a “sufficient connection” to the challenged act, and it is not enough to simply

claim that by virtue of their office they have the general authority to take the allegedly illegal

action. See id. at 1416 (noting that “[g]eneral authority to enforce the laws of the state is not

sufficient to make government officials the proper parties to litigation challenging the law”).

Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief to have Butler approve and publish his thesis. Butler is the

only official who is alleged to have violated Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights. However, Plaintiff

has failed to plead he possesses a constitutional right to have any work published. As to McPhee,

Plaintiff asserts no allegations that McPhee took any action with respect to Plaintiff or his thesis.

The Eleventh Amendment bars any request for injunctive relief against him because there is no

allegation of an ongoing violation of federal law.

In evaluating whether an accommodation exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and

begins to fundamentally alter a school's educational offerings, the “federal judiciary is ill equipped

to evaluate the proper emphasis and content of a school's curriculum” and should afford a

university's judgment and discretion great respect. Kaltenberger, 162 F.3d at 436; Doherty v.

Southern College of Optometry, 862 F.2d 570, 576 (6th Cir. 1988) (same; Rehabilitation Act case)

(citation omitted). Though discrimination statutes guarantee disabled students “equality of

opportunity” and “full participation” in society, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7), they do not require an

educational institution to lower or substantially modify its standards to do so, Southeastern

Community Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 413 (1979). They mandate only reasonable—not

fundamental or substantial—adjustments. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 300 (1985). In

assessing the importance of academic requirements in health care programs especially, where “the

conferral of a degree places the school's imprimatur upon the student as qualified to” practice, the

judiciary ought only reluctantly intervene. Id. at 437 (quotation omitted). Courts must also give

deference to professional academic judgments when evaluating the reasonable accommodation

requirement. See McGregor v. Louisiana State Univ. Bd. of Supervisors, 3 F.3d 850, 859 (5th Cir.

1993); Wynne v. Tufts Univ. Sch. of Med., 976 F.2d 791, 795 (1st Cir. 1992).

Plaintiff asks the court to “implement” his disability accommodations. Docket No. 28, p.

10. However, in the amended complaint he does not identify what actions of either Butler or

McPhee have deprived him of his approved accommodation. Plaintiff’s professors have already

implemented his approved accommodations, and they are not parties to the suit. Plaintiff’s

complaint of discrimination appears to consist of his disagreement with how his professors apply

the accommodations to his work in an academic setting. Docket No. 13. See Southeastern

Community Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 413 (1979) (institutions are not required to lower or

fundamentally alter academic standards to accommodate disabilities; they are only required to

provide reasonable adjustments); Cf. Gati v. W. Kentucky Univ., 762 F. App’x 246, 250 (6th Cir.

2019) (granting summary judgment to defendant University because disabled student’s proposed

accommodations to take classes remotely and conduct counseling sessions at separate location

were not reasonable); Kaltenberger v. Ohio Coll. of Podiatric Med., 162 F.3d 432, 436-37 (1998)

(universities retain discretion in how accommodations are implemented.). Defendants therefore

acted within their professional academic judgment.

Plaintiff also asks the court to order defendants to approve his thesis for publication. Docket

No. 28, p. 10. There is no constitutional right to have a student thesis published and universities

retain broad discretion over school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their decisions are

reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical objectives. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484

U.S. 260, 271-73 (1988) and progeny; Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 733 (6th Cir. 2012); Brown

v. Li, 308 F.3d 939, 952 (9th Cir. 2002) (doctoral student’s First Amendment rights were not

violated upon committee’s declination to approve “disacknowledgement” portion of thesis).

Whether Plaintiff’s thesis is endorsed for publication is an academic judgment based on the

presumption that he successfully completed all degree requirements. Requiring him to complete

degree requirements before publication is a reasonable pedagogical purpose and within accepted

academic norms.

Lastly, Plaintiff asks that his transcript reflect completion of his thesis defense. Docket No.

28, p. 10. Universities have broad discretion regarding students’ academic performance, and courts

may intervene only where there is a substantial departure from accepted academic norms. Board

of Curators, Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 96 n.6 (1978); A-Dabagh v. Case W. Rsrv.

Univ., 777 F.3d 355, 357 (6th Cir. 2015). The acts of University officials fall within their

discretionary academic authority, and Ex parte Young does not apply.

Ill. CONCLUSION

Consistent with the above, the undersigned recommends defendants’ motion to dismiss the

amended complaint (Docket No. 26) be GRANTED. All remaining pending motions: (1)

Plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction (Docket No. 6); (2) defendants’ motion to strike

(Docket No. 23); and (3) Plaintiffs motion to file a sur-reply (Docket 30) should be DENIED AS

MOOT.

Under Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, any party has fourteen (14) days

from receipt of this Report and Recommendation in which to file any written objections to this

Recommendation with the District Court. Any party opposing said objections shall have fourteen

(14) days from receipt of any objections filed in this Report in which to file any response to said

objections. Failure to file specific objections within fourteen (14) days of receipt of this Report

and Recommendation can constitute a waiver of further appeal of this Recommendation. Thomas

v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985), reh’g denied, 474 U.S. 1111 (1986).

— 2 Xe.

oe

United States Magistrate Judge

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