Webb

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

NASHVILLE DIVISION

GREGORY RYAN WEBB, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 3: 24-cv-706;

) Consolidated Case. No. 3:24-cv-956

MIDDLE TENNESSEE MENTAL ) Judge Trauger / Frensley

HEALTH INSTITUTE, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action is before the undersigned on a motion to dismiss for

insufficient process, insufficient service of process, and lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), 12(b)(4), and 12(b)(5), filed by defendant Volunteer

Behavioral Health Care System, d/b/a Cumberland Mental Health Services, Inc. (“VBHCS” or

“Cumberland).” Docket No. 45. VBHCS has also filed a supporting memorandum. Docket No.

46. Mr. Webb has not responded to the motion. For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned

recommends Defendant’s motion (Docket No. 45) be granted and the action be dismissed as to

VBHCS.

Also before the undersigned are Plaintiff’s motions to amend his complaint, and for various

other (tangentially) related relief. Docket Nos. 53, 56, 60, 64, 66. The motions should be denied

as moot or futile.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Gregory Ryan Webb,1 proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed his original

1 Since 2022, Webb has filed over thirty cases in this court, all proceeding IFP, except for one fee-

paid case where noted. The following list does not include three pro se petitions for habeas corpus

relief. The cases are: Webb v. Worley et al, 2:22-cv-00026 (dismissed; not eligible to proceed

complaint on June 7, 2024. Docket No. 1. After several amendments to his complaint, the district

judge granted Plaintiff leave to file a Third Amended Complaint (“TAC” or “complaint”), the

operative complaint now before the court. Docket Nos. 36, 37.

The district judge conducted the required initial screening for an IFP complaint. The

district court noted Plaintiff indicated that his TAC was his “final” complaint. Docket No. 36, p.

3. Plaintiff named three defendants in the TAC: Dani Wiest; Cumberland; and the Mount Juliet

Police Department. Docket No. 37, p. 1. The district judge concluded the Mount Juliet Police

Department was not a proper party for § 1983 purposes and dismissed it from the action. Docket

IFP); Webb v. Webb et al, 2:22-cv-00054 (dismissed without prejudice for failure to comply with

court order); Webb v. Webb et al, 2:23-cv-00009 (dismissed for failure to state a claim); Webb v.

Board of Judicial Conduct et al, 2:23-cv-00010 (dismissed without prejudice for lack of standing

and for failure to state a claim); Webb v. Webb, 2:23-cv-00012 (dismissed without prejudice for

failure to state a claim); Webb v. Fickling et al, 2:23-cv-00013 (dismissed for failure to state a

claim); Webb v. McKenzie, et al, 2:23-cv-00014 (voluntarily dismissed); Webb v. Dunaway et al

2:23-cv-00017 (dismissed without prejudice as frivolous and duplicative); Webb v. Mayberry,

2:23-cv-00025 (dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim); Webb v. Tracking System,

2:23-cv-00029 (dismissed for failure to state a claim); Webb v. Webb et al, 2:23-cv-00032

(dismissed without prejudice for failure to prosecute and failure to pay the filing fee); Webb v.

Powers, et al, 2:23-cv-00065 (fee-paid; pending);Webb v. First Realty et al, 2:24-cv-00034

(dismissed for failing to comply with court order and for want of prosecution); Webb v. Republican

Party of Cumberland County TN, 2:24-cv-00039(dismissed with prejudice as barred by statute of

limitations); Webb v. TBI Agent, 2:24-cv-00056, (dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a

claim); Webb v. 13th District DA's Office, 2:24-cv-00068 (dismissed with prejudice for failure to

state a claim); Webb v. Gardner Mayberry et al, 2:25-cv-00034 (pending); Webb v. Middle

Tennessee Mental Health Institute, 3:24-cv-00706 (pending); Webb v. Webb, 3:24-cv-00819

(petition for writ of mandamus dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction);

Webb v. Weist et al, 3:24-cv-00956 (pending); Webb v. Board of Judicial Conduct TN et al, 3:24-

cv-01307, (transferred from N.D. Alabama); Webb v. Hill et al, 3:25-cv-00019 (motion to dismiss

pending); Webb v. DHS Dayton, TN et al, 3:25-cv-00021 (complaint filed); Webb v. Verizon

Wireless Crossville, TN, 3:25-cv-00022 (case pending); Webb v. Sexton et al, 3:25-cv-00394

(transferred from S.D.Ill.); Webb v. ADA Bateman, 2:24-cv-00070 (dismissed with prejudice

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity); Webb v. Ridley, 2:25-cv-

00007, (dismissed with prejudice); Webb v. City of Crossville, TN et al, 2:25-cv-00018 (pending);

Webb v. Fickling, 2:25-cv-00059 (with pro se unit for initial review); Webb v. Webb, 2:25-cv-

00061 (IFP complaint filed June 10, 2025); Webb v. TN Unemployment et al, 3:25-cv-00020

(motion to dismiss pending).

No. 36, p. 5. The district judge found the complaint sufficiently alleged that Wiest and/or

Cumberland had a relationship with the Mount Juliet Police department such that they were state

actors for purposes of § 1983. Id. The district judge found the complaint alleged that Wiest and/or

Cumberland violated Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights by involuntarily committing him

without probable cause. Id. at p. 7. The district judge found that the complaint stated colorable §

1983 claims against Wiest in his/her individual capacity and against Cumberland. Id. The district

judge concluded Plaintiff’s allegation that defendants violated Plaintiff’s rights to due process

under the Fourteenth Amendment when they failed to follow Tennessee’s involuntary commitment

statute stated a colorable claim. Id. The district judge held Plaintiff alleged a protected liberty

interest under the Fourteenth Amendment to be detained only in accordance with Tennessee’s

involuntary commitment law and that these allegations stated colorable § 1983 claims against

Wiest in his/her individual capacity and against Cumberland. Id. The district judge concluded

Plaintiff stated colorable state law claims for false imprisonment, assault, and battery against Wiest

and/or Cumberland. Id. at p. 8. The district judge consolidated this matter for all purposes with

Case No. 3: 24-cv-00956. Id.

II. LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Volunteer Behavioral Health Care System’s Motion to Dismiss

The instant motion followed. VBHCS moves to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(2), 12(b)(4), and 12(b)(5). Docket No. 45. In support of its motion, it states that

it is a non-profit corporation that provides behavioral health services across Tennessee. Docket

No. 46, p. 1. On August 27, 2025, a summons was delivered to one of VBHCS’s satellite offices,

Lebanon Campus of Volunteer Behavioral Health (“Lebanon Campus”), located at 1404 Winter

Drive, Lebanon, Tennessee 37087. Docket No. 45-1. The summons named Danni Wiest,

“Cumberland Health Services,” Mt. Juliet Police Department, and Tennessee Mental Health

Institute as the defendants. Id. at p. 1. The complaint that was delivered with the summons named

Middle Tennessee Mental Health Institute as the sole defendant and did not otherwise reference

Cumberland Health Services, Lebanon Campus, or Volunteer Behavioral Health Care Systems in

the body of the Complaint. Id. at pp. 3-10. Nevertheless, VBHCS asserts that the documents were

accepted by Cindy Puckett, an officer manager at the Lebanon Campus office. Docket No. 46, p.

2. VBHCS argues that “Cumberland Health Services” is not a legal entity in Tennessee according

to the Office of the Tennessee Secretary of State, nor does “Cumberland Mental Health Services,

Inc.” exist as a legal entity; rather, it is a “Doing Business As” name for a subsidiary of VBHCS.

Id. at p. 2.

VBHCS contends that it is not clear who the parties to the lawsuit are because the summons

names Cumberland Health Services, which is not an existing entity in Tennessee, while the

complaint names Middle Tennessee Mental Health Institute as the sole defendant. Id. at 3. It

argues that, assuming Plaintiff intended to serve Volunteer Behavioral Mental Health Care System

d/b/a Cumberland Mental Health Services, Inc., he failed to do so in both the summons and

complaint, and therefore the complaint is subject to dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(4).

Id. at pp. 3-4. It further argues that to the extent Plaintiff attempted to serve VBHCS, he failed to

do so properly under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(h) because the address included in the

summons was the address for one of its satellite campuses, Lebanon Campus, which is neither the

address of the principal office, nor the address of its registered agent. Id. at p. 4. It further argues

Cindy Puckett was not authorized to accept service on its behalf under federal or Tennessee law.

Id.

On October 9, 2025, the undersigned entered an Order to Show Cause (“show cause

order”), directing Plaintiff to demonstrate by October 24, 2025, why his claims should not be

dismissed for failure to prosecute or for the reasons stated in the motion to dismiss. Docket No.

47. The order warned that failure to comply with the order could result in dismissal of the action.

Id.

Plaintiff responded to the show cause order in five separate filings, some of which he titled

“motions.” Docket Nos. 48, 50-52, 55. Plaintiff states he failed to respond to the motion to dismiss

because of demands of other litigation, financial hardship, and personal circumstances. Docket

No. 48, p. 2-7. Plaintiff does not address the jurisdictional or service deficiencies raised by

VBHCS. See Docket No. 48. Nor has he complied with the show cause order or otherwise

addressed why his claims should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. Id. The caption of his

first response does not name VBHCS, and the document makes no reference to this defendant. Id.

Plaintiff’s four subsequent filings repeat his earlier assertions and include narrative information

that is rambling, convoluted, and unrelated to the issues raised in the show cause order. See Docket

Nos. 50-52, 55.

VBHCS replied, arguing that none of Plaintiff’s filings cure the defects in service, establish

personal jurisdiction, or present any new facts or legal argument that would alter the analysis in its

motion to dismiss. Docket No. 49, p. 2-5. It argues that the court should dismiss the action for

failure to prosecute under Rule 41(b). Id. at pp. 3-7. The undersigned agrees.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) states that: “For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute

or to comply with these rules or any order of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an

action or of any claim against the defendant.” Rule 41(b) also recognizes the power of the district

court to enter a sua sponte order of dismissal. Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 630 (1962);

Steward v. City of Jackson, Tenn., 8 Fed.Appx.294 (6th Cir. 2001). The authority of a court to

dismiss sua sponte for lack of prosecution has generally been considered an “inherent power,”

governed not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own

affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases. Link v. Wabash R. Co.,

370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962). District courts are permitted substantial discretion in determining

whether dismissal is appropriate. Knoll v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 176 F.3d 359, 363 (6th Cir. 1999);

Harmon v. CSX Transp., Inc., 110 F.3d 364, 366 (6th Cir.1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 868, 118

S. Ct. 178, 139 L. Ed. 2d 119 (1997).

A dismissal under Rule 41(b) “operates as an adjudication on the merits.” Id. The authority

to dismiss a case under Rule 41(b) “is available to the district court as a tool to effect management

of its docket and avoidance of unnecessary burdens on the tax-supported courts and opposing

parties.” Schafer v. City of Defiance Police Dept., 529 F.3d 731, 736 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting

Knoll v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 176 F.3d 359, 363 (6th Cir. 1999)). The Sixth Circuit has cautioned

that such a dismissal under Rule 41(b) is a harsh sanction which the court should order only in

extreme situations showing a clear record of delay or contumacious2 conduct by the plaintiff.

Carver v. Bunch, 946 F.2d 451, 454 (6th Cir. 1991) (citation modified).

In determining whether dismissal for failure to prosecute is appropriate, the court

considers four factors: (1) whether the party's failure is due to willfulness, bad faith, or fault; (2)

whether the adversary was prejudiced by the dismissed party’s conduct; (3) whether the dismissed

party was warned that failure to cooperate could lead to dismissal; and (4) whether less drastic

sanctions were imposed or considered before dismissal was ordered. Richter v. Am. Aggregates

Corp., 522 F. App’x 253, 259 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Knoll, 176 F.3d at 363). While no one

2 “Contumacious” is defined as “rebellious” or in defiance of a court order. Merriam-Webster

Dictionary, www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/contumacious (last visited February 4, 2026).

factor is determinative, “a case is properly dismissed by the district court where there is a clear

record of delay or contumacious conduct.” Schafer, 529 F.3d at 737.

The Court is mindful that it should “afford pro se litigants some leniency on matters that

require legal sophistication, such as formal pleading rules.” Thomas v. Liles, No. 3:16-CV-251-

JHM, 2016 WL 4940343 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 14, 2016) (citing Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110

(6th Cir. 1991)). However, “the same policy does not support leniency from court deadlines and

other procedures readily understood by laypersons, particularly where there is a pattern of delay

or failure to pursue a case.” Id. As the Sixth Circuit has explained, “the lenient treatment generally

accorded to pro se litigants has limits. Where, for example, a pro se litigant fails to comply with

an easily understood court-imposed deadline, there is no basis for treating that party more

generously than a represented litigant.” Id. (quoting Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th

Cir. 1996)) (citation modified). With these principles in mind, the undersigned addresses the

factors outlined above.

For a plaintiff's actions to constitute bad faith, willfulness, or fault, they must “display

either an intent to thwart judicial proceedings or a reckless disregard for the effect of [his] conduct

on those proceedings.” Wu v. T.W. Wang, Inc., 420 F.3d 641, 643 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Mulbah

v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 261 F.3d 586, 591 (6th Cir. 2001)). This factor weighs heavily in favor of

dismissal. While there is no evidence of bad faith on Plaintiff’s part, his failure to respond to the

motion to dismiss, to adequately respond to the show cause order requiring him to address the

arguments set forth in the motion to dismiss, and his failure to attempt to cure the deficiencies in

service outlined therein indicate willfulness or fault. Although Plaintiff filed his original complaint

on June 7 7, 2024, service was not attempted until August 27, 2025, well beyond the 90-day

deadline for timely service of process under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m). Docket Nos.

1, 42-43. When it was attempted, Plaintiff’s service documents were so deficient that it was

unclear what entities Plaintiff was naming as defendants, what entity he intended to serve, and how

the allegations related to Volunteer Behavioral Health Care System. Docket No. 45-1. Plaintiff

has yet to address this as he failed to properly respond to the motion to dismiss or to the show

cause order. Nor has Plaintiff made additional attempts to serve Volunteer Behavioral Health Care

System or any of its “doing-business-as” entities, despite being alerted by VBHCS in its motion

to dismiss to problems with his service attempts and ordered by the court to respond. Docket No.

46, p. 2-5; Docket No. 47. The undersigned concludes Plaintiff’s continued conduct demonstrates

willfulness or fault.

Factor two, prejudice to the opposing party, heavily favors dismissal. A defendant is

prejudiced by a plaintiff's dilatory conduct if the defendant is “required to waste time, money, and

effort in pursuit of cooperation which [the plaintiff] was legally obligated to provide.” Harmon v.

CSX Transp., Inc., 110 F.3d 364, 368 (6th Cir. 1997)). The plaintiff bears the burden of executing

due diligence in perfecting service of process and showing that proper service was made. Spencer

v. Caracal Int’l, LLC, 516 F.Supp.3d 755, 758 (M.D. Tenn. 2021). Moreover, “[a]ll parties have

a right to a just and prompt resolution of their cases[;] [t]he failure to advance litigation . . .

prejudices the [defendant] and reflects the type of situation where the [c]ourt should intervene.”

Stacker v. Wal-Mart Inc., 2021 WL 6495024, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 9, 2021), report and

recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 125023 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 12, 2022). Despite having filed suit

in June 2024, Plaintiff has failed to serve VBHCS and has made no attempt to respond to the

arguments raised in its motion to dismiss. VBHCS has spent significant time and expenses

addressing this litigation to which it is not even sure it is a party.

Further, this action has been labor-intensive and time consuming, placing a significant

burden on this tax-supported court. The case is now approaching the two-year mark without any

meaningful action by Plaintiff. See Schafer, 529 F.3d 736. Even under the more lenient standard

afforded pro se litigants, the undersigned finds the complaint violates the principles and letter of

the Federal Rules. The complaint presents a tangled web of conclusory accusations that frequently

fail to correspond with any supporting facts. As such, it places an unfair burden on VBHCS and

this court to attempt to determine which claims have merit and which are merely outlets for Mr.

Webb’s frustrations, primarily with persons and entities not before the court.

Notice, the third factor, is key to a court’s determination as to whether dismissal is

appropriate. Schafer, 529 F.3d at 737. Plaintiff was provided notice. The show cause order

expressly warned Plaintiff that failure to comply with the order could result in the dismissal of his

claims. Docket No. 47. Plaintiff’s numerous filings in response to the show cause order lack any

showing of good cause, or even rational explanation, as to why he failed to respond to the motion

to dismiss. See Docket Nos. 48, 50-52, 55. Moreover, Plaintiff’s stated reasons for his failure to

respond are wholly of his own doing, i.e., costs and time associated with other litigation that he

himself initiated. See, e.g., Docket Nos. 51, 53. Finally, Plaintiff does not assert any external

cause prohibited him from prosecuting his lawsuit. Considering all the circumstances, the notice

factor favors dismissal.

The fourth factor, whether less drastic sanctions were imposed or considered before

dismissal was ordered, favors dismissal. The show cause order provided Plaintiff with the

opportunity to avoid dismissal and warned that dismissal could occur if Plaintiff failed to show

good cause. See Docket No. 47; Harper v. Houston, 2020 WL 3260069, at *5 (W.D. Tenn. June

16, 2020) (show cause order constitutes consideration of less drastic measures prior to dismissal).

Plaintiff failed to act on that opportunity.

Because all four factors weigh in favor of dismissal the undersigned recommends that

VBHCS’s motion to dismiss (Docket No. 45) be granted and the TAC be dismissed for failure to

prosecute pursuant to Rule 41(b). The undersigned further recommends in its discretion that

Webb’s complaint be dismissed with prejudice as to all defendants for failure to prosecute.

B. Plaintiff’s Motions to Amend

Plaintiff has also filed four motions to amend his complaint or for more time to amend his

complaint. Docket Nos. 53, 60, 64, 66. In support of his motions, he contends he has been

“consumed” with other litigation and related cases. Docket No. 53, p. 1. He states that he has no

money, he has no time to prosecute, and that he is proceeding pro se and does not have access to

Westlaw or Lexis. Id. at 2. In one motion he simply states he wishes to amend his complaint to

proceed under § 1985, “conspiracy against rights.” Docket No. 60, p. 1.

Rule 15(a) (2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that leave to amend should be

freely given “when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). In deciding whether to grant a

motion to amend, courts should consider undue delay in filing, lack of notice to the opposing party,

bad faith by the moving party, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by previous amendments, undue

prejudice to the opposing party, and futility of amendment. Brumbalough v. Camelot Care Ctrs.,

Inc., 427 F.3d 996, 1001 (6th Cir. 2005).

Plaintiff does not describe the specific amendments he seeks to make to his pleading or

what claims he seeks to add or revise. See Docket Nos. 53, 60, 64, 66. Such a motion can fail as

a matter of procedure alone. See Tucker v. Middleburg-Legacy Place, LLC, 539 F.3d 545, 551

(6th Cir. 2008) (court has no obligation to guess what the amendment would be); Pittman v.

Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., 901 F.3d 619, 641 (6th Cir. 2018) (perfunctory amendment requests

warrant denial).

Even assuming he did, Plaintiff’s motion to amend is untimely. Plaintiff filed his original

complaint on June 7, 2024. Docket No. 1. On August 8, 2024, he filed an amended complaint

without leave of court. Docket No. 14. On October 18, 2024, he filed a second amended complaint

with leave of court. Docket No. 28. On June 25, 2025, he filed his third amended complaint and

indicated it was his “final” complaint. Docket. No. 37. The instant motions to amend were filed

on November 1, 2025 and thereafter, almost seventeen months after his original pleading and well

outside the 21-day amendment period provided by Rule 15(a)(1). Plaintiff provides no reason why

an amendment could not have been sought earlier, nor does he identify any new fact that would

justify the delay. See Colvin v. Caruso, 605 F.3d 282, 294 (6th Cir. 2010) (where the amendment

follows lengthy delay and the movant provides no adequate explanation, denial is appropriate).

Further, amendment would be futile. Courts deny leave to amend where the proposed

amendment cannot cure jurisdictional or procedural defects. Riverview Health Inst. LLC v. Medical

Mut. of Ohio, 601 F.3d 505, 512 (6th Cir. 2010). Plaintiff has never properly named or served

VBHCS and his original complaint did not reference VBHCS at all. Subsequent amended pleading

referenced “Cumberland Mountain Mental Health” and “Cumberland Mental Health,” neither of

which is VBHCS. Plaintiff states he has been “consumed” with other matters. Docket No. 53, p.

1. Even generous construction for pro se litigants does not excuse noncompliance with service

requirements. Percival v. Girard, 692 F. Supp. 2d 712, 720 (E.D. Mich. 2009).

Finally, the proposed amendment would not cure the substantive deficiencies identified in

VBHCS’s motion to dismiss. “A proposed amendment is futile ‘if the court concludes that the

pleading as amended could not withstand a motion to dismiss.’” Midkiff v. Adams Cnty. Reg’l

Water Dist., 409 F.3d 758, 767 (6th Cir. 2005)); see also Greer v. Strange Honey Farm, LLC, 114

F.4th 605, 614 (6th Cir. 2024) (while pro se litigants receive leniency, courts routinely hold pro se

parties to the same standards when amendments would cause delay or prejudice, or when the

proposed amendment would not survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion).

Plaintiff’s proposed amendments, which he has not included, do not alter the outcome of

the motion to dismiss. They would presumably challenge the same conduct he has been

challenging since the inception of this lawsuit.3 Any amendment would not remedy the fact that

he has not corrected the defective service of process, has not responded to VBHSC’s motion to

dismiss, and has not complied with the show cause order. Plaintiff has provided no meaningful

explanation for these failures and fails to address the jurisdictional issues before the court. The

allegations in Plaintiff’s filings consist of broad narrative assertions involving alleged political

conspiracies, election misconduct, stalking, and unrelated grievances. See Docket Nos. 53, 60, 64,

66. Nothing in the instant motion to amend indicates any change that would establish personal

jurisdiction, proper service, a viable federal claim against VBHCS, or any factual connection

between VBHCS and the events alleged.

VBHCS has been prejudiced by being required to respond to Plaintiff’s overzealous filing.

See Harom bv. CSX Trans. Inc., 110 F.3d 364, 368 (6th Cir. 1997) (compelling a defendant to

expend resources under such circumstances constitutes prejudice). Any amendment would further

delay resolution and would require VBHCS to expend additional resources responding to claims

and would not cure the extant jurisdictional and procedural defects. The undersigned concludes in

its discretion the motions to amend should be denied.

III. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends defendants’ motion to dismiss,

Docket No. 45, be GRANTED and the TAC (Docket No. 37) be dismissed as to VHBCS for

3 Because Mr. Webb has not provided his proposed amendments, the Court can only guess.

failure to prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). The undersigned further

recommends Plaintiff's motions to amend his complaint, Docket Nos. 53, 60, 64, 66, be DENIED;

and Plaintiff's motion for an extension of time for unspecified matter, Docket No. 56, be DENIED.

Plaintiffs additional response to the show cause order, which he incorrectly titled as a “motion,”

Docket Nos. 52, should be DENIED or otherwise terminated.

Under Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, any party has fourteen (14) days

after service of this Report and Recommendation in which to file any written objections to this

Recommendation with the District Court. Any party opposing said objections shall have fourteen

(14) days after service of any objections filed to this Report in which to file any response to said

objections. Failure to file specific objections within fourteen (14) days of service of this Report

and Recommendation can constitute a waiver of further appeal of this Recommendation. See

Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985), reh’g denied, 474 U.S. 1111 (1986); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. =.

CY

United States Magistrate Judge

13