Idkeidek

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

WESTERN DIVISION

BASEL IDKEIDEK, )

)

Petitioner, )

) No. 2:25-cv-02903-TLP-cgc

v. )

)

REEMA IDKEIDEK, )

)

Respondent. )

ORDER GRANTING IN PART PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES

Petitioner Basel Idkeidek moves for attorneys’ fees and costs against Respondent Reema

Idkeidek. (ECF No. 19.) For the reasons below, the Court GRANTS IN PART Petitioner’s

motion.

BACKGROUND

This case involves a father, a mother, one of their children, and the Hague Convention.

In September 2025, Petitioner filed a Verified Petition under the International Child Abduction

Remedies Act (“ICARA”). (ECF No. 1.) See 22 U.S.C. §§ 9001–11 (codifying Hague

Convention). He alleged—through his counsel Rogers & Brackin PLLC (“Rogers &

Brackin”)—that Respondent illegally removed their daughter from Israel and brought her to the

United States. (ECF No. 1.) After a few court appearances, the parties agreed on conditions for

the return of the child to her father’s custody in Israel. And so, the Court entered an Order

memorializing the parties’ terms and ordering the return of the child to Israel. (ECF No. 17.)

After succeeding in securing the child’s return, Petitioner moved for $16,158.66 in

attorneys’ fees, suit expenses, and costs under 422 U.S.C. § 9007.1 (ECF No. 19.) He claimed

$12,545.00 in attorneys’ and paralegal’s fees and $3,613.66 in expenses. (Id. at PageID 502.)

For the reasons below, the Court GRANTS IN PART Petitioner’s motion.

ANALYSIS

ICARA’s fee-shifting provision controls here. Because Petitioner prevailed, ICARA

requires the Court to “order [] [R]espondent to pay necessary expenses incurred by or on behalf

of [] [P]etitioner, including court costs, legal fees, foster home or other care during the course of

proceedings in the action, and transportation costs related to the return of the child.” 22 U.S.C. §

9007(b)(3) (emphasis added); see Pliego v. Hayes, 843 F.3d 226, 231 (6th Cir. 2016) (“As

required under ICARA's fee-shifting provisions . . . the court held in a separate order that [the

petitioner] was entitled to an award of $100,471.18 in attorneys’ fees and costs.”). That is unless

Respondent “establishes that such order would be clearly inappropriate.” 22 U.S.C. §

9007(b)(3).

Below, the Court first addresses Petitioner’s proposed attorneys’ fees before turning to

expenses.

I. Attorneys’ Fees

Well-settled principles guide the Court’s analysis. At its core, attorneys’ fees must be

reasonable. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546,

562 (1986). That standard requires the Court to strike a balance between awarding fees that are

1 In totaling his requested fees and expenses, Petitioner listed Attorney Zant’s fees as $3,187.50,

when twice before in the Motion, he listed her fees as $3,687.50. (See ECF No. 19 at PageID

134–36.) The Court reads the lower value to be a typo, so the Court construes Petitioner’s

request for $15,658.66 as a request for $16,158.66.

“adequately compensatory to attract competent counsel” while avoiding a “windfall for lawyers.”

Geier v. Sundquist, 372 F.3d 784, 791 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Reed v. Rhodes, 179 F.3d 453,

471 (6th Cir. 1999)). To get to a reasonable award, federal courts use the “lodestar” method—

multiplying the reasonable hourly rate by the reasonable number of hours expended on litigation.

Adcock-Ladd v. Sec’y of Treasury, 227 F.3d 343, 349 (6th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). The

party seeking fees bears the burden to “establish[] entitlement to an award and document[] the

appropriate hours expended and hourly rates.” Yellowbook Inc. v. Brandeberry, 708 F.3d 837,

848 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983)). And after

calculating the lodestar, a court may adjust the award based on the Johnson factors.2 Although a

court retains discretion throughout this process, it “must provide a clear and concise explanation

of its reasons for the fee award.” Adcock-Ladd, 227 F.3d at 349 (citation omitted).

Petitioner seeks $12,545.00 in attorneys’ fees. (ECF No. 75.) He offers itemized billing

statements in support, which reflect the work billed by the Rogers & Brackin attorneys and

paralegal. (ECF No. 19-3 at PageID 143–57.) He also offers the supporting affidavit of

Attorney Brackin, his lead attorney in the case. (ECF No. 19-2.) Her affidavit explains that she

has practiced law since 2001 and only practices in domestic relations. (Id. at PageID 141.) But

2 These factors are:

(1) the time and labor required by a given case; (2) the novelty and difficulty of

the questions presented; (3) the skill needed to perform the legal service properly;

(4) the preclusion of employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case;

(5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time

limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved

and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the

attorneys; (10) the ‘undesirability’ of the case; (11) the nature and length of the

professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases.

Adcock-Ladd, 227 F.3d at 349 n.8. That said, the Supreme Court “has limited the application of

the Johnson factors, noting that ‘many of these factors usually are subsumed within the initial

calculation of hours reasonably expended at a reasonable hourly rate.’” Geier, 372 F.3d at 792

(quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434).

nothing in the record explains how long the two other attorneys have practiced law. It is

Attorney Brackin’s professional opinion that Rogers & Brackin’s fees and services were

necessary and reasonable in this case.3 (Id. at PageID 142.)

Turn now to Petitioner’s proposed hourly rates. To arrive at a reasonable hourly rate, a

“district court is permitted to ‘rely on a party's submissions, awards in analogous cases, state bar

association guidelines, and its own knowledge and experience in handling similar fee requests.’”

Waldo v. Consumers Energy Co., 726 F.3d 802, 821–22 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Van Horn v.

Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 436 F. App'x 496, 499 (6th Cir. 2011)). Courts use the

prevailing market rate as a guideline, “defined as the rate that lawyers of comparable skill and

experience can reasonably expect to command within the venue of the court of record.” Geier,

372 F.3d at 791. And courts will compensate parties for work accomplished by paralegals.

Missouri v. Jenkins by Agyei, 491 U.S. 274, 286–89 (1989).

The hourly rates that Petitioner proposes here are:

Attorney Brackin—1 hour at $350.00 and 18.25 hours at $370.00

Attorney Brown—$300.00

Attorney Zant—$250.00

Attorney Rogers—$370.00

Paralegal Bourbonais—$150.00

3 Petitioner did not comply with Local Rule 54.1(b)(2), which requires a local attorney who is

unrelated to the case to verify the reasonableness of the fee request. (See ECF No. 19-2.) In a

recent case in the Court, Attorney Brackin did comply with the Local Rule by filing an affidavit

from Lara Butler, a domestic relations attorney in Memphis, Tennessee. (Pacheco v. Martinez,

Case No. 24-cv-2638 (W.D. Tenn.), ECF No. 76.) Attorney Butler opined that Rogers &

Brackin’s fees and expenses were reasonable. (Id.) For reasons unknown, Attorney Brackin did

not include an affidavit here from a lawyer who is unrelated to the case. And yet, Respondent

did not object to the Motion for Attorneys’ Fees. Based on the affidavit from Lara Butler in July

2025 and based on the lack of an objection here, the Court accepts Attorney Brackin’s affidavit

as sufficient under the Local Rules.

(ECF No. 19 at PageID 133–36.) Attorney Brackin states that these fees were reasonable and

necessary under the factors in Tennessee Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5, which are similar to

the Johnson factors. (ECF No. 19-2 at PageID 142.) The Court finds no reason to disagree.

Next the Court turns to Petitioner’s proposed hours. The party seeking an award must

offer detailed documentation explaining the hours it billed. Inwalle v. Reliance Med. Prods.,

Inc., 515 F.3d 531, 553 (6th Cir. 2008); Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 838 (2011). That said, “[a]

request for attorney’s fees should not result in a second major litigation.” Hensley v. Eckerhart,

461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983). “The essential goal in shifting fees (to either party) is to do rough

justice, not to achieve auditing perfection.” Fox, 563 U.S. at 838.

Petitioner proposes an award here that accounts for 52.3 hours of work. (ECF No. 19.)

Of those hours, Rogers & Brackin charged Petitioner only for 40.75 hours and discounted the bill

by subtracting 11.55 hours they worked free of charge. (Id. at PageID 133–36.) Accounting for

the discount, Petitioner breaks down the remaining charges.

Attorney Brackin—19.25 hours

Attorney Brown—2.75 hours

Attorney Zant—14.75 hours

Attorney Rogers—1.5

Paralegal Bourbonais—2.5 hours

(Id.)

There are some time allotments that the Court finds excessive. For example, on

September 11, 2025, Attorney Zant emailed the State Department Respondent’s “potential

addresses.” (ECF No. 19-3 at PageID 149.) Yet she billed 0.25 hours for that email. (Id.) And

on September 24 and 25, 2025, Attorney Zant billed 0.25 hours each for two more emails. (Id. at

PageID 517.) There, she asked Petitioner for a translation of an email from his attorney, twice.

(Id.) The Court finds that these time allotments are excessive.

But Petitioner’s counsel reduced the number of billable hours worked by 11.55 hours,

worth $3,428.50. (ECF No. 75 at PageID 539.) That decrease is substantial, worth a little over

twenty-one percent of the value of the total hours worked. And the Court finds that the reduction

cures any excessive billing. This is especially true given the Court’s own review of other billing

entries. These entries reflect necessary legal tasks—drafting the Verified Petition, gathering and

organizing exhibits, and communicating with necessary parties. (See ECF No. 19-3.)

With that said, the Court will not grant an award for the time Rogers & Brackin spent

preparing the Motion for Attorneys’ Fees. To be exact, Attorney Zant billed 2.75 hours for

$687.50. (Id.at PageID 158.) Those fees do not relate to the return of Petitioner’s child. See 22

U.S.C. §9007(b)(3). And it would be unreasonable to require Respondent to pay this portion of

the bill. The Court therefore excludes those hours from Petitioner’s attorneys’ fee award.

After excluding those hours, Petitioner’s attorneys’ fees total $11,857.50. And the Court

finds that is reasonable because Rogers & Brackin successfully litigated Petitioner’s case from

the start through the negotiated return of the child to Israel. The record shows that the schedule

was compressed to address the important questions presented and the effort took substantial time

and energy.

After determining the lodestar amount, a court may adjust the fee award while

considering the twelve Johnson factors. The Court keeps in mind, however, that the lodestar

amount likely already accounts for most of these factors. Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559

U.S. 542, 553 (2010) (“[T]he lodestar figure includes most, if not all, of the relevant factors

constituting a ‘reasonable’ attorney's fee.”). But the Court finds that no Johnson factor warrants

an upward or downward adjustment here. With that in mind, courts have awarded similar, and

sometimes higher, fees under ICARA. See Abrego v. Guerra, No. 23-2515, 2024 WL 5454649

(W.D. Tenn. Aug. 2, 2024) (granting $48,187.33 in attorneys’ fees and costs); Schaeffer v.

Jackson-Schaeffer, No. 1:17-cv-00147, 2018 WL 2075335 (E.D. Tenn. Apr. 16, 2018), report

and recommendation adopted, No. 1:17-CV-147, 2018 WL 2074178 (E.D. Tenn. May 3, 2018)

(recommending $73,242.30 in legal fees and litigation expenses); Guevara v. Soto, No. 3:15-cv-

548, 2017 WL 401214 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 30, 2017) (granting $50,312.47 in attorneys’ fees); Olson

v. Olson, No. 13-0138, 2014 WL 1278654, at *1, *3 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 31, 2014) (reducing a

$62,167.50 attorneys’ fee request to $39,673.50); Kufner v. Kufner, No. C.A. 07-46S, 2007 WL

1521248, at *3 (D.R.I. May 23, 2007) (awarding $248,811.00 in attorneys’ fees). The Court thus

awards Petitioner $11,857.50 in attorney fees.

II. Expenses

As mentioned, ICARA entitles Petitioner to the “necessary expenses” that he incurred

during these proceedings. 22 U.S.C. § 9007(b)(3). But the statute does not define “necessary

expenses.” Even so, ICARA says that these expenses include “court costs, legal fees, foster

home or other care during the course of proceedings in the action, and transportation costs

related to the return of the child.” Id. And ICARA’s fee-shifting purpose—which is to “restore

the applicant to the financial position he or she would have been in had there been no removal or

retention, and [] to deter such [conduct]”— provides more guidance. Wan v. Debolt, No. 20-

3233, 2021 WL 3510232, at *12 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 10, 2021) (citing Hulsh v. Hulsh, No. 19 C 7298,

2021 WL 963770, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 15, 2021)).

Petitioner groups his itemized expenses into two categories here—expenses paid through

Rogers & Brackin and expenses that Petitioner paid directly—and seeks $3,613.66 in total.

(ECF No. 19 at PageID 136.) The Court considers each category below.

A. Expenses Paid Through Rogers & Brackin and Private Detective Expenses

Petitioner’s proposed expenses paid through Rogers & Brackin total $1,912.66. (Id.)

This includes the filing fee for the Petition, payments for private detective services, parking at

the airport and courthouse, and payments of the merchant fee for credit card payments to Rogers

& Brackin. (ECF No. 19-1 at PageID 140.) Most of these are the types of “necessary expenses”

that Petitioner is entitled to under ICARA. See 22 U.S.C. § 9007(b)(3). The Court finds, though,

that payments of the merchant fee for credit card payments to Rogers & Brackin are not

“necessary expenses.” Petitioner and his counsel voluntarily incurred those fees when they

chose Petitioner’s payment method. The Court therefore reduces the expenses Petitioner paid

through Rogers & Brackin by $488.10. (See ECF No. 19-1 at PageID 140.) As a result, the

Court awards Petitioner $1,424.56 in expenses paid through Rogers & Brackin.

B. Expenses Paid Directly by Petitioner

Petitioner also seeks to recover expenses that he paid out of pocket. These costs cover

travel and lodging from Petitioner picking up his child in Amman, Jordan, and returning with her

to Israel. (ECF No 19-5 at PageID 160.) They also cover fees paid to a lawyer in Israel for a

consultation on international child abduction and issuing a certified police report. (Id.) The

Court notes that courts across the country have awarded similar travel expenses. See Rishmawy

v. Vergara, No. 4:21-CV-35, 2022 WL 22893118, at *11 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 8, 2022) (awarding

airfare and hotel costs); Neves v. Neves, 637 F. Supp. 2d 322, 344 (W.D.N.C. 2009) (awarding

expenses for airfare, cab fare, and lodging expenses); Kufner v. Kufner, No. C.A. 07-46S, 2007

WL 1521248, at *3 (D.R.I. May 23, 2007) (awarding $12,179.15 in travel and hotel costs);

Antunez–Fernandes v. Connors–Fernandes, 259 F.Supp.2d 800, 816–817 (N.D. Iowa 2003)

(awarding travel and hotel expenses, translation costs, filing fee and service costs). So the Court

finds that these expenses were directly related to “transportation costs related to the return of the

child.” 22 U.S.C. § 9007(b)(3). The fees paid to an Israeli attorney are also “necessary

expenses.” Id. The Court therefore awards Petitioner $1,701 in out-of-pocket expenses.

CONCLUSION

Petitioner is entitled to attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses. Just not in the full amount he

proposed. As a result, the Court GRANTS IN PART Petitioner’s Motion and ORDERS

Respondent to pay Petitioner a total of $14,983.06. This payment includes attorneys’ fees in the

amount of $11,857.50 in attorneys’ fees and $3,125.56 in expenses. Subject to any offset under

the Treasury Offset Program, Respondent shall make this award payable to Petitioner’s counsel

and mail the payment to Petitioner’s counsel.

SO ORDERED, this 1st day of April, 2026.

s/Thomas L. Parker

THOMAS L. PARKER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE