The opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0292-24
DAVID DOMBROWSKI,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
BOARD OF TRUSTEES,
POLICE AND FIREMEN'S
RETIREMENT SYSTEM,
Respondent-Respondent.
Argued January 15, 2026 – Decided April 2, 2026
Before Judges Marczyk and Puglisi.
On appeal from the Board of Trustees of the Police and
Firemen's Retirement System, Department of the
Treasury, PFRS No. xx2442.
Zinovia H. Stone argued the cause for appellant
(Caruso Smith Picini, PC, attorneys; Timothy R. Smith,
of counsel; Zinovia H. Stone, on the briefs).
Thomas R. Hower, Staff Attorney, argued the cause for
respondent (Gregory Petzold, Executive Director of
Legal Affairs, attorney; Thomas R. Hower, on the
brief).
PER CURIAM
Petitioner David Dombrowski appeals from a September 9, 2024 final
administrative decision of the Board of Trustees (Board) of the Police and
Firemen's Retirement System (PFRS), denying his application for accidental
disability retirement benefits (ADRB). We affirm.
I.
Petitioner was a patrol officer for the North Arlington Police Department
(NAPD). He began working for the NAPD in 2014 and enrolled in the PFRS
effective January 1, 2015. In addition to his duties as a patrol officer, petitioner
also served as a Law Enforcement Support Office (LESO)1 officer for
government procurement. As an LESO officer, petitioner routinely transported
government surplus supplies to local law enforcement agencies for their use.
On November 17, 2020, petitioner, accompanied by two other officers,
was unloading government surplus supplies for the NAPD's use. While
removing the boxes from the back of a pickup truck, one of them became stuck.
Petitioner attempted to pull the box loose to lift it out of the truck and, while
doing so, felt a pop in his left shoulder but did not initially feel pain. He
1
LESO is a federal government program used to transfer excess Department of
Defense property to local law enforcement agencies.
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completed his work for the day, went home, and when he woke up the next day,
felt pain in his left shoulder. Petitioner advised his supervisors of what occurred
but declined to have them fill out a report, anticipating he "could tough through"
the pain.
On January 17, 2021, petitioner notified NAPD Lieutenant Gary Edwards
of his injury and lingering pain. Lieutenant Edwards completed a First Report
of Injury (FROI) form on petitioner's behalf. In the FROI, Lieutenant Edwards
stated petitioner's injury occurred from "off[-]loading equipment out of a pick-
up [truck] when an item became stuck requiring extra effort [and] pulling [his]
muscle in the process."
Petitioner filed applications for ADRB on June 9 and September 17, 2021,
indicating he was disabled due to the November 17, 2020 incident and
requesting an effective retirement date of December 1, 2021. His second ADRB
application alleged: "As a result of this injury[,] I have limited range of motion
and cannot lift more than seven pounds in that arm. I cannot perform my duties
as a result of this injury."
The Board considered petitioner's application and denied his claim for
ADRB in an April 12, 2022 written decision. Because the Board found
petitioner was totally and permanently physically disabled, and his injury
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3
occurred during and as a direct result of his regular or assigned duties, it awarded
him ordinary disability retirement benefits (ODRB). However, it denied
petitioner's claim for ADRB, finding the incident was not undesigned and
unexpected.
Petitioner appealed from the denial of ADRB, and the Board transmitted
his case to the Office of Administrative Law for a hearing before an
administrative law judge (ALJ). In addition to recounting the incident,
petitioner testified he did not have any involvement in completing the FROI
form, was not present when Lieutenant Edwards completed it, and was not
shown the report prior to its submission. Petitioner did not instruct Lieutenant
Edwards to indicate he used "extra effort" to remove the box from being stuck,
and he did not recall ever saying that to anyone.
The ALJ's initial decision focused on whether the mechanism that caused
petitioner's injury was the result of an undesigned and unexpected event as
defined in Richardson v. Board of Trustees, Police & Firemen's Retirement
System, 192 N.J. 189, 212 (2007). He concluded appellant's application for
ADRB should be granted because "[t]here [wa]s no evidence in the record to
support any notion that [petitioner] expected or should have expected the box he
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was unloading to become stuck. . . . [I]t was the advent of an unexpected outside
force[] . . . that caused the accident."
The Board rejected the ALJ's conclusion petitioner was entitled to ADRB.
It disagreed with his finding the stuck box qualified as an "unexpected outside
force" under Richardson. The Board reasoned:
[Petitioner], alone, was attempting to lift the box; no
one performed an unusual act forcing the box to become
stuck simultaneous to [petitioner] attempting to lift it.
The action of attempting to loosen the box was not a
traumatic event outside of his control; it was his
decision to continue to attempt to move the box, despite
the fact that he found it was stuck. Although he did not
intend to injure himself, he had the option to
discontinue the attempt to move a box that was initially
immovable. For the foregoing reasons, the Board
rejects the determination that [petitioner] has met his
burden of proof that the incident was undesigned and
unexpected.
Thus, the Board concluded petitioner was not entitled to ADRB. On
appeal, petitioner argues the Board's decision was arbitrary, capricious,
unreasonable, and not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record.
II.
Our role in reviewing the decision of an administrative agency is limited.
Brady v. Bd. of Rev., 152 N.J. 197, 210 (1997). We accord a strong presumption
of reasonableness to an agency's exercise of its statutorily delegated
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responsibility, City of Newark v. Nat. Res. Council in Dep't of Env't Prot., 82
N.J. 530, 539 (1980), and "intervene only in those rare circumstances in which
an agency action is clearly inconsistent with its statutory mission or with other
State policy," Mazza v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 143 N.J. 22,
25 (1995). We will not upset the determination of an administrative agency
absent a "clear showing that it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or that
it lacks fair support in the record." Saccone v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's
Ret. Sys., 219 N.J. 369, 380 (2014) (quoting Russo v. Bd. of Trs., Police &
Firemen's Ret. Sys., 206 N.J. 14, 27 (2011)).
Although we are not bound by an agency's decision on purely legal
questions, we ordinarily give "substantial deference" to an agency's
interpretation of those statutes the agency is responsible for enforcing.
Richardson, 192 N.J. at 196. "This deference comes from the understanding that
a state agency brings experience and specialized knowledge to its task of
administering and regulating a legislative enactment within its field of
expertise." In re Election L. Enf't Comm'n Advisory Op. No. 01-2008, 201 N.J.
254, 262 (2010). Rather, the judicial role in reviewing administrative action is
generally limited to the following inquiries:
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(1) whether the agency's action violates express or
implied legislative policies, that is, did the agency
follow the law;
(2) whether the record contains substantial evidence to
support the findings on which the agency based its
action; and
(3) whether in applying the legislative policies to the
facts, the agency clearly erred in reaching a conclusion
that could not reasonably have been made on a showing
of the relevant factors.
[Allstars Auto Grp., Inc. v. N.J. Motor Vehicle
Comm'n, 234 N.J. 150, 157 (2018) (quoting In re
Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011)).]
To determine whether an agency's decision is supported by substantial
evidence, we may not "engage in an independent assessment of the evidence as
if [we] were the court of first instance." In re Taylor, 158 N.J. 644, 656 (1999)
(quoting State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 471 (1999)). We must consider only
"'whether the findings made could reasonably have been reached on sufficient
credible evidence present in the record,' considering 'the proofs as a whole,' with
due regard to the opportunity of the one who heard the witnesses to judge . . .
their credibility." Mayflower Sec. Co. v. Bureau of Sec., 64 N.J. 85, 92-93
(1973) (quoting Close v. Kordulak Bros., 44 N.J. 589, 599 (1965)). Evidence is
substantial if "a reasonable mind might accept [it] as adequate to support a
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conclusion." In re Application of Hackensack Water Co., 41 N.J. Super. 408,
418 (App. Div. 1956).
The PFRS pension plan grants ADRB if the member is
permanently and totally disabled as a direct result of a
traumatic event occurring during and as a result of the
performance of [the member's] regular or assigned
duties and that such disability was not the result of the
member's willful negligence and that such member is
mentally or physically incapacitated for the
performance of [their] usual duty and of any other
available duty in the department which [their] employer
is willing to assign to [them].
[N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7(a)(1).]
Under Richardson, an individual seeking ADRB under N.J.S.A. 43:16A-
7(a)(1) must prove the following elements:
1) that [the member] is permanently and totally
disabled;
2) as a direct result of a traumatic event that is
a) identifiable as to time and place,
b) undesigned and unexpected, and
c) caused by a circumstance external to the
member (not the result of pre-existing disease
that is aggravated or accelerated by the work);
3) that the traumatic event occurred during and as a
result of the member's regular or assigned duties;
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4) that the disability was not the result of the
member's willful negligence; and
5) that the member is mentally or physically
incapacitated from performing [their] usual or any other
duty.
[192 N.J. at 212-13.]
"The polestar of the inquiry is whether, during the regular performance of
[the] job, an unexpected happening, not the result of pre-existing disease alone
or in combination with the work, has occurred and directly resulted in the
permanent and total disability of the member." Id. at 214. "[A]n accident may
be found either in an unintended external event or in an unanticipated
consequence of an intended external event if that consequence is extraordinary
or unusual in common experience." Russo, 62 N.J. at 154. Injuries resulting
from an unusual situation or combination of circumstances are "undesigned and
unexpected." See Moran v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 438 N.J.
Super. 346, 354 (App. Div. 2014); Brooks v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Emps.' Ret. Sys.,
425 N.J. Super 277, 283-84 (App. Div. 2012).
Here, it is undisputed petitioner is permanently and totally disabled as a
result of the November 17, 2020 incident. It is also undisputed petitioner's
injury occurred during and as a result of the performance of his regular, assigned
duties. The sole issue is whether his disability was the result of a traumatic,
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unintended and undesigned event. Petitioner argues even though lifting the box
of surplus supplies was a part of his regular job tasks, the box getting stuck in
the process of moving it qualifies as an unexpected, external event under
Richardson.
Although a traumatic event can occur during usual work effort,
Richardson makes clear the "work effort itself . . . cannot be the traumatic
event." 192 N.J. at 211. Here, petitioner injured his shoulder while attempting
to lift a box that became stuck in the process of moving it. Nothing in the record
demonstrated the box became stuck from an external, undesigned, and
unexpected event that caused petitioner to suffer an injury while performing a
usual work duty. Rather, petitioner suffered "an unanticipated consequence of
an intended external event." Id. at 201 (quoting Russo, 62 N.J. at 154).
Because the act of moving a box of supplies from a truck was not
undesigned and unexpected, petitioner had to show the unanticipated
consequence of that normal intended work activity was "extraordinary or
unusual in common experience." Ibid. (quoting Russo, 62 N.J. at 154). Because
a shoulder injury from attempting to move a stuck box can hardly be classified
as extraordinary or unusual in our common experience, the Board correctly
found petitioner did not carry his burden.
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Lastly, we note the Board's final administrative determination referenced
Lieutenant Edwards's written statement petitioner used "extra effort" to attempt
to lift the stuck box, which was disputed by petitioner and unsupported by the
record. Nevertheless, excising this erroneous detail from the Board's decision
does not alter the analysis of whether an undesigned, unexpected traumatic event
occurred.
Affirmed.
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