Faith Ranch & Farms Fund, Inc. v. PNC Bank, Natl. Assn.

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as

Faith Ranch & Farms Fund, Inc. v. PNC Bank, Natl. Assn., Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-1145.]

NOTICE

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an

advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to

promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65

South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other

formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before

the opinion is published.

SLIP OPINION NO. 2026-OHIO-1145

FAITH RANCH AND FARMS FUND, INC., APPELLEE, v. PNC BANK, NATIONAL

ASSOCIATION ET AL., APPELLANTS.

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it

may be cited as Faith Ranch & Farms Fund, Inc. v. PNC Bank, Natl. Assn.,

Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-1145.]

Contracts—Mineral rights—Oil and gas—Unambiguous reservation clause, taken

as a whole, makes clear that grantor did not intend reservation to include

oil and gas—Court of appeals’ judgment affirmed.

(No. 2023-1475—Submitted January 7, 2025—Decided April 2, 2026.)

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Harrison County,

Nos. 23 HA 0001 and 23 HA 0002, 2023-Ohio-3608.

__________________

SHANAHAN, J., authored the opinion of the court, which KENNEDY, C.J., and

FISCHER, DEWINE, DETERS, and HAWKINS, JJ., joined. BRUNNER, J., dissented,

with an opinion.

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

SHANAHAN, J.

{¶ 1} In a 1953 deed conveying parcels of land, grantor C.C. Fay reserved

the “right to mine and remove . . . coal or other minerals of any vein.” Appellee,

Faith Ranch and Farms Fund, Inc., the current owner of the parcels, claims that that

reservation does not apply to oil and gas under the parcels and sought to quiet title

to the property. Appellants, the heirs, beneficiaries, successors, and/or assigns of

C.C. Fay and his wife Agnes Fay (“the heirs”), claim that the deed’s reservation

applies to oil and gas under the parcels. The trial court found that the deed’s

language was not broad enough to include oil and gas. The heirs appealed to the

Seventh District Court of Appeals. The court of appeals determined that the deed’s

reservation language was ambiguous and looked to evidence outside of the deed to

determine the parties’ intent. 2023-Ohio-3608, ¶ 18-19 (7th Dist.). It concluded

that the evidence demonstrated that the grantor did not intend to reserve the oil and

gas rights and affirmed the trial court’s judgment on that basis. Id. at ¶ 25.

{¶ 2} We conclude that the Seventh District reached the right result, but we

reach that result for a different reason. Because the deed’s reservation clause is

unambiguous, there is no need to look beyond its four corners. Taken as a whole,

the reservation clause makes it clear that the grantor did not intend for the

reservation to include oil and gas. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Seventh

District.

I. BACKGROUND

{¶ 3} In 1953, C.C. Fay, with Agnes Fay also signing for the purpose of

releasing her dower rights, conveyed parcels of land to Judson Rosebush subject to

the following reservation:

EXCEPTING AND RESERVING to the Grantor from the lands

herein conveyed all the coal below the horizon of the No. 8 coal, if

any under vein exists thereunder, and other minerals, with the right

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to mine and remove such coal or other minerals of any vein, using

any convenient underground mining methods, and to transport coal

and minerals from other premises through and under the surface of

said lands; and particularly reserving the seam of coal, if any, now

being mined at the Nelm’s mine of the Y.&O. Coal Company, near

Unionvale, Ohio, with all mining rights necessary or convenient for

the mining and removal thereof, and the right to transport other coal

of the same vein under said lands.

(Capitalization in original.) In 1973, the parcels were transferred to Faith Ranch

and Farms Fund, Inc. (“Faith Ranch”). C.C. Fay owned the reserved minerals until

his death in 1983. The reservation was then transferred to his heirs.1 In 2021, the

heirs filed an action to reopen C.C. Fay’s estate, claiming that the estate is the owner

of the oil and gas lying under the parcels. Also in 2021, Faith Ranch filed this

action seeking a declaratory judgment that the reservation did not include the oil

and gas and to quiet title to the oil and gas rights in Faith Ranch’s favor.2 The heirs

filed an answer and counterclaim, mirroring Faith Ranch’s requests for declaratory

relief and to quiet title.

{¶ 4} Faith Ranch and the heirs filed competing motions for summary

judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment to Faith Ranch, concluding

that the reservation clearly and unambiguously reserved coal and other minerals

obtained by mining and that there was no language that would broaden the

1. The heirs who are appellants here are Sidney Turner, Michele M. Lazzaro, Esq., trustee of the

Sidney Turner Trust created by the Last Will and Testament of Virginia Fay Mayer, Marilyn Stolz,

individually and as successor trustee of the Virginia Fay Mayer Trust, as modified January 21, 2011,

James M. Roller, and Laurie Edna Evanko, individually and as successor trustee of the Frederick

Roller Revocable Trust dated October 18, 2012.

2. PNC Bank was dismissed from the case on April 25, 2022.

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SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

reservation to include oil and gas. Harrison C.P. No. CVH 2021-0062, 2 (Jan. 9,

2023); see also Harrison C.P. No. CVH 2021-0062 (Sept. 19, 2022).

{¶ 5} The heirs appealed to the Seventh District. Unlike the trial court, the

appellate court determined that the reservation was ambiguous. 2023-Ohio-3608

at ¶ 19 (7th Dist.). The court turned to evidence outside the deed to determine the

parties’ intent when the parcels were conveyed. Id. In particular, the court reviewed

three other deeds executed by C.C. Fay in the ten years before the drafting of the

deed at issue in this case. Id. at ¶ 20-23. The court found that in those deeds, Fay

had specifically used the term “oil and gas” when he wanted to reserve that interest.

Id. at ¶ 24. One 1944 deed that the court examined provides an example. In that

deed, as quoted by the Seventh District, Fay had conveyed a tract of land with the

following reservation: “‘Excepting and reserving coal and mineral rights

underlying said premises, with right to remove same, but not through surface area.

Reserving, also, the oil and gas rights, for drilling and removing.’” (Emphasis in

original.) Id. at ¶ 22.

{¶ 6} In the Seventh District’s view, C.C. Fay’s other deeds demonstrated

that he “possessed the knowledge to decisively include or not include the specific

words ‘oil and gas’ in drafting the reservations in the deeds he conveyed.” Id. at

¶ 24. And the Seventh District concluded that because Fay did not include the

phrase “oil and gas” in the conveyance to Rosebush, he did not intend to reserve

the rights to the oil and gas under the parcels. See id. The court of appeals affirmed

the trial court’s judgment on this basis. Id. at ¶ 26.

{¶ 7} The heirs appealed to this court, and we accepted jurisdiction on the

following proposition of law:

Alexander [v. Buckeye Pipe Line Co., 53 Ohio St.2d 241 (1978),

paragraph two of the syllabus] requires that common words in a

written instrument be given their ordinary meaning unless absurdity

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January Term, 2026

results or some other meaning is clearly evidenced from the overall

contents of the instrument, and “mine,” “mining” and “vein” are

common words whose ordinary meanings encompass oil and gas

exploration.

See 2024-Ohio-335.

{¶ 8} We conclude that the reservation in the deed is unambiguous and that

oil and gas were not reserved to C.C. Fay. The reservation clause, taken as a whole,

demonstrates that Fay did not intend to include oil and gas with the other minerals

reserved in the deed.

II. ANALYSIS

{¶ 9} The parties agree that summary judgment is appropriate in this case.

The question is: Which party is entitled to summary judgment? See Temple v. Wean

United, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327-328 (1977) (summary judgment is properly

rendered to the party who demonstrates that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact, that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and

that reasonable minds can only conclude that judgment must be granted to the

moving party). And the answer to that question hinges on whether the deed’s

reservation of “other minerals” included oil and gas.

{¶ 10} The heirs argue that the reservation of rights as to “other minerals”

includes rights to oil and gas unless other language makes it clear that oil and gas

are excluded. And here, the heirs maintain, the deed did not otherwise indicate that

oil and gas were excluded from the phrase “other minerals.” Faith Ranch, on the

other hand, contends that the reservation did not include oil and gas because the

definition of “minerals” does not include oil and gas. As we will discuss below, we

agree with the heirs that the phrase “other minerals” may include oil and gas, but

we conclude that the context in which the phrase was used in the deed at issue here

makes clear that oil and gas were excluded from this reservation.

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SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

A. The phrase “other minerals” may, but does not necessarily, include oil

and gas

{¶ 11} As early as 1897, this court held that “[p]etroleum oil is a mineral.”

Kelly v. Ohio Oil Co., 57 Ohio St. 317 (1897), paragraph one of the syllabus. But

the next year we qualified that conclusion and explained that the phrase “other

minerals” may, but does not necessarily, include oil and gas. Detlor v. Holland, 57

Ohio St. 492, 504 (1898).

{¶ 12} In Detlor, the question was whether a deed that conveyed “all the

coal of every variety, and all the iron ore, fire clay, and other valuable minerals, in,

on, or under the . . . premises” along with “the right . . . of mining and removing

such coal, ore, or other minerals” conveyed title to the oil under the premises. Id.

at paragraph one of the syllabus. The court explained that “[t]he words ‘other

minerals,’ or ‘other valuable minerals,’ taken in their broadest sense, would include

petroleum oil; but the question [there was], did the parties intend to include such

oil in the mining right?” Id. at 504. The court resolved the question by looking to

the language of the grant. The court reasoned: “The incidents here granted are all

such as are peculiarly applicable to the mining of minerals in place, and not to such

as are in their nature of a migratory character, such as oil or gas. Nothing is said

about derricks, pipe lines, tanks, the use of water for drilling, or the removal of

machinery used in drilling or operating oil or gas wells.” Id. at 503. The court

concluded that the grant did not include the oil below the premises because “apt

words” were not used to express the intention to include the oil and gas. Id. at 504;

see also O’Bradovich v. Hess Ohio Devs., L.L.C., 2021-Ohio-1287, ¶ 31 (7th Dist.)

(“[T]he general phrase [‘other minerals’] may include oil and gas rights so long as

the language can be reasonably seen to include these minerals in some way and

other language in the deed does not exclude these minerals.”).3

3. Seemingly unsatisfied with our conclusion that “other minerals” may include oil and gas when

the context dictates, the dissent points to language in the Ohio Constitution, Article II, Section 36

6

January Term, 2026

{¶ 13} Faith Ranch’s reliance on the meaning of “mineral” is misplaced,

because a review of dictionary definitions of the word demonstrates that its

meaning can vary. For example, it is defined as “a solid homogenous crystalline

chemical element or compound” (which would not include oil or gas). Webster’s

Third New International Dictionary (2002). And it is also defined as “any of

various naturally occurring homogeneous or apparently homogenous and usu. but

not necessarily solid substances (as ore, coal, asbestos, asphalt, borax, clay, . . .

petroleum, water, natural gas, air, and gases extracted from the air)” (which would

include oil and gas). Id.

{¶ 14} But, contrary to the Seventh District’s conclusion, the fact that there

may be different definitions of the word “mineral” does not make the use of the

word ambiguous. The mere fact that there are two different ways to define a term

does not render the term ambiguous. State v. Gwynne, 2023-Ohio-3851, ¶ 20.

Rather, a text is ambiguous when it is susceptible to “two equally persuasive and

competing interpretations.” State ex rel. Ferrara v. Trumbull Cty. Bd. of Elections,

2021-Ohio-3156, ¶ 21. When interpreting a text, a court must consider the language

as a whole, “as informed by the canons of construction and context, and determine

whether one best reading emerges,” Gwynne at ¶ 20. If one best meaning emerges,

the text is not ambiguous. See id.

{¶ 15} To determine whether there is only one best interpretation of the

deed, we do the same as we did in Detlor: we look to the context in which the word

was used. In so doing, here we conclude that the grantor did not intend to include

oil and gas in the deed’s reservation.4

that says “[l]aws may be passed . . . to provide for the regulation of methods of mining, weighing,

measuring and marketing coal, oil, gas and all other minerals.” See dissenting opinion, ¶ 34. While

we disagree with the dissent’s assertion that the Ohio Constitution compels the conclusion that the

phrase “other minerals” in the deed’s reservation includes oil and gas, we acknowledge that as early

as 1913, Ohio recognized that the phrase “other minerals” could include oil and gas.

7

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

B. The reservation’s language establishes an intent to exclude oil and gas

from the reservation

{¶ 16} The heirs argue that nothing in the reservation demonstrates an intent

to exclude oil and gas from the reservation. We disagree. Taken as a whole, the

language of the reservation—including the words mine, mining, and vein—

establishes an intent to exclude oil and gas from the reservation. See O’Bradovich,

2021-Ohio-1287, at ¶ 26 (7th Dist.) (other language in a deed may evidence an

intent to exclude oil and gas from a reservation of other minerals).

{¶ 17} As we explain below, when considered in the context of the entire

reservation, the use of the phrase “other minerals” does not demonstrate an intent

to include oil and gas in the reservation.

1. While “mine” and “mining” could refer to oil and gas, these terms are more

commonly associated with solid mineral extraction

{¶ 18} In looking to dictionary definitions near the time the C.C. Fay

reservation was drafted, we see that The New Century Dictionary of the English

Language (1948) defines “mine” as “[a]n excavation made in the earth for the

purpose of getting out ores, precious stones, coal, etc.” and “[t]o dig in the earth for

the purpose of extracting ores, coal, etc.” Modern sources include similar

definitions. See Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (2002) (defining a

“mine” as “a pit or excavation in the earth from which mineral substances (as ores,

precious stones, or coal) are taken by digging or by some other method of

extraction”).

{¶ 19} Similarly, this court has defined “mine” as “an underground or

surface excavation . . . for the extraction of coal, gypsum, asphalt, rock or other

4. The dissent remarks that we are finding that the phrase “other minerals” does not include oil and

gas, because that interpretation is “more common.” Dissenting opinion at ¶ 31. In fact, we are

finding that the phrase “other minerals” does not include oil and gas because, as directed by Detlor,

we have reviewed the context in which the phrase was used, and that context supports the conclusion

that the grantor did not intend to include oil and gas in the reservation.

8

January Term, 2026

materials (excluding natural gas and petroleum).” Consolidation Coal Co., Hanna

Coal Co. Div. v. Kosydar, 42 Ohio St.2d 189, 191 (1975), quoting Dye Coal Co. v.

Evatt, 144 Ohio St. 233, 235 (1944).

{¶ 20} Both the dictionary definitions of “mine” and this court’s 1944

definition contemplate solid substances. That understanding is also reflected in

caselaw from other courts in Ohio. For example, in 1924, the Fifth District

determined that the following language did not show an intent to transfer the rights

to oil and gas: “All the coal and other minerals under the surface” with a right “to

enter upon said land, make all excavations, drains, entries, and structures of

whatever nature as may be necessary to conveniently take out said minerals . . . .”

Gordon v. Carter Oil Co., 19 Ohio App. 319, 320 (5th Dist. 1924). And more

recently, the Seventh District agreed with the trial court’s finding that the grantor

in an 1848 deed did not reserve oil and gas interests because the use of the term

mineral in the reservation “showed [that] the intent of the parties to the deed was to

reserve coal and other mined minerals, not migratory minerals.” Sheba v. Kautz,

2017-Ohio-7699, ¶ 1, 36 (7th Dist.); see also Muffley v. M.B. Operating Co., Inc.,

1986 Ohio App. LEXIS 8865, *1-2 (5th Dist. Oct. 27, 1986) (concluding that the

following 1960 reservation did not include oil and gas: “all minerals, clay, and coal

underlying the soil, subject only to the condition that the removal of said minerals,

clay, and coal shall be without damage to the surface of said land except to provide

air shafts and escape for mine water”).

{¶ 21} In contrast to the use of words that are commonly associated with

solid mineral extraction, the reservation clause does not use words that are

commonly associated with extracting oil and gas—words and phrases such as

“derricks,” “pipe lines,” “tanks,” “the use of water for drilling,” and “machinery

used in drilling or operating oil or gas wells,” Detlor, 57 Ohio St. at 503. The

absence of words commonly associated with extracting oil and gas indicates that

oil and gas were not included in the reservation.

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SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

2. The use of the word “vein” supports a finding that the reservation does not

include oil and gas

{¶ 22} The use of the word “vein” provides further context for

understanding the intended meaning of the phrase “other minerals” as used in the

reservation clause. “Vein” was commonly understood to refer to “a vein of coal.”

(Emphasis in original.) Webster’s New International Dictionary, Second Edition

(1942). The New Century Dictionary of the English Language (1948) defines

“vein” as “a body or mass of igneous rock, deposited mineral, or the like, occupying

a crevice or fissure in rock.” It has also been defined as “any body or stratum of

ore, coal, etc.” The American Everyday Dictionary (1955). These references are

to solids—“ore” and “coal.” Oil and gas are not solids.

{¶ 23} The dissent calls our attention to four cases from other states that

refer to “veins of oil.” See dissenting opinion, ¶ 41. But rather than undermining

our conclusion, those cases reinforce the importance of context. For example, in

Bay v. Oklahoma S. Gas, Oil & Mining Co., 73 P. 936, 937, 940 (Okla. 1903), the

court discussed drilling for oil, gas, and other minerals and described how certain

claims could not be made “until some body or vein ha[d] been discovered from

which the oil c[ould] be brought to the surface.” In that context, “vein” undeniably

referred to oil. Likewise, in R.L. Cox & Co. v. J. H. Markham, Jr., & Co., 87 S.W.

1163, 1164 (Tex.Civ.App. 1905), the parties contracted for the drilling of a flow of

oil and found a “vein” of oil. The agreement in R.L. Cox was about oil. Reference

to a vein of oil makes sense in that context. Similarly, a witness testified in S.

Pacific Co. v. United States, 249 F. 785, 795 (9th Cir. 1918), rev’d on other grounds

by United States v. Southern Pacific Co., 251 U.S. 1 (1919), that “there [was] a

direction to that oil vein.” Again, the context there was oil. And finally, in Allen

v. Derby Oil Co., 276 P. 53, 53 (Kan. 1929), the court referred to a “vein of oil.”

And the parties were talking about oil—apt words were used in the contract at issue

there: “derrick, additional casing, tanks, engine, tubing and pump and all other

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January Term, 2026

equipment, material and supplies necessary for producing and saving the oil and

gas from said well . . . .” Id. at 80.

{¶ 24} In contrast to those cases cited by the dissent, the reservation here

does not mention oil. Instead, it refers to “all the coal below the horizon of the No.

8 coal, if any under vein exists thereunder.” (Emphasis added.) And the deed

reserves to C.C. Fay “the right to transport other coal of the same vein.” (Emphasis

added).

{¶ 25} The canon of ejusdem generis is also instructive. This canon

provides that when a statute lists specific items followed by a general term, the

general term should be interpreted to include only items of the same nature as those

specifically listed. Gabbard v. Madison Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 2021-Ohio-

2067, ¶ 26, 28; see also Nielson v. Shinseki, 607 F.3d 802, 807 (Fed.Cir. 2010),

quoting Airflow Technology, Inc. v. United States, 524 F.3d 1287, 1292 (Fed.Cir.

2008) (“Even ‘where a general term follows one expressly set forth specific term,’

. . . application of the rule is appropriate.”).

{¶ 26} In this case, in the phrase “coal or other minerals of any vein,” “coal”

is the specific item, and it is followed by the general term “other minerals of any

vein.” Applying the canon of ejusdem generis to this phrase, we conclude that

“other minerals of any vein” is intended to include items of the same nature as

“coal”—that is, a solid rock found in veins, rather than a liquid or gas extracted

from a pool or reservoir.

{¶ 27} In short, in the context of the reservation clause at issue here, the use

of the word “vein” indicates that the meaning of “other minerals” was limited to

solids like coal. Thus, we conclude that in the reservation clause in this case, oil

and gas were not included in the reservation.

III. CONCLUSION

{¶ 28} Consistent with our precedent, the phrase “other minerals” may, but

does not necessarily, include oil and gas. We look to the context in which the phrase

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is used to determine what the parties intended. And here, the context leads us to

conclude that the parties did not intend to include oil and gas in the reservation. We

therefore affirm the judgment of the Seventh District Court of Appeals.

Judgment affirmed.

__________________

BRUNNER, J., dissenting.

{¶ 29} I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. This appeal

requires us to interpret a reservation clause concerning subterranean mineral rights

in a 1953 deed. In relevant part, the clause reserves to the grantor

all the coal below the horizon of the No. 8 coal, if any under vein

exists thereunder, and other minerals, with the right to mine and

remove such coal or other minerals of any vein, using any

convenient underground mining methods, and to transport coal and

minerals from other premises through and under the surface of said

lands . . . .

(Emphasis added.) This court’s task is to decide whether this clause reserved the

rights to oil and gas under the property by using the words “coal or other minerals

of any vein” to describe the mineral rights granted by the deed. The majority

opinion interprets the reservation clause as using language that is associated with

the extraction of only solid minerals and thus concludes that oil and gas rights are

not included in the reservation language. Majority opinion, ¶ 18-21. The majority

opinion holds that the reservation clause at issue unambiguously excludes oil and

gas from the phrase, “other minerals of any vein.” Id. at ¶ 2, 8. I respectfully

disagree. I view the reservation clause as being unambiguously inclusive of oil and

gas because of language appearing in Article II, Section 36 of the Ohio Constitution.

{¶ 30} We have held that “a contract is unambiguous if it can be given a

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January Term, 2026

definite legal meaning.” Westfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis, 2003-Ohio-5849, ¶ 11. By

contrast, “terms in a contract are ambiguous when they are susceptible to more than

one reasonable interpretation.” Tera, L.L.C. v. Rice Drilling D, L.L.C., 2024-Ohio-

1945, ¶ 12. That said, “[t]he mere fact that a contract’s text might be subject to

competing interpretations does not mean that the text is ambiguous.” Corder v.

Ohio Edison Co., 2024-Ohio-5432, ¶ 14. A possible alternative interpretation that

“‘strain[s] ordinary usage or conflict[s] with the structure or purpose of the text as

a whole,’ . . . is not reasonable and does not make the contractual text ambiguous.”

(Bracketed text in original.) Id., quoting Corder v. Ohio Edison Co., 2020-Ohio-

5220, ¶ 38 (DeWine, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

{¶ 31} The majority opinion concludes—with a scant discussion of legal

principles relating to ambiguity—that the deed’s reservation clause is

unambiguous. In reaching its conclusion, the majority opinion utilizes an approach

that is wholly inconsistent with the legal principles that relate to ambiguity. The

majority opinion recognizes that two reasonable interpretations of the reservation

clause exist—one that interprets “other minerals” to include oil and gas and one

that does not—and then rests its finding that the clause is unambiguous on the

conclusion that the latter interpretation is more common.

{¶ 32} The majority opinion expressly recognizes that the terms “‘mine’

and ‘mining’ could refer to oil and gas.” (Emphasis added.) Majority opinion at

¶ 18 (subheading above paragraph). But, unconstrained by the law, the majority

opinion leaps to the conclusion that those terms would include oil and gas only if

additional language specific to oil and gas was used elsewhere in the reservation

clause. Without such additional language, it reasons that the terms “mine” and

“mining” refer only to solid substances.

{¶ 33} A number of court decisions from the first half of the twentieth

century recognize the common-sense differences between the surface estate and

surface rights. See Jividen v. New Pittsburg Coal Co., 45 Ohio App. 294, 295-296

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(4th Dist. 1933); Chartiers Oil Co. v. Curtiss, 24 Ohio C.D. 106, 107-112 (Cir.Ct.

1911). Those decisions also recognize a right separate from surface rights—the

right to drill for minerals underlying the surface property. Surface and mineral

rights need not belong to the same owner. Chartiers Oil Co. at 108 (“It is the settled

law of Ohio that different estates may exist in the same real estate. The surface

may belong to one owner, and the minerals underlying it may belong to other and

different owners.”).

{¶ 34} The Ohio Constitution itself also uses the term “mining” in a way

that explicitly includes oil and gas. It explicitly refers to both oil and gas alongside

the phrase “other minerals” in the context of mining, stating: “Laws may be passed

. . . to provide for the regulation of methods of mining, weighing, measuring and

marketing coal, oil, gas and all other minerals” (emphasis added), Ohio Const., art.

II, § 36 (effective January 1, 1974). This foundational source of Ohio law describes

oil and gas as “other minerals” and notably does so within the context of “mining.”

No additional words commonly associated with the extraction of oil and gas are

used or needed to understand the meaning. Given that, I can reach no other

conclusion: This court, having the final responsibility to determine what the Ohio

Constitution says and how it should be applied, Ohio Const. art. IV, § 1, should read

the phrase “other minerals” in the deed’s reservation clause as including oil and

gas.

{¶ 35} Even though the deed’s reservation clause includes the additional

phrase “of any vein” when referring to “other minerals,” that additional phrase does

not change the meaning of “other minerals” when viewed in light of how that same

language is used in the Ohio Constitution. The language of Article II, Section 36

leaves nothing to interpret—the provision plainly uses the words “coal, oil, gas and

all other minerals” in the context of “methods of mining.” The majority opinion

has caused this court to overstep its bounds. There is no need to interpret when one

can simply read the language and apply it. See Krewina v. United Specialty Ins.

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January Term, 2026

Co., 2023-Ohio-2343, ¶ 23.

{¶ 36} An examination of how the majority opinion reaches its conclusion

is in order so future decisions do not repeat this flawed process. The majority

opinion cites a dictionary definition from 1948 and a decision this court issued in

1944, both published near the time the deed was executed in 1953. In each instance,

the terms “mine” and “mining” were used in a way that refers only to solid minerals.

Majority opinion at ¶ 18-19. However, in this instance, the Ohio Constitution

provides us all the guidance we need to fairly decide the case, and so there is no

need for the majority opinion to create its own definition of “other minerals” by

essentially cherry-picking historical definitions that support its conclusion and then

using its own definition to determine what the reservation clause means.

{¶ 37} Further, there is no analysis in the majority opinion that even

purports to include a comprehensive review of all sources published near the time

the deed was executed. And even more troubling, there is little to no analysis of

how and why these sources were selected to divine the legal meaning of the words

in the deed. The dearth of analysis in interpreting this deed shakes public

confidence in the integrity and reliability of our jurisprudence.

{¶ 38} The Ohio Constitution’s definition of oil and gas as a mineral is the

stated will of the people of the State of Ohio as of 1974, when Article II, Section

36 became effective. See Ohio Const., art. II, § 36 (referring to “coal, oil, gas and

all other minerals”); see also Ohio Const., art. I, § 2 (“All political power is inherent

in the people.”); Ohio Const., art. IV, § 2 (setting out the organization and

jurisdiction of this court). An analysis that finds the reservation clause

unambiguous simply because one meaning of a word or phrase was more common

than another at the time of the reservation is not even an originalism analysis in the

classic constitutional context as described in of the writings of former United States

Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, especially when that analysis is so

incomplete.

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{¶ 39} This ill-advised use of not carefully considered or imprecise

historical sources to interpret contracts, especially contracts involving real estate

and mineral rights, neither of which is renewable or regenerative, illustrates the

danger of using originalism to select a meaning. It is unclear whether the majority

opinion is engaging in original-intent originalism, focusing on the intentions of the

drafter, or original-public-meaning originalism, focusing on how the text would

have been understood by an ordinary person at the time the language became law.

Regardless, the majority opinion has abused its judicial discretion by needlessly

constraining it and anchoring its interpretation in historical facts about meaning and

then declaring the meaning unambiguous with an originalist approach. And all of

this has occurred without reference to caselaw about contract-language ambiguity

and in disregard of language in the state Constitution defining the terms in question.

{¶ 40} As a bootstrap, the majority opinion points to the clause’s reservation

of the right to remove minerals “of any vein” as support for its conclusion that the

clause does not include oil and gas. At first glance, this appears to be a fair issue

to consider. However, the key language in the Ohio Constitution cannot and should

not be parsed when the only language modifying it is descriptive and not

substantive. The majority opinion states that, at the time of the reservation at issue

here, “‘[v]ein’ was commonly understood to refer to ‘a vein of coal.’” (Emphasis

in Webster’s.) Majority opinion at ¶ 22, quoting Webster’s New International

Dictionary, Second Edition (1942). Again, cherry-picking historical sources, the

majority opinion points to three dictionaries from the middle of the twentieth

century, all of which defined “vein” by referring to solid substances. Id. Based on

those definitions, it suggests that because “[o]il and gas are not solids,” they are not

found in veins. Id.

{¶ 41} I have no reason to disagree with the suggestion that the term “vein”

was sometimes or perhaps “commonly” used to refer to solid substances. But I

depart from the majority opinion because there are a substantial number of sources

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from around the time the deed was executed indicating that “vein” was also

understood to have a meaning that did refer to oil and gas. For example, numerous

cases from the early twentieth century refer to “vein[s] of oil.” See, e.g., Bay v.

Oklahoma S. Gas, Oil & Mining Co., 13 Okla. 425, 429 (1903) (“he moved his drill

onto said land, and drilled a well 43 feet deep, when he struck a vein of oil”); R.L.

Cox & Co. v. J. H. Markham, Jr., & Co., 87 S.W. 1163, 1164 (Tex.Civ.App. 1905)

(“a flow or vein of oil was found in the well”); S. Pacific Co. v. United States, 249

F. 785, 795 (9th Cir. 1918) (quoting a government witness who had stated, “‘You

find that among oil men because experience has taught that there is a direction to

that oil vein.’”), reversed on other grounds by United States v. S. Pacific Co., 251

U.S. 1 (1919); Allen v. Derby Oil Co., 276 P. 53, 53 (Kan. 1929) (“in a few weeks

[the driller] had drilled the prospect hole down to 3,187 feet, at which level a vein

of oil was struck”).

{¶ 42} The appellants have also pointed to a plethora of other sources

spanning the mid-1800s to the present day that similarly used the term “vein” to

refer to oil and gas. See, e.g., Byron D. Magbee and Robert L. Alkire, Oil and Gas

in Morgan County, State of Ohio Department of Natural Resources, Natural

Resources Commission, Division of Geological Survey, Report of Investigations

No. 22, Petroleum and Natural Gas Series No. 6, 30 (1954), available at

https://dam.assets.ohio.gov/image/upload/ohiodnr.gov/documents/geology/RI22_

Magbee_1954.pdf (accessed July 16, 2025) [https://perma.cc/V3NQ-RHTG]

(“after drilling to a depth of 71 feet struck a vein of oil”); Twenty-Five Years Ago;

Anniversary of Col. Drake’s Discovery of Petroleum. The First Vein of Oil Struck

at Titusville Aug. 28, 1859, and More Than $400,000,000 Invested Since, New York

Times 5 (Aug. 28, 1884); Striking a Vein of Gas, New York Times 3 (March 4,

1880) (“Freeberg & Workum, in drilling for water at their distillery yesterday, at a

depth of 274 feet, struck a strong vein of sulphureted hydrogen gas.”); Ken

Silverstein, Some Oil And Gas Companies May Want The Rights To Drill In The

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SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

Arctic Refuge While Trump ls In Office, Forbes (Sept. 4, 2019), available at

https://www.forbes.com/sites/kensilverstein/2019/09/04/leasing-the-arctic-refuge-

to-oil-and-gas-drillers-while-the-political-climate-is-hot-is-galvanizing-the-

troops/ (accessed July 16, 2025) [https://perma.cc/YH5R-H4CK] (“if the region is

a rich vein of oil and gas, it could—one day—be worth billions”).

{¶ 43} These sources are relevant because they demonstrate that

interpreting “vein” to refer to oil and gas is reasonable, does not strain ordinary

usage, and is consistent with the text in the state Constitution. That in turn means

that the deed’s reservation clause is subject to a reasonable and unambiguous

interpretation that oil and gas are included as “other minerals” distinct from coal.

{¶ 44} It is unacceptable and unforgivable that the majority opinion has

diverted its analysis from the source of this court’s power, the Ohio Constitution,

and succumbed to the temptation to follow the United States Supreme Court down

a path that has undermined public confidence in the courts—making up methods of

analysis that satisfy political thirsts for power in the name of the rule of law. Under

the rule of law, no interpretive mechanism such as originalism should be applied by

a court to supply an advantage to one side or person. The rule of law exists to

render fairness in human endeavors and to allow individuals to live peaceably

among one another with predictability and safety; when carefully tended, it can be

a springboard for their individual pursuits of happiness. In a democracy governed

by the rule of law, members of that society inherently recognize that there is

something greater than themselves in the law. When the keepers of the rule of law

remember that they work in service to the people, the law works without favor to

either liberal or conservative views, for the good of all people. It should be this

court’s aim in exercising its power to follow the will of the people expressed in this

State’s founding document. Sadly, today’s decision fails the people, abuses the

court’s power, and in doing so, erodes freedom.

{¶ 45} For the reasons I have stated in this separate opinion, I respectfully

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January Term, 2026

dissent from the majority opinion and would hold that the 1953 deed that includes

the language “coal or other minerals of any vein” includes the reservation of oil and

gas.

__________________

Kidder Law Firm, L.L.C., Charles L. Kidder, Steven R.R. Anderson, and

Madison J. Gregory, for appellants Sidney Turner, Michele M. Lazzaro, Esq.,

Trustee, and Marilyn Stolz.

Edward M. Janis Co., L.P.A., and Edward M. Janis, for appellants James M.

Roller and Laurie Edna Evanko.

Frankovitch, Anetakis, Simon, Decapio & Pearl, L.L.P., Michael G. Simon,

and Carl A. Frankovitch; and Robinson Law Firm L.L.C., and Emmett E. Robinson,

for appellee, Faith Ranch and Farms Fund, Inc.

__________________

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