Ofer

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 25-22154-CV-WILLIAMS

RAZIEL OFER,

Plaintiff,

v.

ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant.

_______________________________/

ORDER

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Magistrate Judge Ellen F. D’Angelo’s

Report and Recommendations (DE 44) (“Report”) on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff’s Initial Complaint (DE 20) (“Motion”). In the Report, Judge D’Angelo

recommends granting the Motion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (DE 44 at 12,

19). Plaintiff filed objections to the report (DE 47) (“Objections”)1 to which Defendant

responded (DE 53), and Plaintiff replied (DE 55). For the reasons set forth below, Judge

D’Angelo’s Report is AFFIRMED IN PART.

I. BACKGROUND

This lawsuit is one of several matters instituted by Plaintiff in this Court.2 (DE 44

1 The Court notes that Plaintiff’s 68-page objection to the Report violates S.D. Fla. Mag.

J. R. 4, which states, “no party shall file any objections or responses to another party’s

objections exceeding twenty pages in length.” S.D. Fla. Mag. J. R. 4(a)(1).

2 Plaintiff presently has six pending cases in this district. See Ofer v. 1434 Collins, LLC et

al., No. 26-CV-20561 (S.D. Fla. Jan 27, 2026); Ofer v. Miami Dade Property Appraiser’s

Off. et al., No. 26-CV-20292 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 15, 2026); Ofer v. Scales, III et al., No. 25-

CV-26133, (S.D. Fla. Dec. 29, 2025); Ofer v. Ruiz, No. 25-CV-26134 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 29,

2025); Ofer v. Attorney Gen. for the United States of America, No. 25-CV-22154 (S.D.

at n.7) (noting Plaintiff’s open cases in this district and the contents of a show cause

order issued by the Florida Third District Court of Appeal which resulted in Plaintiff being

barred from filing in the Third DCA absent review and signature of a member in good

standing of the Florida bar). In this suit, Plaintiff names United States Bankruptcy Judge

Laurel Isicoff (“Bankruptcy Judge”) and sues the United States as her employer. (DE

1 “Complaint”). Plaintiff asserts three causes of action: Negligence (Count I), Civil

Rights Violations of Title VI (Count II), and Negligent Retention (Count III).

The Complaint alleges that Plaintiff is the subject of litigation in Florida due to his

real estate business and several third parties moving to enforce alleged liens and

encumbrances against his properties. (Id. at ¶ 3). As a result of the mounting suits,

Plaintiff filed petitions for reorganization of two entities in the United States Bankruptcy

Court for the Southern District of Florida. (Id. at 4–6). Plaintiff alleges that “several private

actors . . . conspired to cause the appointment of a very specific judge to become

appointed to preside over the matters in the bankruptcy court prior to the petitions being

filed.” (Id. at 7). Plaintiff further alleges that the Bankruptcy Judge conspired with Barry

S. Mukamal “to cause the loss of property through conduct which was based upon the

race, ethnicity and religion of the Plaintiff as he is Jewish.” (Id. at 9–10). The Complaint

states that the Bankruptcy Judge was presented with antisemitic affidavits and a voice

recording discussing the Bankruptcy Judge’s appointment over the bankruptcy matters,

which were allegedly ignored by the Bankruptcy Judge. (Id. ¶¶ 12–15). Moreover, as

part of the alleged conspiracy, Plaintiff accuses the Bankruptcy Judge of receiving a

“$2M bribe for her role in this criminal conspiracy.” (Id. ¶ 20).

Fla. May 8, 2025); Ofer v. Isicoff, No. 23-CV-24738 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 13, 2023).

Defendant moved to dismiss the Complaint, arguing that the Court lacks subject

matter jurisdiction and Plaintiff failed to state a claim. (DE 20). Upon careful review of

the Report, the Objections, the record, and applicable law, the Motion is now ripe for

resolution.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

“In order to challenge the findings and recommendations of the magistrate judge,

a party must file written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the

proposed findings and recommendation to which objection is made and the specific

basis for objection.” Macort v. Prem, Inc., 208 F. App’x 781, 783 (11th Cir. 2006)

(cleaned up). Under the Southern District of Florida Local Rules, objections must also

cite to the relevant supporting legal authority. S.D. Fla. Mag. J. R. 4(a). When a party

timely objects to a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, the district judge

“shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed

findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

“Attacks on subject matter jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) comes in two

forms.” Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1528-29 (11th Cir. 1990). Facial attacks

require the court to consider whether the plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a basis of

subject matter jurisdiction, “and the allegations in his complaint are taken as true for the

purposes of the motion.” Id. at 1529. Conversely, “factual attacks” challenge “the

existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact, irrespective of the pleadings, and matters

outside the pleadings, such as testimony and affidavits, are considered.” Id. (quotations

omitted).

“To survive a motion to dismiss [under Rule 12(b)(6)], a complaint must contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Pleadings must contain “more than labels and conclusions,

and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550

U.S. at 555 (citation omitted). Indeed, “only a complaint that states a plausible claim for

relief survives a motion to dismiss.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at

556).

III. DISCUSSION

Although Plaintiff timely filed objections to the Report3, they do not set forth specific

matters in dispute and are not supported by “statutory, rule, or case authority” as

required by the Southern District of Florida Magistrate Judge Rules. S.D. Fla. Mag. J. R.

4(a). The Objections merely rehash the allegations of the Complaint, arguing that “[t]he

Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate [Judge] should be denied” on two

grounds: (1) “the recording of the conversation between ROIV4 and Kalb is a genuine

recording, and Plaintiff has submitted a copy of the recording with the Clerk of the Court,

to be filed;” and (2) “Plaintiff has moved for leave to amend the complaint to further clarify

the positions that he raises.” (DE 47 at 3).

The Court is required to “make a de novo determination of those portions of the

report . . . or recommendations to which objection is made;” however, Plaintiff’s

3 Plaintiff did not seek leave of Court to file his 68-page Objections in violation of the

Southern District of Florida Magistrate Rules, which limits a party’s objections and

responses to twenty pages. See S.D. Fla. Mag. J. R. 4(a)(1).

4 Throughout the Objections, Plaintiff identifies Mr. Roniel Rodriguez IV as “ROIV.” (DE

47 at 2). ROIV is the Bankruptcy Judge’s alleged partner in the “hate crime” against

Plaintiff. (Id.)

objections do not specifically address the deficiencies identified in the Report. 28 U.S.C.

¶ 636 (emphasis added); see also Taylor v. Acting Comm’r, 761 Fed. App’x. 966, 969 n.

1 (11th Cir. 2019) (noting that “failure to object to the magistrate’s factual findings after

notice precludes a later attack on these findings”) (citing Lewis v. Smith, 855 F.2d 736,

738 (11th Cir. 1988)) (quotations omitted). “District Courts in the Eleventh Circuit have

reviewed those portions of a magistrate’s report and recommendation to which no

objection has been made for clear error.” Lombardo v. U.S., 222 F. Dupp. 2d 1367, 1369

(S.D. Fla. 2002) (emphasis added).

The Report analyzed four arguments advanced by Defendant. (DE 20; DE 44).

First, Defendant argued that the Complaint is “frivolous and fantastical.” (DE 20 at 2–4).

Second, Defendant maintained that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over

Plaintiff’s Title VI claim, or in the alternative, Plaintiff failed to state a violation of Title VI.

(Id. at 4–6). Third, Defendant argued that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over

Plaintiff’s tort claims (Count I and III). (Id. at 6–8). And fourth, Defendant urged the Court

to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim for negligence (Count I) and negligent

retention (Count III). (Id. at 8–10). Based on these assertions, Judge D’Angelo

recommended (1) “that Count two be DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1);” and (2) “that Counts One and Three be

DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(1).” (DE 44 at 12, 19) (emphasis in original). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)

and S.D. Fla. Mag. J. R. 4(a), the Court reviews each recommendation below and “shall

set aside any portion of the Magistrate Judge’s order found to be clearly erroneous or

contrary to law.” S.D. Fla. Mag. J. R. 4(a).

A. The Report recommends dismissal of Count II.

The Report recommends dismissal of Count II because the Court lacks subject

matter jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s claim under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000d et seq.. (DE 44 at 11–12). The Court finds Magistrate Judge D’Angelo’s

recommendation to dismiss Count II sound and consistent with the law. The Report

correctly noted that “[s]overeign immunity is jurisdictional in nature” because, without an

explicit waiver, the Federal Government and its agencies are immune from suit. F.D.I.C.

v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994).

Title VI does not contain an explicit waiver of the federal government’s sovereign

immunity, and Plaintiff does not allege facts to the contrary. See Dorsey v. U.S. Dept. of

Labor, 41 F.3d 1551, 1554–55 (“Even if there is an implied right of action for damages

under Title VI, . . . it cannot exist as against the federal government. The federal

government’s waiver of sovereign immunity must be “unequivocally expressed” and the

statutory provision containing the expression must ‘establish unambiguously that the

waiver extends to monetary claims.’”) (citing United States v. Nodic Village, Inc. 503 U.S.

30, 33 (1992)); see, e.g., 43 U.S.C. § 390uu (expressly waiving sovereign immunity and

noting, “[t]he United States, when a party to any suit, shall be deemed to have waived

any right to plead that it is not amenable thereto by reason of its sovereignty, and shall

be subject to judgments, orders, and decrees of the court having jurisdiction . . . in the

same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances”);

see also 28 U.S.C. § 2409a (“The United States may be named as a party defendant in

a civil action under this section to adjudicate a disputed title to real property in which the

United States claims an interest, other than a security interest or water rights.”).

Therefore, where Defendant has not expressly waived sovereign immunity, the Court

lacks jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s Title VI claim. Accordingly, the Court adopts

Magistrate Judge D’Angelo’s recommendation and dismisses Count II of the Complaint

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

B. The Report recommends dismissal of Counts I and III.

Next, the Report recommends dismissing Counts I and III for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction because the Complaint does not establish negligence or negligent

retention under Florida law. The Report relies on the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”)

and concludes that “where no cognizable state law tort claim could be sustained against

a private individual in like circumstances, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over

Plaintiff’s claim under the FTCA.” (DE 44 at 16).

As noted by the Report, Plaintiff’s response to the motion to dismiss argued that

jurisdiction is proper before this Court because Defendant purportedly “waived its

sovereign immunity under two related sections of the FTCA:” Sections 1346(b) and

2674. (DE 20 at 10). However, Sections 1346(b) and 2674 similarly explain that the

United States may only be liable for a tort if a private person would similarly be liable

under applicable state law. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(1), 2674. Specifically, Section

1346(b)(1) states:

Subject to the provisions of chapter 171 of this title, the district courts,

together with the United States District Court for the District of the Canal

Zone and the District Court of the Virgin Islands, shall have exclusive

jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States, for money

damages, accruing on and after January 1, 1945, for injury or loss of

property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act

or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the

scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the

United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in

accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission

occurred.

28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (emphasis added). Likewise, Section 2674 provides, in relevant

part:

The United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this title

relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a

private individual under like circumstances, but shall not be liable for

interest prior to judgment or for punitive damages.

28 U.S.C. § 2674 (emphasis added).

Therefore, the Court only has jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s claims if an analogous

cause of action under Florida law exists. See Zelaya v. U.S., 781 F.3d 1315, 1323 (11th

Cir. 2015) (“[B]oth §§ 1346(b)(1) and 2674 preclude liability of the federal government

absent a showing by the plaintiff that a private individual who had acted as did the federal

employee, in like circumstances, would be liable for the particular tort under governing

state law where the tort occurred.”). To be sure, “the question is not whether plaintiff

sufficiently alleges all elements of the underlying cause of action, but whether state tort

law imposes an analogous duty on private individuals in similar circumstances.” Guillermo

Antonio De Leon Serrabi v. U.S.A., et al., No. 3:24-cv-1212-JEP-LLL, 2026 WL 642365,

at *7 (M.D. Fla. Jan 8, 2026).

As it relates to Count 1 (Negligence), Plaintiff asserts that the United States “owed

a duty of care to Plaintiff for its employee and agent not to take actions which violate his

civil rights and engage in conduct which is based upon his race, ethnicity or religion as a

person of Jewish origin.” (DE 1 ¶ 26). The correct inquiry here is “whether [Florida] tort

law imposes an analogous duty on private individuals in similar circumstances.” Serrabi,

2026 WL 642365, at *7. Plaintiff fails to identify a single Florida analogous cause of action

where a third party must come to the aid of another to prevent a civil rights violation.

Indeed, the two Florida statutes identified by Plaintiff do not suffice as analogous state

claims to create tort liability under the FTCA. (Id. at 16–17) (explaining that Florida Statute

Sections 768.28 and 760.01 are the Florida equivalent of FTCA and Title VI, respectively,

and do not create tort liability). Moreover, Under Florida law, “[n]o common law duty

exists, absent special relationship, for one person to come to the aid of another or to

intervene in the misconduct of a third person to prevent the possibility of harm to another.”

Laskey v. Martin Co. Sheriff’s Dept., 708 So. 2d 1013, 1014 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998). As

noted in the Report, Magistrate Judge D’Angelo concluded, “[p]laintiff does not allege the

existence of any special relationship that would give rise to a legal duty establishing tort

liability.” Accordingly, the Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear Count I

and adopts the Report’s recommendation of dismissal.5

As to Count III (Negligent Retention), Florida recognizes a cause of action for

negligent hiring, training, retention, supervision, or entrustment. See Jones v. Vasilias,

359 So. 3d 10, 14 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2023) (recognizing that a claim for negligent training,

retention, supervision, or entrustment can be asserted against a supervisor individually

or a corporate employer). Therefore, a private person could be subjected to liability for

common law negligent retention of an employee. However, the Court construes

Defendant’s arguments and the Report’s analysis as being focused on Plaintiff’s failure

to state a claim. Compare (DE 20 at 9) (“Plaintiff fails to allege facts sufficient to maintain

5 Plaintiff’s failure to plead an analogous cause of action under Florida law is also a basis

for dismissal under Federal Rule of Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted. See Zelaya v. U. S., 781 F.3d 1315, 1325 (11th Cir. 2015)

(“Unless Plaintiffs can identify corresponding state law duties, they have, at the least,

failed to state a claim, and arguably their lapse deprives the court of even subject matter

jurisdiction over the action.”). However, “[w]here dismissal can be based on lack of subject

matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, the court should dismiss on only the

jurisdictional grounds.” Boda v. U.S., 698 F.2d 1174, 1177 n. 4 (11th Cir. 1983).

a negligent retention Claim.”), with (DE 44 at 19 n. 10) (“To the extent the deficiencies

identified herein do not implicate the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction, it is respectfully

recommended that those deficiencies warrant dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).”); see also

Serrabi, et al., 2026 WL 642365, at *8 (recognizing that Florida has a false imprisonment

cause of action and that “[t]he United States’ arguments concerning false imprisonment

[were] more aptly characterized as failure to state a claim under Fed. R. 12(b)(6)” where

the plaintiff asserted false imprisonment under the FTCA).

To state a claim for negligent retention, a plaintiff must plead facts to establish that

the employer should have “foreseen, based on its employees’ work history, that they

would commit the current tort.” Bello v. Johnson, 442 F. App’x 477, 480 (11th Cir. 2011).

The underlying wrong committed by the employee “must be a common law tort.” Gutman

v. Quest Diagnostics Laboratories, Inc., 707 F. Supp. 2d 1327, 1331–32 (S.D. Fla. 2010);

see also Scelta v. Delicatessen Support Servs., Inc., 57 F. Supp. 1327, 1348 (M.D. Fla.

1999) (“Under Florida law, the underlying wrong allegedly committed by an employee in

a negligent supervision or negligent retention claim must be based on an injury resulting

from a tort which is recognized under common law.”).

Here, the point of contention is whether Plaintiff adequately alleged an underlying

tort. The Complaint specifically alleges that the United States failed to protect him from

antisemitic conduct while the Bankruptcy Judge performed her official duties. (DE 1 ¶¶

40–45). Specifically, Plaintiff states: (1) Defendant “owes a duty of care to Plaintiff for its

employee and agent not to take actions which violate his civil rights and engage in

conduct which is based upon his race, ethnicity or religion as a person of Jewish origin;”

(2) “[t]his duty of care was not to deprive the Plaintiff of the various protections afforded

him under the constitution an laws of the United States;” (3) “Defendant failed in that duty

to protect the Plaintiff from those harms in the antisemitic conduct while performing her

official duties” as Defendant’s employee; and (4) Defendant “became aware” of the

problems with the Bankruptcy Judge’s “unfitness to hold office” and failed to take action,

causing harm to Plaintiff. (DE 1 ¶¶ 40–46).

The Report found that the allegations sound in discrimination as they allude to

“discriminatory conduct as the basis for Defendant’s alleged negligent retention of its

employee.” (DE 44 at 18). Certainly, Plaintiff insists that “[t]his matter is a case or

controversy where the Plaintiff has suffered a manifest injustice and grave deprivation of

his civil rights . . . at the hand of antisemitic conduct of an employee” and agent of the

United States. (DE 47 at 2). The Court agrees with regard to the characterization of the

count sounding in discrimination and does not find this determination to be a clear error

where Plaintiff alleges that the Bankruptcy Judge discriminated against him because he

is “a person of Jewish origin.” (DE 1 ¶ 40; DE 53 at 2). As noted by the Report,

discrimination is not recognized as a tort that can sustain a negligent retention claim under

Florida law. (DE 44 at 14); see also Mighty v. Genesis Eldercare Rehab. Servs., Inc., No.

18-CIV-80440, 2018 WL 5113965, at *2 (S.D. Fla. May 24, 2018) (“Harassment and

discrimination are not recognized under Florida law as torts that can support a claim for

negligent supervision and retention”). Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege

an actionable claim for negligent retention. Accordingly, the Court overrules Magistrate

Judge D’Angelo’s recommendation as to dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

and instead dismisses Count III for failure to state a claim.

C. The Report concludes that future amendments will be futile.

As an initial matter, Plaintiff is well beyond his deadline to amend the Complaint

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) as Defendant filed its Motion to Dismiss on

August 28, 2025, giving Plaintiff until September 18, 2025, to Amend the Complaint as

a matter of course. See Ofer v. Isicoff, No. 24-11542, 2025 WL 2466579, at 1–2 (11th

Cir. 2025) (noting that despite the Court’s “serious doubt that amendment would save

[Ofer’s] claims, . . . Ofer is entitled to amend once as a matter of course” because the

motion to dismiss was granted before the twenty-one-day clock started ticking)

(emphasis added). Unlike that Ofer case, 2025 WL 2466579, Plaintiff here is beyond the

twenty-one-day period to amend under rule 15(a). Therefore, Plaintiff may only amend

the Complaint with leave of Court.

The Report finds that future amendment to the Complaint would be futile because

the Complaint is so “devoid of legal merit, such that even if Plaintiff incorporated the

more detailed allegations from his Opposition into the Complaint,” the Complaint would

still fail to establish subject matter jurisdiction over Counts I and II; and Count III would

still fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (DE 44 at 21). The Court

agrees. Amendment is futile “if an amended complaint would still fail at the motion-to-

dismiss or summary-judgement stage.” L.S. ex rel. Hernandez v. Peterson, 982 F.3d

1323,1332 (11th Cir. 2020). Here, Count II (Title VI) would fail, despite amendment,

because Defendant is immune from suit as Title VI does not include an express waiver

of sovereign immunity. Likewise, Count I (Negligence) would continue to fail at the

dismissal stage because Plaintiff cannot identify an analogous cause of action under

Florida law. And lastly, amendment to Count III (Negligent Retention) would be futile

because Plaintiff’s claim is grounded in discrimination which cannot support a negligent

retention cause of action.

Moreover, the Report found, and the Court agrees, that Plaintiff’s claims are

frivolous and unsupported as the affidavits submitted with the Complaint do not mention

the Bankruptcy Judge nor do they establish her participation in the alleged conspiracy.

(DE 1 at 13–14; DE 44 at 8). Similarly, the purported recording of a conversation

discussing the conspiracy is unavailing. (DE 52; DE 44 at 8). As the Court noted in a

separate litigation by Plaintiff against the Bankruptcy Judge, the Complaint “presents no

support for these fantastical conspiracy accusations.” Ofer v. Isicoff, No. 23-CIV-24738,

DE 25 at 4–5 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 30, 2024); see also Ofer v. Isicoff, 2025 WL 2466579, at 2

(expressing “serious doubt” that amendment would save Ofer’s claims). Accordingly, the

Court finds that leave to amend would be futile.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:

1. Judge D’Angelo’s Report (DE 44) is ADOPTED IN PART.

2. Counts I and II of the Complaint are DISMISSED. Plaintiff is NOT

GRANTED leave to amend Count I and II as any amendment would be

futile.6

6 Because Counts I and II were dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the Court

can only dismiss without prejudice. See Boda, 698 F.2d at 1177 n. 4. (“Where dismissal

can be based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, the court

should dismiss on only the jurisdictional grounds. This dismissal is without prejudice.);

see also Woodson v. Eleventh Jud. Cir. in and for Miami Dade Cnty, Fla, 791 F. App’x

116, 119 (11th Cir. 2019) (noting that the plaintiff’s “claim should have been dismissed

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, which is without prejudice, rather than failure to state

a claim, which is with prejudice”). However, as Judge D’Angelo and the Court concludes,

amendment would be futile. See Woodson, 791 F’ Appx. at 119–20 (recognizing that

although plaintiff’s claim was dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction, the Court did not find “that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing

[the] complaint without leave to amend, since . . . [the] proposed amendment . . . was

3. Count Ill of the Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as Plaintiff

failed to state a claim and amendment would be futile.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers in Miami, Florida, onthis 18th day

of March, 2026.

KATHLEEN M. WILLIAMS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

futile.”).

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