Watkins

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

MARQUAIL WATKINS, ) CASE NO. 4:25-CV-02630-JRA

)

) JUDGE JOHN R. ADAMS

Plaintiff,

) UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

)

v.

) MAGISTRATE JUDGE

) CARMEN E. HENDERSON

PENNEX ALUMINUM COMPANY LLC,

)

KENT JOHNSON, KRISTEN COLLEY,

) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

SYDNEY WHITE, NATHAN MCMURRAY,

)

)

Defendants, )

I. Introduction

Currently before the Court is Plaintiff Marquail Watkins’s motion to remand this matter to

state court. (ECF No. 9). The motion was referred to the undersigned for preparation of a Report

and Recommendation. (ECF No. 12). For the reasons set forth below, it is RECOMMENDED

that the Court DENY Plaintiff’s motion.

II. Procedural History

On October 23, 2025, Plaintiff Marquail Watkins (“Plaintiff”) filed his complaint in the

Mahoning County Court of Common Pleas, against his former employer, Pennex Aluminum

Company, LLC (“Pennex”), alleging race discrimination, retaliation, and failure to promote under

Ohio law. (ECF No. 1-1). Plaintiff also named as additional defendants Kent Johnson, a former

supervisor for Pennex; Kristen Colley (“Colley”), a senior human resources generalist for Pennex;

Sydney White, a human resources generalist for Pennex; and Nathan McMurray, an environmental

health and safety manager for Pennex (together, “Individual Defendants”), alleging the Individual

Defendants aided and abetted Pennex in discriminating against Plaintiff. (Id.).

Pennex and Colley (together, “Removing Defendants”) filed a notice of removal in this

Court on December 3, 2025, alleging diversity jurisdiction. (ECF No. 1). Removing Defendants

assert that Plaintiff is a citizen of Ohio; Pennex is a limited liability company (“LLC”) whose sole

member is Lefton Metal Enterprises Corporation, a Missouri corporation with its principal place

of business in Missouri such that Pennex is a citizen of Missouri; and the citizenship of the

Individual Defendants should be disregarded for purposes of determining jurisdiction because they

were fraudulently joined to defeat jurisdiction. (Id. at 2-3). As to the amount in controversy,

Removing Defendants assert that based on Plaintiff’s prayer for “monetary damages including

economic compensatory damages, non-economic compensatory damages, liquidated, treble,

punitive, or other exemplary damages, reinstatement or, in the alternative, front pay, reasonable

attorneys’ fees, all costs and expenses, pre- and post-judgment interest, and all other legal and

equitable relief available,” it is more likely than not that Plaintiff seeks damages in excess of the

$75,000.00 threshold. (Id. at 5-7).

Consistent with their position that the Individual Defendants were fraudulently joined,

Removing Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Individual Defendants on December 9, 2025.

(ECF No. 4, “Dismissal Motion”). Plaintiff requested an extension of time to respond to the

Dismissal Motion, representing that he intended to file a motion for remand and asserting that such

should be resolved before any ruling on the Dismissal Motion. (ECF No. 5). The Court granted

Plaintiff’s motion on December 15, 2025, such that Plaintiff’s response to the Dismissal Motion is

not due until two weeks after a ruling on Plaintiff’s motion to remand. (ECF No. 6; see ECF No.

5).

On December 30, 2025, Plaintiff filed his motion to remand to state court. (ECF No. 9).

The motion is fully briefed. (ECF Nos. 9, 10, 11).

III. Applicable Law

“[A]ny civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States

have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court

of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.”

28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). District court have original jurisdiction over disputes “where the matter in

controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs” and the civil

action is between citizens of different states. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Thus, “[d]efendants may

remove an action on the basis of diversity of citizenship if there is complete diversity between all

named plaintiffs and all named defendants.” Lincoln Property Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 84

(2005). However, “[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks

subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(a).

“Fraudulent joinder is a judicially created doctrine that provides an exception to the

requirement of complete diversity. A defendant is fraudulently joined if it is clear that there can be

no recovery under the law of the state on the cause alleged or on the facts in view of the law.”

Casias v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 695 F.3d 428, 432-33 (6th Cir. 2012) (citation modified). “The

relevant inquiry is whether there is a colorable basis for predicting that a plaintiff may recover

against a defendant.” Id. at 432. The applicable test is “similar to, but more lenient than, the

analysis applicable to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.” Id. The removing party—as the party

asserting jurisdiction—bears the burden of establishing fraudulent joinder. Id.

IV. Discussion

Here, there is no dispute that Plaintiff is a citizen of Ohio and that Pennex is a citizen of

Missouri1 such that complete diversity exists between these parties. (See ECF No. 1-1 at 2; ECF

No. 1 at 2-3). It is similarly undisputed that each of the Individual Defendants is, like Plaintiff, a

citizen of Ohio such that their presence, if proper, destroys complete diversity. (See ECF No. 1-1

at 2-3). Thus, the relevant question is whether Removing Defendants have established that the

Individual Defendants were fraudulently joined such that their citizenship should be disregarded

for purposes of determining jurisdiction.2

In support of remand, Plaintiff alleges he brought two claims against each of the Individual

Defendants: retaliation in violation of Ohio Revised Code § 4112.02(A) (Count Two) and aiding

and abetting in violation of Ohio Revised Code § 4112.02(J) (Count Four). (ECF No. 9 at 2).

Plaintiff argues that “[b]ecause Ohio is a notice-pleading state, Ohio law does not require a plaintiff

to plead operative facts with particularity” and by stating that the Individual Defendants “treated

him differently because of his race and participated in the decisions to suspend and terminate his

employment,” Plaintiff has pled facts that are “more than sufficient to put the individual

Defendants on notice of a colorable claim against them.” (Id. at 4-5).

Removing Defendants respond that “Plaintiff’s threadbare allegations against the

Individual Defendants do not give them reasonable notice as to Plaintiff’s claims against them,

such as which, if any, of the Individual Defendants supervised him, participated in the decision to

terminate Plaintiff’s employment, or committed any other allegedly discriminatory act or omission

1 As an LLC, Pennex’s citizenship is that of its members and sub-members. Akno 1010 Mkt. St. St. Louis Missouri

LLC v. Pourtaghi, 43 F.4th 624, 626 (6th Cir. 2022). Pennex’s sole member is a Missouri corporation with its principal

place of business in Missouri such that it, and Pennex, are citizens of Missouri. Prime Rate Premium Fin. Corp., Inc.

v. Larson, 930 F.3d 759, 765 (6th Cir. 2019) (“[A] corporation is a citizen of the state in which it has been incorporated

and of the state in which it has its principal place of business.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2 Plaintiff does not dispute Removing Defendants’ assertion that the amount of controversy exceeds the jurisdictional

threshold. (ECF No. 9 at 6). Defendants’ representations include that Plaintiff’s lost wages claim potentially totals

$27,664, his backpay claim may amount to $41,496 (or more), and Plaintiff seeks additional damages. (ECF No. 1 at

5-6). The undersigned is satisfied that the amount in controversy is satisfied and will not discuss it further.

against him.” (ECF No. 10 at 1). Removing Defendants argue that in determining whether

Plaintiff has properly pled claims against the Individual Defendants, the federal pleading standard

applies rather than Ohio’s liberal pleading standard. (Id. at 4). Removing Defendants indicate that

Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies against the Individual Defendants, instead

having only received a Notice of Right to Sue as to Pennex. (Id. at 8-10). Regarding Plaintiff’s

assertion that his retaliation claim was brought against the Individual Defendants as well as

Pennex, Removing Defendants argue nothing in the complaint alerts the Individual Defendants

that this claim was brought against them. (Id. at 10). As to the aiding and abetting claim,

Removing Defendants argue the complaint is devoid of any factual allegations to support

Plaintiff’s claim against the Individual Defendants, rending them fraudulently joined such that

remand is not warranted. (Id. at 12-14).

Plaintiff replies that “[r]ather than meet their heavy burden of establishing fraudulent

joinder, Defendants continue to make a Motion to Dismiss argument (which is clearly not the

subject of the remand), ask the Court to apply federal pleading standards, weigh factual disputes,

and adjudicate the merits of Plaintiff’s Ohio law claims,” which is “flatly inconsistent with Sixth

Circuit precedent and Ohio law.” (ECF No. 11 at 1). Plaintiff argues that fraudulent joinder is not

analyzed under the standard applicable to Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss but rather a more

lenient standard. (Id. at 2). Additionally, Plaintiff argues that “[f]ederal courts may not impose

heightened federal pleading standards when evaluating whether Ohio law provides a reasonable

basis for liability.” (Id.). Plaintiff also argues “[a] claim may be weak, inartfully pleaded, or even

vulnerable to dismissal and still defeat removal.” (Id.). As to exhaustion, Plaintiff argues the

applicable statute “makes it abundantly clear that a party has the option to file a charge against the

employer and individuals or one or the other,” such that Plaintiff was not required to file a separate

charge as to the Individual Defendants. (Id. at 5).

A. Appropriate Pleading Standard

The parties dispute the pleading standard the Court should apply in analyzing fraudulent

joinder, with Removing Defendants relying on the federal standard and Plaintiff relying on the

more lenient state standard. “[I]t does not appear that the Sixth Circuit has explicitly stated

whether district courts assessing fraudulent joinder should consider the claims in light of the

pleading standard applicable in state court rather than the federal pleading standards (if they

differ).” Garner v. SDH Servs. East, LLC, 55 F. Supp. 3d 1016, 1022 (M.D. Tenn. 2014); but see

Alexander v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 13 F.3d 940, 948 (6th Cir. 1994) (instructing that “[i]n

addressing the sufficiency of pleadings, we must look to state law” when determining if a

defendant was fraudulently joined). While many federal courts have applied the state pleading

standards in determining fraudulent joinder, others have determined the federal standards apply

based on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 81(c)(1)’s provision that the federal rules “apply to a

civil action after it is removed from a state court.” Garner, 55 F. Supp. 3d at 1022-23 (collecting

cases).

Were the case to remain in federal court, under Rule 81(c)(1), the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure would apply. Thus, when the Court ultimately addresses the pending motion to dismiss,

the federal pleading standard will apply. However, the current question is limited to whether to

apply the state standard in determining whether remand is proper. Based on the guidance from the

Sixth Circuit that the fraudulent joinder analysis is similar to but more lenient than that applied in

assessing whether a plaintiff failed to state a claim, it is most appropriate to apply the more lenient

state pleading standard in determining whether there is a colorable basis under which a plaintiff

can recover. See Kent State Univ. Bd. of Trs. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 512 F. App'x 485, 489 (6th Cir.

2013) (“[I]f there is a colorable basis for predicting that a plaintiff may recover against non-diverse

defendants, this Court must remand the action to state court.”). As one court explained, “[w]here

a claim survives state pleading standards, it necessarily means the plaintiff did not join the

defendant only to defeat diversity; indeed, the plaintiff has a viable claim under state pleading

rules.” Red Hed oil, Inc. v. H.T. Hackney Co., 292 F. Supp. 3d 764, 771 (E.D. Ky 2017); see Adair

v. Bluegreen Vacations Unlimited, Inc., No. 3:19-cv-54, 2019 WL 13216610, at *4-5 (E.D. Tenn.

Oct. 25, 2019) (determining state pleading standard should apply in fraudulent joinder analysis).

Ohio law requires a pleading to contain “(1) a short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the party is entitled to relief, and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief to which

the party claims to be entitled.” Ohio Civ. R. 8(A).

Because Ohio is a notice-pleading state, Ohio law does not

ordinarily require a plaintiff to plead operative facts with

particularity. Notice pleading under Civ. R. 8(A)(1) and (E) requires

that a claim concisely set forth only those operative facts sufficient

to give fair notice of the nature of the action. Nevertheless, to

constitute fair notice, the complaint must allege sufficient

underlying facts that relate to and support the alleged claim; the

complaint may not simply state legal conclusions.

Montgomery v. Ohio State Univ., 2012-Ohio-5489, ¶ 20 (Ohio Ct. App. 10th Dist.) (citation

modified); See Storer v. Nat'l Coop. Bank, 2024-Ohio-1676, ¶ 24, 242 N.E.3d 1242, 1252 (Ohio

Ct. App. 4th Dist.) (“A complaint must allege (1) a legal cause of action and (2) facts which, if

construed as true, would support that cause of action.”); Hernandez v. Riggle, 2016-Ohio-8032, ¶

16, 74 N.E.3d 822, 827 (Ohio Ct. App. 7th Dist.).

B. Application

While the undersigned ultimately agrees with Plaintiff that the more liberal state pleading

standard should apply in determining whether remand is warranted, even under that standard

Plaintiff has failed to show that remand is warranted.

1. Allegations of the Complaint

Plaintiff alleges that he was hired by Pennex in November 2023 and worked for Pennex as

a press team member. (ECF No. 1-1 at 4). Plaintiff was the only African American on his press

team. (Id.). During his employment, Plaintiff complained to Pennex “about unlawful and

discriminatory conduct regarding his race.” (Id. at 5). Plaintiff also “applied for various open

positions in the Die Shop and as a Press Operator for which he was qualified” but was not

promoted. (Id.). Pennex suspended Plaintiff on February 25, 2025, and subsequently terminated

his employment on February 27, 2025. (Id. at 4). “Upon information and belief, [the Individual

Defendants] treated Plaintiff differently based upon his race, and participated in the decision to

suspend and ultimately terminate Plaintiff’s employment.” (Id. at 6-7).

2. Count Two-Retaliation

Plaintiff’s Count Two alleges retaliation in violation of Revised Code § 4112.02(I), which

provides that it shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for “any person to discriminate in any

manner against any other person because that person has opposed any unlawful discriminatory

practice … or because that person has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any

manner in any investigation, proceeding, or hearing” regarding discrimination.

While Plaintiff argues Count Two was brought against the Individual Defendants, nothing

in the text of Count Two would alert the parties that the claim was brought against anyone other

than Pennex. Notably, Plaintiff alleges that he “complained to Defendant Pennex about unlawful

and discriminatory conduct regarding his race” and “Defendant’s” (singular) conduct in

terminating Plaintiff was retaliatory. (ECF No. 1-1 at 5) (emphasis added). Further, Plaintiff

specifically alleges that he suffered damages “for which Defendant Pennex is liable.” (Id.)

(emphasis added). There is no mention of the Individual Defendants—or even a use of a generic

plural “Defendants”—anywhere in Count Two that would alert the parties that this claim was

asserted against anyone other than Pennex nor are there any facts alleged to establish that Plaintiff

has a colorable basis for a retaliation claim against the Individual Defendants.

3. Count Four-Aiding and Abetting

Plaintiff’s Count Four—which in contrast to Count Two specifically lists the Individual

Defendants by name—alleges that the Individual Defendants aided and abetted Pennex in

discriminating against him in violation of Revised Code § 4112.02(J). This section provides that

it shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person “to aid, abet, incite, compel, or coerce

the doing of any act declared by this section to be an unlawful discriminatory practice, to obstruct

or prevent any person from complying with this chapter or any order issued under it, or to attempt

directly or indirectly to commit any act declared by this section to be an unlawful discriminatory

practice.” Ohio Rev. Code § 4112.02(J).

Here, the only factual allegations against the Individual Defendants include that they

treated Plaintiff differently based on his race and participated in the decision to suspend and

terminate him. (ECF No. 1-1 at 6-7). These allegations appear to address the elements of

Plaintiff’s claim, but Plaintiff fails to set out any facts—including, but not limited to, how each of

the Individual Defendants “treated him differently” or what role they each played in his

suspension/termination—to support his claim. Thus, Plaintiff fails to include sufficient underlying

facts to support an aiding and abetting clam against the Individual Defendants. See Storer, 2024-

Ohio-1676 at ¶¶ 25, 27 (plaintiff failed to state a discrimination claim where complaint alleged

that plaintiff was pregnant and qualified to perform her job, her employer knew she was pregnant,

and employer terminated her because she was pregnant but alleged “no set facts to support her

legal conclusion that the [employer’s] decision to terminate her” was motivated by her pregnancy);

Hernandez, 2016-Ohio-8032 at ¶ 18 (plaintiffs alleging national origin discrimination by a labor

union failed to state a claim where complaint failed to allege facts showing plaintiffs applied for

union membership, what the application process was, what the qualifications for membership were

under the union bylaws and collective bargaining agreements, or that plaintiffs met the

qualifications).

Because Plaintiff has failed to set forth sufficient underlying facts in support of his aiding

and abetting claim against the Individual Defendants, and because such is the only claim in the

complaint against the Individual Defendants, there is no colorable basis to predict that Plaintiff

may recover against the Individual Defendants. See Casias, 695 F.3d at 432. Thus, Removing

Defendants have established that the Individual Defendants were fraudulently joined, and remand

is not warranted.

V. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the Court DENY Plaintiff’s motion

to remand, ECF No. 9.

Dated: March 10, 2026

s/ Carmen E. Henderson

CARMEN E. HENDERSON

U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

OBJECTIONS

Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with the Clerk of Courts

within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this document. Failure to file objections

within the specified time may forfeit the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See Berkshire v.

Beauvais, 928 F. 3d 520, 530-31 (6th Cir. 2019).

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