Wilson

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA

CHRISTOPHER JAMES WILSON,

Plaintiff,

v. CIVIL NO. 2:25-CV-01

(KLEEH)

PAMELA BONDI,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

IN PART [ECF NO. 63], REJECTING IT IN PART, AND REFERRING MATTER

TO MAGISTRATE JUDGE

On January 3, 2025, the pro se Plaintiff, Christopher Wilson

(“Plaintiff”), filed a complaint against numerous defendants. See

ECF No. 1. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and the local rules, the

Court referred the action to United States Magistrate Judge Michael

J. Aloi (the “Magistrate Judge”) for initial review. See ECF No.

5. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint and a second amended

complaint. See ECF Nos. 24, 47. He brings discrimination claims

against Defendant Pamela Bondi (“Defendant”), in her official

capacity as the Attorney General of the United States, relating to

his employment with the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”).1 On May 7,

2025, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss. See ECF Nos. 49, 50.

On August 19, 2025, the Magistrate Judge entered a Report and

1 Plaintiff states that he has consolidated his claims against the “head of the

Department as the proper defendant.” Second Am. Compl., ECF No. 47, at ¶ 5.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

IN PART [ECF NO. 63], REJECTING IT IN PART, AND REFERRING MATTER

TO MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Recommendation (“R&R”) recommending that the Court grant the

motion to dismiss and dismiss the second amended complaint without

prejudice. See ECF No. 63.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a white male who has been employed by the BOP

since 2008. See Second Am. Compl., ECF No. 47, at ¶ 3. In the

second amended complaint, he alleges that he experienced

discrimination, retaliation, and a hostile work environment.

Specifically, he alleges that he applied for five supervisory

positions at FCI Gilmer and FCI Morgantown and that he was not

selected for them, despite his superior qualifications and

extensive BOP experience. See id. ¶¶ 6–9. Plaintiff lists the

positions:

(1) Recreation Supervisor – Vacancy

Announcement MXR-2022-0282 at FCI Gilmer

(“Position #1);

(2) Recreation Supervisor – Vacancy

Announcement MXR-2023-0158 at FCI Gilmer

(“Position #2);

(3) Recreation Supervisor – Vacancy

Announcement MXR-2023-0065 at FCI

Morgantown (“Position #3);

(4) Correctional Counselor – Vacancy

Announcement GIL-2023-0026 (“Position

#4”); and

(5) Correctional Counselor – Vacancy

Announcement GIL-2023-0055 at FCI Gilmer

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

IN PART [ECF NO. 63], REJECTING IT IN PART, AND REFERRING MATTER

TO MAGISTRATE JUDGE

(“Position #5”).

Id. at ¶ 8. Plaintiff asserts that “Diversity, Equity, and

Inclusion” policies at the BOP “unduly influenced promotion

decisions.” See id. ¶¶ 10, 14.

II. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION AND OBJECTIONS

The R&R informed the parties that they had fourteen (14) days

from the date of service of the R&R to file “specific written

objections identifying the portions of the Report and

Recommendation to which objection is made, and the basis for such

objection.” R&R, ECF No. 63, at 13. It further warned them that

the “[f]ailure to timely file written objections . . . shall

constitute a waiver of de novo review by the District Court and a

waiver of appellate review by the Circuit Court of Appeals.” Id.

When reviewing a magistrate judge’s R&R, the Court must review

de novo only the portions to which an objection has been timely

made. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Otherwise, “the Court may adopt,

without explanation, any of the magistrate judge’s

recommendations” to which there are no objections. Dellarcirprete

v. Gutierrez, 479 F. Supp. 2d 600, 603–04 (N.D.W. Va. 2007) (citing

Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 199 (4th Cir. 1983)). Courts will

uphold portions of a recommendation to which no objection has been

made unless they are clearly erroneous. See Diamond v. Colonial

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

IN PART [ECF NO. 63], REJECTING IT IN PART, AND REFERRING MATTER

TO MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Life & Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005).

Plaintiff has filed numerous documents since the R&R was

entered. Out of an abundance of caution, the Court will conduct

a de novo review of the R&R.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Count One – Racial Discrimination (Disparate Treatment)

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits

“discriminat[ion] against any individual with respect to his

compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,

because of such individual’s race . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-

2(a)(1). To state a prima facie case of racial discrimination by

disparate treatment, a plaintiff must establish “(1) membership in

a protected class; (2) satisfactory job performance; (3) adverse

employment action; and (4) different treatment from similarly

situated employees outside the protected class.” Sanders v. Tikras

Tech. Sol. Corp., 725 F. App’x 228, 230 (4th Cir. 2018) (citation

omitted). The Supreme Court has found that the standard for

proving disparate treatment under Title VII does not vary based on

whether or not the plaintiff is a member of a majority group. See

Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (“Discriminatory

preference for any group, minority or majority, is precisely and

only what Congress has proscribed.”).

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

IN PART [ECF NO. 63], REJECTING IT IN PART, AND REFERRING MATTER

TO MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Here, as to the first element, Plaintiff has sufficiently

pled that he is a member of a protected class. Although he is

white, he is pleading that he has been subjected to discrimination

based on his race. Second, he has sufficiently pled that he has

performed his job in a satisfactory way. Third, he has

sufficiently pled that he was subjected to an adverse employment

action when the BOP did not hire him for five positions. The only

element at issue is the fourth element: whether he has sufficiently

pled that he was treated differently from similarly situated

employees outside the protected class.

With respect to the fourth element, Plaintiff alleges that

Position #3, Position #4, and Position #5 were filled by white

individuals. Second Am. Compl., ECF No. 47, at ¶ 20. Accordingly,

those adverse employment actions cannot form the basis of a racial

discrimination claim. With respect to Position #1, Plaintiff

asserts that David Russell (“Russell”), who is biracial, also

applied and was deemed “unqualified” in a subsequent posting. Id.

¶ 14. When the previous Recreation Supervisor retired, Russell

was placed in an “acting” supervisor role. Id. ¶ 15. This

appointment, Plaintiff argues, bolstered Russell’s qualifications.

Id. Liberally construing the second amended complaint, the Court

finds that Plaintiff sufficiently pleads that Russell was selected

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

IN PART [ECF NO. 63], REJECTING IT IN PART, AND REFERRING MATTER

TO MAGISTRATE JUDGE

for Position #1 even though he was less qualified than Plaintiff.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Count One is sufficiently pled

with respect to Position #1.

As for Position #2, Plaintiff has not sufficiently pled that

the role was filled with someone outside of his protected class.

Aside from Russell, Plaintiff does not identify any specific

individuals who are members of other races. Plaintiff makes

generalized complaints about the BOP’s incorporation of diversity,

equity, and inclusion policies, as well as the “tainted” selection

process for open positions. As pled, with respect to Count One,

Plaintiff has only raised his right to relief above the speculative

level with respect to Position #1. The motion to dismiss Count

One is granted in part and denied in part. The motion is denied

with respect to Position #1 but granted with respect to the other

positions. The R&R is, therefore, adopted in part and rejected in

part with respect to Count One.

B. Count Two – Retaliation

Title VII also prohibits unlawful retaliation. It prevents

an employer from “discriminat[ing] against any of its employees or

applicants for employment . . . because he has opposed any

practice made an unlawful employment practice . . . , or because

he has . . . participated in any manner in an investigation” under

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

IN PART [ECF NO. 63], REJECTING IT IN PART, AND REFERRING MATTER

TO MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a). To state a prima facie case

of retaliation, a plaintiff must establish “(1) that []he engaged

in protective activity, (2) that [his] employer took adverse action

against [him], and (3) that a causal relationship existed between

the protected activity and the adverse employment activity.

Sanders, 725 F. App’x at 230 (citation omitted and numbering

changed). “In the context of element one of a retaliation claim,

an employee is protected when []he opposes not only employment

actions actually unlawful under Title VII but also employment

actions []he reasonably believes to be unlawful.” Id. (citation

omitted). “However, opposition activity is only protected if an

employee’s subjective belief is objectively reasonable in light of

the facts.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

With respect to the second element, “the challenged action well

might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting

a charge of discrimination.” Burlington N. v. Stana Fe Ry. Co. v.

White, 548 U.S. 53, 54 (2006) (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted).

Here, Plaintiff asserts that he engaged in protected activity

in 2016, 2019, and February 2023, precipitating retaliatory

actions by the BOP. Second Am. Compl., ECF No. 47, at ¶ 25.

Specifically, Plaintiff states that the retaliatory actions

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

IN PART [ECF NO. 63], REJECTING IT IN PART, AND REFERRING MATTER

TO MAGISTRATE JUDGE

included “shift changes almost weekly”; reassignment to “less

desirable posts such as housing units on varying

shifts . . . [d]espite being a bus-certified operator and assigned

to Medical Escorts”; and frequent selection “to provide coverage

on the medical bus.” Id. Most importantly, Plaintiff also asserts

that on May 21, 2023, he learned that he was not selected for

Position #2; on May 22, 2023, he learned that he was not selected

for Position #3; on June 20, 2023, he learned that he was not

selected for Position #4; and on December 12, 2023, he learned

that he was not selected for Position #5. Id. ¶ 26. Finally, he

asserts that the BOP retaliated against him by

“withholding . . . his performance evaluation”; by

“manipulati[ng] and omi[tting] . . . favorable reference checks”;

by reassigning his shift without justification; and by altering

his work schedule. Id. ¶ 31. Plaintiff has also alleged that a

coworker told him that he is “often scared to work with Plaintiff

because he feels that the executive staff at FCI Gilmer would

target him for working with . . . [him] due to his engagement in

protected activities.” Id. ¶ 23a.

After reviewing the second amended complaint, the Court finds

that the retaliation claim is sufficiently pled. At this stage,

at a minimum, the assertion that Plaintiff was not selected for

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

IN PART [ECF NO. 63], REJECTING IT IN PART, AND REFERRING MATTER

TO MAGISTRATE JUDGE

positions within a few months of his bringing claims with the EEOC

is sufficient to state a claim of retaliation. It is premature to

find that no causal connection exists. The allegations in the

second amended complaint raise Plaintiff’s right to relief above

the speculative level. The motion to dismiss is denied with

respect to Count Two, and the R&R is rejected with respect to Count

Two.

C. Count Three – Hostile Work Environment

Before bringing a claim under Title VII, an employee must

first exhaust his available administrative remedies. Campbell v.

Geren, No. 09-1764, 2009 WL 4250582, at *2 (4th Cir. 2009)

(unpublished) (citation omitted). “Only those discrimination

claims stated in the initial charge, those reasonably related to

the original complaint, and those developed by reasonable

investigation of the original complaint may be maintained in a

subsequent Title VII lawsuit.” Chacko v. Patuxent Inst., 429 F.3d

505, 506 (4th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). Here, the record

indicates that Plaintiff did not raise a hostile work environment

claim before the EEOC, and the Court finds that the claim is not

reasonably related to the claims raised. His failure to exhaust

his claim deprives this Court of subject matter jurisdiction over

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

IN PART [ECF NO. 63], REJECTING IT IN PART, AND REFERRING MATTER

TO MAGISTRATE JUDGE

the claim. See Davis v. N.C. Dep’t of Corr., 48 F.3d 134, 138–40

(4th Cir. 1995).

Even if Plaintiff had exhausted his hostile work environment

claim, it would fail as a matter of law. To succeed in pursuing

a claim of hostile work environment, a plaintiff must show that

the harassment was “sufficiently severe or pervasive . . . to

alter the conditions of . . . employment and create an abusive or

hostile atmosphere.” See Perkins v. Int’l Paper Co., 936 F.3d

196, 208 (4th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). The Fourth Circuit

has described how “severe or pervasive” should be assessed under

Title VII:

In determining whether the harassment alleged

was sufficiently severe or pervasive, we must

“look[] at all the circumstances,” including

the “frequency of the discriminatory conduct;

its severity; whether it [was] physically

threatening or humiliating, or a mere

offensive utterance; and whether it

unreasonably interfere[d] with [the]

employee’s work performance.” Harris, 510

U.S. at 23, 114 S.Ct. 367.

Parker v. Reema Consulting Servs., Inc., 915 F.3d 297, 304 (4th

Cir. 2019) (citation omitted).

Upon review of the second amended complaint, the Court agrees

with the Magistrate Judge that Plaintiff has not sufficiently pled

facts to support Count Three. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

IN PART [ECF NO. 63], REJECTING IT IN PART, AND REFERRING MATTER

TO MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Accordingly, the Court grants the motion to dismiss with respect

to Count Three and adopts the R&R with respect to Count Three.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, the Court ORDERS as follows:

 The R&R is ADOPTED IN PART and REJECTED IN

PART [ECF No. 63];

 The motion to dismiss the second amended

complaint is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN

PART [ECF No. 49];

 Count One is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE IN

PART for failure to state a claim;

 Count One is DISMISSED with respect to

Position #2, Position #3, Position #4, and

Position #5;

 Count One is not dismissed with respect to

Position #1;

 Count Two is not dismissed;

 Count Three is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE

for lack of jurisdiction;

 The original motion to dismiss is DENIED AS

MOOT [ECF No. 36];

 Finding no good cause to grant Plaintiff’s

motions to supplement the record or file a

third amended complaint, the remaining

pending motions are DENIED [ECF Nos. 65,

67, 71, 75, 77];

 The case shall proceed on the second amended

complaint;

WILSON V. BONDI 2:25-CvV-0O1

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

IN PART [ECF NO. 63], REJECTING IT IN PART, AND REFERRING MATTER

TO MAGISTRATE JUDGE

e The Clerk is DIRECTED to TERMINATE all

defendants except Attorney General Pam

Bondi; and

e The case is again REFERRED to the Magistrate

Judge to conduct a scheduling conference

and issue a scheduling order, for written

orders or reports and recommendations, as

the case may be, regarding any motions

filed, and to dispose of any other matters

that may arise.

It is so ORDERED.

The Clerk is directed to transmit copies of this Order to

counsel of record via email and the pro se Plaintiff via certified

mail, return receipt requested, at the last known address as shown

on the docket.

DATED: March 31, 2026 “tw 5 Kb 1

THOMAS S. KLEEH, CHIEF JUDGE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA

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