Davis

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

LARRY DAVIS,

Plaintiff, 9:24-cv-00218 (BKS/MJK)

v.

KRISTEN HALL, Registered Nurse; TIMOTHY

KIJOWSKI, Correction Officer; M. SMITH, Sergeant; R.

BURKE, Correction Officer; and S. HUFF, Correction

Officer,

Defendants.

Appearances:

Plaintiff Pro Se:

Larry Davis

Elmira Correctional Facility

Elmira, New York 14902

For Defendants:

Letitia James

Attorney General of the State of New York

Elizabeth V. Lombardi

Assistant Attorney General

300 South State Street, Suite 300

Syracuse, New York 13202

Hon. Brenda K. Sannes, Chief United States District Judge:

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff pro se Larry Davis commenced this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action arising out of his

incarceration at Auburn Correctional Facility. (Dkt. No. 1). Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment

excessive force, failure to intervene, and deliberate indifference to medical needs claims survived

the Court’s initial 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) review. (Dkt. No. 4, at 15). On June 5, 2025,

Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. (Dkt. No. 42). The same day, the Court mailed

Plaintiff a notice informing him of the nature and consequences of summary judgment as

required by Vital v. Interfaith Medical Center, 168 F.3d 615, 620–21 (2d Cir. 1999). (Dkt. No.

43, at 2). Plaintiff filed responses on June 23 and July 28, 2025. (Dkt. Nos. 45, 48). Defendants

filed a reply on August 12, 2025. (Dkt. No. 52).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72.3(c), this matter was referred to

United States Magistrate Judge Mitchell J. Katz, who on November 13, 2025 issued a Report-

Recommendation and Order recommending that the Court grant Defendants’ motion. (Dkt. No.

58). Magistrate Judge Katz instructed Plaintiff that he had 14 days to object to the Report-

Recommendation, and that failure to object would preclude appellate review. (Id. at 32 (citing,

inter alia, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 72)). The Court subsequently extended

Plaintiff’s time to object until February 12, 2026. (Dkt. No. 60). Plaintiff failed to timely file

objections, so the Court has reviewed the Report-Recommendation for clear error. See Nambiar

v. Cent. Orthopedic Grp., LLP, 158 F.4th 349, 359 (2d Cir. 2025). Upon such review, the

Report-Recommendation is rejected in part and adopted in part.

II. FACTS

Plaintiff entered Auburn in early 2023. (See Dkt. No. 42-10, at 28–29). During his

incarceration there, Defendants Mark A. Smith, Robert Burke, Sean Huff, and Timothy Kijowski

worked as corrections staff, and Defendant Kristen Hall (now Leader) worked as a registered

nurse. (Dkt. No. 42-23, ¶ 1; Dkt. No. 42-27, ¶ 1; Dkt. No. 42-31, at 1; Dkt. No. 42-35, ¶ 1; Dkt.

No. 42-39, ¶ 1). Plaintiff alleges that Burke, Huff, and Kijowski assaulted him twice—initially in

a strip frisk room, and then in an observation cell—that Smith failed to stop these assaults, and

that Smith and Hall were deliberately indifferent to his resulting medical needs. (See Dkt. No.

45, at 3–5).

The Court’s initial review order and the Report-Recommendation contain detailed

descriptions of the relevant events. (See Dkt. No. 4, at 4–6; Dkt. No. 58, at 2–7). Accordingly,

the Court assumes familiarity with the facts and discusses below only those necessary to explain

its decision.

III. DISCUSSION

The Court has reviewed the Report-Recommendation according to well-established

summary judgment standards, viewing the record in the light most favorable to Plaintiff as the

non-moving party.1 See, e.g., Gilles v. Repicky, 511 F.3d 239, 243 (2d Cir. 2007). The record,

however, includes video depicting some of the relevant events. So as to such evidence, the Court

views “the facts in the light depicted by the videotape.” Linton v. Zorn, 135 F.4th 19, 30 (2d Cir.

2025) (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381 (2007)). Additionally, because Plaintiff’s pro

se complaint was sworn under penalty of perjury, (see Dkt. No. 1, at 6), the Court has considered

it “as evidence for summary judgment purposes.”2 Brandon v. Kinter, 938 F.3d 21, 26 n.5 (2d

Cir. 2019); cf. Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 101–02 (2d Cir. 2010) (discussing the special

solicitude afforded pro se litigants).

1 In his opposition, Plaintiff included a document titled “Notice of Motion,” requesting that the Court “grant[] [his]

complaint against the defendants” and citing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. (Dkt. No. 48, at 25). Magistrate

Judge Katz previously instructed Plaintiff how to file a proper summary judgment motion under the local rules, (see

Dkt. No. 28), and the deadline for submitting dispositive motions expired before Plaintiff submitted his opposition,

(see Dkt. Nos. 41, 60). Accordingly, the Court has not construed this document as a separate summary judgment

motion. In any event, the Court would deny such a motion for the reasons stated in this decision and the adopted

portions of the Report-Recommendation.

2 Plaintiff signed the complaint and stated: “I declare[] under penalty of perjury that the for[e]going is true and correct.”

(Dkt. No. 1, at 6). Although Plaintiff omitted the date from the handwritten “dated” section he had included in the

complaint’s body, (id.), the top of the cover sheet with which he concurrently submitted the complaint was dated

February 12, 2024, (Dkt. No. 1-1, at 1). In light of Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court deems this sufficient to comply

with 28 U.S.C. § 1746. See LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene & MacRae, L.L.P. v. Worsham, 185 F.3d 61, 65–66 (2d Cir.

1999); cf. Edwards v. Arocho, 125 F.4th 336, 348 & n.5 (2d Cir. 2024) (liberally construing “broad[]” affirmation in

pro se summary judgment declaration to “support the factual allegations contained in [pro se litigant’s] entire summary

judgment brief” submitted concurrently with declaration).

A. Excessive Force and Failure to Intervene

The Eighth Amendment proscribes cruel and unusual punishment, including the

“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976); see

also Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 4 (1992). Such claims involve “two components—one

subjective, focusing on the defendant’s motive for his conduct, and the other objective, focusing

on the conduct’s effect.” Wright v. Goord, 554 F.3d 255, 268 (2d Cir. 2009); Crawford v.

Cuomo, 796 F.3d 252, 256 (2d Cir. 2015). The subjective component asks “whether the

defendants had a ‘wanton’ state of mind when they were engaging in the alleged misconduct.”

Davidson v. Flynn, 32 F.3d 27, 30 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7). It “turns on

‘whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously

and sadistically to cause harm.’” Blyden v. Mancusi, 186 F.3d 252, 262 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting

Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7). The objective component asks whether the conduct was “sufficiently

serious,” and involves a “context specific” inquiry, Crawford, 796 F.3d at 256 (first citing

Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8; then quoting Hogan v. Fischer, 738 F.3d 509, 515 (2d Cir. 2013)), in

light of “contemporary standards of decency,” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble,

429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)). However, “contemporary standards of decency always are violated”—

“whether or not significant injury is evident”—when officials “use force to cause harm

maliciously and sadistically.” Wright, 554 F.3d at 268–69 (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9).

Additionally, officials “have an affirmative duty to intervene to protect the constitutional

rights of citizens from infringement by other law enforcement officers in their presence.” Sloley

v. VanBramer, 945 F.3d 30, 46–47 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting Anderson v. Branen, 17 F.3d 552,

557 (2d Cir. 1994)); see also O’Neill v. Krzeminski, 839 F.2d 9, 11 (2d Cir. 1988) (applying

standard to pretrial detainee excessive force claim). In the excessive force context, the official

must have “observe[d] the use of force and ha[d] sufficient time to act to prevent it.” See

Figueroa v. Mazza, 825 F.3d 89, 106 (2d Cir. 2016) (citing O’Neill, 839 F.2d at 11–12).

“Whether the officer had a ‘realistic opportunity’ to intervene is normally a question for the jury,

unless, ‘considering all the evidence, a reasonable jury could not possibly conclude otherwise.’”

Sloley, 945 F.3d at 47 (quoting Terebesi v. Torreso, 764 F.3d 217, 244 (2d Cir. 2014)).

Here, Plaintiff asserts two sets of excessive force and failure to intervene claims, one

stemming from the events in the strip frisk room, and the other from those in the observation

cell. The Court addresses each incident in turn.

1. Strip Frisk Room

The Report-Recommendation concluded that, as to the strip frisk room claims, Plaintiff

satisfied the objective component, but not the subjective component. (See Dkt. No. 58, at 15–22).

As a result, his corresponding failure to intervene claims failed too. (Id. at 22). The Court

disagrees. It first summarizes the relevant summary judgment record evidence in the light most

favorable to Plaintiff, before addressing the merits.

a. Evidence in the Record

According to Plaintiff, the facts underlying these claims are as follows: after escorting

Plaintiff into the strip frisk room, Kijowski “punched [him] on the right side of his face,” and

Burke and Huff “slammed [him] on the floor face first.” (Dkt. No. 45, at 3; see also Dkt. No. 1,

at 3; Dkt. No. 42-10, at 48–49). While Plaintiff remained on the floor, those three then “started

punching and kicking [him] in the face, legs, ribcage and chest for about five to seven minutes.”

(Dkt. No. 45, at 3; Dkt. No. 1, at 3; Dkt. No. 42-10, at 51–53). Smith saw the entire incident but

did not intervene. (Dkt. No. 45, at 3; Dkt. No. 1, at 3–4).

For their part, Smith, Burke, Huff, and Kijowski all aver that no such assault occurred; no

one intervened, they say, because none believed any other had used excessive force. (Dkt. No.

42-23, ¶¶ 9, 12, 14; Dkt. No. 42-27, ¶¶ 8–10; Dkt. No. 42-35, ¶¶ 8, 10–11; Dkt. No. 42-39, ¶¶ 8–

9, 11). Instead, these Defendants maintain that they used “reasonable force”—primarily body

holds—in response to Plaintiff’s threats, aggression, and refusal to cooperate with the strip frisk.

(Dkt. No. 42-23, ¶¶ 8, 10–13; Dkt. No. 42-27, ¶¶ 5–7, 9; Dkt. No. 42-35, ¶¶ 7, 9, 11; Dkt. No.

42-39, ¶¶ 6–7, 9). They assert that, during the struggle, Plaintiff spit on them, bit Kijowski’s

finger, and attempted to bite Huff’s leg. (Dkt. No. 42-23, ¶¶ 8, 13; Dkt. No. 42-27, ¶ 7; Dkt. No.

42-35, ¶¶ 7, 9; Dkt. No. 42-39, ¶¶ 7, 9, 10).

Defendants have submitted video surveillance footage from Auburn during the relevant

time.3 (Dkt. Nos. 42-4, 42-5, 42-6, 42-7, 42-8). None of this footage, however, provides a full

view of what occurred in the strip frisk room. From one angle, a small portion of the room is

visible. (See Dkt. No. 42-6, at 00:00–05). But after Plaintiff and corrections staff arrive, staff

bodies block most of that portion. (See id. at 02:59–03:30). Before and upon arrival, Plaintiff can

be heard refusing to cooperate with staff; at times, he also raises his voice and tells officers to

“take the cuffs off” so they all could fight. (Id. at 00:24–43, 01:00–46, 02:13–33, 03:03–40).

Plaintiff’s head is visible for just over 30 seconds. (Id. at 03:05–40). As he continues to yell, one

officer moves Plaintiff away from the visible portion of the room and yells “stop” and “take him

down,” before a struggle ensues off camera; during the struggle, Plaintiff exclaims, “yeah hit

me,” while they appear—though they are not entirely visible—to bring him to the ground. (Id. at

03:34–04:01). After that, no one’s conduct in the strip room is visible. (Id. at 03:40–14:20).

Audio reflects that, with Plaintiff on the ground continuing to yell, an officer directs him

multiple times to “stop spitting,” says “I think he just tried to bite me,” and yells “ah, fucker, stop

biting,” to which Plaintiff replies, “I’m not biting you.” (Id. at 03:48–04:14). Plaintiff is also

3 They have also submitted footage from a handheld camera, which the Court discusses below in connection with the

second set of excessive force and failure to intervene claims. (See Dkt. No. 42-9).

heard saying “y’all hitting me.” (Id. at 04:13–15). After a period of quiet, Plaintiff tells officers

that they “should’ve took the cuffs off,” and that one of them “hit like a bitch.” (Id. at 05:23–49).

Plaintiff then yells to a fellow prisoner that “they just jumped on me.” (Id. at 06:04–20). When a

supervisor returns to have officers stand Plaintiff up for a force strip frisk, Plaintiff remarks,

“they punched me in my fucking face.” (Id. at 06:24–38). Plaintiff again yells that officers

punched him and threatens to “fight officers” if they would uncuff him. (Id. at 06:49–07:56,

08:08–09:10, 9:50–10:07). Eventually, Plaintiff tells another prisoner that officers are cutting his

clothes, presumably for a force strip frisk. (Id. at 10:26–35). Plaintiff again remarks that officers

would not remove his handcuffs, and that they had punched him. (Id. at 10:35–42, 11:53–12:02,

12:11–14). Following this frisk, officers escort Plaintiff out of the room to the observation cell.

(See id. at 14:13–20).

Medical records documenting the treatment Plaintiff received after the incident reflect

that he complained of bruising on his face, left foot, and left ankle, though no ankle fracture or

dislocation occurred. (See Dkt. No. 42-12, at 1, 3, 6). Additionally, in early April, Plaintiff

complained of numbing in his left hand, which had been “ongoing since” the strip frisk room

incident. (Id. at 3). When a nurse touched his hand to assess it, Plaintiff “screamed.” (Id.). As

Defendants note, Plaintiff’s mental health records also reflect that he told a counselor the day

after the incident that he had done “some things to staff.” (Dkt. No. 42-13, at 10).

On summary judgement, the Court cannot resolve the factual dispute between Plaintiff’s

and Defendants’ competing versions of events. While the Report-Recommendation noted

inconsistencies between Plaintiff’s account and other evidence, (see Dkt. No. 58, at 16–17, 18),

they go to credibility. And “[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of evidence, and the

drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge.” Proctor

v. LeClaire, 846 F.3d 597, 608 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting Kaytor v. Elec. Boat Corp., 609 F.3d 537,

545 (2d Cir. 2010)). Plaintiff’s testimony itself is not “so contradictory that doubt is cast upon

[its] plausibility.” Jeffreys v. City of New York, 426 F.3d 549, 555 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Aziz

Zarif Shabazz v. Pico, 994 F. Supp. 460, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (Sotomayor, J.)); see also Rojas v.

Roman Cath. Diocese of Rochester, 660 F.3d 98, 106 (2d Cir. 2011) (per curiam).

Additionally, some of the purported inconsistencies are arguably not inconsistent when

construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff as the nonmoving party. See Gilles, 511 F.3d at

243. For example, the Report-Recommendation noted Plaintiff’s allegation “that Kijowski

punched him in the right side of his head,” even though the “left side of [his] face was bruised.”

(Dkt. No. 58, at 16 (emphasis omitted)). However, the citation for the latter proposition reflects

only Plaintiff’s admission that “the medical provider noted that [he] had a bruise on the left side

of his face.” (Dkt. No. 45, at 20 (emphasis added)). An acknowledgement of what the notes

stated, (see Dkt. No. 42-12, at 6), is not an admission of their accuracy. Moreover, Plaintiff

might have sustained an injury to the left side of his face when Burke and Huff “slammed [to]

the floor,” or when Kijowski, Burke, and Huff repeatedly “punch[ed] [him] in the face” after the

initial punch. (See Dkt. No. 45, at 3). The Report-Recommendation further highlighted that,

despite being subject to a lengthy “gang assault,” Plaintiff escaped “with only two bruises.” (Dkt.

No. 58, at 17). But as described above, Plaintiff suffered arguably significant injury. And on

April 3, 2023—weeks after the March 15 incident—a medical provider described some of his

bruising as still “dark.” (Dkt. No. 42-12, at 3).

Nor does the video surveillance footage resolve these factual disputes. See Linton, 135

F.4th at 30. It does not definitively support either side’s account. As described above, for most of

the incident, Plaintiff and the relevant Defendants were not visible to the camera. The audio

reflects Plaintiff’s yelling and aggressive remarks, as well as some Defendants’ assertions that he

tried to bite them. But it also reflects Plaintiff’s statements that Defendants had hit him, and that

he was not biting them. The footage therefore does not provide enough contradictory evidence to

deem Plaintiff’s allegations that he was gratuitously beaten for several minutes while handcuffed

a “visible fiction.” Scott, 550 U.S. at 381.

b. Merits

Considering those allegations, there exists a genuine issue of material fact on both the

objective and subjective components of Plaintiff’s excessive force claim. As to the latter, the

Report-Recommendation correctly identified factors the Second Circuit has instructed courts to

use “to determine if prison officials used force maliciously or wantonly.” See Jordan v. Walker,

No. 22-1118, 2024 WL 4635225, at *2, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 27661, at *5 (2d Cir. Oct. 31,

2024) (citing Romano v. Howarth, 998 F.2d 101, 105 (2d Cir. 1993)); (see also Dkt. No. 58, at

13 (citing Scott v. Coughlin, 344 F.3d 282, 291 (2d Cir. 2003))).

Applying those factors here, Defendants needed to use some degree of force—Plaintiff

refused to cooperate with the strip frisk. But again, the video does not depict the full events. So

the Court cannot determine the degree of force necessary, or whether the force used was

proportional to that need. See Romano, 998 F.2d at 105. The factual disputes here also “make[] it

difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain what threat [Defendants] perceived and whether they

made an effort to temper the severity of their response” inside the strip frisk room. See Harris v.

Miller, 818 F.3d 49, 64 (2d Cir. 2016) (per curiam). Accepting Plaintiff’s account that

Defendants gratuitously beat him for several minutes while handcuffed, those factors weigh in

Plaintiff’s favor. Further, as the Report-Recommendation acknowledged, a prisoner “who is

gratuitously beaten by guards does not lose their ability to pursue an excessive force claim

merely because they had the good fortune to escape without serious injury.” (Dkt. No. 58, at 19

(alterations adopted) (quoting Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 39 (2010) (per curiam))).

Plaintiff’s “allegations and evidentiary proffers could reasonably, if credited, allow a

rational factfinder to find that [Defendants] used force maliciously and sadistically.” Wright, 554

F.3d at 269. And “when prison officials use force to cause harm maliciously and sadistically,

‘contemporary standards of decency always are violated,’” satisfying the objective component.

Id. at 268–69 (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9). To be sure, a reasonable person might expect

Plaintiff’s medical records to reflect additional injury. One might also reasonably discredit his

testimony based on the limited video evidence—reflecting, among other things, his disobedient

conduct—and Defendants’ declarations telling a different story. Nevertheless, the Second Circuit

“has reversed summary dismissals of Eighth Amendment claims of excessive force even where

the plaintiff’s evidence of injury was slight and the proof of excessive force was weak.” Wright,

554 F.3d at 269; Harris, 818 F.3d at 65 (same). Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims survive

summary judgment, and the Court rejects so much of the Report-Recommendation as

recommended otherwise.4

Plaintiff’s corresponding failure to intervene claims may also proceed. Because the video

does not depict what happened in the strip frisk room, a genuine dispute of material fact exists as

to whether, and to what extent, each Defendant “observe[d] the use of force and ha[d] sufficient

time to act to prevent it.” Figueroa, 825 F.3d at 106. That factual issue must be resolved by a

jury. See Sloley, 945 F.3d at 47. The Court notes Defendants’ argument that Burke, Huff, and

Kijowski cannot be liable for both using excessive force and failing to intervene. (See Dkt. No.

4 Although Defendants raised qualified immunity, (see Dkt. No. 58, at 31 (declining to reach this issue)), the factual

disputes identified above also preclude the Court from granting summary judgment on that basis at this stage. See

Jones v. Baran, 798 F. Supp. 3d 197, 216 (D. Conn. 2025) (concluding same in Eighth Amendment excessive force

case involving video evidence).

42-1, at 18–19 (citing cases)). However, again in light of the factual disputes described above,

the Court declines to address that issue at this time. It accordingly rejects the Report-

Recommendation’s conclusion as to these failure to intervene claims.

2. Observation Cell

As to the alleged observation cell assault, the Report-Recommendation concluded that

both the subjective and objective components were lacking; again, with no underlying

constitutional violation, these failure to intervene claims failed too. (Dkt. No. 58, at 22–26). The

Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Katz that these claims do not survive summary judgment.

Plaintiff avers the following as to his observation cell claims: Defendants escorted him

from the strip frisk room to the cell, and “once [he] was inside,” they “assaulted [Plaintiff] again

for about four to five minutes,” all with Smith present. (Dkt. No. 45, at 3, 5). This incident,

however, was fully captured by the handheld camera video noted above. (See Dkt. No. 42-9).

The Court adopts the Report-Recommendation’s factual description of this incident, (Dkt. No.

58, at 23), which accurately reflects “the facts in the light depicted by the videotape,” Linton, 135

F.4th at 30 (quoting Scott, 550 U.S. at 381).

In short, the video shows Defendants using reasonable, proportional force to regain the

retention strap from Plaintiff; nowhere does it depict Defendants or anyone else beating him. So

there is no genuine dispute that the force “was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or

restore discipline,” not “maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Blyden, 186 F.3d at 262

(quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7). Plaintiff’s excessive force and failure to intervene claims

stemming from the observation cell incident fail. See Wright, 554 F.3d at 268–69; Figueroa, 825

F.3d at 106. The Court therefore adopts the Report-Recommendation as to these claims.

B. Deliberate Indifference

The remainder of the Report-Recommendation addressed Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment

deliberate indifference to medical needs claims. (Dkt. No. 58, at 26–31). The deliberate

indifference standard, too, “includes both subjective and objective components.” Mallet v. N.Y.

State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 126 F.4th 125, 132 (2d Cir. 2024) (quoting Chance v.

Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 702 (2d Cir. 1998)). To satisfy the former, as Magistrate Judge Katz

explained, a plaintiff “must show that the prison officials consciously disregarded a substantial

risk of serious harm” to their health of safety. (Id. at 27 (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,

835 (1994))). “[T]he official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be

drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and [they] must also draw the inference.”

Clark v. Valletta, 157 F.4th 201, 209 (2d Cir. 2025) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837).

Here, no reasonable juror could conclude based on the record evidence that either Smith

or Hall drew the required inference. See id. Accordingly, on that basis, the Court adopts the

Report-Recommendation’s conclusion that these claims also do not survive summary judgment.

(See Dkt. No. 58, at 28).

IV. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, it is hereby

ORDERED that the Report-Recommendation (Dkt. No. 58) is REJECTED in part and

ADOPTED in part as set forth above; and it is further

ORDERED that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 42) is DENIED

as to Plaintiff’s excessive force and failure to intervene claims stemming from the strip frisk

room incident and GRANTED in all other respects; and it is further

ORDERED that each of Plaintiff’s claims, except for the excessive force and failure to

intervene claims identified above, are DISMISSED with prejudice; and it is further

ORDERED that the Clerk is respectfully directed to terminate Kristen Hall as a

Defendant in this action and serve a copy of this Order on Plaintiff in accordance with the Local

Rules.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 12, 2026

Syracuse, New York

Pronda (Girne

Brenda K. Sannes

Chief U.S. District Judge

13