Lipkin

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

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SARAH LIPKIN, :

:

Plaintiff, :

:

v. : 23-CV-127 (SFR)

:

VELMA GEORGE, :

:

Defendant. :

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MEMORANDUM & ORDER

Plaintiff Sarah Lipkin worked as an Advanced Practice Registered Nurse for Cornell-

Scott Hill Health Corporation (“CS-HHC”) from 2021 to 2022. Lipkin’s responsibilities

included providing medical care to people at homeless shelters and warming centers in the

City of New Haven (the “City”). On the morning of March 29, 2022, Lipkin met with

Defendant Velma George, the City’s Coordinator for Homelessness, to discuss one of Lipkin’s

patients. Although accounts of the conversation differ markedly, it is clear that Lipkin and

George had a disagreement. After the meeting, George wrote to Lipkin’s supervisors to express

her “concern[] about [Lipikin’s] ability to serve our clients with dignity” and “ability to work

collaboratively with partner agencies.” CS-HHC later invoked George’s concerns as the basis

for not renewing Lipkin’s contract for cause.

Lipkin asserts that George retaliated against Lipkin in violation of the First Amendment

and committed the common law torts of defamation per se and interference with contractual

relations by deliberately misrepresenting Lipkin’s professional skills to Lipkin’s supervisors.

At the close of discovery, George moved for summary judgment on all three claims. For the

reasons stated below, I deny George’s Motion for Summary Judgment on all claims.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

The following facts are taken from the parties’ Local Rule 56 statements and the

underlying evidentiary record and are uncontested unless otherwise stated.1

1. Services for New Haven’s Homeless Population

Lipkin was hired by CS-HHC to work as an Advanced Practice Registered Nurse

(“APRN”). Pl.’s L.R. 56(a)2 St. of Mat. Facts in Dispute (“Pl.’s L.R. 56(a)2 St.”) ¶ 1, ECF No.

93.2 They3 were hired by CS-HHC on a one-year renewable contract lasting from May 2021

to May 2022. Id. ¶¶ 40-41. Lipkin’s responsibilities included providing medical care to

homeless people living on the streets, in shelters, and at warming centers. Lipkin Dep., ECF

No. 87-3, at 12. CS-HHC partnered with the City of New Haven to provide medical services

to New Haven’s homeless population. ECF No. 107, at 1.

At all times relevant to this action, George served as Coordinator for Homelessness for

the City of New Haven. Pl.’s L.R. 56(a)2 St. ¶ 3. George’s responsibilities included

“developing and implementing programs with stakeholders” and “maintaining relationships

with partners and stakeholders.” Id. The City contracted with BHCare, which provided “case

management, behavioral health, and counseling services to homeless individuals in the City of

New Haven.” Id. ¶ 4. The City funded BHCare to operate a warming center out of the New

1 The page numbers cited to in this ruling regarding any documents that have been electronically

filed refer to the page numbers imprinted by the electronic case filing system on the header of the

documents and not to the page numbers of the original documents, if any.

2 When Lipkin admits a fact stated in George’s Local Rule 56(a)1 Statement, I cite only to Lipkin’s

Local Rule 56(a)2 Statement admitting that fact as true.

3 Lipkin uses they/them pronouns. Pl.’s Mem. in Opp. to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. (“Pl.’s Mem.”)

1 n.1, ECF No. 94.

Haven Inn. Id. ¶¶ 7-8. This warming center permitted homeless people in New Haven to shelter

indoors from the elements. George Dep., ECF No. 87-4, at 6-7.

2. Events on March 29, 2022

On the morning of March 29, 2022, Lipkin conducted medical visits at a soup kitchen

before proceeding to the warming center at the New Haven Inn. Pl.’s L.R. 56(a)2 St. ¶¶ 5-6.

Lipkin was accompanied by Chloe Andree, a registered nurse also hired by CS-HHC. Id. ¶ 5.

That morning, Lipkin was copied on a medical note from the Yale-New Haven Emergency

Department, which reported that Lipkin’s patient “RD” had been sexually assaulted and treated

in the emergency room the previous evening. Id. ¶ 6. Lipkin had treated RD in the past because

RD was living at the warming center at the New Haven Inn. Lipkin Dep., ECF No. 87-3, at 17.

Lipkin and Andree proceeded to the New Haven Inn, where they spoke with “G,” RD’s partner.

Pl.’s L.R. 56(a)2 St. ¶ 9. G told Lipkin and Andree that, in spite of RD’s injuries, he and RD

had been informed they would be discharged from the warming center the following day. Id.

The couple was due to be discharged on March 30 because the City of New Haven had set an

April 1 end date for paying for services at the New Haven Inn. Id. ¶ 10. G asked that Lipkin

and Andree advocate on his and RD’s behalf to identify some alternative discharge plan. Id. ¶

12.

Lipkin and Andree sought out BHCare staff after speaking with G. Id. ¶¶ 12-15. Lipkin

and Andree spoke with BHCare staff in an office. The parties agree that Lipkin, Andree, Bobbi-

Jo Evans (Housing Outreach Program Manager for BHCare), Rogsbert King (another BHCare

employee), a BHCare social worker, and Velma George were in the office at the time. Id. ¶ 16.

Lipkin’s goal was to learn about the substance of the discharge plan for RD and G and to

ensure that RD received “adequate health care and was safe.” Id. ¶ 13. After the BHCare social

worker confirmed that RD was due to be discharged the following day, id. ¶ 15, Lipkin told

the BHCare social worker they were “disappointed with the discharge plan for the couple and

that more had not been done to support RD,” id. ¶ 17. After overhearing this remark, Bobbi-

Jo Evans became upset and told Lipkin “that Lipkin did not understand how hard BHCare staff

worked.” Id. ¶¶ 17, 23. Evans remarked, “We can’t do more for clients than they do for

themselves.” Id. ¶ 17. When Evans brought up the care needs of another client, “Lipkin accused

[Evans] of yelling at them.” Id. ¶ 27.

George then joined the conversation. George told Lipkin that Evans was not yelling at

them. Id. ¶ 28. George stated to Lipkin: “You don’t know what you are talking about.” Id. ¶

18. Lipkin in turn responded to George that Lipkin did know what they were talking about

because Lipkin had been working with RD every week since August 2021. Id. ¶ 19. Lipkin

also said to George that this was the first time that Lipkin had seen George at the warming

center. Id. ¶ 20. Lipkin then stated that they would leave; George agreed that Lipkin should

leave. Id. ¶ 22.

Although those basic details are not disputed, the parties have submitted divergent

accounts of the tone, tenor, and additional content of this interaction. George supports her

account with her own deposition testimony, as well as the deposition testimony of Rogsbert

King.4 Lipkin relies on their own deposition testimony, as well as the affidavit of Chloe

Andree. Andree avers that BHCare staff responded defensively to Lipkin’s respectful query as

to the discharge plan for RD and G. Andree Aff., ECF No. 93-3, ¶¶ 17-19. Without raising

4 Although Bobbi-Jo Evans participated in the conversation and was deposed in relation to this

action, see ECF No. 87-11, the parties agree that, following an unrelated injury, Evans “does not

recall the subject incident,” Pl.’s L.R. 56(a)2 St. ¶ 37.

their voice, Lipkin responded “clearly and firmly” that Lipkin “would be disappointed if we

could not provide some other arrangements for RD.” Id. ¶ 20. BHCare staff quickly “became

loud and began yelling,” suggesting that Lipkin and Andree were unqualified to criticize

BHCare’s work. Id. ¶ 24. Andree recounts that Lipkin responded “in a normal tone and in a

professional manner.” Id. ¶ 29. When George and BHCare criticized Lipkin, Lipkin “expressed

confusion about why people were yelling,” and suggested that “perhaps we should leave.” Id.

¶ 28. Lipkin also testified that they never yelled at George. Lipkin Dep., ECF No. 87-3, at 27.

In contrast, George testified that Lipkin “came in the office very hostile and very

combative.” George Dep., ECF No. 87-4, at 17. According to George, Lipkin “did not come

in asking questions, [Lipkin] came in accusing the staff of not doing their job, and that they

don’t care about the clients, so that set the tone for the exchange, and it went downhill from

there.” Id. at 17-18. Rogsbert King, BHCare’s manager of the warming center, recalls that

Lipkin arrived “angry in her stance.” King Dep., ECF No. 87-8, at 9. King further maintains

that after engaging in a loud argument with Bobbi-Jo Evans, George sought to intervene, which

caused Lipkin to become “livid with Miss Velma.” Id. at 13. King states that Lipkin “was

yelling and screaming . . . and she was saying that everyone was attacking her, she was being

attacked by the staff.” Id. at 14.

3. George’s Email to CS-HHC on April 5, 2022

On April 5, 2022, George drafted an email regarding her interaction with Lipkin on

March 29, 2022. Pl.’s L.R. 56(a)2 St. ¶ 30. Prior to sending the email, George spoke with

Jessica Arroyo, CS-HHC’s Program Manager for the Homeless Division, to share that George

had had a “disturbing interaction” with Lipkin. Id.. George told Arroyo that she wanted to send

an email describing this interaction to CS-HHC. Arroyo responded that George should write

to Lipkin’s direct supervisor, Phil Costello, the Medical Director of the Greater New Haven

Health Care for the Homeless Team at CS-HHC, and copy Arroyo on that message. Id. ¶¶ 32-

33. George wrote to Costello and Arroyo that evening; her email reads as follows:

Hello Phil and Jessica

I am writing to share an incident that occurred at the New Haven Inn Warming

Center last Tuesday March 29th. It was so upsetting, I needed to take some time

to process the incident.

Last Tuesday I was at the warming center meeting with the staff when Sarah

Lipkin and Chloe came to the office after they met with clients. Sarah proceeded

to ask the staff about the housing plan for a particular couple. The staff shared

the couple’s status. Sarah then stated that she was very disappointed to hear that

going back to the street was the option. Sarah proceeded to accuse the staff of

not doing their job. She stated that every week when she came by she saw the

staff doing nothing, so she wasn’t surprised that they did not have a plan for the

couple. The staff told Sarah that her comments were off base and disrespectful.

The staff went on to share the many unfruitful attempts that were made to engage

this couple. Sarah dismissed and challenged all the alternate plans the staff

presented. The staff asked for Sarah’s suggestions for the couple since their

options were not to her liking. Sarah had no suggestions and proceeded to accuse

staff of yelling at her. At that point I interjected and said to Sarah that no one

was yelling at her- they simply disagreed with her. Sarah then lashed out at me

and stated that I was never there- so how could I possibly know what was going

on there. She went on to say this was her first time seeing me at the motel. I told

Sarah how disappointed I was with her level of disrespect and

unprofessionalism. The fact that she would make such a gross generalization

about the staff when she was only there for a short window of time weekly was

offputting. I asked her if she was able make a patient take a medication that

he/she was refusing. She said no. So I asked why would it be different for a case

worker offering services that a client refused. Sarah then said she was feeling

attacked and thought she should leave. We all agreed that she should leave - so

she did leave.

Prior to Tuesday’s incident, I had received several complaint [sic] from the staff

about how disrespectful Sarah had been to both staff and clients. They described

her as being condescending and dismissive. On Tuesday March 22, I arrived at

the warming center only to find the staff scurrying around the neighborhood

trying to find an elderly client who left the hotel after meeting with Sarah that

day. The staff was able to find the elderly gentleman and brought him back to

the motel. I met with him and asked why he left in such a haste after meeting

with the nurse. He said he was very frustrated because the nurse was very mean

to him and dismissed his complaints. He said she would tell him she would see

him the following week, he would wait for her and she would say the same thing

every week. So left to catch the train to New York to get help for his frost bite.

This elderly man came to the motel with frost bite to his toes and fingers and

said she did nothing to address it. Sarah diagnosed this client as having scabies

and ordered a treatment cream - it turns out the client had lice. The staff brought

it to Sarah’s attention and asked her to have him admitted to the hospital for

treatment of all his medical issues. Sarah dismissed the staff’s concerns so out

of frustration the staff gave this client a shower, had his room professionally

cleaned and reached out to the VNA for assistance. I stepped in and called Laura

Daniels for help to get this elderly man assessed admitted to the hospital. Within

a day Laura was able to get this elderly man admitted to the hospital as compared

to two months of Sarah’s delay tactics.

Phil and Jessica, as you know, the City of New Haven and Cornell Scott has

enjoyed a collaborative relationship over the years. We do not always agree on

issues, but we are always respectful and professional as we work through our

differences. So the incident with Sarah was very disturbing as it was totally

unlike the level of professionalism that I have come to expect from all staff at

Cornell Scott.

I am concerned about Sarah’s ability to serve our clients with dignity and her

ability to work collaboratively with partner agencies.

ECF No. 87-9, at 2-3. George testified that the email was her only substantive communication

to CS-HHC concerning Lipkin. George Dep., ECF No. 87-4, at 16.

On April 6, 2022, Evans submitted a separate complaint regarding Lipkin to CS-HHC.

Pl.’s L.R. 56(a)2 St. ¶ 36. Evans’ email is consistent with George’s email. See ECF No. 87-10,

at 2-3.

4. Lipkin’s Contract Is Terminated for Cause

After receiving these emails, CS-HHC placed Lipkin on paid leave and conducted an

investigation. Pl.’s L.R. 56(a)2 St. ¶¶ 39, 45. During that investigation, CS-HHC leadership

met with Lipkin. Id. ¶ 46. George has included a lengthy audio recording of that meeting

among her evidentiary submissions. ECF No. 101. In the meeting, Lipkin agrees they told

George they had never seen George at the warming center. Id. (13:16). Lipkin can also be

heard acknowledging that this statement “might have been not appropriate.” Id. (13:27).

By letter dated April 21, 2022, Andrea Lobo, CS-HHC’s Chief of Human Resources,

informed Lipkin that their contract had been terminated for cause. Id. ¶ 44. Lobo stated as

follows:

Dear Sarah:

I regret to inform you that your contract with the Cornell Scott Hill Health

Center will not be renewed for cause. We have come to this decision based on

numerous complaints from the City of New Haven Coordinator of

Homelessness and the Housing and Outreach Program Manager for BHcare.

While I understand that your actions that day were driven by your passion and

dedication, the success of our Homeless Department, and other departments

within CSHHC, depend on our ability to work collaboratively with community

partners such as these. Regrettably, the conflict, strive and lack of emotional

intelligence has destroyed the trust and overall relationship with both

community partners. Our relationship with the city of New Haven is especially

important and paramount to the success of our program. It is evident that the fit

is damaged beyond repair.

You will remain on payroll and benefits for 90 days until such time when your

contract will officially expires [sic].

I wish you well in your future endeavors.

ECF No. 87-12, at 2.

The parties dispute whether CS-HHC terminated Lipkin’s contract because CS-HHC

supervisors genuinely believed Lipkin had engaged in misconduct. Lobo maintains that CS-

HHC’s investigation substantiated the finding that Lipkin acted unprofessionally in the manner

they spoke with George and BHCare employees. Lobo Dep., ECF No. 87-5, at 13. Andree

notes that, beyond a brief conversation with CS-HHC’s office of human resources on or about

March 30, 2022, CS-HHC never conducted a follow-up interview to hear from Andree whether

Lipkin acted unprofessionally during the visit to the New Haven Inn on March 29, 2022.

Andree Aff., ECF No. 93-3, ¶ 32. In his deposition, Costello (Lipkin’s direct supervisor at CS-

HHC) stated that Lipkin’s clinical record did not provide cause to terminate Lipkin’s contract.

Costello Dep., ECF No. 93-5, at 4. Indeed, Costello stated that “if I had a private practice, I

would hire [Lipkin] as a provider and I have no concerns with her ability to provide quality

care to patients.” Id.

B. Procedural History

Lipkin filed suit on February 1, 2023. Compl., ECF No. 1. Lipkin filed an Amended

Complaint on May 5, 2023. Am. Compl., ECF No. 33. The Amended Complaint named two

Defendants: Velma George and Cornell Scott-Hill Health Center (“CS-HHC”). Id. at 1. The

Amended Complaint asserted four causes of action; three counts were alleged against George:

(1) First Amendment retaliation, (2) defamation per se, and (3) tortious interference with a

contractual relationship. Id. at 6-8. The fourth count, violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-51q,

was brought against CS-HHC.

CS-HHC and George moved separately to dismiss the Amended Complaint. ECF Nos.

38, 40. The Court5 issued two Memoranda of Decision resolving these Motions to Dismiss.

On March 11, 2024, the Court granted CS-HHC’s Motion to Dismiss. Lipkin v. George, No.

3:23-cv-127 (KAD), 2024 WL 1050358 (D. Conn. Mar. 11, 2024), ECF No. 59. On March 14,

2024, the Court denied George’s Motion to Dismiss. Lipkin v. George, No. 3:23-cv-127

(KAD), 2024 WL 1119958 (D. Conn. Mar. 14, 2024) (“MTD Op.”), ECF No. 60. After its

5 The Honorable Kari A. Dooley, United States District Judge, presided over this action from July

20, 2023 to January 6, 2025, when it was transferred to me. ECF Nos. 52, 76.

Motion to Dismiss was denied, George filed an Answer to the Amended Complaint. ECF No.

86.

After completing discovery, on May 1, 2025, George moved for summary judgment.

Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 87, Mem. of L. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. (“Def.’s Mem.”),

ECF No. 87-1. Lipkin timely responded in opposition on June 23, 2025. Pl.’s Mem. in Opp. to

Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. (“Pl.’s Mem.”), ECF No. 94. George filed a reply brief on July 11,

2025. Reply to Pl.’s Mem. in Opp. to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. (“Def.’s Reply”), ECF No. 97.

I heard oral argument on George’s Motion on November 3, 2025. ECF No. 103; see also Tr.

of Oral Arg. (“Tr.”), ECF No. 108. Following oral argument, the parties agreed to file

supplemental memoranda of law. ECF No. 104. The parties filed their supplemental

memoranda on November 17, 2025. Pl.’s Supp. Mem. in Opp. to Summ. J. (“Pl.’s Supp.

Mem.”), ECF No. 106; Def.’s Supp. Mem. in Supp. of Summ. J. (“Def.’s Supp. Mem.”), ECF

No. 107.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion for summary judgment must be granted if the record shows no genuine issue

as to any material fact, and the movant is “entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party bears the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine

dispute of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Cartrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The non-moving

party may defeat the motion by producing sufficient specific facts to establish that there is a

genuine issue of material fact for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249

(1986). “[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not

defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that

there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Id. at 247-48. The moving party may satisfy this

burden by pointing out to the district court an absence of evidence to support the non-moving

party’s case. See PepsiCo, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 315 F.3d 101, 105 (2d Cir. 2002) (per

curiam).

When deciding a motion for summary judgment, I may review the entire record,

including the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, affidavits, and

any other evidence on file to determine whether there is any genuine issue of material fact. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In reviewing the record, I must “construe the evidence in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in [his] favor.” Gary

Friedrich Enters., L.L.C. v. Marvel Characters, Inc., 716 F.3d 302, 312 (2d Cir. 2013) (citation

omitted). If there is any evidence in the record from which a reasonable factual inference could

be drawn in favor of the non-moving party for the issue on which summary judgment is sought,

then summary judgment is improper. See Security Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Old Dominion

Freight Line Inc., 391 F.3d 77, 83 (2d Cir. 2004).

III. DISCUSSION

George moves for summary judgment on all of Lipkin’s claims. I begin by addressing

George’s arguments that no triable issues remain on Lipkin’s First Amendment claim before

turning to the causes of action for defamation and tortious interference with contractual

relations.

A. First Amendment Retaliation

“[A]s a general matter, the First Amendment prohibits government officials from

subjecting individuals to retaliatory actions after the fact for having engaged in protected

speech.” Houston Cmty. Coll. Sys. v. Wilson, 595 U.S. 468, 474 (2022) (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted). “First Amendment retaliation claims typically arise in three distinct

contexts: prisoners, public employees, and criticism of public officials by private citizens.”

Decker Advert. Inc. v. Delaware Cnty., New York, 765 F. Supp. 3d 128, 141 (N.D.N.Y. 2025)

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Any plaintiff complaining of retaliation in

violation of the First Amendment must establish that “(1) he has a right protected by the First

Amendment; (2) the defendant’s actions were motivated or substantially caused by his exercise

of that right; and (3) the defendant’s actions caused him some injury.” Dorsett v. Cnty. of

Nassau, 732 F.3d 157, 160 (2d Cir. 2013). But the First Amendment does not provide the same

protections to public employees as it does to private citizens. See, e.g., Long v. Byrne, 146

F.4th 282, 291 (2d Cir. 2025) (“When asserting a First Amendment retaliation claim, public

employees . . . face greater burdens than private citizens to demonstrate that their speech is

protected by the First Amendment, because ‘[t]he government as employer . . . has far broader

powers [to restrict speech] than does the government as sovereign.’”) (quoting Garcetti v.

Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 419 (2006)); see also Pickering v. Bd. of Ed. of Twp. High Sch. Dist.

205, Will Cnty., Illinois, 391 U.S. 563, 572 (1968).6

The parties dispute whether to classify Lipkin as a public employee. Even assuming

Lipkin is properly classified as a private citizen, George argues that no reasonable jury could

6 “[T]he First Amendment protects a public employee’s right, in certain circumstances, to speak

as a citizen addressing matters of public concern.” Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 417. “So in assessing the

first prong of the retaliation test–whether a public employee’s speech is protected–we must

consider ‘two separate subquestions’: (1) whether the employee ‘spoke as a citizen rather than

solely as an employee,’ and (2) whether he spoke on ‘a matter of public concern.’” Shara v. Maine-

Endwell Cent. Sch. Dist., 46 F.4th 77, 82–83 (2d Cir. 2022) (quoting Matthews v. City of New

York, 779 F.3d 167, 172 (2d Cir. 2015)). “If the employee satisfies those requirements, then the

First Amendment is implicated, but more is required to establish that the Amendment protects the

public employee’s speech. The court must also assess whether the government employer ‘had an

adequate justification for treating the employee differently from any other member of the public

based on the government’s needs as an employer.’” Long v. Byrne, 146 F.4th 282, 291 (2d Cir.

2025) (quoting Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228, 242 (2014)).

find that her conduct was motivated by Lipkin’s protected speech or that Lipkin was injured

by George’s conduct. In the alternative, George maintains she is entitled to qualified immunity.

As I explain below, I find as a matter of law that Lipkin was a private citizen, not a public

employee. I conclude that triable issues remain and that George is not entitled to qualified

immunity at this stage of the case.

1. Lipkin Was Not a Public Employee

In resolving George’s Motion to Dismiss, the Court declined to treat Lipkin as a public

employee because Lipkin was hired by CS-HHC, not the City of New Haven. MTD Op., 2024

WL 1119958, at *3. The Court assumed that the City of New Haven contracted with CS-HHC,

but held that the contractual relationship between CS-HHC and the City of New Haven did not

require the Court to apply the Pickering-Garcetti framework to Lipkin’s First Amendment

claim. Id. George asks me to revisit this holding, contending that Lipkin was functionally a

public employee because of the relationship between CS-HHC and the City of New Haven.

Def.’s Mem. 9-21.

In their briefing and at argument, the parties assumed that CS-HHC and the City of

New Haven had a contract for CS-HHC to provide medical care to homeless patients at the

warming center. Pl.’s Mem. 13; Def.’s Mem. 14; Tr. 4, 26. The parties stipulated that “CS-

HHC provides medical care to homeless individuals and provides these services to the City of

New Haven.” Pl.’s L.R. 56(a)2 St. ¶ 2. But as I observed at argument, the record does not

support a finding that CS-HHC was a government contractor. Tr. 3-4. George and Andrea

Lobo (CS-HHC’s Chief of Human Resources)—the two witnesses who could be expected to

testify from personal knowledge about the relationship, contractual or otherwise, between the

City and CS-HHC—explicitly declined to say that the City had a contract with CS-HHC.

George Dep., ECF No. 87-4, at 9;7 Lobo Dep., ECF No. 87-5, at 7-8.8 Indeed, George went so

far as to say that the City “do[es] not fund Cornell Scott [Hill Health Corporation].” George

Dep., ECF No. 87-4, at 9. Instead, these witnesses described a “partnership” between the City

and CS-HHC by which CS-HHC provided healthcare services to homeless people in New

Haven at facilities that received municipal funding. Lobo Dep., ECF No. 87-5, at 8.

At the close of argument, I invited the parties to supplement the record to demonstrate

the existence of a contract between CS-HHC and the City and to file additional briefs on this

issue. Tr. 39. The parties did not point me to any additional evidence regarding the relationship

between the City and CS-HHC. Instead, in a supplemental brief, George now concedes that

“the relationship [between the City of New Haven and CS-HHC] is not contractual—rather, it

is a partnership pursuant to which CS-HHC provides medical services to the City’s homeless

with funding from various sources, including from the City.” Def.’s Supp. Mem. 1. I cannot

credit the statement in George’s supplemental memorandum that the City partially funded CS-

7 George was asked, “Now, am I correct that the city over the last several years has maintained a

contract with Cornell Scott Hill Health Corporation to provide medical services to the homeless

population?” ECF No. 87-4, at 9. In response, George stated: “That’s not correct.” Id. George later

stated as follows: “The City of New Haven, we partner with [CS-HHC]. We do not fund [CS-

HHC].” Id.

8 Lobo testified as follows regarding the contractual relationship between the City and CS-HHC.

Q. So HHC is a contractor for the City of New Haven?

A. A contractor?

Q. How would you describe their relationship? I don’t want to put words in your

mouth.

A. We describe it as a partnership.

Q. Okay. Does HHC provide services to the city?

A. Correct.

ECF No. 87-5, at 7-8.

HHC because it is not supported by any evidence in the record; indeed, this statement is

contradicted by George’s sworn testimony that the City “do[es] not fund Cornell Scott [Hill

Health Corporation].” ECF No. 87-4, at 9. In any case, because George now concedes that

Lipkin’s employer did not contract with the City of New Haven, I cannot say that Lipkin was

a public employee.

Moreover, even looking beyond the formalities of the relationship between CS-HHC

and the City, it would not be appropriate to conclude that Lipkin was functionally a public

employee. As the Second Circuit has explained, Pickering and its progeny are predicated on

the recognition that when the government “pay[s] public moneys to private individuals for

services to be rendered,” the government therefore obtains “a stronger interest in restricting

those individuals’ speech than in restricting the speech of the public at large.” Wandering

Dago, Inc. v. Destito, 879 F.3d 20, 38 (2d Cir. 2018). Although some courts have treated the

employees of government contractors as public employees, they have done so because the

record revealed that the government as a contractor retained close control over its contractors’

employees. For example, in Clairmont v. Sound Mental Health, 632 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2011),

the Ninth Circuit classified the employee of a government contractor as a public employee

because the employee worked full time from a public facility, was closely supervised by public

officials, and provided services going to the heart of the agency’s public function. Id. at 1102.

Similarly, in Brink v. Bormann, the district court held that a nurse employed by a company

that contracted with the local school system was a public employee because the nurse was

supervised by a school employee, worked from a school facility, and interacted regularly from

a position of trust with other school employees and students. No. CV 23-497 (ZNQ) (JTQ),

2025 WL 892980, at *4-6 (D.N.J. Mar. 24, 2025).9

Unlike in Clairmont and Brink, Lipkin was supervised by CS-HHC rather than by City

employees. Indeed, the attenuated relationship between Lipkin and the City is demonstrated

by the fact that George did not know the identity of Lipkin’s supervisor. Pl.’s L.R. 56(a)2 St.

¶¶ 30-33. In contrast to the employees of contractors in Clairmont and Brink who performed

their responsibilities exclusively from government facilities, here Lipkin’s duties involved

caring for patients in a variety of private settings. See Lipkin Dep., ECF No. 87-3, at 12 (stating

that Lipkin “provided care as part of team to people who were living in temporary housing or

were unhoused”); see also id. at 18 (describing visit to a soup kitchen). Indeed, George’s email

recognized that Lipkin spent only a “short window of time weekly” at the BHCare-operated

warming center at the New Haven Inn. ECF No. 87-9, at 2. Finally, Lipkin’s function as a

medical provider was completely distinct from the responsibilities performed by the public

employees with whom Lipkin interacted.

In conclusion, I decline to revisit the Court’s holding that Lipkin was a private citizen,

not a public employee. As George now concedes, Lipkin was not employed directly or

indirectly by the City of New Haven. And Lipkin’s employment relationship was too

9 In a footnote, Brink cites Hayes v. Buffalo Mun. Hous. Auth., No. 12-CV-578S, 2013 WL

5347544, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2013), in support of the proposition that the Pickering-

Garcetti framework applies to retaliation claims brought by employees of government contractors.

Brink, 2025 WL 892980, at *5 n.2. But as Lipkin notes in their response brief, Pl.’s Mem. 13-14,

Hayes was brought by the “owner and sole member of a construction company” that contracted

with a municipal agency, Hayes, 2013 WL 5347544, at *1. Hayes therefore does not address

whether the Pickering-Garcetti framework applies to retaliation claims brought by the employees

of government contractors.

attenuated to classify Lipkin as a functional public employee. I therefore conclude as a matter

of law that Lipkin’s speech should be analyzed under the test applicable to private citizens.10

2. Issues of Fact on Lipkin’s Retaliation Claim

Because I conclude that Lipkin was not a public employee, I analyze Lipkin’s First

Amendment retaliation claim under the framework applicable to private citizens.

“To plead a First Amendment retaliation claim a plaintiff must show: (1) he has a right

protected by the First Amendment; (2) the defendant’s actions were motivated or substantially

caused by his exercise of that right; and (3) the defendant’s actions caused him some injury.”

Rupp v. Buffalo, 91 F.4th 623, 634 (2d Cir. 2024) (quoting Dorsett v. Cnty. of Nassau, 732

10 George’s supplemental memorandum identifies one additional argument to treat Lipkin as a

public employee subject to Pickering-Garcetti. Given its cursory presentation, I address it only

briefly. George relies on Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass’n, 531

U.S. 288 (2001) (“Brentwood I”) and Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass’n v. Brentwood

Academy, 551 U.S. 291 (2007) (“Brentwood II”). In both cases, the Supreme Court analyzed the

extent to which a voluntary athletic association of public and private schools could discipline a

private school whose football coach had violated the association’s antirecruiting rules. In

Brentwood I, the Supreme Court held that the association, although nominally private, was in fact

a state actor liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because of the “pervasive entwinement of public

institutions and public officials in its composition and workings.” 531 U.S. at 932. In Brentwood

II, the Court rejected the proposition that the First Amendment would otherwise prevent the

association from imposing a penalty on the school because of the coach’s comments. 551 U.S. at

300. In reaching that holding, the Brentwood II Court stated that, consistent with Pickering-

Garcetti, the association could discipline the private school without violating the First Amendment

because—even assuming the coach was speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern—the

coach’s comments hazarded the “league’s ability to operate ‘efficiently and effectively.” Id.

(quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 419).

Analogizing to Brentwood I, George contends that CS-HHC is a state actor because of its

close relationship with the City, and that Lipkin should be considered a state actor insofar as this

action implicates Lipkin’s work for CS-HHC. Def.’s Supp. Mem. 2-5. But as I have observed, the

record does not demonstrate that CS-HHC—let alone Lipkin—was closely entwined with public

functions in a manner that would justify treating Lipkin as a public employee. In short, neither

Brentwood I and II persuade me to apply Pickering-Garcetti to this dispute.

F.3d 157, 160 (2d Cir. 2013)). With respect to the third prong—injury—some Second Circuit

decisions previously required a private citizen plaintiff to establish that “defendants’ actions

effectively chilled the exercise of [plaintiff’s] First Amendment right.” Williams v. Town of

Greenburgh, 535 F.3d 71, 76 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Curley v. Village of Suffern, 268 F.3d

65, 73 (2d Cir. 2001). As the Second Circuit has since clarified, however, “[c]hilled speech is

not the sine qua non of a First Amendment claim.” Dorsett, 732 F.3d at 160. Thus, a private

citizen satisfies the injury requirement by “show[ing] either that his speech has been adversely

affected by the government retaliation or that he has suffered some other concrete harm.”

Mangino v. Inc. Vill. of Patchogue, 808 F.3d 951, 956 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Dorsett, 732

F.3d at 160). “Allegations of loss of business or some other tangible injury as a result of a

defendant’s statements would suffice to establish concrete harm.” Zherka v. Amicone, 634 F.3d

642, 646 (2d Cir. 2011). In general, “retaliatory conduct must be the type that would deter ‘a

similarly situated individual of ordinary firmness from exercising his or her constitutional

rights.’” Hayes v. Dahlke, 976 F.3d 259, 272 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d

346, 353 (2d Cir. 2003)).

Even where all elements of a retaliation claim are established, “the defendant may rebut

those allegations by showing that ‘it would have reached the same decision . . . even in the

absence of the protected conduct.’” Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Vullo, 144 F.4th 376, 387 (2d

Cir. 2025) (quoting Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287

(1977)).

Lipkin has satisfied their burden of demonstrating that at least some of their comments

were protected by the First Amendment. Of course, the precise content of Lipkin’s speech is

sharply disputed. At minimum, the parties agree that Lipkin (1) expressed disappointment

regarding a discharge plan for Lipkin’s clients; (2) Lipkin and George each accused each other

of not knowing what the other was talking about with regard to the clients’ needs and BHCare’s

ability to meet those needs; and (3) Lipkin “told Velma George that they had never observed

[George] to be at the warming center before.” Pl.’s L.R. 56(a)2 St. ¶¶ 17-20. George concedes

that, assuming the Pickering-Garcetti framework does not apply, this speech was protected by

the First Amendment.11 Tr. 12.

To satisfy the second prong—whether George’s email was motivated or substantially

caused by Lipkin’s protected expression—Lipkin must establish that George acted “with a

retaliatory motive.” Vullo, 144 F.4th at 387. George argues that her decision to send an email

to Lipkin’s supervisors was not caused by Lipkin’s protected speech. Def.’s Mem. 19. A

reasonable jury could disagree. George’s email is framed as being in response to a conversation

that George had with Lipkin. ECF No. 87-9, at 2. Although the parties sharply dispute the tenor

of that conversation, I address the import of that dispute below. But for purposes of causation,

a reasonable jury could find that George’s email was substantially motivated by Lipkin’s

protected expression because George’s email was premised on recounting her own reaction to

Lipkin’s concededly protected speech.

11 Even absent such a concession I would conclude that the statements the parties agree Lipkin

made were protected by the First Amendment. “‘The First Amendment has permitted restrictions

upon the content of speech in a few limited areas,’ including fraud, defamation, obscenity,

incitement to violence, and fighting words.” Volokh v. James, 148 F.4th 71, 88 (2d Cir. 2025)

(quoting United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468-69 (2010)). A private citizen’s speech “need

not have been on a matter of public concern for it to fall within the protection of the First

Amendment.” Williams v. Town of Greenburgh, 535 F.3d 71, 77 (2d Cir. 2008); see also Friend

v. Gasparino, 61 F.4th 77, 88 (2d Cir. 2023) (reiterating that a private citizen plaintiff “does not

need to establish that his speech addressed a matter of public significance in order to receive the

protection of the First Amendment”).

A jury could also find that George’s email injured Lipkin by (1) deterring Lipkin from

exercising their rights and (2) causing Lipkin to lose their position at CS-HHC.

In her email, George expressed serious “concern[] about Sarah’s ability to serve our

clients with dignity and her ability to work collaboratively with partner agencies.” ECF No.

87-9, at 3. CS-HHC attended to George’s stated concern that Lipkin was not able to collaborate

with the City and its partner agencies by conducting an investigation. Following that

investigation, CS-HHC explicitly invoked George’s complaint as justification for their

decision not to renew Lipkin’s contract for cause. ECF No. 87-12, at 2. This conclusion is

further supported by the testimony of Lipkin’s former supervisor, who stated “if I had a private

practice, I would hire [Lipkin] as a provider and I have no concerns with her ability to provide

quality care to patients.” Costello Decl., ECF No. 93-5, at 4. A reasonable jury could infer

from these facts that CS-HHC terminated Lipkin because George conveyed that Lipkin posed

a threat to the partnership between CS-HHC and the City. Indeed, even if CS-HHC did not

terminate Lipkin based on the email, a reasonable jury could find the email would deter a

similarly situated individual from exercising their rights. See Decker Advert., 765 F. Supp. 3d

at 151 (applying standard for retaliation by private citizens and observing that newspaper

plausibly alleged adverse action because “other local newspapers would be deterred from

participating in similar unfavorable coverage of the County out of fear that a similar directive

would complicate and hinder their reporting on County activities”).

Thus, a reasonable jury could conclude from this record that Lipkin has satisfied all

elements of a First Amendment retaliation claim by a private citizen.

I conclude by discussing one affirmative defense identified but not yet analyzed by the

parties. In Mount Healthy, the Supreme Court articulated an affirmative defense to First

Amendment retaliation claims. 429 U.S. at 287. “Because protected speech could not

substantially cause an adverse action if the employer would have taken that action in any event

. . . once the employee has established a prima facie case, the employer may still be entitled to

summary judgment based on the Mount Healthy defense by demonstrating by a preponderance

of the evidence that it would have taken the same adverse employment action even in the

absence of the protected conduct.” Smith v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 776 F.3d 114, 119 (2d Cir. 2015)

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Greenwich Citizens Comm., Inc. v. Counties

of Warren & Washington Indus. Dev. Agency, 77 F.3d 26, 32 (2d Cir. 1996) (describing the

Mount Healthy defense as tantamount to the “hypothetical question, ‘Would the defendant

have taken the same adverse action even if the impermissible reason had not existed?’”); see

also Vullo, 144 F.4th at 387 (observing that Mount Healthy balances government interests

“against the need to uphold robust constitutional protections”). “[A]lthough the language in

Mt. Healthy refers to the plaintiff’s protected conduct, the Court’s analysis, properly

understood, attempts to weigh the impact of the defendant’s impermissible reason on the

defendant’s decision to act.” Anemone v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 629 F.3d 97, 120 (2d Cir.

2011). “[D]efendants asserting a Mount Healthy defense may not rely solely on the occurrence

of unprotected misconduct: they must also articulate and substantiate a reasonable link

between that misconduct and their specific adverse actions.” Smith, 776 F.3d at 123 (emphasis

in the original).

Mount Healthy offers a helpful framework for analyzing George’s suggestion that she

took an adverse action against Lipkin not because of Lipkin’s protected expression but because

of Lipkin’s purportedly disruptive or inappropriate conduct. But George’s briefing is silent on

this issue, and counsel presented this argument only in response to my questions at oral

argument. Tr. 18. George does not analyze, under the standard applicable to private citizen

speech, which of Lipkin’s statements or actions are entitled to constitutional protection and

what forms of alleged misconduct or speech are not protected by the First Amendment. For

example, there has been no adversary presentation on the issue of whether, if Lipkin indeed

screamed and yelled at George and BHCare staff, such conduct by a private citizen is protected

by the First Amendment. Beyond further legal analysis, the Mount Healthy defense turns on

disputed issues of fact, including the tone, tenor, and content of the interaction between Lipkin,

George, and BHCare staff. Indeed, a rational jury could conclude from evidence in the record

that Lipkin reacted calmly and professionally to outbursts from George and BHCare staff. ECF

No. 87-3, at 27 (Lipkin testifying they did not yell at George); Andree Decl. ¶¶ 20, 26, 29.12 If

a jury accepted Lipkin’s and Andree’s account of events, the jury could permissibly find that

George’s email overstated concerns around Lipkin’s “unprofessional” behavior in retaliation

for Lipkin’s criticism regarding the treatment of RD and G and the statement that Lipkin had

never seen George at the warming center before.

In short, I cannot resolve from this record whether a Mount Healthy defense entitles

George to judgment as a matter of law. See Gorman-Bakos v. Cornell Co-op Extension of

Schenectady Cnty., 252 F.3d 545, 558 (2d Cir. 2001) (“Both sides’ arguments rest heavily on

12 George’s reply brief states that “Andree’s affidavit, . . . consisting primarily of Andree’s

impression of the exchange, does not raise disputed issues of material fact relevant to this Court’s

resolution of the motion.” Def.’s Reply 3-4. At argument, counsel argued for the first time that

Andree’s affidavit should be disregarded because it “is hearsay upon hearsay” insofar as it relates

to matters of which Andree lacks personal knowledge. Tr. 38. Although counsel suggested that the

reply brief set forth George’s objection to the evidentiary value of the Andree affidavit, Tr. 39, the

reply brief contains no such objection, see Def.’s Reply 3-4. Moreover, it is not clear why Andree,

who was present at the meeting, cannot describe Lipkin’s conduct at the meeting. In any event,

because George has not sufficiently articulated an objection to the Andree affidavit, I can rely on

it for the purposes of this motion.

the proper characterization of plaintiffs’ speech and defendants’ motives. Making these

determinations correctly depends on an evaluation of conflicting testimonial evidence, which

a factfinder is in the best position to evaluate.”).

3. Qualified Immunity

Without conceding liability on the First Amendment retaliation claim, George

nonetheless asserts she is entitled to qualified immunity. Def.’s Mem. 21-23.

“Qualified immunity attaches when an official’s conduct does not violate clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

City of Escondido v. Emmons, 586 U.S. 38, 42 (2019) (citations omitted). Qualified immunity

“affords government officials ‘breathing room’ to make reasonable—even if sometimes

mistaken—decisions.” DiStiso v. Cook, 691 F.3d 226, 240 (2d Cir. 2012). “To determine

whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity, we consider (1) ‘whether the facts that a

plaintiff has shown make out a violation of a constitutional right,’ and (2) ‘whether the right

at issue was ‘clearly established’ at the time of defendant’s alleged misconduct.’” Matusak v.

Daminski, 165 F.4th 702, 711 (2d Cir. 2026) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232

(2009)) (alterations adopted). Because I have concluded that a reasonable jury could find that

George violated Lipkin’s First Amendment rights, George “is entitled to qualified immunity

only if the rights at issue in this case were not ‘clearly established’ at the time of her challenged

conduct.” Vullo, 144 F.4thth at 389.

“To be sure, a case directly on point is not required for a right to be clearly established.”

Liberian Cmty. Ass’n of Conn. v. Lamont, 970 F.3d 174, 186 (2d Cir. 2020) (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted). “A right is clearly established if the contours of the right

are sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what [they are] doing

violates that right.” Eaton v. Estabrook, 144 F.4th 80, 93 (2d Cir. 2025) (internal quotation

marks omitted). “In determining if a right is clearly established,” the Second Circuit has

instructed that I should analyze “whether (1) it was defined with reasonable clarity, (2) the

Supreme Court or the Second Circuit has confirmed the existence of the right, and (3) a

reasonable defendant would have understood that his conduct was unlawful.” Radwan v.

Manuel, 55 F.4th 101, 114 (2d Cir. 2022) (quoting Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334, 345 (2d

Cir. 2011)). In conducting this analysis, I construe all factual disputes in Lipkin’s favor. See

Eaton, 144 F.4th at 94; Walker v. Schult, 45 F.4th 598, 617 (2d Cir. 2022) (“Any disputed

questions of material fact—such as the acts of the defendant and their effects on the plaintiff—

are to be determined by the factfinder.”).

George’s primary argument is that she is qualifiedly immune because it is not clearly

established how to analyze retaliation claims brought by the “employee of a municipal

contractor.” Def.’s Mem. 22. But as described above, CS-HHC was not a municipal contractor.

Because Lipkin’s employer cannot be classified as a government contractor, any uncertainty

in how to analyze such claims—if such uncertainty indeed exists—does not bear on whether

George is entitled to qualified immunity.

Indeed, resolving all disputed factual issues and drawing all inferences in Lipkin’s

favor, it is plain that clearly established law imposed liability in these circumstances. The Court

rejected George’s qualified immunity argument at the motion-to-dismiss stage, observing that

a “government official’s retaliation against a private citizen for engaging in constitutionally

protected speech is an infringement of the First Amendment right.” MTD Op., 2024 WL

1119958, at *6. At summary judgment, George does not make any attempt to meet her burden

to distinguish this record—viewed in the light most favorable to Lipkin—from the long line

of authority establishing that a public official cannot retaliate against a private citizen on

account of the citizen’s protected expression.13 See, e.g., Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250,

256 (2006) (“[T]he law is settled that as a general matter the First Amendment prohibits

government officials from subjecting an individual to retaliatory actions, including criminal

prosecutions, for speaking out.”); Sheppard v. Beerman, 94 F.3d 823, 827 (2d Cir. 1996)

(reiterating that First Amendment permits adverse employment action only when the protected

speech disrupts workplace); Beechwood Restorative Care Ctr. v. Leeds, 436 F.3d 147, 153-54

(2d Cir. 2006) (holding that employees of a regulatory agency can be liable under the First

Amendment for retaliating against a regulated entity); Royal Crown Day Care LLC v. Dep’t of

Health & Mental Hygiene of City of New York, 746 F.3d 538, 545 (2d Cir. 2014) (holding that

plaintiff’s “right[] to be free from retaliation” following protected speech was clearly

established); see also Clark v. Boughton, No. 3:21-CV-1372 (SRU), 2022 WL 4778582, at *16

(D. Conn. Oct. 3, 2022) (collecting cases in support of the proposition that the “rights to

criticize a public official, and to be free from retaliation for doing so, have long been protected

by the First Amendment”).

Moreover, in the First Amendment context, the Second Circuit has recognized that

qualified immunity is not available where (1) “specific intent of a defendant is an element of

plaintiff’s claim under clearly established law” and (2) a “plaintiff has adduced sufficient

13 As the Second Circuit recently explained, George’s argument here—that qualified immunity

attaches “because the relevant caselaw, persuasive as it may be, does not clearly bar the challenged

conduct”—requires courts to confront “the difficult question of whether the relevant factual

circumstances are truly ‘novel’ under existing precedent.” Vullo, 144 F.4th at 390. George’s

briefing does not confront the “difficult question” of identifying how competent evidence in the

record renders this case “truly novel.”

evidence of that intent to defeat summary judgment.” Mandell v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 316 F.3d

368, 385 (2d Cir. 2003); Sheppard v. Beerman, 94 F.3d 823, 828 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating that

qualified immunity is unavailable where a plaintiff shows “particularized evidence of direct or

circumstantial facts supporting his claim of unconstitutional motive”); see also Davi v. Guinn,

No. 16-CV-5060 (ERK) (PK), 2024 WL 2746940 (E.D.N.Y. May 29, 2024), at *11-12 (stating

that in the First Amendment retaliation context, “qualified immunity does not apply where

there is evidence that the defendants’ actual motive was to retaliate against the employee’s

speech rather than due to a concern about disruption”). Thus, qualified immunity should not

be granted on a First Amendment retaliation claim where a plaintiff has presented evidence of

a defendant’s retaliatory animus. Cecchini v. Schenck, No. 3:14-CV-1704 (MPS), 2017 WL

902849, at *16 (D. Conn. Mar. 7, 2017) (observing that qualified immunity was not appropriate

“[b]ecause the central issue here is the causal connection, i.e., retaliatory animus”).

George’s motive in writing her email—whether she wrote to Lipkin’s supervisors to

retaliate for Lipkin’s protected conduct or, as George maintains, to address Lipkin’s

inappropriate and unprotected workplace conduct—is a required element of Lipkin’s

retaliation claim. And, as noted throughout this opinion, Lipkin has adduced sufficient

evidence to create a triable issue of George’s motive. To wit: the record includes evidence

from which a jury could reasonably find that George’s email contained information that

George knew was untrue, which would support the inference that George sent the email with

the intent of retaliating for Lipkin’s protected expression. I therefore conclude from this record

that George is not entitled to summary judgment on Lipkin’s First Amendment claim.

B. State Law Claims

George also seeks judgment as a matter of law on Lipkin’s state law claims of

defamation per se and tortious interference with contractual relations. I conclude that triable

issues remain as to each claim.

1. Defamation Per Se

Lipkin asserts that George is liable for defamation per se by making false statements to

Lipkin’s supervisors at CS-HHC that injured Lipkin’s professional reputation. Am. Compl. 7.

George argues that the defamation claim fails as a matter of law because George was merely

expressing her opinion of Lipkin rather than purporting to assert objective facts. Def.’s Mem.

25-27.

“A defamatory statement is defined as a communication that tends to harm the

reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third

persons from associating or dealing with him. But it is not enough that the statement inflicts

reputational harm. To be actionable, the statement in question must convey an objective fact,

as generally, a defendant cannot be held liable for expressing a mere opinion.” NetScout

Systems, Inc. v. Gartner, Inc., 334 Conn. 396, 410 (2020) (citations and internal quotation

marks omitted). The Connecticut Supreme Court has identified several factors a court should

consider in analyzing whether a statement expressed an opinion or instead purported to convey

an objective fact. These include “(1) whether the general tenor of the entire work negates the

impression that the defendant was asserting an objective fact, (2) whether the defendant used

figurative or hyperbolic language that negates that impression, and (3) whether the statement

in question is susceptible of being proved true or false.” Id. at 413 (citation omitted). Even if

the distinction between fact and opinion can be “somewhat nebulous,” the Connecticut

Supreme Court has emphasized that the lodestar should be “whether ordinary persons hearing

or reading the matter complained of would be likely to understand it as an expression of the

speaker’s or writer’s opinion, or as a statement of existing fact.” Goodrich v. Waterbury

Republican-American, Inc., 188 Conn. 107, 112 (1982) (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted).

Lipkin’s briefing identifies several statements within George’s April 5 email that I

agree expressed facts rather than opinions. Pl.’s Mem. 17-18. For example, George’s email

reported that “Sarah proceeded to accuse the staff [at BHCare] of not doing their job. She

stated that every week when she came by she saw the staff doing nothing, so she wasn’t

surprised that they did not have a plan for the couple.” ECF No. 87-9, at 2. George also wrote

that, before the argument on March 29, 2022, “I had received several complaint[s] from the

staff about how disrespectful Sarah had been to both staff and clients.” Id. George also reported

that Lipkin had responded dismissively and engaged in “delay tactics” rather than attending to

the needs of an elderly patient. Id. at 2-3.

Each of these statements conveyed objective, falsifiable facts. I therefore agree that

these statements properly form the basis of a defamation claim. George’s motion for summary

judgment as to the defamation claim is accordingly denied.

2. Interference with Contractual Relations

Lipkin asserts that George tortiously interfered with Lipkin’s contractual employment

relationship. Am. Compl. 7.

“A claim for intentional interference with contractual relations requires the plaintiff to

establish: (1) the existence of a contractual or beneficial relationship; (2) the defendant’s

knowledge of that relationship; (3) the defendant’s intent to interfere with the relationship; (4)

that the interference was tortious; and (5) [that there was] a loss suffered by the plaintiff that

was caused by the defendant’s tortious conduct.” Sackman v. Quinlan, 198 Conn. App. 614,

628 (2020) (citation omitted).

George contends that Lipkin cannot satisfy the third, fourth, and fifth elements. Def.’s

Mem. 29-30. I disagree. Resolving all factual disputes in Lipkin’s favor, a reasonable jury

could conclude from George’s email that George published false statements with the intent of

causing Lipkin to lose their job at CS-HHC. Although George suggests her goal was not for

Lipkin to lose their job and testified that she wrote to CS-HHC “in hopes that we could sit

down and talk,” ECF No. 87-4, at 20, the jury could infer otherwise because George’s email

never requested a meeting. Moreover, a jury could conclude from the record that George

interfered tortiously insofar as her email included false statements about Lipkin’s

professionalism and medical skill.

Finally, a jury could permissibly find that this interference caused Lipkin’s employer

to terminate Lipkin’s contract for cause.

3. Qualified Privilege

Without conceding liability as to the state law claims, George argues her statements are

subject to the qualified privilege for statements made in the bona fide discharge of the

employee’s official duties. Def.’s Mem. 30-33.

“When considering whether a qualified privilege protects a defendant in a defamation

case, the court must resolve two inquiries. The first is whether the privilege applies, which is

a question of law . . . . The second is whether the applicable privilege nevertheless has been

defeated through its abuse, which is a question of fact.” Khan v. Yale Univ., 347 Conn. 1, 49

(2023) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “To establish a qualified privilege

defense, a defendant must prove five elements: ‘(1) an interest to be upheld, (2) a statement

limited in scope to this purpose, (3) good faith, (4) a proper occasion, and (5) a publication in

a proper manner to proper parties only.’” Cox v. Galazin, 460 F. Supp. 2d 380, 390 (D. Conn.

2006) (quoting Miles v. Perry, 11 Conn. App. 584, 595 (1987)). “As a general matter, a

qualified privilege in a defamation case may be defeated if it can be established that the holder

of the privilege acted with malice in publishing the defamatory material.” Gambardella v.

Apple Health Care, Inc., 291 Conn. 620, 630 (2009). “[M]alice is not restricted to hatred, spite

or ill will against a plaintiff, but includes any improper or unjustifiable motive.” Id. at 630

(quoting Bleich v. Ortiz, 196 Conn. 498, 504 (1985)). The “qualified privilege is lost upon a

showing of either actual malice, i.e., publication of a false statement with actual knowledge of

its falsity or reckless disregard for its truth, or malice in fact, i.e., publication of a false

statement with bad faith or improper motive.” Gambardella, 291 Conn. at 630 (emphasis in

original).

Resolving all disputed issues of fact and drawing all inferences in Lipkin’s favor, and

assuming for the sake of argument that the privilege applies, I nonetheless decline to apply the

privilege because I conclude that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that George made

her statements with malice. That is, a jury could conclude that George acted with actual malice

in sending an email that she knew or should have known contained false statements concerning

Lipkin’s professionalism. As material issues of fact remain on the applicability of the qualified

privilege, George’s motion for summary judgment as to both state law claims is denied.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Velma George’s Motion for Summary Judgment

is denied. The court will convene the parties for a scheduling conference to set deadlines for

trial submissions and to query the parties’ interest in a referral to a United States Magistrate

Judge to conduct a settlement conference.

SO ORDERED.

New Haven, Connecticut

March 31, 2026

/s/Sarah F. Russell

SARAH F. RUSSELL

United States District Judge