In re: A.N.

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute

controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with

the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA25-533

Filed 1 April 2026

Forsyth County, No. 23JT000115-330

IN THE MATTER OF: A.N.

Appeal by Respondent-Mother from Order entered 14 February 2025 by Judge

Thomas W. Davis, V, in Forsyth County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals

11 March 2026.

Lisa Noda for Respondent-Appellant Mother.

Monica M. McKinnie for Forsyth County Department of Social Services.

Michelle FormyDuval Lynch for Guardian ad litem.

HAMPSON, Judge.

Factual and Procedural Background

Respondent-Mother appeals from an Order terminating her parental rights in

Austin.1 The Record before us tends to reflect the following:

1 Pseudonym agreed upon by the parties.

IN RE: A.N.

Opinion of the Court

The minor child in this case was born on 20 June 2023. The juvenile was born

with a number of medical diagnoses, including Down Syndrome, a cardiac murmur,

and thyroid issues. On 27 June 2023, Forsyth County Department of Social Services

(DSS) filed a petition alleging the minor child was dependent and neglected, as

defined under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(9) and 7B-101(15). Specifically, the petition

alleged Respondent-Mother struggled to hold the minor child, feed him, and take his

temperature. The minor child was removed from Respondent-Mother’s care and

placed into the nonsecure custody of DSS that same day.

On 28 June 2023, a hearing was held pursuant to the nonsecure custody order.

Respondent-Mother was present at the hearing with her counsel and her Chapter 35

Guardian.2 Counsel for Respondent-Mother asked the trial court to appoint a Rule

17 Guardian ad litem for Respondent-Mother, “due to her having a Rule 35

Guardian.” The request was unopposed, and the trial court appointed a Rule 17

Guardian ad litem for Respondent-Mother.3 Additionally, the trial court continued

Austin in DSS custody and granted Respondent-Mother visits with him for one hour

per week.

Pursuant to an order entered 17 November 2023, Austin was adjudicated a

neglected and dependent juvenile. The trial court ordered Respondent-Mother to

2 Respondent-Mother was adjudicated incompetent and appointed a legal guardian pursuant

to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 35A et seq. on 26 April 2021.

3 See generally N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 17 (2025) (providing procedures for appointing a

Guardian ad litem for incompetent persons).

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IN RE: A.N.

Opinion of the Court

comply with a case plan created by DSS, which included: obtaining a mental health

assessment and following any accompanying recommendations, completing

parenting classes, attending a group counseling program, maintaining stable housing

and employment, completing a “Parenting Capacity and Psychological Evaluation”

and following any recommendations, submitting to random drug testing, and

attending visits with the minor child.

At the adjudication hearing, the legal father of the juvenile, through counsel,

requested to be released as a party to the matter, alleging he had been incarcerated

during the period of the juvenile’s conception and could not be the child’s biological

father. The trial court found the marital presumption of paternity had been rebutted,

allowed the motion, and released the juvenile’s legal father as a party to the

proceedings.

Respondent-Mother named Clarence Fields as Austin’s biological father.

Despite multiple attempts over the life of the case, DSS was unable to make contact

with Fields or determine his whereabouts, and his paternity was never established.

On 30 May 2024, DSS filed a Petition to terminate Respondent-Mother’s

parental rights in Austin. DSS alleged grounds existed to terminate Respondent-

Mother’s parental rights under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1), in that she had

neglected the juvenile, and under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(6), in that she was

incapable of providing for the proper care and supervision of the juvenile, there was

a reasonable probability that the incapability will continue for the foreseeable future,

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IN RE: A.N.

Opinion of the Court

and Respondent-Mother lacked an appropriate alternative child care arrangement.

Additionally, DSS petitioned the trial court to terminate Fields’ and—because

the identity of the minor child’s biological father was never established—the “John

Doe” father’s parental rights. Fields and “John Doe” were served with the Petition to

Terminate Parental Rights by publication on 25 July 2024, 1 August 2024, and 8

August 2024.

The termination hearings were held on 9 and 13 December 2024. In the

resulting Order, the trial court found Respondent-Mother had failed to comply with

her case plan:

16. The Respondent Mother, . . . has failed to complete the items

on her case plan in the following ways in order to rectify the issues

that led to the removal of the juvenile and facilitate reunification

of the juvenile in a safe home in that:

a. [DSS] Social Worker Pia Smalls transported

[Respondent-Mother] to Daymark Recovery Services to

complete a mental health assessment, which she did. The

recommendations from that assessment included that

[Respondent-Mother] was to obtain a psychiatric

evaluation and engage in medication management if

recommended by that evaluation. [Respondent-Mother]

did not follow the recommendations.

b. Social Worker Smalls scheduled and re-scheduled a

psychiatric evaluation for [Respondent-Mother] several

times however [Respondent-Mother] did not attend any of

the scheduled or re-scheduled appointments. Ms. Smalls

spoke with [Respondent-Mother] about why she missed the

appointments and [Respondent-Mother] could never

provide a reasonable excuse. She would simply state

something to the effect of her “being unable to make it.”

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IN RE: A.N.

Opinion of the Court

c. A psychiatric evaluation is required before a

recommendation for medication management can be made.

Because [Respondent-Mother] failed to complete a

psychiatric evaluation, it is unknown whether medication

management would have been recommended.

d. [Respondent-Mother] attended and completed the

Strengthening Families Parenting Class and had no issues

completing that class.

e. [Respondent-Mother] was not able to complete the

Seeking Safety Group because Daymark Recovery Services

was not offering this program therefore she would not have

been able to comply with this recommendation.

f. [Respondent-Mother] was living in a boarding home at

the time of the filing of the petition which was not a stable

residence.

g. Although [Respondent-Mother] receives Social Security

Disability Income she is permitted to work a limited

number of hours and still receive her disability income,

however [Respondent-Mother] is not working.

h. [Respondent-Mother] completed the Parenting Capacity

and Psychological Evaluation on January 16, 2024[,]

however she did not comply with the recommendations[,]

which included:

i. Complete a clinical assessment with someone who

works with individuals with developmental

disabilities to see if there might be services and

supports available to [Respondent-Mother] that

would help her live as independently as possible

because it was Dr. Bennett’s opinion that

[Respondent-Mother] did not have the skills

required to independently care for her then six-

month-old son. Her level of compression difficulty

and general cognitive level would place her son at

risk. [Respondent-Mother’s] history does not

support her capacity to proactively[,] safely[,] and

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IN RE: A.N.

Opinion of the Court

effectively care for a child.

ii. Obtain stable housing.

iii. Visitation with [Austin] should be with

supervision and support until [Respondent-Mother]

can demonstrate her capacity to safely and

effectively care for her child.

iv. Complete a domestic violence assessment based

on her reports to Social Worker Smalls that Clarence

Fields calls her “bitch” and pushed her on at least

one occasion to determine if there is domestic

violence or other issues that would pose a risk to

[Austin].

i. [Respondent-Mother] submitted to at least five drug

screens that were requested by [DSS]. She tested positive

for cocaine in January 2024. Subsequent tests were

negative for controlled substances.

j. [Respondent-Mother] visited regularly with [Austin]

throughout the underlying abuse, neglect and dependency

case. [Respondent-Mother] has benefited from the

assistance of a parenting coach, who has helped her

remember how to feed [Austin], hold him upright when

feeding due to his lack of abdominal muscle strength, and

comfort him when he is crying. However, [Respondent-

Mother’s] visits remain supervised with the assistance of a

parenting coach.

Additionally, the trial court found Respondent-Mother “is not capable of caring for

[Austin] on her own, especially considering his special needs.”

Based on its Findings, the trial court concluded grounds existed to terminate

Respondent-Mother’s parental rights in Austin under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1)

and (a)(6). The trial court also concluded grounds existed to terminate Fields’ and

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IN RE: A.N.

Opinion of the Court

“John Doe’s” parental rights in the minor child under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1),

(a)(5), and (a)(7).4

Respondent-Mother timely filed Notice of Appeal on 11 March 2025.

Issue

The issue on appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion by

appointing a Rule 17 Guardian ad litem for Respondent-Mother.

Analysis

Respondent-Mother’s sole argument on appeal is that the trial court abused its

discretion in appointing her a Rule 17 Guardian ad litem “without notice or

conducting an inquiry.”

“[T]rial court decisions concerning both the appointment of a guardian ad litem

and the extent to which an inquiry concerning a parent’s competence should be

conducted are reviewed on appeal using an abuse of discretion standard.” In re

T.L.H., 368 N.C. 101, 107, 772 S.E.2d 451, 455 (2015) (citing In re M.H.B., 192 N.C.

App. 258, 261, 664 S.E.2d 583, 585 (2008)). “An abuse of discretion results where the

court’s ruling is manifestly unsupported by reason or is so arbitrary that it could not

have been the result of a reasoned decision.” Id. (citation, quotation marks, and

brackets omitted).

“On motion of any party or on the court’s own motion, the court may appoint a

4 Neither Fields nor “John Doe” appealed the Termination Order. As such, we do not address

the Termination Order in any further detail as it relates to these parties.

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IN RE: A.N.

Opinion of the Court

guardian ad litem for a parent who is incompetent in accordance with G.S. 1A-1, Rule

17.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1101.1(c) (2025). An “incompetent adult” is one who

lacks sufficient capacity to manage the adult’s own affairs or to

make or communicate important decisions concerning the adult’s

person, family, or property whether the lack of capacity is due to

mental illness, intellectual disability, epilepsy, cerebral palsy,

autism, inebriety, senility, disease, injury, or similar cause or

condition. An adult or emancipated minor does not lack capacity

if, by means of a less restrictive alternative, he or she is able to

sufficiently (i) manage his or her affairs and (ii) communicate

important decisions concerning his or her person, family, and

property.5

Id. § 35A-1101(7) (2025). There is no express requirement the trial court conduct a

competency hearing before appointing a Guardian ad litem under either Section 7B-

1101.1 or Rule 17.

This Court recently published an opinion wherein we held the trial court

abused its discretion by appointing a Rule 17 Guardian ad litem for the respondent-

father without providing him with notice or an opportunity to be heard on the issue.

See In re A.T. & E.T., _ N.C. App. _, 923 S.E.2d 841 (2025). There, the trial court

appointed a Rule 17 Guardian ad litem for the respondent-father in an order

continuing a permanency planning review hearing. Id. at _, 923 S.E.2d at 845. On

appeal, we observed there was “no evidence on the Record that Respondent-Father

had any knowledge prior to the entry of the trial court’s Continuance Order that the

5 However, “an individual can simultaneously be found incompetent under Chapter 35A yet

not require a GAL under Rule 17.” In re Q.B., 375 N.C. 826, 837, 850 S.E.2d 898, 905 (2020) (footnote

omitted).

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IN RE: A.N.

Opinion of the Court

trial court was considering appointing a Rule 17 Guardian ad litem for him[ ]” and

held the trial court had abused its discretion by doing so.6 Id. at _, 923 S.E.2d at

846-47.

Here, Respondent-Mother was appointed a Rule 17 Guardian ad litem in a

nonsecure custody order, from which there is no statutory right of appeal. See N.C.

Gen. Stat. § 7B-1001(a)(4) (2025). Like the respondent-father in A.T., Respondent-

Mother apparently did not have the immediate opportunity to contest the trial court’s

decision. However, unlike in A.T. where the trial court’s decision to appoint a Rule

17 Guardian ad litem for the respondent-father appeared to be sua sponte, see _ N.C.

App. at _, 923 S.E.2d at 845, here it was Respondent-Mother’s own counsel who

requested Respondent-Mother be appointed a Rule 17 Guardian ad litem.

Additionally, Respondent-Mother was present at the hearing when her counsel

requested the appointment. Thus, there is Record evidence which tends to suggest

Respondent-Mother did, in fact, have notice of the trial court’s decision to appoint her

a Rule 17 Guardian ad litem.

Moreover, the trial court’s Findings of Fact, which are unchallenged by

Respondent-Mother and, consequently, binding on appeal, tend to support a

determination Respondent-Mother is incompetent for the purposes of Rule 17. For

6 Notably, DSS did not file a responsive brief in that case, and the juvenile’s Guardian ad litem,

conceding the respondent-father had not been adjudicated incompetent, did not present any argument

addressing whether the respondent-father had received adequate notice or an opportunity to be heard.

In re A.T., _ N.C. App. at _ n.7, 923 S.E.2d at 847 n.7.

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IN RE: A.N.

Opinion of the Court

instance, in the Termination Order, the trial court made comprehensive Findings

discussing the results of Respondent-Mother’s psychological evaluation, where her

“cognitive abilities, personality, substance abuse (if any), parenting relationships,

stress and memory” were assessed:

22. As part of the Parenting Capacity and Psychological

Evaluation[,] Dr. Bennett conducted a clinical interview with

[Respondent-Mother] to assess her cognitive abilities,

personality, substance abuse (if any), parenting relationships,

stress and memory. He also reviewed medical and Child

Protective Services records provided to him by [DSS]. He made

the following findings:

a. [Respondent-Mother’s] reading and comprehension level

was impaired enough that Dr. Bennett determined that

measures of her IQ and adaptive functioning would not be

reliable.

b. [Respondent-Mother] often understood Dr. Bennett’s

questions to mean the opposite of what he was asking.

c. [Respondent-Mother] has a mild intellectual disability

based on her General Intellectual Ability (GIA) score of 61.

Her score is equivalent to that of a person in second grade

who is eight (8) years old.

d. Her GIA score of 61 is at half of the first percentile (.5),

meaning that over 99% of people would score higher than

her. Her lowest cognitive functioning scores [were] in

verbal comprehension and general knowledge.

e. Her memory and long-term recall were impaired.

f. Dr. Bennett could not conduct assessments of her

personality and parent/child relationship quality because

her reading level was [s]o impaired that she could not read

and answer true/false questions.

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IN RE: A.N.

Opinion of the Court

g. Based on her cognitive functioning scores, Dr. Bennett

determined that [Respondent-Mother] is low functioning,

struggles to maintain regular employment, and has other

issues managing her day-to-day life without assistance.

h. At times[,] [Respondent-Mother] has made statements

that she appeared to believe were true but objectively were

not. For example, [Respondent-Mother] told Dr. Bennett

that she had been looking after [Austin] as the underlying

abuse, neglect and dependency case proceeded. However,

she never cared for [Austin] and had only exercised

supervised visitation with him. She also made conflicting

statements within the same clinical session with Dr.

Bennett about the status of her relationship with Clarence

Fields. At times telling him that they were together, that

they were not together and then that they were engaged to

be married.

i. [Respondent-Mother] never mentioned to Dr. Bennett

that [Austin] has Down Syndrome, special medical needs

or cognitive issues. [Respondent-Mother’s] explanation for

how [Austin] came to be in the care of [DSS] was that the

hospital nurses did not like her.

j. Dr. Bennett’s primary concerns about [Respondent-

Mother’s] ability to parent [Austin] without significant full-

time daily help were her lack of comprehension, lack of life

skills, and lack of awareness of [Austin’s] special needs.

Additionally, the trial court found Respondent-Mother had been formally adjudicated

incompetent, has “intellectual disability,” and had never demonstrated an ability to

care for Austin:

18. [Respondent-Mother] has never demonstrated an ability to

independently care for [Austin] in a home free of neglect.

....

23. [Respondent-Mother] has been declared a legally incompetent

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IN RE: A.N.

Opinion of the Court

adult who also has autism/intellectual disability. Sarah Lord was

appointed as Rule 35 Guardian for [Respondent-Mother].

[Respondent-Mother] receives services through the Arc of North

Carolina.

24. [Respondent-Mother] is not capable of caring for [Austin] on

her own, especially considering his special needs. Sarah Lord as

her guardian of the person nor the Arc of NC can help her care for

[Austin] on a day-to-day basis. There is no service available to

[Respondent-Mother] to assist her in caring for [Austin] full-time.

....

29. [Respondent-Mother] has no other person in her life, including

family members or her legal guardian, who can help her with the

full-time, day-to-day care of [Austin].

Further, “ ‘it is generally the appellant’s duty and responsibility to see that the

record is in proper form and complete and this Court will not presume error by the

trial court when none appears on the record to this Court.’ ” GEA, Inc. v. Luxury

Auctions Mktg., Inc., 259 N.C. App. 443, 453, 817 S.E.2d 422, 430 (2018) (quoting

King v. King, 146 N.C. App. 442, 445-46, 552 S.E.2d 262, 265 (2001)). Rather, “ ‘where

the record is silent on a particular point, we presume that the trial court acted

correctly.’ ” Id. (brackets omitted) (quoting Granville Med. Ctr. v. Tipton, 160 N.C.

App. 484, 488, 586 S.E.2d 791, 795 (2003)). Here, the parties did not include a copy

of the transcript from the hearing in which the trial court appointed the Rule 17

Guardian ad litem for Respondent-Mother. In fact, Respondent-Mother has produced

no evidence the trial court failed to give her notice or conduct an inquiry before

appointing her a Rule 17 Guardian ad litem. Thus, not only may it be inferred from

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IN RE: A.N.

Opinion of the Court

the Record that the trial court did provide Respondent-Mother with notice and make

any necessary inquiry, but we may also “presume that the trial court acted correctly.”

See id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). Therefore, we cannot say the trial

court abused its discretion in appointing a Rule 17 Guardian ad litem for Respondent-

Mother. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in appointing a Rule 17 Guardian ad

litem for Respondent-Mother.

Respondent-Mother has not challenged any of the Findings of Facts or

Conclusions of Law in the Termination Order. Consequently, we affirm the

Termination Order.

Conclusion

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s Order

terminating Respondent-Mother’s parental rights in Austin.

AFFIRMED.

Judges GRIFFIN and STADING concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).

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