LUFFMAN

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

KRISTI LUFFMAN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) 1:25-CV-942

)

YADKIN COUNTY BOARD OF )

EDUCATION, TODD MARTIN, in )

his individual capacity, JAMES )

FREDERICK SWAIM, in his )

individual capacity, and WAYNE O. )

DUGGINS, in his individual capacity, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Catherine C. Eagles, Chief District Judge.

Kristi Luffman worked for several years in various capacities in the Yadkin

County school system. After her contract was not renewed, she brought this lawsuit

asserting claims under state and federal law. Defendants Yadkin County Board of

Education, Todd Martin, and Wayne Duggins move to dismiss.1 Ms. Luffman fails to

state a state law claim for wrongful discharge and there is no private cause of action

under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115C-278.1, so those claims will be dismissed. Some claims will

be narrowed for clarity based on the statute of limitations. The motion will otherwise be

denied, as the defense arguments are better addressed on a more developed factual record.

1 The other defendant in this case, James Swaim, previously filed a motion to dismiss, which

was denied. See Doc. 31. For sake of simplicity, the Court will refer to the moving defendants

here as “the defendants.”

I. Rehabilitation Act and ADA Claims

A. Statute of Limitations

Ms. Luffman alleges that the defendants discriminated against her based on a

mental health disability. Doc. 17 at ¶¶ 174–77, 181–86. The parties disagree on what

statute of limitations applies, a question that appears to turn on whether the health

condition alleged would have been recognized as a disability protected by these laws in

1990.

Before December 1, 1990, the statute of limitations for these claims was

determined by reference to analogous state law. A Soc’y Without A Name v. Virginia, 655

F.3d 342, 347 (4th Cir. 2011); Boone v. Bd. of Governors of Univ. of N.C., 395 F. Supp.

3d 657, 666–67 (M.D.N.C. 2019). That year, Congress created a catch-all four-year

statute of limitations for any “civil action arising under an Act of Congress enacted after

[December 1, 1990],” 104 Stat. 5089, 5114–15 § 313 (1990) (codified as amended at 28

U.S.C. § 1658); see generally Boone, 395 F. Supp. 3d at 666. Included in the catch-all

statute of limitations are federal causes of action that existed before December 1, 1990,

but were amended after December 1, 1990, “if the plaintiff’s claim against the defendant

was made possible by a post-1990 enactment.” Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541

U.S. 369, 382–83 (2004); see Boone, 395 F.Supp.3d at 666–67. So for claims arising

under laws enacted before December 1, 1990, the shorter2 analogous state statute of

limitations, still applies. Latson v. Clarke, 249 F. Supp. 3d 838, 853–54 (W.D. Va. 2017).

2 The parties seem to agree that the applicable North Carolina statute of limitations for

employment-related claims is 180 days. Doc. 23 at 5; Doc. 28 at 13; see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 168A-

The Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008 greatly expanded

the scope of ADA and Rehabilitation Act coverage by significantly revising the definition

of “disability.” See generally Boone, 395 F. Supp. 3d at 667; EEOC v. Optimal Sols. &

Techs., Inc., 422 F. Supp. 3d 1037, 1043 (D. Md. 2019). As a result, some ADA and

Rehabilitation Act claims are limited by the shorter state law statute of limitations, while

others are limited by the newer 4-year statute of limitations. So here, the question is

whether Ms. Luffman’s disability discrimination claims could have been successful under

the laws in effect in 1990 or whether they could only proceed under the ADAAA

amendments.

The statute of limitations is an affirmative defense rarely appropriate for resolution

on the pleadings. Blenheim Cap. Holdings Ltd. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 53 F.4th 286,

298 (4th Cir. 2022). As alleged, it seems likely that Ms. Luffman would not have been

considered disabled under the original definition of “disability,” but that she may be

considered disabled under the 2008 amendments enacted in the ADAAA. See generally

Boone, 395 F. Supp. 3d at 667–68 (discussing narrow definition of “disabled” under law

in 1990 as compared to current law). Subject to discovery and an appropriate factual and

legal showing down the line, it appears that the four-year statute of limitations may well

apply. The motion to dismiss these claims as outside that window and subject to the

much shorter statute of limitations will be denied.

12; see Dickinson v. Univ. of N.C., 91 F. Supp. 3d 755, 763 (M.D.N.C. 2015) (“For Title II of the

ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the most analogous North Carolina law is the

North Carolina Persons with Disabilities Protection Act.” (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 168A-12)).

B. Rule 12(b)(6)

Ms. Luffman has alleged sufficient facts to assert a plausible claim that she was

retaliated against when she asserted her ADA rights by asking for an accommodation.

The Fourth Circuit and district courts in this circuit have held that a request for

reasonable accommodation is a protected activity. Haulbrook v. Michelin N. Am., 252

F.3d 696, 706 (4th Cir. 2001); Kelley v. Mayorkas, 694 F. Supp. 3d 715, 730 (E.D. Va.

2023); Kelly v. Town of Abingdon, 437 F. Supp. 3d 517, 528 (W.D. Va. 2020). The

motion to dismiss will be denied as to this claim.

II. Title VII

A. Statute of Limitations

Title VII requires employees to exhaust administrative remedies by presenting

discrimination claims to the EEOC before filing suit. See Balas v. Huntington Ingalls

Indus., Inc., 711 F.3d 401, 406 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)). The

charge must be “filed within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful

employment practice occurred.” Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101,

109 (2002) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1)); accord McClelland v. Hous. Auth. of

Wake, No. 22-CV-204, 2024 WL 4101476, at *13 (E.D.N.C. July 19, 2024).

Ms. Luffman alleges that she filed her EEOC charge on or about July 5, 2024.

Doc. 17 at ¶ 168; see Doc. 28-2 at 3. As Ms. Luffman implicitly acknowledges, Doc. 28

at 15, her Title VII claim is limited to acts of discrimination occurring on or after January

7, 2024. She has alleged such acts, see Doc. 17 at ¶¶ 87–166, so this aspect of her Title

VII claim can proceed.

Acts occurring outside the limitations period usually will not give rise to liability

themselves, but this does not mean that those factual allegations are irrelevant. First, they

can be used as background evidence. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 105. Second, so long as one

act that is part of a hostile work environment claim falls within the statutory period, all

acts are part of the same unlawful practice. Id. at 122. Ms. Luffman has alleged at least

one act of hostility within the 180-day period, and so the hostile work environment aspect

of her claim can proceed.

Otherwise, to the extent that her Title VII claim is based on acts of discrimination

before January 7, 2024, those aspects of her claim will be dismissed.

B. The Scope of the Charge

As the defendants accurately point out, “the scope of the plaintiff’s right to file a

federal lawsuit is determined by the charge’s contents.” Sydnor v. Fairfax Cnty, 681 F.3d

591, 593 (4th Cir. 2012). Yet their arguments that Ms. Luffman has included acts of

discrimination not mentioned in the charge are conclusory, constituting just a few

sentences. They point to over 50 paragraphs of the complaint without explaining which

parts of those paragraphs go beyond the EEOC charge. Doc. 23 at 9. The Court will not

do the defendants’ work for them. See Hughes v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., No. 12-CV-717,

2014 WL 906220, at *1 n.1 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 7, 2014) (“A party should not expect a court

to do the work that it elected not to do.”).

In any event, EEOC charges need not be as detailed as complaints initiating

lawsuits. Nor does a plaintiff have to lay out every single discriminatory act in the

charge. “So long as a plaintiff’s claims in her judicial complaint are reasonably related to

her EEOC charge and can be expected to follow from a reasonable administrative

investigation,” she may include those claims in her lawsuit. Sydnor, 681 F.3d at 594

(cleaned up). “Documents filed by an employee with the EEOC should be construed, to

the extent consistent with permissible rules of interpretation, to protect the employee’s

rights and statutory remedies.” Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 406

(2008). Construing ambiguities against a Title VII plaintiff would undercut the remedial

framework Congress intended. Id.

The defendants have not clearly identified any claim as to which Ms. Luffman has

not exhausted her administrative remedies. This aspect of the motion to dismiss will be

denied.

C. Rule 12(b)(6)

The defendants contend that Ms. Luffman has not stated a claim for sex

discrimination because the only adverse employment action is non-renewal of her

administrator contract. Even assuming that is so, it is not clear why that is not an adverse

employment action. See Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346, 354–55 (2024). Ms.

Luffman does not have to prove her case in the complaint, and she has asserted a

plausible claim for sex discrimination, both in terminating her employment and in

retaliating against her.

The motion to dismiss will be denied as to this claim.

III. Title IX claim

In her seventh cause of action, Ms. Luffman asserts that the Board violated her

rights under Title IX by retaliating against her for reporting allegations of sexual assault

and harassment of students. Doc. 17 ¶¶ 230–36. The defendants contend that she has

failed to state a plausible claim, but their arguments are factually based and better

addressed on a more developed record. The motion to dismiss will be denied as to this

claim.

In her brief, Ms. Luffman states that the defendants “do not argue that her Title IX

hostile work environment claim fails.” Doc. 28 at 22. To the extent she contends that she

has asserted such a claim outside the retaliation context, she is mistaken. As the

defendants correctly point out, Doc. 29 at 1, she has not alleged such a claim. The

complaint only lists the imposition of a hostile work environment as one of the forms of

retaliation the defendants took against Ms. Luffman after she engaged in protected Title

IX activity. Doc. 17 at ¶ 234.

IV. Tortious Interference with Contract

A. Statute of Limitations

As is relevant here, Ms. Luffman asserts a claim for tortious interference with

contract against defendants Martin and Duggins. Id. at ¶¶ 246–56.3 These defendants

contend that the statute of limitations for this claim is three years and move to dismiss

this claim to the extent it is based on their actions outside that time frame. Ms. Luffman

acknowledges that she can only proceed on this claim based on actions taken from June

2022 to the filing of the lawsuit, but she notes that events before that date may still be

relevant to prove her timely claims.

3 She has also asserted this claim against another defendant, whose separate motion to

dismiss was resolved by previous order. Doc. 31.

To the extent the complaint can be read to assert tortious interference claims based

on actions by these defendants before June 26, 2022, they will be dismissed. As

defendants acknowledge though, Ms. Luffman does allege at least one action after that

date, Doc. 23 at 8, and that claim is not barred by the statute of limitations.

B. Rule 12(b)(6)

Defendants Martin and Duggins contend that Ms. Luffman has not stated a claim

for tortious interference because they had a qualified privilege to interfere with her

contract as corporate fiduciaries of the Board. See Embree Constr. Grp. v. Rafcor, Inc.,

330 N.C. 487, 498, 411 S.E.2d 916, 924 (1992). But the very case the defendants cite for

that proposition refutes their position. In Embree Construction, the North Carolina

Supreme Court clarified that the qualified privilege of insiders depends on questions of

fact that “cannot be resolved on a motion to dismiss” and is an affirmative defense that a

plaintiff has no obligation to address in her complaint. Id. at 498–500. So whether the

defendants’ positions entitled them to a qualified privilege and whether their alleged

interference was for the Board’s benefit are questions that can only be answered on a

developed record. At this stage, Ms. Luffman has alleged sufficient facts to state a

plausible claim for tortious interference with contract.

The motion to dismiss will be denied as to this claim.

V. Section 115C-287.1 Claim

This provision of North Carolina law governs the “method of employment of

principals, assistant principals, supervisors, and directors.” In relevant part, it provides

that:

If a superintendent decides not to recommend that the local board of

education offer a new, renewed, or extended school administrator's contract

to the school administrator, the superintendent shall give the school

administrator written notice of his or her decision no later than May 1 of the

final year of the contract. The superintendent's reasons may not be arbitrary,

capricious, discriminatory, personal, political, or prohibited by State or

federal law. No action by the local board or further notice to the school

administrator shall be necessary unless the school administrator files with the

superintendent a written request, within 10 days of receipt of the

superintendent's decision, for a hearing before the local board. Failure to file

a timely request for a hearing shall result in a waiver of the right to appeal

the superintendent's decision. If a school administrator files a timely request

for a hearing, the local board shall conduct a hearing pursuant to the

provisions of G.S. 115C-45(c) and make a final decision on whether to offer

the school administrator a new, renewed, or extended school administrator's

contract.

If the local board decides not to offer the school administrator a new,

renewed, or extended school administrator's contract, the local board shall

notify the school administrator of its decision by June 1 of the final year of

the contract. A decision not to offer the school administrator a new, renewed,

or extended contract may be for any cause that is not arbitrary, capricious,

discriminatory, personal, political, or prohibited by State or federal law.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115C-287.1(d). The statute does not provide an explicit cause of action

or right to appeal a board’s decision in court. Ms. Luffman asserts that an implied cause

of action exists nonetheless. Doc. 17 at ¶ 258.

The North Carolina Supreme Court has not offered clear guidance on when a state

statute creates an implied cause of action, see United Daughters of the Confederacy v.

City of Winston-Salem ex rel. Joines, 383 N.C. 612, 637–38, 881 S.E.2d 32, 52 (2022),

but § 115C-287.1 seems an unlikely candidate. Until July 2017, N.C. Gen. Stat § 115C-

325(n) allowed for administrators to appeal decisions under § 115C-287.1 to state

superior court. See 2017-157 N.C. Sess. Laws at 11. The General Assembly’s decision to

eliminate an explicit cause of action weighs decisively against judicial recognition of an

implied cause of action. See Nello L. Teer Co. v. N.C. Dep’t of Transp., 175 N.C. App.

705, 710–11, 625 S.E.2d 135, 138–39 (2006) (“[I]f the legislature deletes specific words

or phrases from a statute, it is presumed that the legislature intended that the deleted

portion should no longer be the law.”).

Ms. Luffman contends that Abell v. Nash County Board of Education, 71 N.C.

App. 48, 321 S.E.2d 502 (1984), authorizes her implied cause of action. But Abell

merely noted (in conclusory fashion) the availability of an implied cause of action under

the now defunct § 115C-325(m)(2). See id. at 49. It said nothing about the provision at

issue here, § 115C-287.1, and it long predated the 2017 amendment to § 115C-325(n),

which eliminated the statutory right to appeal § 115C-287.1 decisions to state superior

court.

The motion to dismiss will be granted as to this claim.

VI. State Law Wrongful Discharge in Violation of Public Policy

In her second cause of action, Ms. Luffman asserts a claim against the Board for

wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. Doc. 17 at ¶¶ 189–193. The defendant

moves to dismiss, contending that this claim is only available to at-will employees, which

Ms. Luffman is not.

In her complaint, Ms. Luffman alleges that she is a contract employee with “career

status and tenure rights.” Id. at ¶¶ 16–17. Under North Carolina law, “the tort of

wrongful discharge arises only in the context of employees at will.” Wagoner v. Elkin

City Schs’ Bd. of Educ., 113 N.C. App. 579, 588, 440 S.E.2d 119, 125 (1994). Even

assuming that the defendants’ actions constituted an actual or constructive discharge, the

proper claim for a wrongfully discharged contract employee is breach of contract. Id.

The motion to dismiss will be granted as to this claim.

VII. Constitutional Claim

In her eleventh claim, Ms. Luffman asserts that the Board violated her rights under

the North Carolina constitution, Doc. 17 at ¶¶ 264–69, pleading this claim in the

alternative should “state law remedies prove to be inadequate by operation of

governmental immunity principles or otherwise.” Id. at ¶ 269. The defendants move to

dismiss, asserting that Ms. Luffman has adequate alternative remedies and that she has

not identified which of her state constitutional rights has been violated.

The complaint alleges that the Board’s actions violated her rights under Article I,

§ 1 (equality of rights and persons); Article I, § 15 (right to education); Article I, § 19

(law of the land and equal protection); and Article IX, § 1 (means of education

encouraged). Doc. 17 at ¶ 266. The defendants point to a number of federal statutes that

could provide alternative legal remedies for the alleged harms, but the question under

Corum is whether there is an adequate state remedy, not whether there is an adequate

federal remedy. See Corum v. Univ. of N.C. ex rel. Bd. of Governors, 330 N.C. 761, 782,

413 S.E.2d 276, 289 (1992).

The defendants do note that the North Carolina Persons with Disabilities

Protection Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 168a-1 through 168a-12, could provide an alternative

state remedy, but they make no effort to explain why that is so. As the moving parties,

the defendants bear the burden of demonstrating the insufficiency of the complaint. It is

not the Court’s job to undertake the analysis and legal research needed to support a

perfunctory argument. See Lab’y Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Kearns, 84 F. Supp. 3d 447,

459–60 (M.D.N.C. 2015).

The motion to dismiss will be denied as to the Corum claim.

VIII. Conclusion

The plaintiff’s amended complaint alleges a panoply of federal and state law

claims arising out of her employment with the Yadkin County Board of Education. The

defendants have responded in kind, taking something of an “everything but the kitchen

sink” approach in their motion to dismiss. But most of the defendants’ arguments are

better addressed with the benefit of discovery and a complete factual record.

It is ORDERED that:

1. The motion to dismiss the amended complaint filed by defendants Yadkin

County Board of Education, Todd Martin, and Wayne Duggins, Doc. 22, is

GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as follows:

a. GRANTED as to the plaintiff’s state law wrongful discharge and

§ 115C-287.1 claims;

b. GRANTED to the extent her Title VII claim is based on acts of

discrimination occurring before January 7, 2024, but DENIED as to

alleged acts of discrimination occurring thereafter, including her

hostile work environment claim;

c. GRANTED to the extent the complaint can be read to assert

tortious interference claims based on actions by these defendants

before June 26, 2022, but DENIED as to alleged actions taken on or

after that date; and

d. DENIED as to her Rehabilitation Act, ADA, Title [X, and Corum

claims.

2. The motions to dismiss at Docs. 12 and 14 are directed to the original

complaint and are DENIED as moot.

This the 31st day of March, 2026.

UNITED STATES DIS ST JUDGE

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