The opinion
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-12989
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CARLOS TEJEDA,
JUAN TEJEDA,
PEDRO SERGIO PELAEZ GUTIERREZ,
a.k.a. Pedro Pelaez,
Defendants-Appellants.
____________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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2 Opinion of the Court 23-12989
D.C. Docket No. 2:22-cr-00036-SPC-NPM-1
____________________
Before NEWSOM and LUCK, Circuit Judges and LEIBOWITZ, ∗ District
Judge
PER CURIAM:
Pedro Sergio Pelaez Gutierrez (“Pelaez”), Carlos Tejeda
(“Carlos”), and Juan Tejeda (“Juan”)1 were tried, convicted, and sen-
tenced for conspiracy to commit wire fraud, wire fraud, aggra-
vated identity theft, and related offenses. Each defendant raises
separate issues on appeal: Pelaez challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence for his convictions; Carlos appeals his sentence as substan-
tively unreasonable; and Juan appeals the application of a
three-level enhancement to his offense level under U.S.S.G.
§ 3B1.1(b) for acting as a manager or supervisor in criminal activity
involving five or more participants based on his role in the fraud
scheme. We reject each argument, and, accordingly, AFFIRM each
conviction and sentence.
∗ Honorable David S. Leibowitz, United States District Judge for the Southern
District of Florida, sitting by designation.
1 Carlos and Juan have the same last name, so we refer to them by their first
names.
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23-12989 Opinion of the Court 3
I
A
Carlos—the mastermind behind the operation—hatched a
scheme whereby he and his friends (“the participants”) would (1)
register fake businesses with the Florida Department of State Divi-
sion of Corporations, (2) open bank accounts and buy credit card
machines in the names of those businesses, (3) steal credit card in-
formation and attach it to their own homemade cards, (4) swipe
those fake cards at the credit card terminals, and (5) deposit the
proceeds of those transactions into the bank accounts. Carlos
would bring the counterfeit credit cards to the participants and
swipe them on the credit card terminals, usually for a 40 percent
kickback.
Juan—the IT whiz and Carlos’s son—would construct the
counterfeit cards and encode them with the stolen credit card in-
formation. On occasion, he would visit the participants and swipe
the counterfeit cards on the credit card machines, just like Carlos.
Various participants testified that Carlos and Juan were the go-to
guys handling the day-to-day fraud. When agents searched Juan’s
apartment, they found plastic cards with a black magnetic stripe on
the back, an encoder with which to write data onto magnetic
stripes, and counterfeit credit cards.
Pelaez was a participant in the fraud scheme. He registered
the business Pelaez Trucking Repair and recruited his wife, Estevez,
and his son, Leader, both of whom in turn incorporated their own
businesses. All of these participants would give Carlos 40 percent
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4 Opinion of the Court 23-12989
of the transaction proceeds. While executing a search warrant on
Pelaez Trucking Repair’s named address, an agent observed Pelaez
holding a briefcase, which contained two point-of-sale terminals
and receipts. One receipt showed a card transaction in the amount
of $1,285.14, but had neither a customer signature nor a card-
holder’s name. Upon searching Pelaez, the agent found eight credit
or debit cards—issued personally to Pelaez or Pelaez Trucking Re-
pair—for four separate banks. Various other similar receipts were
also seized from Pelaez’s home.
B
A federal grand jury charged Pelaez, Carlos, and Juan with
conspiracy to commit wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349
(Count 1); wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 2
(Counts 2–30) 2; aggravated identity theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1028A(a)(1) and 2 (Counts 31–41) 3; and conspiracy to commit
money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) (Count 42).
Carlos and Juan were additionally charged with production of
counterfeit access devices, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1029(a)(1),
(c)(1), and 2 (Count 43) and possession of device-making equip-
ment, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1029(a)(4), (c)(2), and 2 (Count
44). The case then proceeded to trial.
At the close of the government’s evidence, Pelaez moved for
a judgment of acquittal and argued that the evidence was
2 Pelaez was charged only in counts 8, 9, 13, 14, 17, and 18.
3 Pelaez was charged only in counts 33, 35, 36, and 42.
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insufficient to sustain a conviction. The court denied the motion,
determining that—viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the government—there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable
jury to conclude that Pelaez was guilty of each and every element
of the criminal charges against him beyond a reasonable doubt.
The jury convicted him on Counts 1, 8, 9, 13, 14, 17, 18, 33, 35, 36,
and 42. Pelaez did not object to his PSR, and was sentenced to 72
months’ imprisonment and three years of supervised release.
The jury convicted Carlos and Juan on Counts 1–44. At sen-
tencing, their PSRs reported that Carlos and Juan orchestrated
large-scale credit and debit card fraud by recruiting and directing
their friends to create fictitious companies, open bank accounts for
those shell companies, apply for integrated merchant processing
services for the companies, and obtain credit card point-of-sale ter-
minals. The PSRs further reported that during the course of the
defendants’ criminal conduct, hundreds of victims were de-
frauded.
The probation officer calculated their base offense level at 29
for Counts 1–30 and 42–44, consistent with U.S.S.G. §§ 2S1.1(a)(1)
and 2B1.1(a)(1). Among other enhancements to the base level, and
pursuant to § 3B1.1(a), the officer added four levels to the base level
because Carlos and Juan were the organizers or leaders of criminal
activity that involved five or more participants or was otherwise
extensive. The result was a total offense level of 35 and a criminal
history category of I; the PSRs calculated a guideline range of 168
to 210 months’ imprisonment for Counts 1-30 and 42-44, and a
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consecutive term of the minimum term of imprisonment required
by statute per count.
Juan objected to the four-level managerial enhancement, ar-
guing that he was not an organizer but was simply recruited by his
father. The government partially agreed, arguing that a three-level
enhancement for being a “manager or supervisor” was more ap-
propriate. The sentencing court agreed with the government, ap-
plying a three-level enhancement and sentencing Juan to 180
months’ imprisonment and three years of supervised release.
Carlos filed a sentencing memorandum requesting that the
court apply a downward variance based on his lack of criminal his-
tory, his age, and the limited victim impact. The court declined the
downward variance, but imposed an imprisonment term at the bot-
tom of his guideline range. He was sentenced to 192 total months’
imprisonment and three years of supervised release.
II
First, Carlos. We review the substantive reasonableness of a
sentence under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard consider-
ing the totality of the circumstances. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.
38, 51 (2007). In reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence, we
will not substitute our own judgment for that of the district court
and will “affirm a sentence so long as the court’s decision was in
the ballpark of permissible outcomes.” United States v. Butler, 39
F.4th 1349, 1355 (11th Cir. 2022) (quotation marks omitted). Fur-
ther, “ordinarily we would expect a sentence within the Guidelines
range to be reasonable.” United States v. Sarras, 575 F.3d 1191, 1219
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(11th Cir. 2009) (citation modified). The “party challenging the
sentence bears the burden of showing it is unreasonable.” United
States v. Boone, 97 F.4th 1331, 1338–39 (11th Cir. 2024).
Although the district court is required to consider all rele-
vant § 3553(a) factors, “the weight given to each factor is commit-
ted to the sound discretion of the district court,” and the court may
attach great weight to one factor over the others. Butler, 39 F.4th at
1355. The court need not explicitly state on the record that it has
considered all the factors or expressly discuss each of them. United
States v. Robles, 408 F.3d 1324, 1328 (11th Cir. 2005). Moreover, the
court’s failure to discuss mitigating evidence does not indicate that
the court “erroneously ‘ignored’ or failed to consider this evi-
dence.” United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823, 833 (11th Cir. 2007).
Carlos’s guidelines range, which he does not contest, was
168 to 210 months on counts 1–30 and 42–44, and 24 months con-
secutive for counts 31–41. After properly considering the 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) factors, the court sentenced Carlos to 168 months’ impris-
onment for counts 1–30, 42, and 44, a concurrent term of 120
months for count 43, and a consecutive term of 24 months’ impris-
onment for counts 31–41, followed by three years of supervised re-
lease. The judge specified that this bottom-of-the-guidelines range
accounts for the both the seriousness of the offense but also the
defendant’s “age and lack of prior criminal history.”
Because the 192-month sentence imposed on Carlos is rea-
sonable given his offense, within the guidelines range, and reflects
consideration of the § 3553(a) factors, it is substantively reasonable.
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III
Next, Juan. As a reminder, he challenges the application of
a three-level sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b) for
being a manager or supervisor. With respect to the district court’s
findings with respect to Guidelines issues, we review legal issues de
novo, factual findings for clear error, and the court’s application of
the Guidelines to the facts with “due deference,” which is akin to
clear-error review. United States v. Rothenberg, 610 F.3d 621, 624
(11th Cir. 2010). We review the district court’s imposition of an
aggravating role enhancement for clear error. United States v.
Shabazz, 887 F.3d 1204, 1222 (11th Cir. 2018). Under this deferential
standard, “we will not disturb a district court’s findings unless we
are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed.” United States v. Clarke, 562 F.3d 1158, 1165 (11th Cir.
2009) (citation modified).
Under § 3B1.1(b), the three-level increase for a managerial or
supervisory role applies if (1) the defendant was a manager or su-
pervisor but not an organizer or leader; and (2) the criminal activity
involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive.
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b). Juan does not contest that the scheme involved
five or more participants. To qualify for the three-level increase,
then, the government was required to prove only that he managed
or supervised one other participant involved in the criminal of-
fense. United States v. Sosa, 777 F.3d 1279, 1301 (11th Cir. 2015).
A sentencing court assesses seven factors to distinguish be-
tween leaders or organizers and managers or supervisors: (1) the
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exercise of decision-making authority, (2) the nature of participa-
tion in the commission of the offense, (3) the recruitment of ac-
complices, (4) the claimed right to a larger share of the fruits of the
crime, (5) the degree of participation in planning or organizing the
offense, (6) the nature and scope of the illegal activity, and (7) the
degree of control and authority exercised over others. U.S.S.G.
§ 3B1.1 cmt.4. But “[t]here is no requirement that all the consider-
ations have to be present in any one case.” United States v. Ramirez,
426 F.3d 1344, 1356 (11th Cir. 2005). Instead, “these factors are
merely considerations for the sentencing judge, who makes the fac-
tual determinations for the applicability of the § 3B1.1 enhance-
ment on a case-by-case basis.” Id.
Juan exercised control over two participants—Maida Flores
and Walter Flores. The Floreses testified that they “dealt directly
with Juan,” such as by paying him kickbacks from the proceeds of
the frauds. Also, he would come to their house—in place of his
father—to swipe counterfeit credit cards on their machines. He ar-
gues that his role was more akin to the “IT guy” rather than the
President or CEO of the operation, but that implicates the second
guidelines factor—the nature of his participation in the offense.
His commitment to the technological aspect of the operation as
the “IT guy” shows he was acting as a manager with an established
role in the crime, because he—in essence—ran the IT Department.
Here, the district court did not err in applying the three-level
enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b) because Juan dealt directly
with his co-conspirators, swiped fraudulent credit cards on his
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co-conspirators’ payment terminals, and received cash kickbacks
from the fraudulent transactions.
IV
Lastly, we consider Pelaez’s challenge to the sufficiency of
the evidence for his convictions for conspiracy to commit wire
fraud, wire fraud, and aggravated identity theft. Ordinarily,
“we . . . review de novo challenges to the sufficiency of the evi-
dence. United States v. Zitron, 810 F.3d 1253, 1260 (11th Cir. 2016).
But here, Pelaez made only a general objection to the sufficiency
of the evidence below, and only specified his objections for the first
time on appeal. We have never held that making a general objec-
tion to the sufficiency of the evidence preserves more specific ar-
guments on appeal, and we needn’t do so today. See United States v.
Tovar, 146 F.4th 1318, 1325 n.3 (11th Cir. 2025). Under either plain
error or de novo review, Pelaez has failed to show that the district
court erred.
We will uphold the district court’s denial of a motion for
judgment of acquittal “if a reasonable trier of fact could conclude
that the evidence establishes the defendant’s guilt beyond a reason-
able doubt.” United States v. Holmes, 814 F.3d 1246, 1250 (11th Cir.
2016) (citation modified). We view the evidence and draw all rea-
sonable inferences and credibility choices in the light most favora-
ble to the government. United States v. Gamory, 635 F.3d 480, 497
(11th Cir. 2011). The evidence need not “exclude every reasonable
hypothesis of innocence” in order for a reasonable jury to find guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt, and the jury is free to choose among
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alternative, reasonable interpretations of the evidence. United
States v. Cruz-Valdez, 773 F.2d 1541, 1545 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc).
To establish conspiracy to commit wire fraud under 18
U.S.C. § 1349, “the government must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt (1) that a conspiracy [to commit wire fraud] existed; (2) that
the defendant knew of it; and (3) that the defendant, with
knowledge, voluntarily joined it.” United States v. Vernon, 723 F.3d
1234, 1273 (11th Cir. 2013) (quotation marks omitted). “Because
the crime of conspiracy is predominantly mental in composition,
it is frequently necessary to resort to circumstantial evidence to
prove its elements.” United States v. Watkins, 42 F.4th 1278, 1285
(11th Cir. 2022) (citation modified). The “government need not
prove that the defendant knew all of the details or participated in
every aspect of the conspiracy.” Id. (citation modified). “Rather,
the government must only prove that the defendants knew the es-
sential nature of the conspiracy.” United States v. Garcia, 405 F.3d
1260, 1270 (11th Cir. 2005) (citation modified).
The record evidence shows that Pelaez registered his own
shell business, opened bank accounts in that company’s name, and
conducted fraudulent credit card transactions with stolen credit
card information. When he was searched pursuant to a warrant,
the contents of his briefcase contained a credit card terminal and
receipts for fraudulent transactions. Additionally, Pelaez roped his
son and wife into the plan and was present when Carlos explained
the scheme to them. This is more than enough evidence to
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establish that the government introduced sufficient evidence for a
jury to convict Pelaez for conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt.
To establish wire fraud, a person must “(1) intentionally par-
ticipate in a scheme or artifice to defraud another of money or
property and (2) use or cause the use of the mails or wires for the
purpose of executing the scheme or artifice.” Watkins, 42 F.4th at
1282 (citation modified). A “defendant intends to defraud when he
‘attempt[s] to obtain, by deceptive means, something to which he
was not entitled.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Bradley, 644 F.3d
1213, 1240 (11th Cir. 2011)). “A jury may infer an intent to defraud
from the defendant’s conduct.” Bradley, 644 U.S. at 1239 (citation
modified).
Just as above, Pelaez registered his company with the pur-
pose of joining Carlos’s scheme to conduct fraudulent credit card
transactions through the use of credit card terminals and by swip-
ing fraudulent credit cards. Moreso, he involved his son and his
wife so they could also profit from this scheme. This clearly shows
his intent to participate in the scheme. Further, police found
point-of-sale terminals at Pelaez’s home as well as receipts from the
fraudulent transactions. Pelaez argues that it was Carlos who mas-
terminded the operation and that Carlos was usually the person
actually swiping the cards through the credit card terminals, but we
have held that “a defendant may be convicted of wire fraud with-
out personally committing each and every element of wire fraud,
so long as [he] knowingly and willfully joined the criminal scheme,
and a co-schemer used the wires for the purpose of executing the
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scheme.” Watkins, 42 F.4th at 1284 (citation modified). The jury
had plenty of evidence to convict Pelaez of wire fraud.
To establish aggravated identity theft under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1028A(a)(1), the government must prove “that the defendant: (1)
knowingly transferred, possessed, or used; (2) the means of identi-
fication of another person; (3) without lawful authority; (4) during
and in relation to a felony enumerated in § 1028A(c).” United States
v. Barrington, 648 F.3d 1178, 1192 (11th Cir. 2011) (citation modi-
fied). Wire fraud is an enumerated felony in § 1028A(c). 18 U.S.C.
§ 1028A(c)(5). Pelaez concedes, or does not dispute on appeal, that
the credit card information was used without authorization. He
contests only prongs 1 and 4—i.e., (1) that the government did not
produce any direct evidence that Pelaez knew that the credit card
information belonged to real people and (4) that he did not commit
a felony because he did not commit wire fraud. Because we held
above that the jury had a sufficient amount of evidence to convict
Pelaez for wire fraud, supra at 13–14, we need only consider his
mens rea.
Leader—Pelaez’s son—testified that he quickly learned that
the cards contained stolen information. Because Pelaez brought
Leader into the scheme and was present when Carlos explained it
to Leader, it was reasonable for the jury to assume that Pelaez also
knew the source of the credit card information. Also, Pelaez stole
hundreds of thousands of dollars over the course of more than 350
transactions; some transactions were conducted twice in the same
day using the same credit card information. A natural inference is
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14 Opinion of the Court 23-12989
that Pelaez ran the credit card information, and once he knew that
the transaction was successful, ran it again. Because knowledge
can be inferred based on circumstantial evidence, see United States
v. Gomez-Castro, 605 F.3d 1245, 1249 (11th Cir. 2010), a jury could
impute knowledge based on the above-described evidence.
The district court did not err in denying Pelaez’s motions for
judgment of acquittal because a reasonable trier of fact could find
Pelaez guilty of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, guilty of wire
fraud, and guilty of aggravated identity theft. We affirm his con-
viction.
V
In sum, we reject each of the defendants’ challenges and
AFFIRM their convictions and sentences.4
4 This appeal was originally scheduled for oral argument, but the panel unani-
mously agreed to remove it from the oral argument calendar under 11th Cir-
cuit Rule 34-3(f).