Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

NEW CINGULAR WIRELESS, CIVIL ACTION

PCS, LLC

VERSUS

LIVINGSTON PARISH, NO. 25-00714-BAJ-RLB

LOUISIANA, ET AL.

RULING AND ORDER

Before the Court is Defendants Livingston Parish, the Livingston Parish

Government, the Livingston Parish Council, and Randy Delatte, in his official

capacity as Parish President's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings On

Defense of Untimeliness (Doc. 18). Plaintiff New Cingular Wireless, PCS, LLC

d/b/a AT&T Mobility “AT&T), opposes the Motion. (Doc. 15). Defendant filed a Reply

Memorandum. (Doc. 19). Plaintiff filed a Sur-reply. (Doc. 238). For the following

reasons, Defendant’s Motion is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case arises out of Defendants’ denial of a zoning variance permit Plaintiff

sought to construct a cell phone tower in Livingston Parish. (Doc. 21 at 1-2). Plaintiff

alleges Defendants improperly denied their permit application because it “was not

supported by substantial evidence contained in a written record,” among other

reasons, in violation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)

(‘the TCA”). (Doc. 1 at 2). Plaintiff seeks declaratory judgment and “an injunction

requiring Defendants to issue the appropriate approvals to allow for the construction

of the proposed telecommunications tower”. (Doc. 23 at 8). Plaintiff alleges the

following facts relevant to the instant Motion.

Plaintiff submitted its permit application to Defendants on November 4, 2024.

(Doc. 1 at □ 50). On March 6, 2025, the Planning Commission held a hearing and

unanimously voted to forward Plaintiffs application to the Parish Council

conditioned on Plaintiff acquiring some additional documents. (/d. at § 58). On June

12, 2025, the Parish Council held a meeting and, after much discussion, orally denied

Plaintiffs application. Ud. at 9 59-68; Doc. 23 at 2-3). Plaintiff alleges that the

minutes from this meeting were approved on July 10, 2025, and “do not provide

reasons for the denial of the [a]pplication” as required by the TCA. Ud. at 4] 69, 71).

Plaintiff filed suit in this Court on August 8, 2025. (Doc. 1). Defendants now

move for judgment on the pleadings, asking the Court to find that Plaintiffs suit is

time-barred. (Doc. 138 at 1). For the following reasons, the Motion will be DENIED.

Il. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) provides that “[a]fter the pleadings are

closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the

pleadings.” A motion brought pursuant to Rule 12(c) is designed to “dispose of cases

where the material facts are not in dispute and a judgment on the merits can be

rendered by looking to the substance of the pleadings and any judicially noticed facts.”

Great Plains Tr. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305, 312

(5th Cir. 2002) (citing Hebert Abstract Co. v. Touchstone Props., Ltd., 914 F.2d 74, 76

(5th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (citing 5A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller,

Federal Practice and Procedure § 1867, at 509-10 (1990)). “[T]he central issue is

whether, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the complaint states a valid claim

for relief.” Great Plains Tr. Co., 313 F.3d at 312 (internal citations omitted).

“Pleadings should be construed liberally, and judgment on the pleadings is

appropriate only if there are no disputed issues of fact and only questions of law

remain.” Id. (internal citations omitted). “The [district] court may dismiss a claim

when it is clear that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that

would entitle him to relief.” Id. (citing Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.8d 322, 324

(5th Cir. 1999) (per curiam); Fee v. Herndon, 900 F.2d 804, 807 (5th Cir. 1990)).

“In analyzing the complaint, [the Court] will accept all well-pleaded facts as

true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Jd. at 312-13 (internal

citations omitted). The Court will not, however, “accept as true conclusory allegations

or unwarranted deductions of fact.” Jd. at 313 (citing Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean

Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 2000) (addressing Rule 12(b)(6) standard))

(quoting Tuchman v. DSC Comm. Corp., 14 F.3d 1061, 1067 (5th Cir. 1994)). “The

issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether he is entitled

to offer evidence to support his claim. Thus, the court should not dismiss the claim

unless the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any set of facts or any possible

theory that he could prove consistent with the allegations in the complaint.” Id.

(internal citations omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants’ Motion asks the Court to dismiss Plaintiffs suit because “the

action complained of occurred on June 12, 2025,” and Plaintiff's Complaint (Doc. 1)

was filed on August 8, 2025, which Defendants argue is not “within the 30 day period

allowed to bring a claim under [the TCA]”. (Doc. 13 at 1). Plaintiff opposes the Motion,

arguing that “the thirty-day deadline for filing suit in this matter began to run July

10, 2025, the date the Parish Council adopted and published the minutes from the

June 12, 2025 Parish Council meeting” and thus its Complaint is timely filed. (Doc.

15 at 2).

Essentially, the Court must determine the relevant date that triggers the

thirty-day statute of limitations to file a claim pursuant to the TCA. The relevant

statutory language states:

Gii) Any decision by a State or local government or instrumentality

thereof to deny a request to place, construct, or modify personal wireless

service facilities shall be in writing and supported by substantial

evidence contained in a written record.

(v) Any person adversely affected by any final action or failure to act

by a State or local government or any instrumentality thereof that is

inconsistent with this subparagraph may, within 30 days after such

action or failure to act, commence an action in any court of competent

jurisdiction. The court shall hear and decide such action on an expedited

basis.

47 U.S.C. §§ 332(c)(7)(B) (iii), 332(c)(7)(B)(v) (emphasis added).

The Parties appear to dispute what is the relevant final action. (Doc. 13-1; Doc.

15 at 4). However, this is a settled question of law. T-Mobile S., LLC v. City of Roswell,

Ga., 574 U.S. 293, 305 n.4 (2015) (‘The relevant ‘final action’ is the issuance of the

written notice of denial.”); see also Preferred Sites, LLC v. Troup Cnty., 296 F.3d 1210,

1217 (11th Cir. 2002) (“The ‘final action’ which triggers the running of the 30-day

statute of limitations, therefore, is the state or local authority's issuance of its

decision in writing.”); New Cingular Wireless PCS, LLC v. City of Jennings, 2023 WL

6209078, at *2 (W.D. La. Sept. 22, 2023) (“Under the TCA, ‘[t]he relevant ‘final action’

is the issuance of the written notice of denial ....” (internal citations omitted)).

The TCA requires that any decision denying a request to build “personal

wireless service facilities,” such as the cell phone tower Platiniff seeks to construct,

be in writing, full stop. 47 U.S.C. §§ 332(c)(7)(B)@ii). Plaintiff alleges that the only

writing denying the permit Plaintiff sought was the minutes from the June 12, 2025

Parish Council meeting, which were not published until July 10, 2025. (Doc. 15 at 4).

Defendants fail to point to any other writing that could plausibly satisfy the statute’s

requirements. The publication of the minutes is thus the relevant final action and

July 10, 2025, is the date upon which the statute of limitations began to run, making

Plaintiffs Complaint timely. Athens Cellular, Inc. v. Oconee Cnty., Georgia, 886 F.3d

1094, 1107 (11th Cir. 2018) (holding that the statute of limitations under the TCA

began to run once the relevant local board approved the minutes of the meeting at

which the vote was taken). Defendants cite no case law for their contention otherwise,

nor do they appear to dispute the date upon which the meeting minutes were adopted

or published. Defendants later attempt to argue in their Reply brief that the TCA is

not the applicable law. (Doc. 19 at 1). This argument not only falls flat but, as Plaintiff

points out, must be disregarded. See, e.g., Dugas v. Vannoy, 2023 WL 8244288, at *1

n.2 (M.D. La. Nov. 28, 2028) (citing Little Tchefuncte River Ass’n v. Artesian Utility

Company, Inc., 155 F. Supp. 3d 637, 657 (E.D. La. Dec. 11, 2015) (“[A]rguments

cannot be raised for the first time in a reply brief.”)).

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the

Pleadings on Defense of Untimeliness (Doc. 18) is DENIED.

Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this 30 y of March, 2026

Ao

JUDGE BRIAN A. JA ON

UNITED STATES DIS'PRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA