Courtney

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

ERIC COURTNEY, ET AL. CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

THE CITY OF WALKER,

LOUISIANA, ET AL. NO. 25-00280-BAJ-RLB

RULING AND ORDER

Before the Court is Defendants Blake Cavalier, the City of Walker, Louisiana,

and David Addison’s Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Complaint (Doc. 12).

Plaintiffs oppose the Motion. (Doc. 14). Defendants filed a Reply Brief. (Doc. 16). For

the reasons stated herein, Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED IN PART and

DENIED IN PART.

I. BACKGROUND

This case arises out of the alleged excessive force officers used on Plaintiff

Eric Courtney, and Courtney’s ultimate alleged false arrest, after officers responded

to a drowning incident at his home. (Doc. 1). Plaintiffs Sarah and Eric Courtney allege

the following.

On April 5, 2024, Sarah Courtney awoke in the early morning hours. (Id. ¶ 5).

She immediately began looking for her young son. (Id.). Sarah Courtney woke her

husband, Eric Courtney, to help her search their home for their child. (Id.). After

noticing the back door open, Plaintiffs found their son’s lifeless body floating in their

swimming pool. (Id.). Plaintiffs immediately called 911. (Id.).

Several police officers responded to the emergency call at the Courtney home.

(Id. ¶ 6). An officer took the Courtneys’ son from Eric Courtney, exited the backyard

with the minor child, and transported him to a nearby hospital. (Id. ¶ 7).

Eric Courtney believed that his son had died and did not know that the officer

transported him to the hospital. (Id. ¶ 8). Officers did not inform Plaintiffs regarding

the whereabouts or capacity of their son. (Id. ¶ 9).

The remaining officer, Defendant Blake Cavalier, ordered Eric Courtney to

come to the front of the home and provide identification. (Id. ¶ 10). Cavalier did not

approach or question Sarah Courtney, despite the fact that she was also present in

the front yard. (Id. ¶ 11).

Eric Courtney was distraught, mourning what he believed to be the loss of his

minor child.1 (Id. ¶ 12). When Courtney did not respond in a manner that Cavalier

felt appropriate, Cavalier became hostile to Courtney. (Id.). Cavalier aggressively

confronted Courtney, telling him to “sit down.” (Id. ¶ 13). When Courtney did not

immediately comply, Cavalier grabbed Courtney’s shoulder with a shoulder lock

maneuver and threw him to the ground. (Id.). This maneuver allegedly has a well-

known high risk of injury to the shoulder. (Id.).

Courtney attempted to ask the officers why they were attacking him and why

they would treat someone in this manner when his child just died. (Id. ¶ 14). Courtney

was held prone on the ground as numerous other officers came to assist Cavalier.

(Id. ¶ 15). Officers kneeled on top of Courtney and thrashed him with their knees and

1 Throughout the remainder of this Ruling and Order, the Court will refer to Eric Courtney

as “Courtney.”

fists. (Id.).

Sarah Courtney and the Courtneys’ other children observed this event, and the

children were scared to tears. (Id. ¶ 16). Sarah Courtney pled with officers not to hurt

her husband. (Id.). At the same time, officers were crowded over Courtney. They

handcuffed him, struck him with their knees, and struck him repeatedly in the torso

and head area. (Id. ¶ 17).

Sarah Courtney witnessed an officer extract his taser, and exclaimed, “Do not

tase him.” (Id. ¶ 18). The officer used his taser, which penetrated Courtney’s skin

while he was face down on the ground and secured in handcuffs. (Id.). Approximately

50,000 volts of electricity were disbursed through Courtney’s body by the officer’s

taser. (Id. ¶ 19).

Sarah Courtney pleaded with officers that she be allowed to console her

husband. (Id. ¶ 20). Officers lifted Courtney to his feet, tripped him, and let him fall

to the ground. (Id. ¶ 21). Officers again raised Courtney to his feet, then shoved him

into the police unit, bashing his face and body on the door frame of the unit. (Id. ¶ 22).

Sarah Courtney became afraid for her husband’s life. (Id. ¶ 23).

Officers transported Courtney to Livingston Parish Prison, where he was

stripped and placed in a cell. (Id. ¶ 24). When Courtney asked why he was there,

guards told him it was “because he refused medical treatment.” (Id.). Courtney asked

the prison staff for help, explaining that he was having difficulty breathing. (Id. ¶ 25).

Guards told him that if he could talk, he could breathe. (Id.). Prison staff then opened

a small flap in the door and told Courtney, “He has a pulse, it looks like he is going

to make it.” (Id. ¶ 26). This was the first time Courtney learned that his son had the

potential to live. (Id. ¶ 27).

Once released from prison, Courtney went immediately to the Children’s

Hospital. (Id. ¶ 29). Medical personnel insisted that Courtney seek treatment in the

emergency room for the injuries officers inflicted on him. (Id.). Courtney suffered a

fractured rib, multiple abrasions, and contusions. (Id. ¶ 30). Defendants strongly

dispute the facts as alleged. (Doc. 16 at 2).

Courtney was later arraigned on criminal charges of resisting arrest by force

or violence. (Id. ¶ 32). He was also accused of battery on Cavelier and damage to the

police car. (Id.).

On April 4, 2025, Plaintiffs Eric and Sarah Courtney filed this lawsuit against:

(1) Blake Cavalier, a Walker Police Department (“WPD”) police officer;

(2) David Addison, WPD chief; and (3) the City of Walker, Louisiana (the “City”).

(Doc. 1). Plaintiffs allege the following causes of action:

(1) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 violation based on Monell policy, practice, or pattern of

inadequate training, supervision, and oversight of its police officers (Count One);

(2) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 violation based on failure to train and supervise its police

officers to ensure proper police practices for safety and wellbeing of citizens

(Count Two);

(3) Unlawful detention by officers in violation of the Fourth and

Fourteenth Amendments (Count Three);

(4) Unreasonable seizure by officers in violation of the Fourth Amendment

(Count Four);

(5) Excessive force by officers in violation of the Fourth Amendment

(Count Five);

(6) False arrest by officers in violation of the Fourth Amendment (Count Six);

(7) Bystander liability against officers pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

(Count Seven);

(8) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 violation based on deliberate indifference to Courtney’s

constitutional right to freedom from unlawful detention, unlawful seizure, excessive

force, and false arrest by officers (Count Eight);

(9) State law claims of negligent or intentional conduct resulting in injury and

emotional distress (Count Nine);

(10) State law claims of respondeat superior liability and vicarious liability of

the City of Walker (Count Ten); and

(11) Loss of consortium (Count Eleven).

(See generally Doc. 1).

Now, Defendants move to dismiss several of Plaintiffs’ claims against them.

(Doc. 12). For the following reasons, Defendants’ Motion will be GRANTED IN

PART and DENIED IN PART.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of the complaint

against the legal standard set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, which

requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled

to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Determining whether a

complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that

requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”

Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 679.

“[F]acial plausibility” exists “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Hence, the

complaint need not set out “detailed factual allegations,” but something “more than

labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action”

is required. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. When conducting its inquiry, the Court

“accepts all well-pleaded facts as true and views those facts in the light most favorable

to the plaintiff.” Bustos v. Martini Club Inc., 599 F.3d 458, 461 (5th Cir. 2010)

(quotation marks omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants move to dismiss several of Plaintiffs’ claims against them. First,

the Court will analyze Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claims against the City. Second, the

Court will turn to Plaintiffs’ claims against Addison, in both his official and individual

capacities. Third, the Court will assess Plaintiffs’ claims against Cavalier. Fourth,

the Court will determine the adequacy of Plaintiff Sarah Courtney’s constitutional

claims. Finally, the Court will consider Plaintiffs’ right to pursue punitive damages.

A. Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 Claims Against the City.

Plaintiffs assert two theories of liability against the City under Section 1983:

(1) policy liability; and (2) failure to train and supervise. Defendants move to dismiss

both claims against the City, arguing that Plaintiffs’ claims are barebones and

conclusory, failing to satisfy the Monell standards for imposing liability on municipal

entities. (Doc. 12-1 at 5, 7). For the following reasons, the Court agrees.

i. Policy Liability.

There are three elements of municipal liability under Section 1983:

“[A] plaintiff must show that (1) an official policy (2) promulgated by the municipal

policymaker (3) was the moving force behind the violation of a constitutional right.”

Hicks–Fields v. Harris Cty., 860 F.3d 803, 808 (5th Cir. 2017) (citations omitted), cert.

denied, 583 U.S. 1014 (2017).

The first policy prong “includes the decisions of a government’s law-makers,

the acts of its policymaking officials, and practices so persistent and widespread as to

practically have the force of law.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011)

(citations omitted); Peterson v. City of Ft. Wor., 588 F.3d 838, 850–51 (5th Cir. 2009).

To proceed beyond the pleading stage, a complaint’s “description of a policy or custom

and its relationship to the underlying constitutional violation . . . cannot be

conclusory; it must contain specific facts.” Spiller v. City of Tex. City, Police Dep’t, 130

F.3d 162, 167 (5th Cir. 1997); see also Peña v. City of Rio Grande City, 879 F.3d 613,

621–22 (5th Cir. 2018).

Here, the only mention of a policy in Plaintiffs’ Complaint is their allegation

that “[t]he lack of proper training resulted in a culture at WPD that was effectively a

policy allowing the use of the TASER to compel compliance with police commands.”

(Doc. 1 ¶ 18). Plaintiffs have failed to identify the existence of any particular policy

that they claim was the moving force behind the alleged violation of Plaintiffs’

constitutional rights in this case. And while an “official policy or custom” giving rise

to Monell liability may be “a persistent, widespread practice which, although not

officially promulgated, is so common and well settled as to constitute a custom that

fairly represents municipal policy[,]” Plaintiffs “may not infer a policy merely because

harm resulted from some interaction with a governmental entity.” Smith v.

Thibodeaux, No. 23-CV-461-SDD-RLB, 2024 WL 1335649, at *7

(M.D. La. Mar. 28, 2024) (citing Esteves v. Brock, 106 F.3d 674, 677 (5th Cir. 1997);

Pudas v. St. Tammany Parish, 2019 WL 2410939, at *3 (E.D. La. June 7, 2019);

Colle v. Brazos Cnty., 981 F.2d 237, 245 (5th Cir. 1993) (internal quotation omitted;

internal brackets omitted)). That is exactly what Plaintiffs have done here.

Plaintiffs argue that the facts, if proven, “establish a persistent widespread

practice of violating the civil rights of persons who encounter police officers, including

multiple illegal acts of summary discipline of [P]laintiff Eric Courtney done in the

presence of his family.” (Doc. 14 at 10). But to plausibly plead “a practice ‘so persistent

and widespread as to practically have the force of law,’ a plaintiff must do more than

describe the incident that gave rise to his injury.” Smith, 2024 WL 1335649, at *7

(citing Peña, 879 F.3d at 622 (internal citations omitted)) (quoting Connick,

563 U.S. at 61). Because Plaintiffs have not alleged more than the facts describing

the incident giving rise to their injuries, Plaintiffs’ claim against the City based on

an unconstitutional policy or custom must fail.

Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 12) is GRANTED in this

respect. Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claim against the City based on an alleged

unconstitutional policy (Count One) is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

ii. Failure to Train or Supervise.

A Monell claim may be based on a municipality’s alleged failure to train,

supervise, or discipline employees. Peña, 879 F.3d at 623. To state a claim for failing

to supervise an employee, the plaintiff must allege “(1) that the municipality’s

training, supervisory, or disciplinary policies or practices were inadequate,

(2) that the municipality was deliberately indifferent in adopting [these] deficient

polic[ies], and (3) that the inadequate training, supervisory, or disciplinary polic[ies]

directly caused the violations in question.” Hankins v. Wheeler, 2022 WL 2208848, at

*7 (E.D. La. June 21, 2022) (citing Ratliff v. Aransas Cnty., 948 F.3d 281, 285

(5th Cir. 2020)).

“Deliberate indifference” can be demonstrated in two ways: “[f]irst and most

often, deliberate indifference generally requires notice of a pattern of similar

violations at the time the plaintiff’s own rights were violated . . . Second, [the Circuit]

has noted that in narrow circumstances, when a constitutional violation results as

the highly predictable consequence” of a municipality’s failure to properly hire, train,

supervise, or discipline, “the failure . . . can amount to deliberate indifference.” Robles

v. Ciarletta, 797 F. App’x 821, 833–34 (5th Cir. 2019).

As to the first method of showing deliberate indifference, the United States

Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has held that “[p]roof of more than a single

instance of the lack of training or supervision causing a violation of constitutional

rights is normally required before such lack of training or supervision constitutes

deliberate indifference.” Livezey v. City of Malakoff, 657 F. App’x 274, 278

(5th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation and citation omitted). Regarding the second

method, the plaintiff must allege that the “highly predictable consequence of not

supervising [the employees] was that they would” commit the specific constitutional

violation alleged. Peterson, 588 F.3d at 850 (internal quotations omitted).

“An injury is ‘highly predictable’ where the municipality ‘fails to train its

employees concerning a clear constitutional duty implicated in recurrent situations

that a particular employee is certain to face.’” Hankins, 2022 WL 2208848, at

*7 (internal brackets omitted) (quoting Hutcheson v. Dall. Cnty., 994 F.3d 477, 482–

83 (5th Cir. 2021)). To establish liability for failure to supervise, it “must have been

obvious that the highly predictable consequence of not supervising [the employees]

was that they would” commit the specific constitutional violation alleged. Peterson,

588 F.3d at 850 (internal quotations omitted); see also Smith, 2024 WL 1335649, at

*8.

Plaintiffs’ Complaint contains the following allegations regarding the City’s

alleged failure to train or supervise WPD officers:

(1) The City and Addison failed to train, supervise, and oversee Cavalier and

the other officers;

(2) Plaintiffs were individually harmed by the lack of training provided to

officers concerning emergency protocols, de-escalation, TASER gun

deployment, and excessive force;

(3) At all pertinent times, Defendants acted unreasonably, recklessly, and with

deliberate indifference and disregard for the safety, constitutional, and civil

rights of Plaintiffs by failing to provide appropriate police training,

supervision, and oversight and their conduct violated established law;

(4) The City and Addison failed to train and supervise their officers, including

Cavalier and the other officers on the scene, to ensure that the officers did not

abuse their authority to unlawfully threaten, intimidate, or harm members of

the public, including Plaintiffs;

(5) Plaintiffs were directly harmed by this failure to train and supervise

because the lack thereof led to the known and repeated actions of the officers,

which caused physical, mental, and emotional harm to Plaintiffs, along with

the false detention and arrest of Courtney.

(Doc. 1 ¶¶ 33, 35, 37–40).

Plaintiffs fail to allege with specificity how any training or supervision was

deficient. Plaintiffs further fail to allege a pattern of similar constitutional violations

by allegedly untrained officers at the time that Plaintiffs’ rights were allegedly

violated. Although a single incident can plausibly suggest deliberate indifference, the

Fifth Circuit has suggested that “the exception is generally reserved for those cases

in which the government actor was provided no training whatsoever.” Peña,

879 F.3d at 624. Plaintiffs do not allege that WPD officers received no training

whatsoever, and Plaintiffs otherwise do not ask the Court to invoke this exception in

their briefing. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claim against the City for failure

to train or supervise must be dismissed. See Smith, 2024 WL 1335649, at *8

(“The Court finds that Plaintiff’s official capacity claims must be dismissed. Plaintiff

fails to identify a policy, explain specifically how any supervision was defective, and

fails to allege any constitutional violation.”); Peña, 879 F.3d at 623 (citing Connick,

563 U.S. at 62) (Because the “standard for [municipal] fault” is a “stringent” one, “[a]

pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees is ordinarily”

required to show deliberate indifference.).

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 12) is GRANTED in this respect.

Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claim against the City based on failure to supervise or train

(Count Two) is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

B. Plaintiffs’ Claims Against Addison.

Next, Defendants ask the Court to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims against Addison,

the WPD chief, in both his official and individual capacities.

i. Official Capacity Claims Against Addison.

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ official capacity claims against Addison fail

for the same reason that Plaintiffs’ claims against the City fail. (Doc. 12-1 at 9).

Defendants argue that “Plaintiffs are bringing an official capacity claim against

Addison based on the same alleged unconstitutional policies for a failure to train,

supervise, and monitor theory asserted against City.” Because Plaintiffs have “failed

to allege sufficient facts to set forth an underlying Monell violation by [the] City[,]”

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ Monell claims against Addison should be dismissed

for this reason alone. (Id.).

Plaintiffs respond that their allegations are sufficient. Plaintiffs argue that

“[t]he facts alleged [] establish the identity of the policy maker for the Town of Walker,

[] Addison, and his dereliction of duty to supervise his officers and prevent them from

violating the civil rights.” (Doc. 14 at 10). Plaintiffs further argue that Addison

“tolerated” the officers’ allegedly unlawful behavior. (Id. at 9).

“An official capacity suit is the equivalent of a suit against the entity of which

the officer is an agent. To determine whether a public official is liable in his official

capacity, the Court looks to the jurisprudence discussing whether a municipality or

local government entity is liable under section 1983.” Jordan v. Gautreaux,

593 F. Supp. 3d 330, 353 (M.D. La. 2022) (citing Romain v. Governor’s Off. of

Homeland Sec., No. 14-660, 2016 WL 3982329, at *6 (M.D. La. July 22, 2016)

(citations and quotations omitted)). Thus, for the same reasons described regarding

Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claims against the City, Plaintiffs’ claims against Addison in

his official capacity must fail.

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 12) is GRANTED in this respect.

Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claims against Addison in his official capacity (Count One,

Count Two) are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

ii. Individual Capacity Claims Against Addison.

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs do not have a claim against Addison in his

individual capacity under the Fourth Amendment based on Courtney’s alleged

unlawful arrest or the use of excessive force because Plaintiffs do not allege that

Addison personally participated in the events alleged in the Complaint. (Doc. 12-1 at

13). Plaintiffs do not oppose Defendants’ argument.

A valid individual capacity claim requires a Section 1983 plaintiff to “establish

that the defendant was either personally involved in a constitutional deprivation or

that his wrongful actions were causally connected to the constitutional deprivation.”

James v. Tex. Collin Cnty., 535 F.3d 365, 373 (5th Cir. 2008). “Indeed, an officer must,

in some way, personally deprive a Section 1983 plaintiff of his federal rights in order

to incur liability in his individual capacity; respondeat superior liability is repugnant

to the plain language of the statute.” La. Cleaning Sys. v. Brown, No. CIV.A. 14-2853,

2015 WL 6869907, at *7 (W.D. La. Nov. 9, 2015).

Here, Plaintiffs do not allege that Addison personally participated in Cavalier’s

alleged constitutional violations. Plaintiffs do not even allege that Addison was

present at the scene of the incident. See Skinner v. Ard, 519 F. Supp. 3d 301, 318

(M.D. La. 2021) (“Plaintiffs fail to allege that Sheriff Ard personally participated in

Deputy McLin’s constitutional violation. . . . [H]e is not even alleged to have been at

the scene of Roscoe’s shooting.”). The Court has already dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims

against Addison for alleged policy liability and alleged failure to supervise or train.

Thus, Plaintiffs’ individual capacity claims under the Fourth Amendment based on

Courtney’s alleged unlawful arrest or the use of excessive force must be dismissed.

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 12) is GRANTED in this respect.

Plaintiffs’ individual capacity claims against Addison under the Fourth Amendment

based on Courtney’s alleged unlawful arrest and the use of excessive force are

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

C. Plaintiffs’ Claims Against Cavalier.

Defendants also move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ excessive force and false arrest

claims against Cavalier.

i. Excessive Force Claim Against Cavalier.

Defendants ask the Court to dismiss Plaintiffs’ excessive force claim against

Cavalier based on qualified immunity. Specifically, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs

cannot overcome qualified immunity for Cavalier’s use of the “shoulder lock

maneuver” to obtain compliance from Courtney. (Doc. 12-1 at 13).

Plaintiffs respond that the facts alleged in the Complaint, if proven, would

defeat any qualified immunity defense. (Doc. 14 at 10). Plaintiffs argue that

“Courtney was not being arrested; he was not even a suspect. There was no crime; []

Courtney was essentially a relative of a victim of a tragic accident.” (Id. at 5).

Plaintiffs argue that the law is clearly established that officers cannot: (1) tackle a

subject when the subject was not attempting to flee; (2) continue to use force against

Courtney while he was on the ground; or (3) use a taser to punish Courtney.

(Id. at 5–7).

“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from

liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’”

Terry v. Hubert, 609 F.3d 757, 761 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan,

555 U.S. 223 (2009)). A public official is entitled to qualified immunity unless the

plaintiff demonstrates that: (1) the defendant violated the plaintiff’s constitutional

rights; and (2) the defendant’s actions were objectively unreasonable in light of clearly

established law at the time of the violation. Porter v. Epps, 659 F.3d 440, 445

(5th Cir. 2011) (citing Freeman v. Gore, 483 F.3d 404, 410–11 (5th Cir. 2007)). The

Supreme Court has held that courts have the discretion to determine which prong of

qualified immunity should be analyzed first. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236.

The Court has emphasized that “[t]his inquiry is undertaken in light of the

specific context of the case, not as a broad, general proposition.” Thibodeaux v.

Louisiana, No. CV 24-00388-BAJ-SDJ, 2026 WL 161347, at *4

(M.D. La. Jan. 21, 2026) (internal citations omitted). It is a violation of the

Fourth Amendment for an officer to use excessive or unreasonable force in the context

of an arrest. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989). To prevail on an

excessive force claim, “[a] plaintiff must show (1) an injury, (2) which resulted directly

and only from the use of force that was clearly excessive, and (3) the excessiveness . .

. was clearly unreasonable.” Collie v. Barron, 747 F. App’x. 950, 952 (5th Cir. 2018)

(citations omitted). Excessiveness turns upon whether the degree of force used was

reasonable in light of the totality of the circumstances facing the officer in each case.

Williams v. Sanders, 723 F. Supp. 3d 467, 472 (M.D. La. 2024) (citing Graham, 490

U.S. at 396; Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985)).

Relevant factors include the “severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect

poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is

actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id. When deciding

whether to use force, officers must determine “not only the need for force, but also

‘the relationship between the need and the amount of force used.’” Williams,

723 F. Supp. 3d at 472 (citing Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156, 167

(5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam); Gomez v. Chandler, 163 F.3d 921, 923 (5th Cir. 1999)).

The reasonableness of the officers’ conduct cannot be judged with the benefit of

hindsight, but must be assessed from the viewpoint of a reasonable officer on the

scene at the moment the force is applied. Williams, 723 F. Supp. 3d at 472

(citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). Excessive force claims are “fact-specific.”

Hammond v. Burns, No. CV 18-00803-BAJ-RLB, 2020 WL 1442963, at *4

(M.D. La. Mar. 24, 2020).

Here, the Court finds that the facts alleged, accepted as true, may establish an

excessive force claim that defeats qualified immunity. First, Plaintiffs have alleged

an injury: Plaintiffs allege that Courtney suffered a fractured rib, multiple abrasions,

and contusions. (Doc. 1 ¶ 30). Second, the alleged force Cavalier used on Courtney,

accepted as true, was objectively unreasonable. In Ramirez, the Fifth Circuit affirmed

the district court’s denial of qualified immunity on plaintiff’s excessive force claim

where plaintiff “alleged he posed no threat to the officers and yet was tased twice,

including once after he was handcuffed and subdued while lying face down on the

ground[.]” Ramirez v. Martinez, 716 F.3d 369, 379 (5th Cir. 2013). In Bush, the Circuit

held that a police officer used excessive force that was objectively unreasonable and

in violation of clearly established law when he forcefully slammed a suspect’s face

into a vehicle after subduing her and placing her in handcuffs. Bush v.

Strain, 513 F.3d 492, 501–02 (5th Cir. 2008). In Poole, the Circuit held that the use

of a taser was not excessive where the arrestee was resisting arrest and the officers

ceased use of the taser once the arrestee was handcuffed and subdued. Poole v.

City of Shreveport, 691 F.3d 624, 626 (5th Cir. 2012).

Here, Plaintiffs allege that they called for emergency assistance after finding

their young child’s limp body in the pool, believing that he had drowned. (Doc. 1 ¶ 5).

While responding to the drowning incident at the Courtneys’ home, officers allegedly

grabbed Courtney’s shoulder with a shoulder lock maneuver, threw him to the

ground, and thrashed him with their knees and fists while kneeling on top of him.

(Id. ¶¶ 13–15). While Courtney was face down on the ground and secured in

handcuffs, Cavalier allegedly tased him. (Id. ¶ 18). Plaintiffs allege that officers lifted

Courtney to his feet, tripped him, and let him fall to the ground. (Id. ¶ 21). Officers

again raised Courtney to his feet, then allegedly shoved him into the police unit,

bashing his face and body on the door frame of the unit. (Id. ¶ 22). Courtney was then

transported to jail. (Id. ¶ 24). According to Fifth Circuit jurisprudence, the facts

alleged, accepted as true, demonstrate use of force that was clearly excessive to the

need which was objectively unreasonable.

The Graham factors support this finding. First, there was allegedly no crime

at issue. Thus, the first Graham factor—the severity of the crime at issue—weighs in

favor of Plaintiffs. Second, a reasonable officer could not have concluded that

Courtney posed a threat after he was lying on the ground in handcuffs. See Ramirez,

716 F.3d at 378 (“[A] reasonable officer could not have concluded Ramirez posed an

immediate threat to the safety of the officers by questioning their presence at his

place of business or laying on the ground in handcuffs.”). Thus, the second factor—

whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others—

weighs in favor of Plaintiffs. Third, according to Plaintiffs, the only fact regarding

Courtney’s resistance alleged in the Complaint is that “Courtney did not immediately

comply” because he was mourning the seeming loss of his child. (Doc. 1 ¶ 13). Thus,

the third factor—whether plaintiff is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade

arrest by flight—weighs in favor of Plaintiffs. See Ramirez, 716 F.3d at 378

(“Pulling his arm out of Martinez’s grasp, without more, is insufficient to find an

immediate threat to the safety of the officers.”).

Next, the Court must determine whether Plaintiffs’ excessive force claim is

defeated by qualified immunity. For the same reasons previously described, the Court

finds that Cavalier’s alleged actions, accepted as true, were objectively unreasonable

in light of clearly established law at the time of the violation. See Ramirez,

716 F.3d at 377; Bush, 513 F.3d at 501–02; Poole, 691 F.3d at 626.

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 12) Plaintiffs’ excessive force claim

(Count Five) is DENIED.

ii. False Arrest Claim Against Cavalier.

Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs fail to state a false arrest claim because

they did not plead facts showing a lack of probable cause for his arrest or that the

charges against Courtney were ultimately resolved in his favor. (Doc. 12-1 at 15).

Plaintiffs respond that criminal charges remain pending against Courtney.

Thus, Plaintiffs contend that these charges are not “mature” until the final

disposition of the pending charges. (Doc. 14 at 1).

A review of the state court docket shows that the pending criminal charges

against Courtney have not yet been resolved. This Court has stayed similar false

arrest claims while criminal charges were pending. In Guillory, the Court

emphasized, “Clearly, if the plaintiff is convicted of simple battery of a police officer,

his section 1983 false arrest claim would be barred by Heck [v.

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994)], unless the conviction is reversed, expunged, or

invalidated by a state tribunal.” Guillory v. Wheeler, 303 F. Supp. 2d 808, 811

(M.D. La. 2004); see also Collier v. Roberts, No. CIV.A. 13-425-SDD,

2013 WL 5671154, at *2 (M.D. La. Oct. 15, 2013) (“Plaintiff’s pending charges of

resisting an officer and battery of a police officer are of a type and character that a

conviction on these charges may bar this Section 1983 action.”); Wallace v.

Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 393–94 (2007) (“[I]f a plaintiff files a false arrest claim before he

has been convicted (or files any other claim related to rulings that will likely be made

in a pending or anticipated criminal trial), it is within the power of the district court

. . . to stay the civil action until the criminal case . . . is ended.”); Santos v. White,

No. CV 16-00598-BAJ-EWD, 2017 WL 5953290, at *4 (M.D. La. Dec. 1, 2017) (“When

faced with uncertainty regarding whether adjudication of a § 1983 claim will impact

a potential criminal conviction, courts in this Circuit have concluded that the civil

proceeding should be stayed until the pending criminal case has run its course.”).

Due to the uncertain resolution of the underlying criminal charges against

Courtney, the Court finds it inappropriate to dismiss Plaintiffs’ false arrest claim at

this time. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 12) Plaintiffs’ false arrest claim

(Count Six) is DENIED.

D. Sarah Courtney’s Constitutional Claims.

Defendants argue that Sarah Courtney has failed to plead any facts showing

that she was arrested or had any force used against her. (Doc. 12-1 at 13). Thus,

Defendants contend that Sarah Courtney’s constitutional claims must be dismissed.

(Id.). Plaintiffs fail to oppose Defendants’ arguments regarding Sarah Courtney’s

constitutional claims. (See generally Doc. 14).

Because the facts underlying Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims pertain to

Eric Courtney, and because Plaintiffs do not oppose dismissal of Sarah Courtney’s

constitutional claims, the Court will construe the constitutional claims as though

asserted by Eric Courtney alone. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 12) is

GRANTED in this respect.

E. Punitive Damages Against the City and Addison in his Official

Capacity.

Finally, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs are not entitled to recover punitive

damages from the City or Addison in his official capacity. (Doc. 12-1 at 16).

Defendants contend that the City is immune from punitive damages under

Section 1983. (Id.). Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages

against Addison in his official capacity must fail because it is the same as a suit

against the government entity of which Addison is an agent. (Id.). Plaintiffs fail to

oppose Defendants’ arguments regarding punitive damages. (See generally Doc. 14).

The United States Supreme Court has long held that punitive damages cannot

be awarded against a municipality. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc.,

453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981). This Court has previously held that “any claims seeking to

recover punitive damages against any entity or individual who is being sued in its

official capacity must be stricken from the pleadings as a matter of law.”

Perron v. Travis, No. CV 20-00221-BAJ-EWD, 2021 WL 1187077, at *4

(M.D. La. Mar. 29, 2021). Thus, Plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages against the

City and Addison in his official capacity must be dismissed.

Defendants’ Motion (Doc. 12) is GRANTED in this respect. Plaintiffs’ claim for

punitive damages against the City and Addison in his official capacity is

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

F. Remaining Claims.

In accordance with the previous discussion, Courtney’s excessive force

(Count Five) and false arrest (Count Six) claims remain. Additionally, Defendants’

Motion does not address the following claims: (1) unlawful detention by officers in

violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments (Count Three); (2) unreasonable

seizure by officers in violation of the Fourth Amendment (Count Four);

(3) bystander liability against officers pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count Seven);

(4) state law claims of negligent or intentional conduct resulting in injury and

emotional distress (Count Nine); (5) state law claims of respondeat superior liability

and vicarious liability of the City of Walker (Count Ten); and (6) loss of consortium

(Count Eleven). Thus, these claims remain.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Defendants Blake Cavalier, City of Walker, Louisiana,

and David Addison’s Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Complaint (Doc. 12) is

GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claims against the

City of Walker (Counts One and Two) are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ claims against Addison, in his

individual and official capacities (Counts One and Two), are DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages

against the City and Addison in his official capacity is DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the constitutional claims shall be deemed

asserted by Plaintiff Eric Courtney alone.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this matter be and is hereby REFERRED

to the Magistrate Judge for entry of a Scheduling Order.

Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this 27 l of March, 2026

JUDGE BRIAN A. JACKSON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

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