Dalton

~ UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

WATIKA DALTON, ET AL. CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

MIKE CAZES, ET AL. NO. 19-00578-BAJ-RLB

RULING AND ORDER

Before the Court is Defendants Mike Cazes, Vance Matranga, Brett Cavaliere,

James Woody, Thomas Carpenter, and Glen Hanagan’s Motion For Partial

Summary Judgment (Doc. 59). The Motion is unopposed. For the following

reasons, the Motion is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

This case involves two consolidated actions arising out of law enforcement

agents’ alleged excessive force, which resulted in the shooting and killing of unarmed

Josef Richardson. (Doc. 21; see also Doc. 1, Case No. 20-00479-BAJ-RLB).

On September 3, 2019, Plaintiffs Jamestaveus Bateaste and Watika Dalton,

on behalf of her minor children, filed suit concerning the alleged use of force on

Richardson. (Doc. 1).! On July 22, 2020, Plaintiff Jessica Clouatre, an eyewitness to

the alleged force used on Richardson, filed suit addressing the harm she allegedly

suffered from the event. (Doc. 1, Case No. 20-00479-BAJ-RLB). On

December 15, 2020, the Court consolidated the two cases. (Doc. 28).

Plaintiffs collectively allege that on July 25, 2019, West Baton Rouge Sheriffs

1 Document citations that do not include a reference to the case number are located in

Case No. 19-00578-BAJ-RLB.

Office (““WBRSO”) deputies executed a “no knock” warrant of “room number 5” at

Budget 7 Motel, located at 1534 U.S. 190, Port Allen, LA 70767, where both

Richardson and Clouatre were residing. (Doc. 21 § 9). Plaintiffs allege that although

Richardson was complying with officers’ commands, WBRSO officers shot Richardson

in the back of the head, causing his death. (Ud. J 23-24). The West Baton Rouge

Parish (““WBR Parish”) Coroner ruled Richardson’s death a homicide. (/d. § 25).

Plaintiffs allege that there was no legal cause to justify the use of force against

Richardson, such that the force was unreasonable and excessive. (/d. § 29).

Plaintiff Clouatre alleges that she was an eyewitness to this incident, as she

was sharing the hotel room with Richardson. (Doc. 1 {J 424,

Case No. 20-00479-BAJ-RLB). Clouatre alleges that WBRSO officers pointed drawn

guns at her, took her into custody, and placed her under arrest immediately after

shooting Richardson. (Id. §] 28). Clouatre alleges that the WBRSO officers’ actions

were in willful, reckless, and callous disregard for her safety. (id. 4 30). Clouatre

alleges that she suffered severe emotional harm, fear, and intimidation as a result of

her false arrest and prosecution. (See generally id.).

In this lawsuit, Clouatre asserts the following claims against Defendants:

(1) Federal constitutional claims against all Defendants, including excessive

force, false arrest, conspiracy to arrest, and malicious prosecution (Count One);

(2) Federal constitutional claims against Cazes and WBRSO arising out of

their alleged failure to train or supervise and failure to correct unconstitutional

policies, practices, patterns, or customs (Count Two);

(8) Federal constitutional claims against WBR Parish arising out of its alleged

encouragement, tolerance, and ratification of policies, patterns, practices, or

customs causing harm to Plaintiff (Count Three);

(4) State law claims against Defendants Cavaliere, Matranga, Cazes, WBRSO,

and WBR Parish (Count Four).

(Id.).

Bateaste and Dalton assert the following similar claims arising out of the force

allegedly used on Richardson:

(1) Excessive force claim against Cavaliere, Matranga, and Cazes (Count One);

(2) Federal constitutional claim against Cazes and WBRSO arising out of their

alleged failure to train or supervise and failure to correct unconstitutional

policies, practices, patterns, or customs (Count Two);

(8) Federal constitutional claim against WBR Parish arising out of its alleged

encouragement, tolerance, and ratification of policies, patterns, practices,

or customs causing harm to Plaintiffs (Count Three);

(4) State law claims against Cavaliere, Matranga, Cazes, WBRSO, and

WBR Parish (Count Four).

(Doc. 1).

Now, Defendants move for partial summary judgment, asking the Court to

grant summary judgment in their favor and dismiss the following claims: (1) all of

Clouatre’s claims; (2) Bateaste and Dalton’s official capacity claims against all

Defendants; and (8) Bateaste and Dalton’s individual capacity claim against Cazes.

(Doc. 59).

Under Local Civil Rule 56(f), facts contained in a supporting statement of

material facts, if supported by record citations, shall be deemed admitted unless

properly controverted. Here, no party has filed an Opposing Statement of Material

Facts. Accordingly, the facts provided in Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Facts

are deemed admitted for purposes of summary judgment. (Doc. 59-2). Defendants’

Statement of Undisputed Facts provides as follows:

Jessica Clouatre was indicted by a grand jury on or about August 11, 2020.

(Doc. 59-2 § 1). On December 12, 2028, Clouatre pled guilty to possession of

marijuana in an amount less than 14 grams. (/d. { 2). Clouatre was not assaulted,

beaten, hit, struck, or physically injured by any Defendants during the course of her

arrest. (Id. § 3). After the shooting of Richardson, deputies held Clouatre at gunpoint

only as long as it took to place her into restraints, and weapons were not pointed at

her at any point after that. Ud. { 4).

Cazes was not present at the scene of the shooting nor was he involved in the

operation in any way. (Id. § 5).

For the following reasons, Defendants’ Motion (Doc. 59) will be GRANTED.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A district court should “grant summary judgment if the movant shows that

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Punches v. Progressive Tractor

& Implement Co., L.L.C., 905 F.3d 846, 849 (5th Cir. 2018) (“This occurs when a party

fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential

to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.”).

For issues on which the movant bears the burden of proof at trial, they “must

come forward with evidence which would entitle [them] to a directed verdict if the

evidence went uncontroverted at trial.” Intl Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally’s, Inc.,

939 F.2d 1257, 1264-65 (5th Cir. 1991). The nonmoving party can then defeat the

motion by either countering with evidence establishing a genuine dispute of material

fact, or “showing that the moving party’s evidence is so sheer that it may not persuade

the reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in favor of the moving party.” Id. at

1265.

Where the nonmovant bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving party must

offer evidence that undermines the nonmovant’s claim or point out the absence of

evidence supporting essential elements of the claim. See Lujan v.

Nat'l Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 885 (1990). Once the movant shows

entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, the nonmovant must bring forward

evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact. Giles v. Gen. Elec. Co.,

245 F.3d 474, 498 (5th Cir. 2001). “The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed,

and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [its] favor.” Darden v.

City of Fort Worth, 880 F.3d 722, 727 (5th Cir. 2018).

III. DISCUSSION

In their Motion, Defendants ask the Court to grant summary judgment in their

favor, dismissing all of Clouatre’s claims. (Doc. 59-1 at 19). Defendants also ask the

Court to dismiss Bateaste and Dalton’s official capacity claims against all

Defendants. Finally, Defendants ask the Court to dismiss Bateaste and Dalton’s

individual capacity claim against Cazes. (Id.). No party opposes Defendants’ Motion.

The Court will address each request in turn, beginning with Clouatre’s claims

against Defendants.

A. Plaintiff Clouatre’s Claims.

Defendants move for summary judgment on Clouatre’s federal claims of false

arrest, conspiracy to arrest, malicious prosecution, and excessive force against them.

Defendants also move for summary judgment on Clouatre’s state law claims of

malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, battery, assault, and emotional distress

against them. For the following reasons, and in light of Clouatre’s failure to present

contrary argument or evidence, Defendants’ Motion will be GRANTED.

i. Clouatre’s False Arrest and Conspiracy to Arrest Claims.

First, Defendants ask the Court to grant summary judgment in their favor on

Clouatre’s false arrest and conspiracy to arrest claims, arguing that these claims are

barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Clouatre does not oppose

Defendants’ request.

It is well settled under Heck that a plaintiff who has been convicted of a crime

cannot recover damages for an alleged violation of her constitutional rights if the

“violation arose from the same facts attendant to the charge for which [s]he was

convicted, unless [s]he proves ‘that his conviction or sentence has been reversed on

direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal

authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s

issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Bush v. Strain, 513 F.3d 492, 497 (5th Cir. 2008)

(citing Ballard v. Burton, 444 F.8d 391, 396 (5th Cir. 2006); Heck,

512 U.S. at 486-87).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has emphasized:

“[I]n order to prevail in a § 1983 claim for false arrest, a plaintiff must

show that he was arrested without probable cause in violation of the

Fourth Amendment.” Parm v. Shumate, 513 F.3d 185, 142

(5th Cir. 2007). The Supreme Court, in Heck, observed that § 1983

unlawful-arrest claims fail in cases where “[a] state defendant is

convicted of and sentenced for the crime of resisting arrest ... [because]

he would have to negate an element of the offense of which he has been

convicted.” 512 U.S. at 486 n. 6];] see also Wells v. Bonner,

45 F.3d 90 (5th Cir. 1995) (explaining that the plaintiffs proof to

establish his false arrest claim would demonstrate the invalidity of his

conviction for resisting a search). Here, [plaintiff] was arrested for

crimes for which he was ultimately convicted. Heck therefore

bars recovery for his false arrest claim as well, because his

convictions necessarily imply that there was probable cause for

his arrest.

Ducksworth v. Rook, 647 F. App’x 383, 386-87 (5th Cir. 2016) (emphasis added). The

same result issues here.

The undisputed facts show that Clouatre was indicted by a grand jury on or

about August 11, 2020, for the events arising out of the July 25, 2019 interaction with

police. (Doc. 59-2 § 1; Doc. 59-3). On December 12, 2028, Clouatre pled guilty to

possession of marijuana in an amount less than 14 grams. (Doc. 59-2 § 2; Doc. 59-4).

Thus, without any contrary evidence or argument from Clouatre, the Court is

constrained to conclude that Heck bars recovery for Clouatre’s false arrest and

conspiracy to arrest claims because her guilty plea necessarily implies that there was

probable cause for her arrest.2 See Ducksworth, 647 F. App’x at 386-87.

Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 59) is

GRANTED in this respect. Clouatre’s false arrest and conspiracy to arrest claims

against Defendants are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

2 Tn reaching this conclusion, the Court echoes the concerns raised by other courts regarding

the fairness of such a result, but is constrained by United States Supreme Court and

Fifth Circuit precedent and by Clouatre’s lack of evidence or argument opposing Defendants’

Motion. See Deemer v. Beard, 557 F. App’x 162, 168 (8d Cir. 2014) (Rendell, J., concurring)

(“A judgment in [plaintiffs] favor, post-release, would only vindicate his rights in the face of

unlawful state action—serving the exact purpose of § 1983—not create the inconsistent result

of continued incarceration and a favorable civil judgment.”); id. (“Why should the former

prisoner be denied even the opportunity for such vindication?”); McNeal v. La. Dep’t of Pub.

Safety & Corr., No. CV 18-7386-JWD-EWD, 2020 WL 798321, at *9 (M.D. La. Feb. 18, 2020)

(deGravelles, J.) “Applying Heck to those no longer incarcerated would render those rights,

in Judge Bennet’s words, “nothing more than a mirage — appearing to exist at first glance,

but transforming into an illusion upon careful inspection due to the lack of a federal forum

in which to enforce them.”).

In this case, Clouatre pled guilty to “possession of marijuana less than 14 grams” in state

court and was sentenced to serve eight days in parish jail. (Doc. 49-2). Although her eight-

day sentence was relatively minor, the Court must now dismiss her current claims that, if

supported by evidence, are quite serious.

Clouatre alleges that she witnessed officers intentionally shoot and kill unarmed and

unresisting Richardson in the back of the head within seconds of entering the hotel room that

she and Richardson shared to execute a “no knock” warrant. (Doc. 1 {| 23-29). Clouatre

alleges that immediately after killing Richardson, officers held Clouatre at gunpoint to arrest

her and take her into custody. (/d.). Thereafter, officers allegedly intimidated Clouatre in

order to suppress her witness statement and to prevent the truth from being revealed.

(Id. 42). Today, the Court dismisses those claims, in part because of Clouatre’s lack of

opposition to same, but questions the fairness of such a result. See Deemer,

557 F. App’x at 168 (Rendell, J., concurring) (“Given the scope and history of § 1983 as

designed to redress constitutional violations, I think that fairness is a persuasive

consideration.”).

ii. Clouatre’s Malicious Prosecution Claim.

Second, Defendants move for summary judgment on Clouatre’s malicious

prosecution claim against them, arguing that no federal malicious prosecution cause

of action existed at the time of the 2019 incident. (Doc. 59-1 at 7). That aside,

Defendants also argue that even if such a cause of action existed, Clouatre’s malicious

prosecution claim must fail because probable cause for an offense is an absolute bar

to malicious prosecution. (/d. at 8). Again, Clouatre does not oppose Defendants’

request.

Without deciding whether Clouatre had the right to pursue a malicious

prosecution claim, the Court finds that any such claim must fail because Clouatre

cannot establish the six elements of the claim as articulated by the Fifth Circuit:

(1) the commencement or continuance of an original criminal proceeding; (2) its legal

causation by the present defendant against plaintiff who was the defendant in the

original proceeding; (8) its bona fide termination in favor of the present plaintiff;

(4) the absence of probable cause for such proceeding; (5) malice; and (6) damages.

Armstrong v. Ashley, 60 F.4th 262, 279 (5th Cir. 2023); Wallace v. Taylor,

No. 22-20342, 2023 WL 2964418, at *6 (5th Cir. Apr. 14, 2023). In addition to proving

each of these elements, plaintiffs must also prove “the threshold element of an

unlawful Fourth Amendment seizure.” Armstrong, 60 F.4th at 279. “[I]f the

prosecution is supported by probable cause on at least one charge, then a malicious

prosecution claim cannot move forward.” Id. at n.15.

In the absence of any opposition from Clouatre, the Court finds that the

undisputed facts show that the criminal proceedings against Clouatre were resolved

against her, not in her favor. Further, as described above, Clouatre’s guilty plea

necessarily implies that there was probable cause for her arrest. See Ducksworth,

647 F. App’x at 386-87. For these reasons, Clouatre’s malicious prosecution claim

must be dismissed.

Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 59) is

GRANTED in this respect. Clouatre’s malicious prosecution claim against

Defendants is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

iii. Clouatre’s Excessive Force Claim.

Third, Defendants move for summary judgment on Clouatre’s excessive force

claim against them, arguing that Plaintiff was not the subject of physical force on the

date of the incident. (Doc. 59-1 at 9). Clouatre does not oppose Defendants’ request.

It is a violation of the Fourth Amendment for an officer to use excessive or

unreasonable force in the context of an arrest. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386,

394 (1989). To prevail on an excessive force claim, “[a] plaintiff must show

(1) an injury, (2) which resulted directly and only from the use of force that was

clearly excessive, and (8) the excessiveness . .. was clearly unreasonable.” Collie v.

Barron, 747 F. App’x. 950, 952 (5th Cir. 2018) (citations omitted). Excessiveness turns

upon whether the degree of force used was reasonable in light of the totality of the

circumstances facing the officer in each case. Williams uv. Sanders,

723 F. Supp. 3d 467, 472 (M.D. La. 2024) (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396; Tennessee

v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985)).

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Here, the undisputed facts show that Clouatre was not injured by any

Defendant during her arrest. (Doc. 59-2 § 3). Because an excessive force claim

requires Clouatre to show an injury, the undisputed facts show that she was not

injured, and Clouatre has failed to set forth evidence to the contrary, her excessive

force claim must fail.

Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 59) is

GRANTED in this respect. Clouatre’s excessive force claim against Defendants is

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

iv. Clouatre’s State Law Claims of Malicious Prosecution,

False Imprisonment, Battery, Assault, and Emotional

Distress.

Fourth, Defendants move for summary judgment on Clouatre’s state law

claims of malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, battery, assault, and emotional

distress. Defendants argue that Clouatre cannot establish the essential elements of

any of these claims for similar reasons previously discussed. (Doc. 59-1 at 12-14).

Again, Clouatre does not oppose Defendants’ request.

The Fifth Circuit has held:

These torts—assault, abuse of process, intentional infliction of

emotional distress, false arrest, false imprisonment, negligence, gross

negligence, and other “intentional torts’—all stem from [plaintiffs]

arrest. Louisiana applies the Heck rationale to state law tort claims.

Williams v. Harding, 2012-1595 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/26/13), 117 So. 3d 187,

191. As with the excessive force claim, so these state law claims imply

the invalidity of the underlying conviction. Since [plaintiff] has failed to

distinguish these torts from the factual basis for the battery conviction,

they are inseparable and Heck-barred. DeLeon, 488 F.3d at 657.

Price v. City of Bossier, 841 F. App’x 650, 654 (5th Cir. 2021). Here, Clouatre has

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similarly failed to distinguish these torts from the factual basis for her guilty plea. In

the absence of any contrary evidence, argument, or jurisprudence from Clouatre, her

state law claims must be dismissed.

Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 59) is

GRANTED in this respect. Clouatre’s state law claims of malicious prosecution, false

imprisonment, battery, assault, and emotional distress against Defendants are

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

B. Plaintiffs Clouatre, Bateaste and Dalton’s Claims Asserting

Liability Under Monell.

Fifth, Defendants move for summary judgment on Plaintiffs Clouatre,

Bateaste, and Dalton’s claims asserting liability under Monell, arguing that Plaintiffs

cannot produce evidence of any pattern or practice of excessive force, false arrest, or

malicious prosecution. (Doc. 59-1 at 17). None of the Plaintiffs oppose Defendants’

Motion.

Plaintiffs appear to assert two theories of liability against WBRSO under

Monell: (1) policy liability; and (2) failure to train and supervise.’ Plaintiffs also assert

a claim of policy lability against WBR Parish.4 The Court will analyze Plaintiffs’

policy liability claim against WBRSO and WBR Parish and then turn to Plaintiffs’

claim for failure to train or supervise against WBRSO.

3 These allegations are contained in Counts Two of each Complaint.

4 These allegations are contained in Counts Three of each Complaint.

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i. Policy Liability Against WBRSO and WBR Parish.

There are three elements of municipal liability under Section 1983:

“TA] plaintiff must show that (1) an official policy (2) promulgated by the municipal

policymaker (3) was the moving force behind the violation of a constitutional right.”

Hicks—Fields v. Harris Cty., 860 F.3d 808, 808 (5th Cir. 2017) (citations omitted), cert.

denied, 583 U.S. 1014 (2017). The first policy prong “includes the decisions of a

government’s law-makers, the acts of its policymaking officials, and practices so

persistent and widespread as to practically have the force of law.” Connick uv.

Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011) (citations omitted); Peterson v. City of Ft. Wor.,

588 F.3d 838, 850-51 (5th Cir. 2009).

Here, Defendants point to a lack of evidence supporting the elements of

Plaintiffs’ claim. (Doc. 59-1 at 17). In response, Plaintiffs have presented no evidence

of a policy or custom at issue and have offered no evidence showing that the policy or

custom was the moving force behind the alleged violation of their constitutional

rights. Because Plaintiffs have failed to offer evidence to establish the essential

elements of their claims, summary judgment is warranted in Defendants’ favor. See

Romain v. Governor’s Off. of Homeland Sec., No. CV 14-660-SDD-RLB,

2016 WL 3982329, at *10 (M.D. La. July 22, 2016) (“The Court finds that [p]laintiff

has presented insufficient summary judgment evidence to carry his burden of

establishing that Sheriff Ard engaged in a widespread municipal policy of failing to

train his officers or that any alleged failure to train or supervise was the direct cause

of Plaintiffs alleged injuries.”).

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Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 59) is

GRANTED in this respect. Plaintiffs’ claims against WBRSO and WBR Parish

asserting liability under Monell based on an alleged policy, practice, pattern, or

custom are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

ii. Failure to Train or Supervise Against WBRSO.

A Monell claim may be based on a municipality’s alleged failure to train,

supervise, or discipline employees. Pera v. City of Rio Grande City, 879 F.3d 618, 623

(5th Cir. 2018). To state a claim for failing to supervise an employee, the plaintiff

must allege “(1) that the municipality’s training, supervisory, or disciplinary policies

or practices were inadequate, (2) that the municipality was deliberately indifferent

in adopting [these] deficient polic[ies], and (8) that the inadequate training,

supervisory, or disciplinary polic[ies] directly caused the violations in question.”

Hankins v. Wheeler, 2022 WL 2208848, at *7 (E.D. La. June 21, 2022) (citing Ratliff

v. Aransas Cnty., 948 F.3d 281, 285 (5th Cir. 2020)).

“Deliberate indifference” can be demonstrated in two ways: “[flirst and most

often, deliberate indifference generally requires notice of a pattern of similar

violations at the time the plaintiffs own rights were violated ... Second, [the Circuit]

has noted that in narrow circumstances, when a constitutional violation results as

the highly predictable consequence” of a municipality’s failure to properly hire, train,

supervise, or discipline, “the failure ...can amount to deliberate indifference.” Robles

v. Ciarletta, 797 F. App’x 821, 833-84 (5th Cir. 2019).

_ As to the first method of showing deliberate indifference, the Fifth Circuit has

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held that “[p]roof of more than a single instance of the lack of training or supervision

causing a violation of constitutional rights is normally required before such lack of

training or supervision constitutes deliberate indifference.” Livezey □□□

City of Malakoff, 657 F. App’x 274, 278 (5th Cir. 2016) Gnternal quotation and

citation omitted). Regarding the second method, the plaintiff must allege that the

“highly predictable consequence of not supervising [the employees] was that they

would” commit the specific constitutional violation alleged. Peterson, 588 F.3d at 850

(internal quotations omitted).

“An injury is ‘highly predictable’ where the municipality ‘fails to train its

employees concerning a clear constitutional duty implicated in recurrent situations

that a particular employee is certain to face.” Hankins, 2022 WL 2208848, at

*7 (internal brackets omitted) (quoting Hutcheson v. Dall. Cnty., 994 F.3d 477, 482—

83 (5th Cir. 2021)). To establish liability for failure to supervise, it “must have been

obvious that the highly predictable consequence of not supervising [the employees]

was that they would” commit the specific constitutional violation alleged. Peterson,

588 F.3d at 850 (internal quotations omitted); see also Smith v. Thibodeaux,

No. 23-CV-461-SDD-RLB, 2024 WL 1335649, at *8 (M.D. La. Mar. 28, 2024).

Here, Plaintiffs have not offered evidence to show that WBRSO’s training or

supervisory practices were inadequate, much less that WBRSO was deliberately

indifferent. Thus, Plaintiffs’ claims against WBRSO for failure to train or supervise

must be dismissed. Romain, 2016 WL 3982329, at *11 (“No evidence, argument, or

jurisprudence has been offered regarding the ‘supervision’ portion of [p]laintiffs

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failure to train/supervise claim, and [p]laintiff has failed to provide any specifics as

to this theory of liability; thus, the Court finds that this claim as it relates to

supervision is abandoned.”); id. (“Furthermore, even if [p]laintiff had submitted

evidence to create genuine material fact disputes on this issue, he fails to present

summary judgment evidence of deliberate indifference, which also forecloses this

claim.”).

Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 59) 1s

GRANTED in this respect. Plaintiffs’ claims against WBRSO asserting liability

under Monell based on failure to supervise or train are DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE.

C. Plaintiffs Clouatre, Bateaste, and Dalton’s Official Capacity Claims

against Matranga, Cavaliere, Woody, Carpenter, Henagan, and

Cazes.

Defendants ask the Court to grant summary judgment in their favor on

Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claims against Matranga, Cavaliere, Woody, Carpenter,

Henagan, and Cazes in their official capacities.

“An official capacity suit is the equivalent of a suit against the entity of which

the officer is an agent. To determine whether a public official is liable in his official

capacity, the Court looks to the jurisprudence discussing whether a municipality or

local government entity is liable under section 1983.” Jordan v. Gautreaux,

593 F. Supp. 3d 330, 353 (M.D. La. 2022) (citing Romain, 2016 WL 3982329, at *6

(citations and quotations omitted)). For the same reasons described regarding

Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claims against WBRSO and WBR Parish, and in the absence

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of any contrary evidence or argument from Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs’ claims against

Matranga, Cavaliere, Woody, Carpenter, Henagan, and Cazes, in their official

capacities, must also be dismissed.

Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 59) is

GRANTED in this respect. Plaintiffs’ claims against Matranga, Cavaliere, Woody,

Carpenter, Henagan, and Cazes in their official capacities are DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE.

D. Bateaste and Dalton’s Individual Capacity Claim Against Cazes.

Finally, Defendants move for summary judgment on Bateaste and Dalton’s

individual capacity claim against Cazes, arguing that he was not present at the scene

of the incident.

A valid individual capacity claim requires a Section 1983 plaintiff to “establish

that the defendant was either personally involved in a constitutional deprivation or

that his wrongful actions were causally connected to the constitutional deprivation.”

James v. Tex. Collin Cnty., 585 F.3d 365, 373 (5th Cir. 2008). “Indeed, an officer must,

in some way, personally deprive a Section 1983 plaintiff of his federal rights in order

to incur liability in his individual capacity; respondeat superior liability is repugnant

to the plain language of the statute.” La. Cleaning Sys. v. Brown, No. CIV.A. 14-2853,

2015 WL 6869907, at *7 (W.D. La. Nov. 9, 2015).

Defendants present the Declaration of Matranga, attesting that Cazes was not

present during the incident and had no involvement in same. (Doc. 59-1 at 18;

Doc. 59-6 ¥ 2 (“At no time was Sheriff Mike Cazes present at the scene of the incident.

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He was not involved in any way in the incident.”)). Defendants argue that Plaintiff

can produce no evidence to the contrary. Likewise, Defendants argue that Plaintiff

can “point to no policy which is unconstitutional and which gave rise to the injury at

issue[.]” (Doc. 59-1 at 18-19). Plaintiffs have failed to offer evidence to the contrary.

Thus, Plaintiffs’ individual capacity claim against Cazes must also be dismissed.

Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 59) is

GRANTED in this respect. Plaintiffs Bateaste and Dalton’s claim against Cazes in

his individual capacity is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion For Partial Summary

Judgment (Doc. 59) is GRANTED.

ITIS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff Jessica Clouatre’s claims against

all Defendants are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs Jamestaveus Bateaste and

Watika Dalton’s claims against WBR and WBRSO asserting liability arising under

Monell are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs Jamestaveus Bateaste and

Watika Dalton’s claims against Matranga, Cavaliere, Woody, Carpenter, Henagan,

and Cazes in their official capacities are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs Jamestaveus Bateaste and

Watika Dalton’s claim against Cazes in his individual capacity is DISMISSED

WITH PREJUDICE.

Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this 40 “day of March, 2026

JUDGE BRIAN A. JA ON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

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