The opinion
Filed 3/20/26 Morris v. Bd. of Trustees of the Cal. State U. CA1/4
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
MATTHEW MORRIS,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
A171548
v.
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF (Alameda County
THE CALIFORNIA STATE Super. Ct. No.
UNIVERSITY et al., 23CV028627)
Defendants and
Respondents.
Matthew Morris appeals from a judgment after the trial
court sustained without leave to amend the demurrer of the
Board of Trustees of the California State University (CSU) and
various individual defendants (with CSU, “CSU Defendants”).1
As best we can determine from Morris’ briefing, he contends the
trial court erred primarily because it accorded CSU immunity to
which it was not entitled. Although the trial court’s immunity
ruling was partially incorrect, as CSU Defendants concede, we
agree with them that the trial court’s order sustaining the
1 The individual defendants are Cathy Sandeen, Terri
LaBeaux, Mitch Watnik, Maureen Scharberg, Danvy Le, Amy
Below, Luz Calvo, and Jerome Narvaez.
1
demurrer was nonetheless legally correct for other reasons.
Morris’ other arguments fail to demonstrate reversible error, so
we will affirm.
BACKGROUND
According to Morris’ operative complaint, he is a bisexual,
African American man who was a student at California State
University, East Bay. In August 2020, Morris filed a complaint
against two fellow students for sexual harassment and assault
under title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (20 U.S.C.
§ 1681 et seq. (Title IX)). CSU did not fairly or thoroughly
investigate Morris’ complaint, and it lost or destroyed evidence
and failed to contact witnesses Morris named. CSU discredited
his allegations based on unsubstantiated information it learned
after contacting Morris’ previous school.2
Morris began working for CSU as a lead research assistant
in January 2021. His supervisor was Dr. Anndretta Wilson, a
professor of Ethnic Studies, Black Studies, Feminism, and
Community Engagement. Dr. Wilson refused to meet with
Morris to prepare for group discussions held over Zoom and
bullied and belittled him during the discussions. Dr. Wilson
refused to discuss the work Morris brought to the meetings and
made comments to put him down because of his race and sex. Dr.
2 Morris mentions various incidents that appear to provide
the basis for his Title IX complaint. The individual students
named in these allegations were also named as defendants in
Morris’ complaint. The students are not parties to this appeal
and the specifics of Morris’ Title IX complaint and CSU’s
investigation of it have no apparent bearing on Morris’ causes of
action, so we do not discuss them.
2
Wilson conspired to undermine Morris’ position by providing
other members of the workgroup advantageous information and
support. Other members were encouraged to conceal information
about school presentations and their relationships with Dr.
Wilson.
Morris later discovered that Dr. Wilson had a close
relationship with the students Morris had named in his Title IX
complaint. Morris believed the harassment he experienced was
retaliation for the Title IX complaint.
Dr. Wilson failed to pay Morris throughout his
employment, and CSU failed to pay Morris scholarships he had
been awarded in 2020 and 2021.
In June 2021, Morris was notified by email that he was
administratively disqualified from working in his position. In
August 2021, Morris appealed the decision and it was denied.
As of January 2022, CSU’s Board of Directors had not made
the agenda or minutes from their meetings available to the
public.
In March 2022, Morris served a demand letter twice on
CSU. CSU did not respond.
On March 3, 2023, Morris filed his initial complaint based
on these allegations, naming CSU, CSU employees, and certain
students as defendants. After the trial court sustained CSU
Defendants’ demurrer, Morris amended his complaint to state
additional causes of action and add defendants. Some of the
newly added defendants were federal officials, and they removed
the case to federal court. (Morris v. Bd. of Trs. of the Cal. State
3
Univ. (N.D.Cal. Jan. 2, 2024, No. 23-cv-04562-HSG) 2024
U.S.Dist. LEXIS 490, at *3 & fn. 2.) The federal district court
granted a motion to dismiss the federal causes of action for
failure to state a claim and granted leave to amend. (Morris v.
Bd. of Trs. of the Cal. State Univ. (N.D.Cal., Apr. 2, 2024, No. 23-
CV-04562-HSG) 2024 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 60624.) The court did not
address the defendants’ arguments for dismissing Morris’ state
law claims. (Id. at *9–*10.)
Morris’ second amended complaint, filed in early May 2024,
deleted the federal causes of action and the federal defendants
from his first amended complaint, leaving 27 causes of action and
22 defendants. This complaint added allegations regarding
events in 2023. Morris alleged that he had reported ongoing
retaliation to the Title IX coordinator in February 2023. In May
2023, he had requested copies of his personnel, payroll, and
timesheet records. A CSU employee asked Morris to create his
own paystub and gave him incorrect and incomplete records. A
CSU department chair gave Morris incorrect work information
and failed to provide any official documentation regarding Morris’
personnel, payroll, and timesheet records. Morris was still
unable to take classes as of June 2023 despite being reinstated as
a student.
While the case was still in federal court, CSU Defendants
filed a statement in the trial court for a scheduled case
management conference. This statement noted that CSU
Defendants expected the case to be remanded. The statement
also asserted that there might be discovery issues because Morris
4
was overdue on code-compliant discovery responses. The trial
court continued the case management conference. The federal
district court remanded the case a few weeks later.
Once the case was back in the trial court, CSU Defendants
conferred with Morris regarding a demurrer to the second
amended complaint that they intended to file. CSU Defendants
ultimately filed the demurrer. In support of their demurrer, CSU
Defendants requested judicial notice of a government claim
Morris had submitted to CSU in February 2023 and CSU had
denied on March 8, 2023, for being untimely.
Morris moved ex parte to continue the demurrer hearing
because of a medical condition. The trial court continued the
hearing by over a month, until September 29, 2024.
On September 12, 2024, Morris filed an ex parte
application for leave to amend his complaint. Morris said that
after meeting and conferring with the defendants he wanted to
make certain clarifications they had requested. He also said he
had been provided new evidence, had been subject to further
retaliation that constituted a continuing tort or violation, and
wanted to add causes of action. Morris did not attach a proposed
amended complaint. In discussing the harm the matter had
caused him, Morris said that while caring for his son, Morris had
contracted COVID and then a respiratory infection. Morris
attached a medical certification stating that he had been unable
to work from September 5 to 10, 2024.
On September 19, 2024, CSU Defendants filed a notice
informing the court that they had not received an opposition to
5
their demurrer. They also urged the court to deny Morris’
request to amend his complaint because it was procedurally
improper and there was no indication that Morris could amend
his pleading to state a viable claim. That same day, the trial
court denied Morris’ ex parte request for leave to amend because,
among other procedural defects, Morris had not included a
declaration stating that defendants had been properly notified of
his request.
Morris filed a response to CSU Defendants asking the court
to ignore their notice and allow his responses because, among
other things, he had good cause for an extension due to his
illnesses. He accused the court of refusing to file anything from
him while the case was in federal court but accepting CSU’s case
management statement, which he claimed was not served on
him, before the case was actually remanded.
On September 23, 2024, the trial court posted a tentative
ruling proposing to grant CSU Defendants’ request for judicial
notice and sustain the demurrer without leave to amend. The
trial court adopted its tentative ruling. It ruled that judicially
noticeable facts established that Morris had failed to comply with
applicable claims presentation requirements and that defendants
had statutory immunity to all of Morris’ causes of action.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review and Principles of Appellate
Procedure
The standard of review is well established. “ ‘We give the
complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and
6
its parts in their context. [Citation.] Further, we treat the
demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but do
not assume the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of
law.’ ” (County of Santa Clara v. Superior Court (2023)
14 Cal.5th 1034, 1041.) “ ‘We may also consider matters subject
to judicial notice.’ ” (Capito v. San Jose Healthcare System, LP
(2024) 17 Cal.5th 273, 280.) “ ‘When a demurrer is sustained, we
determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action. [Citation.] And when it is sustained
without leave to amend, we decide whether there is a reasonable
possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment: if it can
be, the trial court has abused its discretion and we reverse.’ ”
(County of Santa Clara, at p. 1041.) The plaintiff has the burden
of proving a reasonable possibility of curing the defect by
amendment. (People ex rel. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Discovery
Radiology Physicians, P.C. (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 521, 532–533.)
Several other principles guide and constrain our
consideration of Morris’ appeal. First, “it is a fundamental
principle of appellate procedure that a trial court judgment is
ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an
appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to
the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that
justifies reversal of the judgment. [Citations.] ‘This is not only a
general principle of appellate practice but an ingredient of the
constitutional doctrine of reversible error.’ ” (Jameson v. Desta
(2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608–609.) “[W]e may affirm on any ground
supported by the record [citation], including grounds not raised
7
by the respondent, and even if the respondent does not file a brief
[citations]. ‘Thus, respondent can assert a new theory on appeal
in order to establish that the judgment was correct on that theory
unless doing so would unfairly prejudice appellant by depriving
appellant of the opportunity to litigate an issue of fact.’ ” (J.R. v.
Electronic Arts Inc. (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 1107, 1115, fn. 2,
italics omitted.)
Second, “ ‘[i]n order to demonstrate error, an appellant
must supply the reviewing court with some cogent argument
supported by legal analysis and citation to the record.’ ” (United
Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th
142, 153.) The Rules of Court applicable to appellate briefs play
a role in determining which issues an appellant has raised. (See
ibid.) Among other things, those rules require every argument to
be stated “under a separate heading or subheading summarizing
the point” and supported by argument and, if possible, authority.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B).) The rules also require
that factual statements, wherever in a brief they appear, be
supported by citations to the volume and page number in the
record. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C); Alki Partners,
LP v. DB Fund Services, LLC (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 574, 590,
fn. 8.) We will consider and address arguments that comply with
these requirements. But we deem forfeited and will not consider
loose or stray arguments not set out in a heading (Provost v.
Regents of University of California (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1289,
1294) and “any factual assertion unsupported by record citation
at the point where it is asserted” (Alki Partners, at p. 590, fn. 8).
8
We will also “ ‘disregard conclusory arguments that are not
supported by pertinent legal authority or fail to disclose the
reasoning by which the appellant reached the conclusions he
wants us to adopt.’ ” (United Grand, at p. 153.)
Third, we will not consider points Morris raises for the first
time in his reply brief. (Doe v. McLaughlin (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th
640, 653.) “This rule is based on considerations of fairness:
withholding a point until the reply brief deprives ‘ “the
respondent the opportunity to answer it or require[s] the effort
and delay of an additional brief by permission.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 654.)
We recognize that Morris is representing himself in this
appeal. But a party proceeding pro se is “ ‘ “held to the same
restrictive rules of procedure as an attorney” ’ ” and is not
entitled to greater consideration than other litigants. (First
American Title Co. v. Mirzaian (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 956, 958,
fn. 1.)
II. Analysis
A. Failure to State a Claim
Morris’ most substantial argument is that the trial court
incorrectly relied on Bitner v. Department of Corrections &
Rehabilitation (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1048 as authority for ruling
that Government Claims Act (Gov. Code3, § 810 et seq.) immunity
bars all of his causes of action. Morris points out that Bitner
concerns Government Code section 844.6 immunity to claims by
prisoners and argues it does not apply to claims by plaintiffs such
3 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Government Code.
9
as himself. (Bitner, at p. 1058.) CSU Defendants concede that
Bitner is not precisely on point and section 844.6 specifically is
inapplicable here. They further admit that Government Claims
Act immunity does not bar all of Morris’ causes of action. But
they argue that the trial court’s judgment is nonetheless correct
because, whether because of immunity or some other reason,
Morris’ complaint does not state a claim under any theory. We
agree with CSU Defendants that, even if we disregard immunity,
Morris’ complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action under any theory.
1. Claims Presentation Requirement
We begin with the issue of claims presentation under the
Government Claims Act, which the trial court cited as an
independent reason for sustaining the demurrer. With certain
exceptions, no suit may be brought against CSU for “money or
damages based upon an express contract or for an injury for
which the Trustees of the California State University is liable”
(§ 905.9) until the plaintiff has presented a written claim to CSU
and CSU has either acted upon it or the claim is deemed to have
been denied (§ 945.4). With an exception not relevant here,
causes of action against individual public employees for acts in
the scope of their employment are barred “if an action against the
employing public entity for such injury is barred” for failure to
comply with the claims presentation requirements. (§ 950.2.)
“The [Government] Claims Act does not apply, however, to
nonpecuniary actions, ‘such as those seeking injunctive, specific
or declaratory relief.’ ” (Canova v. Trustees of Imperial Irrigation
10
Dist. Employee Pension Plan (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1487, 1493.)
It also does not apply to claims under the California Fair
Employment and Housing Act (§ 12900 et seq. (FEHA)). (Garcia
v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 701,
710–711.)
Section 911.2, subdivision (a) requires a plaintiff to present
a claim within one year, at the latest, after the claim accrues.
Each cause of action in a complaint “ ‘ “must [be] reflected in a
timely claim. In addition, the factual circumstances set forth in
the written claim must correspond with the facts alleged in the
complaint; even if the claim were timely, the complaint is
vulnerable to a demurrer if it alleges a factual basis for recovery
which is not fairly reflected in the written claim.” ’ ” (Gong v.
City of Rosemead (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 363, 376.) “[F]ailure to
allege facts demonstrating or excusing compliance with the claim
presentation requirement subjects a claim against a public entity
to a demurrer for failure to state a cause of action.” (State of
California v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1239.) “If a
plaintiff alleges compliance with the claims presentation
requirement, but the public records do not reflect compliance, the
governmental entity can request the court to take judicial notice
under Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (c) that the entity’s
records do not show compliance.” (Gong, at p. 376.)
The trial court correctly granted judicial notice of CSU’s
records showing Morris submitted a claim that CSU received on
March 6, 2023. The claim incorporated by reference a demand
letter his counsel had sent to CSU in March 2022.
11
This claim was not timely, as CSU determined. Because
Morris signed the claim form in late February 2023, it could only
have been timely to support causes of action that accrued
between February 2022 and February 2023. Morris’ complaint
primarily concerns events between late 2020 and January 2022,
since it alleges that CSU failed to properly or thoroughly
investigate his Title IX complaint and failed to pay his
scholarships in 2020 and 2021, Dr. Wilson discriminated against
and harassed him and failed to pay his wages between January
and June 2021, he was administratively disqualified from his
position in June 2021, CSU denied his appeal in August 2021,
and CSU failed to release the minutes of its board meetings as of
January 2022. None of these events took place between February
2022 and February 2023, so Morris’ March 6, 2023 claim cannot
support any causes of action based on them. Morris’ complaint
further alleges that Morris was still unable to take classes as of
June 2023 and that in May 2023 CSU failed to give him correct
and complete personnel, payroll, and timesheet records. These
events post-date Morris’ claim, so Morris cannot state causes of
action subject to the claims filing requirement based on these
events, either.
Morris appears to suggest that the March 2022 letter
satisfied the claim requirement, but this is incorrect. Leaving
aside procedural defects, as a matter of substance the letter only
clearly alleges a claim for violation of the Brown Act and does not
set out the factual basis for the other causes of action that Morris
alleges in his complaint. The first paragraph of the letter states
12
Morris had retained counsel “to prepare this cease and desist
correspondence, put CSU on notice of Brown Act (section 54950.5
et seq.) violations, demand to cure said violations and make a
monetary demand to resolve the matter.” The letter goes on to
state that Morris was majoring in political science and wanted to
be a part of that department but CSU had disqualified him in
retaliation for voicing and asserting serious concerns with CSU’s
failure to follow legal obligations. Aside from the Brown Act, the
letter never identifies those obligations CSU failed to follow, nor
does it allege that Morris was an employee who suffered
retaliation or unpaid wages. Later in the letter, a list of demands
includes requests for Dr. Wilson to be fired for harassment and
defamation and other employees to be fired from CSU’s Title IX
department. But the letter never provides any facts to support
these demands.
Because Morris failed to timely file a claim alleging the
facts on which his complaint is based, we agree with CSU
Defendants that Government Code section 945.4 bars all of his
causes of action except for those based on FEHA and those based
on the Brown Act to the extent that Morris seeks injunctive or
declaratory relief. CSU Defendants do not contend that Morris’
wage claims are barred, presumably based on authority such as
Loehr v. Ventura County Community College Dist. (1983)
147 Cal.App.3d 1071, 1080. Loehr discussed section 905, which
requires presentment of all claims for “money or damages against
local public entities” but in subdivision (c) excepts wage claims
against local public agencies from the pre-complaint claims
13
presentation requirement applicable to such entities. (See Loehr,
at p. 1080.) Section 905.9 uses similarly broad language,
requiring presentment of “all claims against the California State
University for money or damages based upon an express contract
or for an injury” for which CSU is liable, but it has no exceptions.
Morris offers no reason to think that his wage claims are exempt
from this provision, so his failure to present those claims bars his
suit on them.
2. Remaining Causes of Action
Although Government Code section 945.4 does not bar
Morris’ FEHA causes of action and his Brown Act causes of action
for declaratory or injunctive relief, those causes of action are not
viable for other reasons.
The Brown Act statutes Morris cites in his complaint apply
only to local public agencies. (§§ 54951, 54952, 54954.2, 54956.)
CSU is a constitutionally authorized state agency, not a local
public agency. (City and County of San Francisco v. Regents of
University of California (2019) 7 Cal.5th 536, 545.)
This leaves only Morris’ FEHA claims for discrimination
and harassment based on race, sexual orientation and marital
status.4 At the pleading stage, a plaintiff must “ ‘set forth the
4 Morris’ complaint also alleges that CSU failed to prevent
its employees’ harassment and retaliation based on race, sexual
orientation, and marital status. But the only harassment or
retaliation by an employee alleged in the complaint is Dr.
Wilson’s conduct, and CSU is strictly liable for Dr. Wilson’s
conduct because she was his supervisor. (Bailey v. San Francisco
Dist. Attorney’s Office (2024) 16 Cal.5th 611, 635 (Bailey).) The
14
essential facts of his case with reasonable precision and with
particularity sufficient to acquaint a defendant with the nature,
source and extent of his cause of action.’ ” (Ludgate Ins. Co. v.
Lockheed Martin Corp. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 592, 608.) To plead
a FEHA intentional discrimination claim, a plaintiff must allege
facts showing he was “a member of a protected class; was
performing competently in the position he held, and suffered an
adverse employment action such as termination or demotion; and
that other circumstances suggest a discriminatory motive.”
(Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 885.)
To plead a claim for racial, sexual, or marital status harassment,
an employee must allege facts showing he or she was subjected to
harassing conduct that was (1) unwelcome; (2) because of race,
sexual orientation, or marital status; and (3) sufficiently severe
or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an
abusive work environment. (See Bailey, supra, 16 Cal.5th at
p. 627 [racial harassment].) These standards together mean that
Morris must allege facts to acquaint CSU Defendants with the
general conduct that he believes constituted discrimination or a
hostile work environment.
Morris’ complaint does not meet this standard. The
complaint is a confusing jumble of allegations about conduct by
individual students before CSU employed Morris, staff members
who investigated that harassment, and his supervisor once
Morris began employment as a research assistant. We will not
failure to prevent allegations therefore add nothing to the
discrimination and harassment causes of action.
15
sift and parse the particulars of those allegations to determine
which allegations satisfy the elements of the FEHA claims
because Morris’ briefing offers us no assistance in the endeavor.
Suffice it to say that we see no factual allegations sufficient to
support the key elements of discriminatory motive for the
discrimination claims or sufficiently severe or pervasive conduct
to create a hostile work environment for the harassment claims.
(See Bailey, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 631, fn. 6 [single epithet can
create hostile work environment, depending on the totality of the
circumstances in which the epithet is used].) After CSU
Defendants argued in their respondents’ brief that Morris had
failed to allege facts to support any FEHA causes of action,
Morris still offered no rejoinder on reply to demonstrate that his
complaint is sufficient or that he could amend it to make it so.
Morris’ briefing on appeal is therefore insufficient to carry
Morris’ burden as the appellant to demonstrate that his
complaint alleges facts to constitute his FEHA causes of action.
B. Other Arguments for Reversal
Having determined that the trial court correctly sustained
CSU Defendants’ demurrer to Morris’ complaint, in part for other
reasons that it provided in its ruling, we turn to Morris’ other
arguments for reversal of the judgment.
1. Hearing
Morris contends the trial court erred by holding a hearing
on the demurrer even though it was aware that he could not
attend, and accepting evidence that was prejudicial to him and
that the court used to dismiss his case. But Morris cites nothing
16
to show that he ever affirmatively asked the trial court to defer
its consideration of the demurrer. Morris was aware of and able
to follow the correct procedure for requesting a continuance, since
he had succeeded with an ex parte request for a continuance a
month earlier. But he filed no other request to continue the
demurrer hearing. Morris points out that he mentioned his
medical issues in his ex parte request for leave to amend his
complaint before the trial court ruled on the demurrer. But he
does not address, much less show error in, the trial court’s ruling
that his ex parte request was defective for, among other things,
failing to show proper service of the request on the defendants.
Nor does he cite any authority making a request to amend,
defective or otherwise, a basis for deferring consideration of a
demurrer when Morris never affirmatively requested that relief.
The same is true of Morris’ reference to the need for an extension
in his response to CSU Defendants’ notice of nonreceipt of
opposition to their demurrer. Additionally, Morris cites nothing
in the record to show that the trial court received any evidence at
the hearing on the demurrer that Morris contends took place.
There is no record of the oral proceedings at any such hearing.
So far as we can tell from the clerk’s transcript and case register,
the trial court simply adopted its tentative ruling when Morris
failed to contest it.
Morris notes that he sought leave to amend his complaint
to address one of CSU Defendants’ concerns, raised in a meeting
and conference before they filed their demurrer, that the second
amended complaint failed to allege facts to show compliance with
17
the FEHA requirement that he exhaust his administrative
remedies before filing suit. Even if this were correct, Morris cites
no authority to support his implicit contention that CSU
Defendants were obligated to accept his offer to amend the
complaint a third time or were precluded from raising any other
arguments in a demurrer.
2. Waiver of immunity
Morris contends that CSU Defendants were not entitled to
immunity because they were not engaged in a protected activity,
CSU Defendants waived their claim to immunity, and federal law
prevents CSU Defendants from asserting immunity. These
arguments have no merit, but we need not examine them in
detail in light of our conclusion, ante, that Morris’ complaint fails
to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action regardless
of whether immunity applies.
3. Federal Law Arguments
Morris devotes considerable space in his opening brief to
arguments about the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title IX, 42 U.S.C.
section 1983, the Eighth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, and other federal law, as well as a description of the
qualifications of an expert witness regarding damages under
federal law. As best we can understand them, these arguments
have no apparent bearing on the trial court’s ruling on Morris’
complaint, which alleges only state law causes of action. These
arguments do not justify reversal of the judgment.
Morris accuses CSU Defendants of abuse of process for
filing a case management statement in the trial court before the
18
case was remanded from federal court. He supports his
accusation with assertions that CSU Defendants filed the
statement without serving him with it, the trial court held a case
management hearing without notifying him, and the trial court
issued a case management order despite preventing Morris from
filing documents while the case was pending in federal court.
The record contains a proof of service of CSU Defendants’
case management statement on Morris, which contradicts Morris’
claim of lack of service. Morris cites nothing in the record to
support his assertion that he was prevented from filing
documents in the trial court or explain what documents he
attempted to file. We perceive no impropriety in the trial court
issuing a case management order requesting an update on the
case to determine whether to dispose of the case records, and
Morris offers no authority to support his argument that the trial
court lacked jurisdiction to request or consider the update. And
in any event, Morris cites nothing to demonstrate any prejudice
from CSU Defendants’ case management statement or the trial
court’s case management conference. Morris notes that CSU
Defendants’ case management statement predicted that there
might be discovery issues because Morris was overdue on code-
compliant discovery responses. But this statement has no
bearing on the trial court’s later ruling on CSU Defendants’
demurrer. Nor was it prejudicial, given our conclusion ante that
the trial court correctly sustained that demurrer as a matter of
law.
19
4. Racial Justice Act
Morris points out that the Legislature enacted Penal Code
section 745 as part of the Racial Justice Act (Stats. 2020, ch. 317)
to eliminate racial bias in criminal cases. Morris’ complaint is
civil, not criminal, so the Racial Justice Act does not apply.
Morris suggests that the trial court was biased because it ruled
that there was no reasonable possibility that he could amend his
complaint to state a cause of action. Adverse rulings, even
erroneous ones, are not evidence of apparent or actual bias.
(Brown v. American Bicycle Group, LLC (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th
665, 674.) Morris points to nothing else to substantiate his
serious accusation against the trial court.
5. Jury as Factfinder
Citing only cases decided in other states, Morris argues
that a jury can infer the intent necessary for an intentional tort
from circumstances, acts, or conduct. This may be an accurate
statement of California law, but it does not save Morris’
complaint given the defects discussed ante.
6. Public Hearing
Morris argues that the trial court failed to ensure a public
record and he has a right to a public trial grounded in the
historical common law. The trial court’s ruling was public, not
private. Morris cites no authority to suggest that his right to a
public trial, whatever its validity or extent, precluded the trial
court from sustaining a demurrer when his complaint failed to
state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action under any
theory.
20
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
BROWN, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
GOLDMAN, J.
MOORMAN, J.
Morris v. Board of Trustees of the California State University (A171548)
Judge of the Superior Court of Mendocino County,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.
21