The opinion
2026 IL App (1st) 240354-U
No. 1-24-0354
First Division
March 30, 2026
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT
____________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the
ILLINOIS, ) Circuit Court of
) Cook County.
Respondent-Appellee, )
)
v. ) No. 19 CR 03830
)
FLOYD JORDAN, ) Honorable
) Ursula Walowski
Petitioner-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.
____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE COBBS delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Fitzgerald Smith and Justice Howse concurred in the
judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The circuit court’s order granting petitioner leave to file an amended postconviction
petition is vacated where the court lacked jurisdiction. The court’s order dismissing
that amended petition is also vacated.
¶2 Petitioner Floyd Jordan appeals from an order of the circuit court dismissing his amended
petition for postconviction relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq.
(West 2022)). Petitioner argues that his private postconviction counsel provided unreasonable
assistance by failing to support the amended petition with sufficient evidence, argument, and legal
No. 1-24-0354
authority. For the reasons that follow, we find that the circuit court’s order granting petitioner leave
to file the amended petition is void for lack of jurisdiction. Consequently, the amended petition
was improperly filed without leave, and the court’s subsequent order dismissing that amended
petition is also vacated.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 A full recitation of the facts underlying petitioner’s conviction can be found in this court’s
order affirming the conviction on direct appeal. People v. Jordan, 2022 IL App (1st) 210314-U.
As those facts are not in dispute here, we will briefly describe them only to the extent relevant to
the issues raised on appeal.
¶5 On March 1, 2019, petitioner was stopped by a Chicago police officer who was responding
to a “shot spotter” report in the area. Petitioner fled from the officer, and, during the ensuing foot
chase, the officer observed petitioner pull a gun from his waistband and toss it aside. After
petitioner was detained, the officer backtracked and recovered a loaded pistol about 15 feet away
from where petitioner was detained.
¶6 Based on his criminal history, petitioner was charged with being an armed habitual criminal
(AHC) (720 ILCS 5/24-1.7(a) (West 2018)). At petitioner’s bench trial, the State presented the
testimony of the officer as well as footage and stills from the officer’s body worn camera. To
establish the predicate felonies for the AHC charge, the State also entered certified copies of two
convictions it attributed to petitioner. The first conviction was for the manufacture and delivery of
a controlled substance in case number 00-CR-15878-01 against a “Manny Winters.” The second
was for the manufacture and delivery of cocaine in case number 00-CR-11405-01 against a
“Freemon Jordan.” Petitioner stipulated at trial that these were both “his convictions.” The defense
rested without presenting any evidence. The trial court found petitioner guilty of AHC.
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¶7 At the sentencing hearing, the State offered in aggravation that petitioner had two other
drug-related felony convictions aside from the ones presented at trial. Petitioner had also been
convicted in Indiana of attempting to murder a police officer after he fired six shots at an officer
during a foot chase.
¶8 This criminal history was also reflected in petitioner’s presentence investigation report
(PSI). Petitioner’s counsel confirmed that he reviewed the PSI with petitioner and requested no
corrections, stating, “For the most part, it’s accurate.” The PSI also listed petitioner’s date of birth
as January 24, 1982, meaning that he was 18 years old when the predicate felonies were committed
in April and May of 2000, respectively. This same birthdate also appears on the indictment return
sheet, the arrest report, and Pretrial Services’ public safety assessment.
¶9 In mitigation, the defense emphasized that petitioner had a difficult upbringing and had not
had any legal trouble in the many years since he was released from prison for the attempted murder.
Petitioner was employed at a barbershop and helped guide the youths who hung around the shop.
¶ 10 The trial court acknowledged petitioner’s criminal history but found that he had
demonstrated rehabilitative potential. Ultimately, the court sentenced petitioner to seven years in
prison for AHC.
¶ 11 On direct appeal, petitioner argued only that the State failed to prove that he possessed the
recovered gun. Jordan, 2022 IL App (1st) 210314-U, ¶ 11. In particular, petitioner contended that
the officer’s testimony was “ ‘contrary to human experience,’ ” contradicted by the body worn
camera footage, and not supported by corroborating forensic evidence. Id. Petitioner did not
challenge the predicate convictions underlying the AHC charge. Id. This court affirmed
petitioner’s conviction, concluding that a rational trier of fact could have found that he possessed
the gun beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. ¶ 21.
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No. 1-24-0354
¶ 12 On August 8, 2022, petitioner filed a pro se postconviction petition arguing that his trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to quash his arrest and suppress evidence. Petitioner also alleged
an unspecified “S.A.F.E.-T. Act violation.” The circuit court summarily dismissed the pro se
petition on September 19, 2022.
¶ 13 On October 13, 2022, petitioner mailed a notice of appeal from prison. The clerk of the
circuit court received the notice on October 31, 2022, and filed it the same day.
¶ 14 Petitioner also hired private counsel around this time. On October 31, 2022, postconviction
counsel motioned in the circuit court for leave to enter his appearance and amend the pro se
petition. On November 21, 2022, postconviction counsel filed his appearance and a notice for his
motion to amend the pro se petition. The notice states that the motion was to be heard on November
30, 2022. However, it appears no hearing was held that day. According to the case summary sheet,
the case was “off call” at that time.
¶ 15 On April 7, 2023, petitioner filed a motion in this court to voluntarily withdraw his appeal
of the summary dismissal of his pro se petition. We granted the motion on April 11, 2023.
However, the mandate was not issued and filed in the circuit court until May 26, 2023.
¶ 16 On April 19, 2023, before the issuance and filing of the mandate, postconviction counsel
re-filed his motion for leave to appear and to amend the pro se petition. On April 26, 2023, also
before the mandate dismissing the appeal was issued and filed, the circuit court granted petitioner
leave to file an amended petition with the aid of postconviction counsel.
¶ 17 On August 2, 2023, petitioner filed an “Amended Post-Conviction Petition.” The amended
petition abandoned the claims raised in the initial pro se petition and instead argued that
petitioner’s AHC conviction could not stand because the State failed to prove that he was convicted
of two predicate felonies. First, petitioner argued that he was not the “Freemon Jordan” convicted
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No. 1-24-0354
in case number 00-CR-11405-01. Petitioner noted that his individual record (IR) number, which
is “derived from the specific and particularly individualized fingerprints” of each defendant, is
different from the one listed for Freemon Jordan in the case file. Second, petitioner argued that,
even if he were the defendant in the predicate convictions used by State, the birthdates listed on
the arrest reports and the “criminal file from the Clerk of the Circuit Court” show that he was just
17 years old at the time of those offenses. Citing People v. Gray, 2021 IL App (1st) 191086,
petitioner argued that felony convictions which would now be treated as juvenile matters cannot
support an AHC conviction. 1
¶ 18 Attached to the amended petition was an affidavit in which petitioner averred that he
informed his private trial counsel, Richard Fenbert, that the predicate felonies “were not able to be
used against [him] because [he] was a juvenile at the time and because [he] was not convicted of
both charges.” Petitioner directed Fenbert to file a motion challenging the predicates on this basis,
but Fenbert refused to do so. Petitioner also instructed Fenbert to raise the same argument on direct
appeal, but Fenbert again refused.
¶ 19 The circuit court next held a hearing on September 28, 2023. On that date, the State argued
that petitioner’s filing “would be more properly a supplemental PC” because petitioner’s pro se
petition had been dismissed and taken off call. The court dismissed the State’s position as
“incorrect” and ordered it to respond to the amended petition. The assistant state’s attorney (ASA)
again resisted, stating that she would “need to get the transcripts because in Odyssey it shows that
1
Gray was pending appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court at the time petitioner filed his amended
petition. Our supreme court subsequently reversed Gray, ruling that the defendant (1) waived his
challenge by stipulating that he had two or more predicate convictions at trial and (2) could not establish
the prejudice necessary for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel where he had been convicted of
qualifying offenses other than those committed when he was 17. People v. Gray, 2024 IL 127815, ¶¶ 26,
32.
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No. 1-24-0354
the PC has been dismissed.” The court handed the ASA a copy of the amended petition and insisted
that she “[r]ead this and respond in a month.”
¶ 20 The State filed a motion to dismiss the amended petition on November 7, 2023, arguing
that Fenbert did not provide ineffective assistance because any challenge to the predicate felonies
underlying the AHC charge would have been baseless. The State pointed out that the trial record
showed that “Manny Winters” and “Freeman Jordan” were two of petitioner’s known aliases.
Petitioner also requested no corrections to the PSI, which reflected the two convictions relied upon
by the State. Additionally, the State contended that the record showed petitioner was 18 at the time
of both predicate felonies based on a birth date of January 24, 1982. The State also submitted that
the predicates would still be valid even if petitioner were 17 at the time, as there was a “split in the
First District” caselaw as to whether convictions that now might have been juvenile adjudications
could support an AHC conviction.
¶ 21 At the hearing on the motion, postconviction counsel maintained that the different IR
numbers and demographic information “from the case file” showed that petitioner was not the
defendant in the predicate felonies and that, in any event, he would have been 17 at the time of
those offenses. The court rejected petitioner’s argument, stating that “it fails completely.” The
court opined that petitioner had “not presented anything to show that those two convictions are not
[his].” Consequently, the court issued an oral ruling that, “Motion to dismiss is granted. Previous
order to stand.”
¶ 22 This appeal followed.
¶ 23 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 24 On appeal, petitioner argues that postconviction counsel provided unreasonable assistance
by failing to adequately support the amended petition. More specifically, petitioner contends that
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No. 1-24-0354
postconviction counsel should have attached court documents showing that he and the defendant
in case number 00-CR-11405-01 (Freemon Jordan) had different IR, SID, and FBI numbers.
Petitioner also submits that postconviction counsel should have provided legal authority to show
that “these differences mattered,” namely that the numbers are based on fingerprints and thus
unique to an individual. Petitioner raises no challenge regarding the conviction against “Manny
Winters” in case number 00-CR-15878-01.
¶ 25 Before we can consider that claim, however, we must first address the State’s argument
that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to enter the April 26, 2023, order granting petitioner leave
to file the amended petition in the first place. According to the State, this lack of jurisdiction
rendered the April 26 order void and the amended petition “a legal nullity,” meaning that “nothing
related to it or its merits may be reviewed on appeal.”
¶ 26 This court always has an independent duty to consider issues of jurisdiction, both its own
and that of the circuit court. People v. Smith, 228 Ill. 2d 95, 104 (2008). Whether a court has
jurisdiction presents a question of law subject to de novo review. People v. Marker, 233 Ill. 2d
158, 162 (2009).
¶ 27 The timely filing of a notice of appeal is the only jurisdictional step required to convey
jurisdiction to the appellate court. People v. Abdullah, 2019 IL 123492, ¶ 21. “ ‘[W]hen the notice
of appeal is filed, the appellate court’s jurisdiction attaches instanter, and the cause is beyond the
jurisdiction of the trial court.’ ” Id. (quoting People v. Bounds, 182 Ill. 2d 1, 3 (1998)). The filing
of a notice of appeal divests the circuit court of jurisdiction to enter any order involving a matter
of substance in the case. People v. Rivera, 2024 IL App (1st) 240520, ¶ 19. During the pendency
of an appeal, the circuit court may not enter any order that would modify the order or judgment
being appealed, or that would have the effect of interfering with the appellate court’s review.
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People v. McCray, 2016 IL App (3d) 140554, ¶ 23. Instead, “ ‘[t]he only continuing power the
[circuit] court possesse[s] over the case [is] limited to enforcement of the judgment or correction
of clerical errors or matters of form so that the record conformed to the judgment actually
entered.’ ” People v. Scheurich, 2019 IL App (4th) 160441, ¶ 17 (quoting People v. Flowers, 208
Ill. 2d 291, 306-07 (2003)). Importantly, “the trial court does not regain jurisdiction until it files
the reviewing court’s mandate.” People v. Evans, 2015 IL App (3d) 140753, ¶ 13. Any order issued
by the circuit court without jurisdiction is void. People v. Chapman, 2018 IL App (1st) 163045,
¶ 4.
¶ 28 In this case, it is undisputed that petitioner filed his notice of appeal for the summary
dismissal of his pro se petition on October 13, 2022. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 373(b) (eff. July 1, 2017)
(notice of appeal received more than 30 days after entry of the final judgment being appealed is
deemed filed at the time of mailing). Although this court granted petitioner’s motion to withdraw
his appeal on April 11, 2023, the mandate was not filed in the circuit court until May 26, 2023.
Thus, the circuit court lacked the jurisdiction to enter any substantive orders between October 13,
2022, and May 26, 2023. The circuit court’s April 26, 2023, order granting petitioner leave to file
his amended petition was clearly an order of substance, as it sought to modify the order that
summarily dismissed the pro se petition. Petitioner does not argue otherwise. Consequently, the
April 26 order is void. Chapman, 2018 IL App (1st) 163045, ¶ 4.
¶ 29 So, where does that leave us? Because we have determined that the April 26 order is void,
we must also conclude that the amended petition was improperly filed without leave, and that the
circuit court’s order dismissing that amended petition is also void. As our jurisdiction is limited to
vacating the circuit court’s void orders (People v. Shunick, 2024 IL App 129244, ¶ 73), we cannot
address the parties’ arguments as to whether postconviction counsel rendered unreasonable
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assistance. Yet petitioner laments that he “should not suffer losing a valid claim simply because
the post-conviction court and his counsel got the procedure wrong.” He asserts that it is unjust to
punish him for the circuit court’s failure to simply “wait[] a few more weeks” for the mandate to
be filed before granting him leave to file the amended petition.
¶ 30 However, as the State points out, the circuit court could not have granted petitioner leave
to file an amended petition on April 26, 2023, even if petitioner had never filed a notice of appeal.
This is because the court’s September 19, 2022, order summarily dismissing the pro se petition
was a final judgment in the case. 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2022); People v. White, 2013 IL
App (2d) 120205, ¶ 9. The circuit loses jurisdiction 30 days after the entry of a final judgment.
People v. Bailey, 2014 IL 115459, ¶ 8. Even assuming, arguendo, that the notice of appeal tolled
this period until the appeal was withdrawn, the circuit court’s April 26 order was still entered more
than 30 days after its dismissal of the pro se petition.
¶ 31 Regardless, although the circuit court should freely grant leave to amend a pro se
postconviction petition, it can do so only “as is generally provided in civil cases.” 725 ILCS 5/122-
5 (West 2022). Under the Code of Civil Procedure, amendment is allowed “[a]t any time before
final judgment.” 735 ILCS 5/2-616 (West 2022). Because the summary dismissal of a
postconviction petition is a final judgment, “a defendant may not amend a postconviction petition
following a first-stage dismissal[.]” People v. Smith, 2013 IL App (4th) 110220, ¶ 23.
¶ 32 In light of the foregoing, petitioner claims that “in the very least” the circuit court had
jurisdiction to consider the “amended petition” as a successive petition. However, even if we
characterize the amended petition as a successive petition, the record shows that petitioner was
never granted leave to file a successive petition. In order to file a successive petition, the petitioner
must obtain leave by establishing cause and prejudice for failing to raise the claims in the initial
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petition. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2022); People v. Smith, 2014 IL 115946, ¶ 33. Alternatively,
a petitioner may be granted leave to file a successive petition where he raises a colorable claim of
actual innocence. People v. Griffin, 2024 IL 128587, ¶ 35. This is a different and much stricter
standard than what is required for leave to amend the initial petition. See People v. Currey, 2024
IL App (2d) 230099, ¶ 14 (leave to amend an initial petition should be freely given). Indeed,
petitioner concedes on appeal that “the post-conviction court never found that the amended petition
met the cause and prejudice or actual innocence test. Nor did the amended petition even attempt
to meet either test.” Although petitioner argues that postconviction counsel was unreasonable for
failing to establish cause and prejudice, he admits that the record clearly shows that the circuit
court never considered or ruled on whether cause and prejudice existed. Under such circumstances,
we cannot say that the court erred in denying petitioner leave to file a successive petition.
Jurisdictional issues aside, the court did not “deny” leave to file a successive petition because the
court was never asked to grant that kind of leave.
¶ 33 However, petitioner is not necessarily without recourse. We observe that a prisoner may
attempt to establish the cause and prejudice required to file a successive petition at any time he
remains incarcerated or on parole. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2020); see also White, 2013 IL App
(2d) 120205, ¶ 10 (where the circuit court did not consider a motion filed after summary dismissal
of the initial petition as a successive petition, the proper disposition was to treat the motion as a
motion for leave to amend “without prejudice to [the] defendant’s right to seek leave to file a
successive petition”). We also note that, should he obtain leave of court, petitioner will have the
opportunity to file a successive petition correcting the critical errors he alleges postconviction
counsel made in the amended petition. Of course, we express no opinion as to whether petitioner
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could establish cause and prejudice or present a meritorious claim if the amended petition is
bolstered as he argues it should have been.
¶ 34 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 35 For the reasons stated, we vacate the circuit court’s April 26, 2023, order granting petitioner
leave to file an amended postconviction petition as well as the court’s January 1, 2024, motion
dismissing the amended petition. This ruling is without prejudice to petitioner’s right to seek leave
to file a successive postconviction petition.
¶ 36 Vacated.
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