Ryan Milbeck v. Allison George

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

____________________

No. 25-1061

RYAN W. MILBECK,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ALLISON GEORGE, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Western District of Wisconsin.

No. 3:23-cv-00525-wmc — William M. Conley, Judge.

____________________

SUBMITTED FEBRUARY 2, 2026 * — DECIDED MARCH 30, 2026

____________________

Before BRENNAN, Chief Judge, and HAMILTON and KIRSCH,

Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. Ryan Milbeck sued the Village of Rothschild,

Wisconsin, and Kenosha County, Wisconsin, as well as a

* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because

the briefs and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments,

and oral argument would not significantly aid the court. See Fed. R. App.

P. 34(a)(2)(C).

2 No. 25-1061

prosecutor and several law-enforcement officers in those

jurisdictions. Invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Milbeck alleges that

the defendants violated his federal constitutional rights by

entering his home and arresting him without a warrant or

probable cause and that the defendants then maliciously

prosecuted him. The district court dismissed all claims on the

pleadings because the officers had probable cause to arrest

Milbeck and the prosecutor was absolutely immune from suit.

We agree with the district court’s determinations as to

both probable cause and prosecutorial immunity. But

probable cause is not, without more, a defense to a claim of

unlawful warrantless entry. Milbeck has plausibly alleged

that officers violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment

by entering his property and arresting him on the basis of

what Wisconsin officials call a “temporary felony want”—a

document issued by a law enforcement officer rather than by

a judicial officer. We therefore affirm in part, vacate in part,

and remand for further proceedings.

I. Background

We review de novo a grant of a motion to dismiss on the

pleadings, and we accept all factual allegations in the

complaint as true, reading them in the light most favorable to

the plaintiff. Schillinger v. Kiley, 954 F.3d 990, 994 (7th Cir.

2020). We may also consider documents attached to the

complaint if the plaintiff refers to them and relies upon them.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c); Williamson v. Curran, 714 F.3d 432,

435–36 (7th Cir. 2013).

According to documents attached to Milbeck’s complaint,

in July 2020, Milbeck’s ex-wife Kendra told the Kenosha

County Sheriff’s Department that Milbeck was violating a

No. 25-1061 3

restraining order against him. Kendra told Detective Allison

George that Milbeck had hacked into her email and social-

media accounts. She provided log-in records showing that a

phone at the location of Milbeck’s home in the Village of

Rothschild (more than 200 miles away in Marathon County)

had made several attempts (some successful) to access her

accounts. It appeared that, after logging in, Milbeck read her

emails, searched her contacts, and tried to change her

passwords. Kendra explained that before their separation,

Milbeck had threatened to kill her if she left him, so she feared

that he was trying to find out where she lived.

Detective George contacted police officers in Rothschild

and asked them to speak with Milbeck at his home. When

they did so, he denied trying to access Kendra’s accounts.

Detective George then requested that charges be filed

against Milbeck for violating the restraining order and

stalking. She again contacted officers in Rothschild. They told

her they would need a warrant to arrest him. According to

Detective George’s report, she then “placed a temporary

felony warrant” (emphasis added) for Milbeck and told

officers in Rothschild that she had done so.

A Wisconsin “temporary felony want” is a database alert

that officers in one jurisdiction believe a suspect has

committed a felony and that there is “information sufficient

to support an arrest warrant, but that no arrest warrant ha[s]

yet been issued.” State v. Subdiaz-Osorio, 849 N.W.2d 748, 755

n.8 (Wis. 2014). The “want” is intended to help officers

promptly apprehend suspects who may flee across

jurisdictional boundaries. Id. at 755 n.10. And though it is

essentially an electronic “wanted” poster or all-points

bulletin, law-enforcement officers in Wisconsin have

4 No. 25-1061

interchangeably referred to this sort of document as both a

“temporary felony want” and a “temporary felony warrant.”

See, e.g., Henderson v. Goldbeck, No. 23-cv-1067, slip op. at *3

(E.D. Wis. March 21, 2025) (referring to “temporary felony

warrant” but noting document is not actually a warrant); State

v. Collins, 363 N.W.2d 229, 230 n.1 (Wis. App. 1984) (noting

use of both terms).

According to Milbeck, Rothschild Police Department

Officers Matthew Loveless and Andrew Schroeder arrived at

his home and entered without his consent, claiming they had

a “warrant” for his arrest. Milbeck also alleges the officers

claimed that Jeremy Hunt, the chief of the Rothschild Police

Department, verified the warrant and that the officers

arrested him and transported him to Kenosha County.

Milbeck was charged with stalking, but the prosecutor later

voluntarily dismissed the charges at the preliminary hearing.

Milbeck alleges that he later requested a copy of the

warrant for his arrest from the Kenosha County Sheriff’s

Department, but the department’s representative told him

that no warrant ever existed.

Milbeck then filed this suit under § 1983 alleging the

defendants violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment.

He alleged that the officers arrested him with a defective

warrant (claim 1), unlawfully entered his home (claim 2),

falsely arrested him (claim 3), and falsely imprisoned him

(claim 4). He sued supervisors at both police departments

under a theory of supervisory liability (claims 6 and 7) and

both Kenosha County and the Village of Rothschild under a

theory of municipal liability for failing to train their officers

(claim 9). He also sued all defendants for malicious

prosecution (claim 5). And he asserted a claim under 42 U.S.C.

No. 25-1061 5

§§ 1985 and 1986 alleging that several officers conspired to

violate his rights and/or neglected to prevent the violations of

his rights (claim 8).

Under Rule 12(b)(6), the district court dismissed all claims

for failure to state a claim. The court treated Milbeck’s

theories of defective warrant, unlawful entry, false arrest, and

false imprisonment as one consolidated claim for false arrest

and imprisonment in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

The court then concluded that Milbeck’s arrest was supported

by probable cause, which is an absolute bar to false arrest

claims arising under § 1983, and dismissed all claims relating

to his arrest. The court dismissed the malicious prosecution

claim because Milbeck could not show that he was charged

without probable cause. The court also dismissed the

supervisory liability claims because Milbeck failed to allege

that any supervisor played a personal role in his arrest. The

court dismissed the claims under §§ 1985 and 1986 because

Milbeck failed to allege any factual details of any conspiracy

to deprive him of equal protection of the laws. And though

the prosecutor did not appear or file a response to Milbeck’s

complaint, the court dismissed the claims against her because

prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity from civil suit for

initiating charges or presenting a case on behalf of the state.

Finally, the court reasoned that because Milbeck failed to state

a claim against any individual defendant, he could not

establish municipal liability for failure to train under § 1983.

II. Discussion

We granted Milbeck’s motion for leave to proceed on

appeal in forma pauperis, noting that his claim that the police

unlawfully entered his home under the auspices of the

temporary felony “want” was potentially viable. Milbeck

6 No. 25-1061

presses that issue, arguing that the temporary felony “want”

was not a valid warrant and that the district court improperly

dismissed his unlawful entry and unlawful arrest claims. We

agree in part.

A possible source of confusion was the district court’s

decision to treat as duplicative Milbeck’s claims alleging that

officers secured a defective warrant (claim 1), unlawfully

entered his property (claim 2), unlawfully arrested him (claim

3), and falsely imprisoned him (claim 4). The district court

explained that it did so because the claims “stem from the

same operative facts and allege the same injury.” That’s true,

but an unlawful entry pursuant to a defective or non-existent

warrant is an actionable wrong distinct from an allegedly

unlawful arrest. “Fourth Amendment claims for unlawful

entry [and] unlawful arrest or detention … are separate

claims that focus on different points in a law enforcement

officer’s interaction with the plaintiff.” Dukes v. Sheriff of Levy

County, 155 F.4th 1291, 1300 (11th Cir. 2025). We therefore

analyze claims challenging the legality of the home entry

separately from those alleging unlawful arrest and detention.

See, e.g., Muhammad v. Pearson, 900 F.3d 898, 904, 907 (7th Cir.

2018).

A. Unlawful Entry Claims

The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right to be free

from unreasonable searches and seizures, and the “sanctity of

a person’s living space” stands at the core of the Fourth

Amendment. Lange v. California, 594 U.S. 295, 303 (2021).

“[P]hysical entry of the home is the chief evil against which

… the Fourth Amendment is directed,” and “the warrant

procedure minimizes the danger of needless intrusions of that

No. 25-1061 7

sort.” Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585–86 (1980) (citations

omitted).

Warrantless searches and seizures inside a home,

including arrests, are therefore presumed to be unreasonable.

Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474–75 (1971); Gaetjens

v. City of Loves Park, 4 F.4th 487, 491–92 (7th Cir. 2021)

(citations omitted). “[P]olice officers may not constitutionally

enter a home without a warrant to effectuate an arrest, absent

consent or exigent circumstances, even if they have probable

cause.” Sparing v. Village of Olympia Fields, 266 F.3d 684, 688

(7th Cir. 2001), citing Payton, 445 U.S. at 585–90;

see also Hawkins v. Mitchell, 756 F.3d 983, 991–92 (7th Cir.

2014). When there is time to secure a valid warrant, then,

officers who choose not to do so risk violating constitutional

rights. Sparing, 266 F.3d at 691.

A fundamental principle of Fourth Amendment law is that

a valid warrant may be issued only by a “neutral and

detached magistrate” upon a showing of probable cause, not

by an “officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of

ferreting out crime.” Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14

(1948); accord, e.g., United States v. Hueston, 90 F.4th 897, 902

(7th Cir. 2024); United States v. Harris, 464 F.3d 733, 737–38

(7th Cir. 2006). Allowing the police to issue warrants to

themselves would “reduce the [Fourth] Amendment to a

nullity.” Johnson, 333 U.S. at 14. That would be the effect of

treating “temporary felony wants” as if they were warrants.

Milbeck has plausibly alleged that his Fourth Amendment

rights were violated when the officers entered his home

without a valid warrant. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Milbeck alleged that Detective

George secured a document that she told other officers was a

8 No. 25-1061

“temporary warrant,” but that document was not an arrest

warrant issued by a judicial officer and thus was facially

defective. Under the Fourth Amendment, an arrest warrant

may be issued only by a neutral and detached magistrate,

Johnson, 333 U.S. at 14, upon an affidavit describing

information sufficient to establish probable cause, Whiteley v.

Warden, Wyoming State Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560, 564–65

(1971), and particularly describing the person to be arrested,

Powe v. City of Chicago, 664 F.2d 639, 645 (7th Cir. 1981). See

also Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 485–86 (1958)

(warrant requirement applies equally to arrests and searches).

A temporary felony “want” may name the person to be

arrested, but it fails the other two requirements: it is issued by

an investigating officer rather than a neutral magistrate, and

it lacks a statement describing the facts establishing probable

cause. Even if the latter omission might be correctable, the

difference between a judge-issued warrant and a police-

issued “want” can be cured only by obtaining a warrant from

a judge.

Milbeck alleges that Officers Schroeder and Loveless

entered his home pursuant to that facially defective “want,”

without exigent circumstances or consent. No allegations in

the complaint indicate that a valid warrant for Milbeck’s

arrest actually existed. To the contrary, Milbeck alleged that a

representative of the Kenosha County Sheriff’s Department

told him that no warrant ever existed, and the use of a

temporary felony “want” implies that no valid warrant has

yet issued. Collins, 363 N.W.2d at 230 n.1. Milbeck has

plausibly alleged that the officers’ entry into his home to make

a routine arrest without a valid warrant, consent, or exigent

circumstances violated his rights under the Fourth

Amendment. Id. at 231–32 (suspect’s arrest in his home

No. 25-1061 9

pursuant to temporary felony “want” and without exigent

circumstances violated Fourth Amendment); see also State v.

Burrows, 925 N.W. 2d 789 (table), 2018 WL 6788157 at *5 (Wis.

App. Dec. 26, 2018) (noting arrest pursuant to a “want” is

constitutional so long as it is not used to enter a defendant’s

property); State v. Ott, 870 N.W. 2d 247 (table), 2015 WL

4633358 at *1–2 (Wis. App. Aug. 5, 2015) (noting that trial court

concluded that “warrant” was a “misnomer” in this context).

The defendants offer two arguments in response. First,

relying on facts in Officer Schroeder’s police report, which

Milbeck attached to his notice identifying the arresting

officers, they argue that the officers did not need a warrant

because upon a valid arrest outside a home, officers are

entitled to enter the home with the arrestee to gather the

arrestee’s personal belongings. See Washington v. Chrisman,

455 U.S. 1, 6–7 (1982). Second, the defendants claim the

individual officers are entitled to qualified immunity because

it is not clearly established that a temporary felony “want” is

insufficient to allow police to enter a suspect’s home.

Defendants have failed to preserve either argument for

this appeal because they did not present either to the district

court. See Bradley v. Village of University Park, 59 F.4th 887, 897–

98 (7th Cir. 2023) (appellees may waive arguments by not

raising them in the district court); Henry v. Hulett, 969 F.3d

769, 786–87 (7th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (defense of qualified

immunity not preserved for appeal when party failed to raise

it before the district court). Nor do the defendants advance

any defense they raised before the district court or defend the

district court’s reasoning. See Bowman v. Korte, 962 F.3d 995,

998 (7th Cir. 2020). Thus, they have provided no factual or

legal basis to convince us that Milbeck’s allegations—which

10 No. 25-1061

we must accept as true at this stage of the case—fail to state a

plausible claim. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

B. Monell Claims

For these reasons, we must also conclude that Milbeck has

plausibly alleged that Kenosha County and the Village of

Rothschild could be liable for failing to train officers on the

difference between a temporary felony “want” and a valid

warrant (claim 9).

Municipalities are not vicariously liable for the torts of

their employees or agents, but a plaintiff can establish

municipal liability under § 1983 when the “execution of a

government’s policy or custom” caused a violation of the

plaintiff’s rights. Monell v. Dep’t of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658,

691–94 (1978). Such a claim has three elements: municipal

policy or custom, municipal fault, and causation. Bohanon v.

City of Indianapolis, 46 F.4th 669, 676 (7th Cir. 2022). In some

circumstances, a municipality’s failure “to train certain

employees about their legal duty to avoid violating citizens’

rights may rise to the level of an official government policy for

purposes of § 1983.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61

(2011). A municipality may be held liable for such a failure to

train if the plaintiff shows that the municipality was

deliberately indifferent to his constitutional rights. Bohanon,

46 F.4th at 675 (citations omitted).

Establishing deliberate indifference ordinarily requires

the municipality to be on notice of constitutional violations,

but the Supreme Court has explained that the consequences

of failing to train employees “could be so patently obvious

that a city could be liable under § 1983 without proof of a pre-

existing pattern of violations.” Connick, 563 U.S. at 64;

No. 25-1061 11

see also J.K.J. v. Polk County, 960 F.3d 367, 380–85 (7th Cir.

2020) (en banc). A plaintiff must also show a causal link

between the policy or custom and the violation. Bohanon, 46

F.4th at 675–76 (citations omitted).

Milbeck has plausibly alleged Monell claims against both

the Village of Rothschild and Kenosha County for the

arresting officers’ allegedly unlawful entry into his home. He

contends that the Village and County each maintained what

amounts, for purposes of Monell, to a policy of failing to train

officers adequately on the constitutional limits of home entry,

including the components of a lawful warrant and the critical

constitutional difference between a judge-issued warrant and

a police-issued temporary felony “want.” The municipalities

might be at fault for such inadequate training when, as may

be the case here, it would have been obvious that it could lead

to violations of constitutional rights (namely unlawful entries

into suspects’ homes). See Connick, 563 U.S. at 64; City of

Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989); J.K.J., 960 F.3d

at 380–85; Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510, 1521

(7th Cir. 1990). Milbeck has alleged that the inadequate

training caused the officers to violate his rights by unlawfully

entering his home to arrest him.

The record bolsters the plausibility of his allegations. After

local officers requested an arrest warrant, Detective George

wrote that she “placed” a warrant, and Officers Schroeder and

Loveless told Milbeck that they had a warrant for his arrest.

Yet Detective George was not empowered to issue a warrant

and, according to a representative of the Kenosha County

Sheriff’s Department, no warrant for Milbeck’s arrest existed.

What’s more, the temporary felony “warrant” states at the top

of the page: “This entry requires knowledge by law

12 No. 25-1061

enforcement that a felony was committed and who the person

was that committed the felony but no warrant has been issued

yet.” (Emphasis added.) Milbeck also attached a Wisconsin

Department of Justice training manual to his complaint. It

explains that, after a temporary felony “want” is issued: “The

entering agency must actively pursue obtaining a warrant

within 48 hours.” And as noted, other courts have observed

that law-enforcement officers in Wisconsin refer to temporary

felony “wants” as “temporary felony warrants.”

To be clear, we offer no opinion on the underlying merits

of Milbeck’s claims. Milbeck may not be able to show that the

officers unlawfully entered his home or that the

municipalities’ training was so inadequate that it constituted

deliberate indifference. But taking his factual allegations as

true, as we must, he must be given the opportunity to conduct

discovery and to offer evidence on these issues.

C. Remaining Claims

Milbeck also maintains that he was arrested without

probable cause, and he argues that the district court wrongly

dismissed his claims alleging unlawful arrest and malicious

prosecution. We agree with the district court that the officers

had probable cause to arrest Milbeck, which is an absolute

defense to any § 1983 claim against a police officer for

unlawful arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious

prosecution. See Hart v. Mannina, 798 F.3d 578, 587 (7th Cir.

2015); see also Taylor v. Hughes, 26 F.4th 419, 432 (7th Cir.

2022) (unlawful arrest). Milbeck’s apparent repeated attempts

to access Kendra’s accounts, to read private information, and

to change her passwords, coupled with his prior threats, were

sufficient for a reasonable officer to believe that Milbeck was

harassing and stalking his ex-wife.

No. 25-1061 13

Milbeck attacks the officers’ probable cause on the basis

that Kendra may have been untruthful. But that attack misses

the legal target. Detective George was entitled to rely on

Kendra’s assertions and the records she provided to support

those assertions, leaving for prosecutors and courts further

evaluation of Kendra’s credibility or the veracity of her

statements. See Garcia v. Posewitz, 79 F.4th 874, 880 (7th Cir.

2023). In turn, the arresting officers were entitled to rely on

Detective George’s knowledge, which was sufficient to

establish probable cause. See United States v. Howard, 883 F.3d

703, 707 (7th Cir. 2018).

Further, as the district court explained, the prosecutor

who filed charges against Milbeck is absolutely immune from

civil suit under § 1983 for initiating a prosecution and

presenting the state’s case. Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 125–

26 (1997); Atkins v. Gilbert, 52 F.4th 359, 361 (7th Cir. 2022).

Finally, Milbeck argues that if we find that he stated any

claims against the individual officers, we should revive his

claims alleging supervisory liability (claims 6 and 7) and

liability under §§ 1985 and 1986 (claim 8). To hold supervisors

liable under § 1983, the supervisors must be personally

involved in violating the plaintiff’s rights and deliberately

indifferent to those rights. Bostic v. Murray, 160 F.4th 831, 841–

42 (7th Cir. 2025). They cannot be held liable for their

subordinates’ conduct under a theory of vicarious liability. Id.

at 840–41. Milbeck has plausibly alleged that Chief Hunt was

personally involved in his arrest by erroneously verifying for

the arresting officers that a valid warrant had been issued.

Accepting Milbeck’s allegations as true, we must also assume

Chief Hunt had a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Any

reasonable supervisor would have recognized that no valid

14 No. 25-1061

warrant had been issued and would have directed the

arresting officers not to enter Milbeck’s home.

But Milbeck has failed to allege plausibly that Detective

George’s supervisors are liable for violating his rights.

Though he alleges they approved of the temporary felony

“want” Detective George issued, he has not alleged that they

knew she intended to treat the “want” as a substitute for a

valid warrant for an in-home arrest.

Finally, the district court did not err in dismissing

Milbeck’s claims under §§ 1985 and 1986. Milbeck has not

alleged any facts plausibly alleging a conspiracy to deprive

him of equal protection of the laws, as he must to establish

liability under § 1985. See Brokaw v. Mercer County, 235 F.3d

1000, 1024 (7th Cir. 2000). Absent a viable claim under § 1985,

his claim under § 1986 also fails. See Katz-Crank v. Haskett,

843 F.3d 641, 650 (7th Cir. 2016).

***

We therefore AFFIRM the district court’s judgment

dismissing claims 3–6 and 8, VACATE the judgment as to

claims 1, 2, 7, and 9, and REMAND for proceedings consistent

with this opinion. We DENY Milbeck’s request that we order

assignment to a different judge on remand.