The opinion
FILED
Mar 30, 2026
09:06 AM(CT)
TENNESSEE COURT OF
WORKERS' COMPENSATION
CLAIMS
TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
IN THE COURT OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION CLAIMS
AT MEMPHIS
JEROME MONROE Docket No. 2024-80-7306
Employee,
v. State File No. 860422-2024
KELLOGG COMPANY,
Employer. Judge Allen Phillips
COMPENSATION ORDER
The Court held a compensation hearing on March 3, 2026, where the only
issue was whether Mr. Monroe willfully violated a safety rule. For the reasons
below, the Court holds he did not and awards some of the benefits he requested.
History of Claim
Mr. Monroe was a maintenance mechanic. On September 9, 2024, the
operator of a rice dryer advised that rice was leaking from one of the machine’s
doors. Mr. Monroe found the door was open because of a broken bolt. He and
another mechanic decided they would hold the door with zip ties while repairing it.
When the other mechanic left to get zip ties, Mr. Monroe noticed the gasket
that sealed the door laying on the floor. He removed his gloves, picked up the gasket,
and attempted to place it back in position. A spinning screw drive inside the machine
then caught his right hand and severed his middle finger.
Kellogg obtained Mr. Monroe’s verbal statement in the presence of several
people, including the other mechanic, the machine operator, and Claudia Langarica,
Kellogg’s safety and health manager. The job titles of the other attendees were not
included, and they were not called as witnesses.
In his statement, Mr. Monroe said the operator stopped the machine and he
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began work on the broken bolt. The operator then commented he would need to
restart the machine “before the food got hard,” and the other mechanic left to get the
zip ties. At that point, Mr. Monroe tried to replace the gasket but said he did not
know the machine was operating. He also said he did not believe he had to lockout
the machine because he was not crossing the “outer guard,” but he admitted a lockout
would have prevented his injury.1
Kellogg terminated Mr. Monroe for violations of the company’s “Plant Safety
Absolutes Policy” and “Plant Rules.” Specifically, he violated lockout procedures
and reached into moving equipment.
Mr. Monroe testified that an outer door, also called a guard, was not present,
and its absence alerted him that a lockout was not required. He worked on many
machines in Kellogg’s massive facility, and not all require lockouts. He added that
the plant had just returned from a three- to four-day “down,” where all machines
were serviced. He thought that if the door needed a guard, then the mechanic who
serviced it during the shutdown would have either replaced it or notified them that
it needed to be.
On cross-examination, Mr. Monroe said a mechanic should lockout a machine
if “anything dangerous” were present, but he consistently maintained the guard was
not there “[to tell] me to stop” for a lockout. He also admitted the machine had
multiple warning placards regarding lockout points, including one beside the switch
controlling the “screw conveyor” that injured him, and step-by-step instructions for
servicing the machine. He never wavered in his belief that the door was not a
“lockout” door.
Kellogg contended the outer guard was in place and offered photographs of it
and the multiple warning notices. Mr. Monroe disputed the timing and authenticity
of the photograph of the guard, and he denied any photographs were shown to him
during the interview.
Ms. Langarica confirmed her presence at the meeting with Mr. Monroe but
said she had no role in his termination. She did not say who did. She identified the
photographs but hesitated several seconds before saying the photograph showing
that the guard in position was taken the day of the accident. She also explained how
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Mr. Monroe agreed that Kellogg included lockout procedures in its safety rules. The procedure
requires the mechanic to place a lock on the power switch to prevent it from operating while the
mechanic works on the machine.
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the guard acts as an outer door and the photograph showed it attached in the same
location as the broken bolt. The photographs made clear that no one could access the
inner door if the guard were in place.
Ms. Langarica said Mr. Monroe should have locked out the machine because
he put himself in harm’s way. She also said one might easily determine that the
machine is running because it is loud and hot.
Mr. Monroe is 53 years old and attended technical school and some college
classes. He has advanced OSHA safety training and has been a maintenance
mechanic for several years. He testified he always thinks of safety and had never
been disciplined before. He said he would have done nothing to risk his job that paid
him over $200,000 per year. He now earns less than half that salary at another
mechanic job.
Kellogg initially paid medical and temporary benefits but stopped paying after
the termination. Kellogg asserted Mr. Monroe’s willful misconduct and willful
failure to use a safety device bars his recovery under Tennessee Code Annotated
sections 50-6-110(a)(1) and (4) (2025).
Mitchell v. Fayetteville Public Utilities, 368 S.W.3d 442, 453 (Tenn. 2012),
provides the elements of Kellogg’s defense. Of those, Mr. Monroe admitted he knew
of the lockout rules, the danger involved in violating them, and that Kellogg enforced
the rules. But he maintained the lockout rule should not apply in this situation
because the absence of the guard meant he could safely work on the door without
locking out the machine. He further argued that the absence of the guard meant he
had a valid excuse for violating the lockout rule, even if it did apply.
He argued Kellogg bore the burden of showing he lacked a valid excuse. He
pointed out that Kellogg did not call the machine operator and the other mechanic,
and he questioned when the photographs were taken because they bore no time and
date stamp.
Kellogg called this a “classic case” of a willful safety rule violation,
comparing the facts to those of Mitchell. In Mitchell, the employee consciously and
deliberately removed his safety gloves and was injured as a result. Id. at 455. In its
brief, Kellogg quoted Mitchell: “The lack of a valid excuse for the failure to use a
safety appliance or device, when the first three elements have been satisfied,
amounts to willfulness.” Id.
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Kellogg also cited Dennison v. Packaging Corporation of America, 2020 TN
Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 60 (Oct. 2, 2020), where the employee was injured
when he failed to lock out a machine. That employee claimed he had a valid excuse
for not following the rule because another employee had already locked out the
machine, meaning he did not have to. Id. at *12.
Mr. Monroe countered with Roper v. Allegis Group, 2017 TN Wrk. Comp.
App. Bd. LEXIS 14 (Feb. 10, 2017), where the Appeals Board said that lack of a
valid excuse to follow a safety rule is not necessarily a willful failure. Instead, the
Board called that “an overbroad interpretation” of Mitchell that would allow
employers to deny claims where the employee negligently or recklessly violated a
safety rule.
Mr. Monroe requested an award of original and increased permanent partial
disability benefits, and additional temporary disability benefits from when Kellogg
stopped paying them until he reached maximum medical improvement on December
17, 2025.
Kellogg argued that if Mr. Monroe were to receive benefits, he is limited to
only an original award equal to his impairment rating because his misconduct
prohibits an award of increased benefits. § 50-6-207(3)(D)(ii). Further, Kellogg
properly stopped paying temporary disability benefits because of Mr. Monroe’s
termination for misconduct.
Mr. Monroe had a 5% impairment rating, did not return to work at the same
or greater wage, was over 40, and his weekly compensation rate was $1,237.
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Mr. Monroe must establish all elements of his claim by a preponderance of
the evidence. Id. § 50-6-239(c)(6). Kellogg bears the burden of proving its defenses.
Id. § 50-6-110(b).
Both parties emphasized the presence or absence of the guard, and the
evidence does not preponderate one way or the other. But the Court finds the
presence of the guard is not controlling, because the evidence is clear that the
malfunctioning inner door could only be accessed if the guard were removed. Thus,
the controlling question is what Mr. Monroe did when the guard was not in place.
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Mr. Monroe initially worked on the machine after the operator shut it down.
However, he admitted the operator said he needed to restart it, and the evidence
shows the sound and heat of the machine left no doubt it was on when he tried to
replace the gasket. Given those facts, was Mr. Monroe’s attempt to replace the gasket
on a running machine a willful act?
Kellogg said it was, citing Mitchell and Dennison. However, in Mitchell, the
employee consciously and deliberately removed his safety gloves in direct
contravention of a rule. Mr. Monroe did not make a conscious decision to violate the
lockout rule but instead made no reasoned decision at all. He simply grabbed the
gasket and tried to put it on the door without stopping to think of the danger.
The Dennison employee deliberately ignored the lockout rule and offered no
valid reason why. Mr. Monroe’s decision was glaringly poor, but he did not
consciously decide to work on the machine without locking it out.
Kellogg cited Mitchell for the proposition that lack of a valid excuse
constitutes willfulness. The Appeals Board rejected that argument in Roper, holding
“an employee’s negligent or reckless actions generally are not enough to defeat a
claim for workers’ compensation benefits.” 2017 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS
14, at *11.
The Court finds that Mr. Monroe did not act willfully but he rather acted
recklessly when he tried to replace the gasket while the machine was running. A
mechanic with Mr. Monroe’s training and experience should have known better than
to place himself in that position of danger. He exhibited a very poor lapse in
judgment and failed to exercise reasonable care, which is, by definition, negligence.
Giggers v. Memphis Hous. Auth., 277 S.W.3d 359, 364 (Tenn. 2009).
Thus, Mr. Monroe is entitled to recover benefits. He has a 5% impairment and
is entitled to an original award of permanent disability benefits based on that rating,
22.5 weeks, at the weekly rate of $1,237, or $27,832.50. He is also entitled to
reasonable and necessary future medical expenses.
The Court finds Mr. Monroe cannot recover increased benefits because
section 207(3)(D)(ii) does not allow an award when the employee’s loss of
employment is due to his misconduct. Willful misconduct is not required.
Kellogg was entitled to enforce its rules, and temporary partial disability
benefits would have ceased as of the date of termination. Woodard v. Freeman
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Expositions, LLC, 2021 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 21, at *9 (July 16, 2021).
However, the parties agreed he never received temporary partial disability benefits,
and Mr. Monroe is entitled to additional temporary total disability benefits.
Payments stopped on October 7, 2024, and he reached maximum medical
improvement on December 17, 2024, a period of ten weeks and one day, or
$12,543.18 (10.14 x $1,237).
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED as follows:
1. Kellogg shall pay Mr. Monroe an original award of permanent partial
disability benefits equal to his 5% impairment rating, or $27,832.50. Mr.
Monroe’s claim for enhanced benefits is denied.
2. Kellogg shall pay Mr. Monroe additional temporary disability benefits for
October 7, 2024, through December 17, 2024, a period of ten weeks and one
day, in the total amount of $12,543.18.
3. Mr. Monroe’s attorney is entitled to 20% of the above awards as fees.
4. Kellogg shall furnish Mr. Monroe with reasonable and necessary future
medical benefits under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-204(a)(1)(A).
5. The Court taxes the $150.00 filing fee to Kellogg, to be paid to the Court Clerk
under Tennessee Compilation Rules and Regulations 0800-02-21-.06 (2026)
within five business days of this order becoming final, and for which
execution might issue if necessary.
6. Kellogg shall file a Statistical Data Form (SD2) with the Court Clerk within
ten business days of the date this order issues.
7. Unless appealed, this order shall be final 30 days after entry.
ENTERED March 30, 2026.
____________________________________
JUDGE ALLEN PHILLIPS
Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims
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APPENDIX
Exhibits:
1. Diagram of machine showing lockout points
2. Photograph of door guard
3. Photograph of Mr. Monroe’s lock and keys
4. Wide angle photograph of machine
5. Photograph of screw drove power switch
6. Copy of Mr. Monroe’s training certificate
7. Photograph of gasket, screw drive, and door handle
8. Photograph of area where accident occurred
9. Photograph of warning placards
10. Transcript of meeting with Mr. Monroe
11. Termination letter
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of this order was sent as indicated on March 30, 2026.
Name Email Service sent to:
William B. Ryan, Employee’s Attorney X billy@donatilaw.com
rebecca@donatilaw.com
Jared S. Renfroe, Employer’s Attorney X jrenfroe@spicerfirm.com
imiller@spicerfirm.com
____________________________________
PENNY SHRUM, COURT CLERK
Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims
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Right to Appeal:
If you disagree with the Court’s Order, you may appeal to the Workers’ Compensation
Appeals Board. To do so, you must:
1. Complete the enclosed form entitled “Notice of Appeal” and file it with the Clerk of the
Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims before the expiration of the deadline.
If the order being appealed is “expedited” (also called “interlocutory”), or if the
order does not dispose of the case in its entirety, the notice of appeal must be filed
within seven (7) business days of the date the order was filed.
If the order being appealed is a “Compensation Order,” or if it resolves all issues
in the case, the notice of appeal must be filed within thirty (30) calendar days of
the date the Compensation Order was filed.
When filing the Notice of Appeal, you must serve a copy on the opposing party (or attorney,
if represented).
2. You must pay, via check, money order, or credit card, a $75.00 filing fee within ten calendar
days after filing the Notice of Appeal. Payments can be made in-person at any Bureau office
or by U.S. mail, hand-delivery, or other delivery service. In the alternative, you may file an
Affidavit of Indigency (form available on the Bureau’s website or any Bureau office)
seeking a waiver of the filing fee. You must file the fully-completed Affidavit of Indigency
within ten calendar days of filing the Notice of Appeal. Failure to timely pay the filing
fee or file the Affidavit of Indigency will result in dismissal of your appeal.
3. You are responsible for ensuring a complete record is presented on appeal. If no court
reporter was present at the hearing, you may request from the Court Clerk the audio
recording of the hearing for a $25.00 fee. If you choose to submit a transcript as part of your
appeal, which the Appeals Board has emphasized is important for a meaningful review of
the case, a licensed court reporter must prepare the transcript, and you must file it with the
Court Clerk. The Court Clerk will prepare the record for submission to the Appeals Board,
and you will receive notice once it has been submitted. For deadlines related to the filing of
transcripts, statements of the evidence, and briefs on appeal, see the applicable rules on the
Bureau’s website at https://www.tn.gov/wcappealsboard. (Click the “Read Rules” button.)
4. After the Workers’ Compensation Judge approves the record and the Court Clerk transmits
it to the Appeals Board, a docketing notice will be sent to the parties.
If neither party timely files an appeal with the Appeals Board, the Court Order
becomes enforceable. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-239(d)(3) (expedited/interlocutory
orders) and Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-239(c)(7) (compensation orders).
For self-represented litigants: Help from an Ombudsman is available at 800-332-2667.
NOTICE OF APPEAL
Tennessee Bureau of Workers’ Compensation
www.tn.gov/workforce/injuries-at-work/
wc.courtclerk@tn.gov | 1-800-332-2667
Docket No.: ________________________
State File No.: ______________________
Date of Injury: _____________________
___________________________________________________________________________
Employee
v.
___________________________________________________________________________
Employer
Notice is given that ____________________________________________________________________
[List name(s) of all appealing party(ies). Use separate sheet if necessary.]
appeals the following order(s) of the Tennessee Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims to the
Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (check one or more applicable boxes and include the date file-
stamped on the first page of the order(s) being appealed):
□ Expedited Hearing Order filed on _______________ □ Motion Order filed on ___________________
□ Compensation Order filed on__________________ □ Other Order filed on_____________________
issued by Judge _________________________________________________________________________.
Statement of the Issues on Appeal
Provide a short and plain statement of the issues on appeal or basis for relief on appeal:
________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________________
Parties
Appellant(s) (Requesting Party): _________________________________________ ☐Employer ☐Employee
Address: ________________________________________________________ Phone: ___________________
Email: __________________________________________________________
Attorney’s Name: ______________________________________________ BPR#: _______________________
Attorney’s Email: ______________________________________________ Phone: _______________________
Attorney’s Address: _________________________________________________________________________
* Attach an additional sheet for each additional Appellant *
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Employee Name: _______________________________________ Docket No.: _____________________ Date of Inj.: _______________
Appellee(s) (Opposing Party): ___________________________________________ ☐Employer ☐Employee
Appellee’s Address: ______________________________________________ Phone: ____________________
Email: _________________________________________________________
Attorney’s Name: _____________________________________________ BPR#: ________________________
Attorney’s Email: _____________________________________________ Phone: _______________________
Attorney’s Address: _________________________________________________________________________
* Attach an additional sheet for each additional Appellee *
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, _____________________________________________________________, certify that I have forwarded a
true and exact copy of this Notice of Appeal by First Class mail, postage prepaid, or in any manner as described
in Tennessee Compilation Rules & Regulations, Chapter 0800-02-21, to all parties and/or their attorneys in this
case on this the __________ day of ___________________________________, 20 ____.
______________________________________________
[Signature of appellant or attorney for appellant]
LB-1099 rev. 01/20 Page 2 of 2 RDA 11082