The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
PITTSBURGH DIVISION
GARRETT R. REID, ) Civil Action No. 2:22-CV-01025-CBB
)
)
Plaintiff, ) United States Magistrate Judge
) Christopher B. Brown
vs. )
)
VETERANS ADMINISTRATION, )
)
PITTSBURGH, PA,
)
)
Defendant,
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
Plaintiff Garrett R. Reid (“Reid”) initiated this pro se civil action alleging his
employer, Defendant Veterans Administration, Pittsburgh, PA (“Defendant”),
discriminated against him by failing to accommodate his traumatic brain injury
after he returned from military service. For the reasons below, Reid’s case will be
dismissed for failure to prosecute.
I. Procedural History
Reid initially brought this case on June 27, 2022 (ECF No. 1), and his
Complaint was docketed on July 31, 2024. ECF No. 11. In his Complaint, Reid
alleged the Defendant failed to accommodate his brain injury after he returned from
military service in violation in violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29
U.S.C. § 794, et seq. (“the Rehabilitation Act”), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, as amended 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. (“Title VII”), the Age Discrimination in
1 All parties have consented to jurisdiction before a United States Magistrate Judge. See 28
U.S.C. § 636, et seq.
Employment Act of 1967, as amended 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq. (“ADEA”), the
Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 P.S. § 951, et seq. (“PHRA”), and the
Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994, 38 U.S.C.
§§ 4301 to 4333 (“USERRA”). ECF No. 11.
The Court granted Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss/Motion for Summary
Judgment (ECF No. 14) on June 30, 2025. ECF No. 31. The Court dismissed Reid’s
PHRA for lack of subject matter jurisdiction with prejudice. Id. at 21-22. Reid’s
other claims were dismissed without prejudice and Reid was given leave to file an
Amended Complaint on or before July 30, 2025. Id. at 2-3.
On September 10, 2025, Reid sent correspondence reiterating his arguments
and requesting that the case proceed to a jury. ECF No. 32. The correspondence
did not include an Amended Complaint nor request additional time to file an
Amended Complaint. Id.
Since Reid is proceeding pro se, on September 15, 2025, the Court gave Reid
an additional thirty days, or until October 15, 2025, to file a motion for leave to
amend his Complaint. ECF No. 33. The Order instructed Reid that his motion
must: (1) address good cause under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(B) for filing the Motion
well beyond his initial time of July 30, 2025 to amend the complaint; and (2) must
include a copy of the proposed amended complaint as an exhibit. Id. The Court’s
Order advised Reid that if he did not respond by the deadline, the case would be
dismissed for failure to prosecute. Id.
Before this next deadline, however, the case was stayed on October 3, 2025,
in light of the lapse of federal funding. ECF No. 34. After the stay was lifted on
November 17, 2025, the Court again extended Reid’s deadline to file a motion for
leave to amend his Complaint until December 3, 2025. ECF No. 37.
Since then, Reid has not filed a motion for leave, filed an Amended
Complaint, sought an extension, or otherwise communicated with the Court.
II. Discussion
After over six months since his last correspondence, Reid’s failure file an
Amended Complaint or seek leave to do so reflects his lack of prosecution of this
case. A federal court has the discretion to dismiss a proceeding based on a party’s
failure to prosecute. Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629–30 (1962); Qadr v.
Overmyer, 642 F. App’x 100, 102 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b)). Fed. R.
Civ. P. 41(b) states in pertinent part:
Involuntary Dismissal; Effect. If the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to
comply with these rules or a court order, a defendant may move to
dismiss the action or any claim against it. Unless the dismissal order
states otherwise, a dismissal under this subdivision (b) . . . operates as
an adjudication on the merits.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).
A district court has the power to dismiss a case pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
41(b) for failure to prosecute even if the plaintiff is proceeding pro se. The Sixth
Circuit has stated that “while pro se litigants may be entitled to some latitude when
dealing with sophisticated legal issues, acknowledging their lack of formal training,
there is no cause for extending this margin to straightforward procedural
requirements that a layperson can comprehend as easily as a lawyer.” Jourdan v.
Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 109 (6th Cir. 1991). Thus, a pro se litigant’s failure to prosecute
is not the same as “inartful pleading or [a] lack of legal training.” Id. at 110.
The Third Circuit laid out factors that a court must consider when
determining whether a case should be dismissed for the plaintiff’s failure to
prosecute in Poulis v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, 747 F.2d 863, 868
(3d Cir. 1984). These factors are: (1) the extent of the party’s personal
responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the adversary caused by the failure to meet
scheduling orders and respond to discovery; (3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether
the conduct of the party or the attorney was willful or in bad faith; (5) the
effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, which entails an analysis of
alternative sanctions; and (6) the meritoriousness of the claim or defense. Id.
Based on these factors, Reid’s case will be dismissed for failure to prosecute.
Factor one weighs in favor of dismissal. Because Reid is proceeding pro se, “the
responsibility of moving the case forward lies with him.” Cravener v. McClister, No.
2:23-CV-00355, 2023 WL 7168929, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 9, 2023), report and
recommendation adopted, No. CV 23-355, 2023 WL 7166475 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 31,
2023). And yet, Reid has not participated in this case since his correspondence to
the Court in September 2025.
Factors two and three also weigh in favor of dismissal. The case simply
cannot move forward with a non-responsive Plaintiff. Defendant has been unable to
evaluate an amended complaint or otherwise proceed with its defense in this action,
and Reid has repeatedly missed deadlines. Reid has been given multiple extensions
of time, and yet failed to amend his complaint. Factor three is neutral. The Court
cannot conclude that Reid’s dilatory conduct is in bad faith, so this factor does not
weigh in favor of dismissal.
Additionally, under factor five, there are no alternative sanctions which
would adequately punish Reid for his failure to prosecute his case; imposing a
monetary sanction against Reid who is proceeding in forma pauperis would not be
effective as he appears impecunious.
Factor six is also neutral. The standard for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim applies in the Poulis analysis. Briscoe v. Klaus, 538 F.3d
252, 263 (3d Cir. 2008). Because his claims have been dismissed, the Court cannot
reach any conclusion about whether Reid could successfully amend his claims that
were dismissed without prejudice. But not all the Poulis factors “need be met for a
district court to find dismissal is warranted.” Hicks v. Feeney, 850 F.2d 152, 156 (3d
Cir. 1988).
In conclusion, four Poulis factors weigh heavily in favor of dismissal and only
two factors are neutral. The case will be dismissed.
III. Conclusion
It has been nearly eight months since Reid’s original July 30, 2025 deadline
to amend his Complaint and since then, the case has been unable to advance beyond
the motion to dismiss stage. Because Reid failed to amend his complaint, there are
no claims pending in this matter. The Court cannot move this action forward and
properly protect the rights of all parties if Reid does not take any action to prosecute
this matter. This case will be dismissed for failure to prosecute.
An appropriate Order follows.
DATED this 17th day of March, 2026.
BY THE COURT:
s/Christopher B. Brown
Christopher B. Brown
United States Magistrate Judge
CC: GARRETT R. REID
1155 WALL AVENUE
PITCAIRN, PA 15140
All counsel of record, via ECF