Ashford

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA

TIMOTHY L. ASHFORD and

TIMOTHY L. ASHFORD, P.C.L.L.O.,

8:25CV95

Plaintiffs,

v. MEMORANDUM

AND ORDER

GOOGLE LLC, ALPHABET INC., ROSES

ROSES, GO GAMERS, JOHN DOES, 1-

1000, and JANE DOES, 1-1000,

Defendants.

Plaintiffs Timothy L. Ashford and Timothy L. Ashford P.C.L.L.O (together,

“Ashford”) allege Rose Thompson (“Thompson”), the relative of a former client, posted

two negative reviews on Ashford’s “Google Business Profile.” Upset by the reviews,

Ashford sued the platform on which the reviews appeared, Google LLC and Alphabet, Inc.

(together, “Google”). He also sued Thompson’s online aliases, Roses Roses and Go

Gamers, and up to 2,000 unnamed Doe defendants.

Ashford originally filed this action on February 17, 2025 (Filing No. 1).1 He

amended his complaint once as a matter of right, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1) (Filing No. 3),

and again with leave on August 17, 2025 (Filing No. 24). More than five months have

passed since Ashford filed his second amended complaint, but he has not served any of the

defendants in this case.2 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) (providing that “[i]f a defendant is not

served within 90 days after the complaint is filed, the court . . . must dismiss the action

1That same day, Ashford filed the same complaint in state court. Google removed

the state-court case to this Court, and the Court dismissed it as duplicative. See Ashford v.

Google, Inc., No. 8:25CV284, 2025 WL 2205920, at *1 (D. Neb. Aug. 4, 2025).

2Google voluntarily entered its appearance to resolve this matter (Filing Nos. 29,

30, 31) despite never being served (Filing No. 33).

without prejudice against that defendant or order that service be made within a specified

time”).

On November 26, 2025, the magistrate judge3 ordered Ashford to show cause why

the Court should not dismiss the claims against defendants Roses Roses and Go Gamers

for failure to timely serve them under Rule 4(m) (Filing No. 56). The magistrate judge set

a deadline for December 10, 2025, and warned Ashford that failure to comply could result

in dismissal of his claims against those defendants without further notice. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1)(A), (B) (providing that a district judge “may designate a magistrate judge” to

submit “findings of fact and recommendations” regarding involuntary dismissals).

While Ashford filed a “Motion show cause” (Filing No. 57) on the December 10th-

deadline, the entire motion reads: “Comes [sic] now the Plaintiffs Timothy L. Ashford and

Timothy L. Ashford, P.C., L.L.O. (“Plaintiffs”) and files this Motion.” Ashford also filed

an accompanying “brief” (Filing No. 57-1), but that document is identical to the “Motion.”

And although Ashford dubiously certified that a true and correct copy of this blank

“Motion” was mailed by United States first-class mail to Roses Roses, Go Gamers, and

John and Jane Does 1-1000 on December 12, 2025—a date which had not yet occurred—

he did not certify that the amended complaint, summons, or any other document was

served.

In line with his warning, the magistrate judge issued a Findings and

Recommendation (Filing No. 60), recommending that Ashford’s claims against Roses

Roses and Go Gamers be dismissed for want of prosecution without further notice. See

Fed R. Civ. P. 41(b) (providing for dismissal for “fail[ure] to prosecute or to comply with

these rules or a court order”); NECivR 41.2 (same).

3The Honorable Ryan C. Carson, United States Magistrate Judge for the District of

Nebraska.

This matter is now before the Court on Ashford’s objections (Filing No. 61) to the

Findings and Recommendation.4 When a party timely objects to a magistrate judge’s

findings and recommendation, the Court reviews de novo “those portions of

the . . . specified proposed findings or recommendations to which” the party objects. 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). To invoke de novo review, Ashford “must specify (1) the parts of

the order or findings and recommendations to which [he] objects and (2) the legal basis of

the objections.” NECivR 72.2(a); see also Branch v. Martin, 886 F.2d 1043, 1046 (noting

that the “plaintiff’s objections to the magistrate’s factual conclusions objections were

timely filed and specific enough to trigger de novo review”).

Ashford explains (Filing No. 61-1) that he did not respond by the show-cause

deadline because the Public Access to Court Electronic Records database (“PACER”)

“locked [him] out after [he] was in the middle of filing on December 10, 2023 [sic] which

is good cause.” He claims he spent “two hours with Pacer on December 18, 2025” and “1

hour and 45 minutes with Pacer to attempt to correct the system on December 23, 2025”—

long after the show-cause deadline came and went. According to Ashford, PACER

“informed [him] that [he] should not use Google Chrome in the future to access the federal

court.”

4As an initial matter, Ashford fails to establish that online usernames are proper

defendants to this suit, particularly when Ashford knows (at least, “upon information and

belief”) the identity of the person behind them. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a) (requiring that a

complaint “include the names of all parties”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b) (explaining how the

capacity to be sued is determined for (1) individuals, (2) corporations, and (3) partnerships

or other unincorporated associations). Just as suits against a “doing business as”

designation are merely descriptive of the person or entity operating under the name, an

alias or username likewise does not create a party independent from the real person behind

it. See, e.g., Duval v. Midwest Auto City, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 1381, 1387 (D. Neb. 1977),

aff’d, 578 F.2d 721 (8th Cir. 1978). In any event, the Court need not get into the weeds on

this issue because Ashford failed to serve either the defendants identified by the usernames

or Thompson.

Ashford also unpersuasively contends that “good cause” exists for an extension of

time to serve the defendants simply because Google removed his state-court action to

federal court. He argues the Court “caused” his delay in serving Roses Roses and Go

Gamers by dismissing his duplicate case on August 4, 2025. These arguments are

unavailing. The Court’s August dismissal of a separate case is not “good cause” for

Ashford’s failure to serve any defendants in this case for more than five months, nor does

it explain Ashford’s abject failure to comply with the magistrate judge’s November show-

cause order.

Ashford also faults the Court’s “refus[al] to sanction the Google attorney” for

removing his other case to federal court and accuses the Court of being prejudiced against

him. He asks for a 90-day extension of time to serve Roses Roses and Go Gamers. In the

alternative, he argues the Court lacks jurisdiction over this case and must dismiss it.5

Having carefully considered the facts of this case and Ashford’s arguments, the

Court finds he has not shown good cause for an extension of time to effect service. See

Kurka v. Iowa County, 628 F.3d 953 (8th Cir. 2010) (explaining that a “showing of good

cause requires at least ‘excusable neglect’—good faith and some reasonable basis for

noncompliance with the rules.” (quoting Adams v. AlliedSignal Gen. Aviation Avionics,

74 F.3d 882, 887 (8th Cir. 1996))). Whether good cause exists “is largely dependent on

the facts of each individual case” and “is entrusted to the sound and considerable discretion

of the district court[.]” Id. (quoting Colasante v. Wells Fargo Corp., 81 Fed. Appx. 611,

613 (8th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (unpublished)).

To date, Ashford has not shown any efforts made to serve Roses Roses or Go

Gamers. His December-10th struggles with PACER do not establish a “reasonable basis”

for why he has not complied with Rule 4(m) in the five months since he filed his second

5The magistrate judge previously rejected this jurisdictional argument (Filing

No. 56).

amended complaint. See Adams, 74 F.3d at 887. Ashford does not need a PACER account

to serve a defendant, and he has successfully filed many documents on this Court’s docket.

After “mak[ing] a de novo determination of those portions of the report” to which

Ashford objects, see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), the Court overrules his objections.

Ashford’s failure to prosecute his case against Roses Roses and Go Gamers and his

disregard for the show-cause order warrant dismissal with prejudice, especially in view of

his obligations as an officer of the court. See Peaster v. Spinnaker Ins. Co., No. 23-1419,

2024 WL 488543, at *1-2 (8th Cir. Feb. 8, 2024) (affirming dismissal with prejudice due

to the plaintiffs “failure to follow the court’s orders”); Garrison v. Int’l Paper Co., 714

F.2d 757, 759 (8th Cir. 1983) (upholding a prejudicial dismissal for failure to prosecute

and explaining the Court “has inherent power, acting on its own initiative, to dismiss a

cause of action with prejudice for failure to prosecute”). Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED:

l. The magistrate judge’s Findings and Recommendation (Filing No. 60) is

accepted.

2. Plaintiffs Timothy L. Ashford and Timothy L. Ashford P.C.L.L.O’s

objections (Filing No. 61) are overruled.

3. The claims against defendants Roses Roses and Go Gamers are dismissed

with prejudice.

Dated this 30th day of January 2026.

BY THE COURT:

Robert F. Rossiter, Jr.

Chief United States District Judge