Hooks

Southern District of Texas

ENTERED

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT March 09, 2026

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS Nathan Ochsner, Clerk

HOUSTON DIVISION

RAYMOND GLENN HOOKS, §

§

Plaintiff, §

VS. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:25-cv-2667

§

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL §

OF TEXAS, e¢ al., §

§

Defendants. §

§

ORDER

Pending before the Court are several motions, including two Motions to Dismiss.

Defendant, Office of the Attorney General of Texas (“the OAG”), filed its Motion to Dismiss (Doc.

No. 7) and Defendants Chin Van Dang and Amy Adelan filed their Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No.

26). Plaintiff Raymond Hooks responded to both motions. (Doc. No. 10 and Doc. No. 30,

respectively). Defendant OAG replied. (Doc. No. 13). Plaintiff's Motion for Temporary

Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction (Doc. No. 9), Emergency Motion (Doc. No. 34), and

Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 40) are also pending. For the following reasons, the

Court GRANTS the Office of the Attorney General of Texas’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 7)

and GRANTS Chin Van Dang and Amy Adelan’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 26). As a result,

the remaining motions are DENIED as moot, and this case is DISMISSED without prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Raymond Hooks, proceeding pro se, brought this suit against several entities and

employees associated with Texas’ administration of child support. Plaintiff has sued the Attorney

General of Texas’ Child Support Division, the Texas Attorney General’s Office of Child Support

Unit 0502E, Beaumont Child Support Office, Chin Van Dang, “in private and official capacity as

Agent of the Attorney General of Texas Child Support Division and/or Beaumont Child Support

Office,” and Amy Adelan “in private and official capacity as Agent of the Attorney General of

Texas Child Support Division and/or Beaumont Child Support Office.”! (Doc. No. 1 at 13). Dang

and Adelan are child support officers employed by the Office of the OAG. (Doc. No. 26 at 7).

Plaintiff alleges that these Defendants deprived him of his constitutional and statutory rights when

they enforced child support obligations on him after he claims to have validly relinquished his

parental rights through an agreement. (/d. at 2-3). Specifically, Plaintiff appears to bring claims

under 42. U.S.C § 1981 and § 1983, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Fair Credit Reporting

Act, and Texas negligence law. See (Doc. No. 1 at 2-7). Defendants, the OAG, Chin Van Dang,

and Amy Adelan, have all moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims under Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).

The Court will focus on their arguments for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) as they are dispositive

in this case.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and must have statutory or constitutional

power to adjudicate a claim. Home Builders Ass’n of Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006,

1010 (Sth Cir. 1998). A federal court has original jurisdiction to hear a suit when it is asked to

adjudicate a case or controversy that arises under federal-question or diversity jurisdiction. U.S.

Const., art. III, § 2, cl. 1; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331-32. Whether a federal court has jurisdiction must “be

established as a threshold matter” and “is inflexible and without exception.” Webb v. Davis, 940

F.3d 892, 896 (Sth Cir. 2019) (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env t, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95

‘Federal courts in Texas have uniformly held that entities without a separate jural existence are not subject to suit.”

Torti v. Hughes, Civil Action No. 3:07-CV-1476-M, 2007 WL 4403983, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 17, 2007). Plaintiff filed

suit against a number of non-jural entities including The Office of the Attorney General of Texas — Child Support

Division and The Office of the Attorney General of Texas — Child Support Division Unit 0502E (Beaumont Office).

As these divisions and units are not entities capable of being sued, the claims against them are properly asserted only

against the Office of the Attorney General of Texas, and this Order will reflect that.

(1998)). A Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss allows a party to challenge the exercise of the Court's

subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). In analyzing a motion to dismiss under Rule

12(b)(1), a court may consider: (1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by

undisputed facts or evidence in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts

plus the court's resolution of disputed facts. Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (Sth Cir.

2001). Plaintiff, as the party asserting jurisdiction, bears the burden of proof to defeat a Rule

12(b)(1) motion to dismiss. /d.

Il. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff sued the OAG’s Child Support Division and several of its offices. This Court will

proceed as if those claims were brought against the OAG itself. Plaintiff also brings claims against

two OAG employees, Amy Adelan and Chin Van Dang. From his Complaint, it is not clear whether

Plaintiff intended to bring his claims against Adelan and Van Dang in their official or individual

capacities, which would impact this Court’s analysis. In his Complaint, Plaintiff states in a section

titled “Service of Process,” that he is suing both Adelan and Van Dang “in private and official

capacity as Agent of the Attorney General of Texas Child Support Division and/or Beaumont Child

Support Office.” (Doc. No. | at 13). That being so, in the section of Plaintiff’s Complaint titled

“Factual Allegations,” Plaintiff alleges that “Adelan, acting in her official capacity . . . has engaged

in a pattern of threats, bullying, and coercion.” (/d. at 3) (emphasis added). Additionally, in the

caption of his lawsuit, he has named both Adelan and Dang “‘in official capacity as Agent of the

Attorney General of Texas Child Support Division.” (/d. at 1). Furthermore, Dang is not mentioned

in the Complaint beyond being named as a defendant. See (id.). From the allegations in the

Complaint, it appears Plaintiff has only made allegations against Adelan and Dang in their official

capacities; therefore, the Court will treat them as such. See Casaubon v, Texas Mut. Insurance Co.,

No. 1:19-CV-617-RP, 2025 WL 2664083, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 12, 2025) (“[W]hen a plaintiff

sues government officials and employees but does not indicate whether the employees are sued in

their official or individual capacity, they are sued in their official capacity.”). Accordingly,

Plaintiff's claims against those two individuals are no different than if they had been brought

against the OAG itself. See Will v. Michigan Dep t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (“[A]

suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather

is a suit against the official’s office. As such, it is no different from a suit against the State itself.”);

Cf Finna Fail, LP v. Moore, No. CIV.A. H-10-2045, 2010 WL 5437272, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 27,

2010) (finding governmental immunity barred plaintiff's claims brought against defendants in their

“individual capacities” when as pled, the plaintiff’s claims arose only out of the defendants’ actions

taken in their official capacities as employees of the County).

The Court now turns to the two Motions to Dismiss, which present similar arguments, so

the Court will analyze their arguments together. The OAG first argues that this Court lacks subject

matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims under the Eleventh Amendment, so his claims must be

dismissed. (Doc. No. 7 at 2). The Eleventh Amendment deprives a federal court of jurisdiction to

hear a suit against the State of Texas or its officials, regardless of the relief sought, unless sovereign

immunity is expressly waived. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 121

(1984). It has been established that “[t]he Office of the Attorney General is an arm of the state

entitled to sovereign immunity.” Walker v. Texas, Office of Atty. Gen., 217 F. Supp. 2d 776, 779

(E.D. Tex. 2002); see Tex. Const. art. IV, § 22. The burden of establishing subject-matter

jurisdiction lies with the plaintiff. Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161. Here, Plaintiff fails to establish any

waiver of immunity, consequently, this Court is barred by the Eleventh Amendment from

considering these claims.

First, to the extent Plaintiff intended to bring a claim alleging a violation of equal protection

or any other Constitutional guarantee, such claims are brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and

§ 1981 and are barred by sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Fox v. Mississippi, 551 F. App’x 772, 774—

75 (Sth Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (holding, inter alia, that sovereign immunity barred claims under

sections 1983 and 1985 against a state, a district that was an agency of a state, and individuals sued

in their official capacities); see also Moore v. Univ. of Miss. Med. Ctr, 719 F. App’x 381, 388 (Sth

Cir. 2018) (citing Sessions v. Rusk State Hosp., 648 F.2d 1066, 1069 (Sth Cir. 1981)) (“Section

1981 does not waive a state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity.’’). Accordingly, because Plaintiff

has not plead a valid waiver of immunity, any claims brought under 42 U.S.C. §1983 or §1981

must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Next, to the extent Plaintiff asserts claims under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act

(“FDCPA”) or the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) against the OAG, those claims are likewise

barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Congress has not abrogated sovereign immunity in the context

of the FDCPA or the FCRA, and Plaintiff does not plead that Texas has waived its immunity as to

either statute. See Webb v. Texas Higher Educ. Coordinating Bd., No. EP-14-CV-00345-FM, 2014

WL 12594193, at *10 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 12, 2014) (finding that the FCRA and the FDCPA do not

abrogate state sovereign immunity); Johnson v. Mercedes Benz Fin., No. 1:22-CV-202-LY-ML,

2022 WL 17732339, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 13, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, No.

1:22-CV-202-LY, 2022 WL 21757204 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 20, 2022) (“Texas has not waived its

immunity for the purposes of FCRA.”). Plaintiff does not plead any waiver of immunity by the

OAG. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s FDCPA and FCRA claims against the Office of the Attorney General

and any of its Divisions, are barred by sovereign immunity, and must be dismissed for lack of

jurisdiction.

Finally, to the extent that Plaintiff intended to assert any state tort claims for negligence,

those are likewise barred. The Texas Tort Claims Act (“TTCA”) is the only avenue for recovery

against a Texas governmental defendant. See Mission Consol. Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 253 S.W.3d

653, 659 (Tex. 2008). The TTCA contains a limited waiver of sovereign immunity, but that waiver

only applies in state court. Sherwinski v. Peterson, 98 F.3d 849, 851-52 (Sth Cir. 1996) (holding

the Texas Tort Claims Act “waives sovereign immunity in state court only”). Plaintiff did not

identify any waiver of immunity in the TTCA that would apply to any of his claims in state court.

See generally (Doc. No. 1). For these reasons, any state law negligence claims fail due to the

OAG’s sovereign immunity.

In his response, Plaintiff argues that the Ex parte Young doctrine applies here, so sovereign

immunity does not bar his claims. That doctrine permits suits against state officials, in their official

capacities, for prospective injunctive relief to address ongoing violations of federal law; it does

not authorize suits against the state or its agencies. Cox v. Texas, 354 F. App’x 901, 902 (Sth Cir.

2009) (“Ex Parte Young only applies to suits for prospective relief against state officials; it “has

no application in suits against . . . States and their agencies.”) (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123

(1908)). Ex parte Young does not apply here because the OAG is not an individual official, but a

state agency. /d. Even if it did, Plaintiff has not alleged any ongoing violation of federal law that

could support equitable relief under this exception. See Williams ex rel. JE. v. Reeves, 954 F.3d

729, 736 (Sth Cir. 2020). Thus, this argument is unavailing.

Plaintiff also argues in response that Congress has abrogated sovereign immunity for FCRA

claims, citing Dep t of Agric. Rural Dev. Rural Hous. Serv. v. Kirtz, 601 U.S. 42 (2024). (Doc. No.

10 at 1). Kirtz held that the FCRA effects a clear waiver of sovereign immunity by Congress as to

the United States. Kirtz, 601 U.S. at 52. Individual states can still invoke Eleventh Amendment

immunity against the FCRA, which the OAG has done here. See Cutrer v. Tarrant Cnty. Local

Workforce Dev. Board, 943 F.3d 265, 271-72 (Sth Cir. 2019). Like previously stated, the State of

Texas has not waived its immunity for purposes of the FCRA. See Walker v. Texas, Office of Atty.

Gen., 217 F. Supp. 2d 776, 779 (E.D. Tex. 2002) (citing Tex. Const. art. IV, § 22). Here, Plaintiff

fails to establish any waiver of immunity, and as a result, all of his claims against the OAG are

barred by sovereign immunity.

Furthermore, Plaintiff asks the Court to “terminate further enforcement and modifications,”

and to enjoin and restrain Defendants from initiating or continuing any enforcement, all to halt

ongoing state court proceedings to enforce a valid child support order through federal intervention.

(Doc. No. 1 at 14). Plaintiff judicially admitted to the ongoing state court proceedings in his request

for temporary restraining order and attached affidavit. (Doc. No. 9 at 2, 7). Accordingly, the Court

takes judicial notice of the ongoing state court enforcement proceeding in the 88th District Court,

Hardin County, Texas; Cause No. 51838. (Doc. No. 26-2; Doc. No. 26-3). Sparkman v. Charles

Schwab & Co., Inc., 336 F. App’x 413, 415 (Sth Cir. 2009). ?

To the extent that Plaintiff complains of ongoing state court proceedings, his claims are

barred by the Younger abstention doctrine, which prohibits federal courts from enjoining pending

state judicial proceedings. See Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 US.

423, 432 (1982) (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)). Under Younger and its progeny,

federal courts abstain from enjoining state court civil proceedings “when important state interests

are involved.” /d. The Fifth Circuit has held that Younger and Middlesex require federal courts to

abstain where: (1) the dispute involves an “ongoing state judicial proceeding,” (2) the state has an

2 “In determining whether the Court has subject matter jurisdiction, the Court is not confined to the pleadings.”

Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. v. Mack, No. CV H-17-881, 2018 WL 6981152, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 19, 2018),

citing Ambraco, Inc. v. Bossclip B.V., 570 F.3d 233, 238 (Sth Cir. 2009) (under Rule 12(b)(1), the court is permitted to

look at evidence in the record beyond facts alleged in the complaint).

important interest in regulating the subject matter of the claim, and (3) there should be an “adequate

opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges.” Wightman v. Tex. Supreme

Ct., 84 F.3d 188, 189 (Sth Cir. 1996).

Here, all of the prongs are met. First, the state court action filed by the OAG to enforce the

valid Texas child support order is ongoing as of the filing of this Motion. See (Doc. No. 26-2).

Second, Federal courts routinely apply Younger abstention to ongoing child support actions,

including enforcement proceedings. See, e.g., Agustin v. Cnty. of Alameda, 234 F. App’x 521, 522

(9th Cir. 2007); Dixon v. Kuhn, 257 F. App’x 553, 555-56 (3d Cir. 2007); Tindall v. Wayne Cnty.

Friend of Court, 269 F.3d 533, 538-40 (6th Cir. 2001); Melton v. D.C., 46 F. Supp. 3d 22, 25

(D.D.C. 2014); see also Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 704 (1992). The state court

proceeding to collect child support is a family relations matter that implicates important state

interests. Mendives v. Bexar Cnty., No. 521CV00356JKPRBF, 2021 WL 4708079, at *4 (W.D. Tex.

June 23, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, No. SA-21-CV-0356-JKP, 2021 WL

4705175 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 8, 2021) (“Child-support awards, custody and divorce decrees, and wage

gamishment to satisfy a state child-support order are important state interests.”). Third, to

overcome the presumption in favor of abstention, Plaintiff must show that he had no opportunity

to litigate the federal issue in state court. DeSpain v. Johnston, 731 F.2d 1171, 1178 (Sth Cir. 1984).

“Texas law is apparently as accommodating as the federal forum... . [A]bstention is appropriate

unless state law clearly bars the interposition of the constitutional claims.” Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S.

415, 425~26 (1979). Plaintiff has a full opportunity to raise his constitutional challenges in the

Texas state courts. See DeSpain, 731 F.2d at 1176. Accordingly, in line with well-settled law, this

Court will abstain from exercising jurisdiction and dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint under Younger.

Next, Plaintiff also asks this Court to “declare that the disputed alleged debt has not been

established through a valid and enforceable contract between Plaintiff and Defendants’. (Doc. No.

1 at 15). In substance, this is a request for the Court to declare that his child support obligation

does not exist, to nullify a valid state court judgment establishing the requirement to pay child

support and confirming the amount, and to relitigate issues already fully and finally decided in his

state court proceedings. Such relief is precisely the type of collateral attack on state court

judgments that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits.

Under Rooker-Feldman, federal district courts lack jurisdiction to review state court

judgments when federal claims are “inextricably intertwined” with those judgments. See United

States v. Shepherd, 23 F.3d 923, 924 (Sth Cir. 1994) (citing District of Columbia Court of Appeals

v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983)). “If the district court is confronted with issues that are

‘inextricably intertwined’ with a state judgment, the court is ‘in essence being called upon to

review the state court decision,’ and the originality of the district court’s jurisdiction precludes

such a review.” Shepherd, 23 F.3d at 924.

Here, Plaintiff’s claims directly challenge the validity of state court orders and judgments.

(Doc. No. | at 15). In his Complaint, Plaintiff repeatedly claims that his agreement to waive

parental rights was a valid agreement that the OAG is illegally enforcing against him. The 88th

Judicial District Court of Hardin County, Texas already found that “there was never an agreement

between the parties for [Plaintiff] to terminate his parental rights of the children.” (Doc. No. 26-

3). Through his prayer for relief, Plaintiff asks this Court to declare his “agreement” to waive

parental rights and child support obligations as valid, but the State court has already determined

that it was not a valid agreement. See (id.). As a result, this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear

5 .

Plaintiffs collateral or direct attacks on state court decisions. If he is dissatisfied with the results

of his state court case, his remedy is to appeal that case.

IV. CONCLUSION

To conclude, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over all of Plaintiff’s claims under

the Eleventh Amendment, the Younger abstention doctrine, and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

Moreover, the claims under sections 1983 and 1981, the FDCPA, the FCRA, and any state-law tort

claims are barred by sovereign immunity. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss are

GRANTED, and Plaintiffs claims against all Defendants are DISMISSED without prejudice.

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant, The Office of the Attorney General of Texas’ Motion

to Dismiss (Doc. No. 7) and Defendants, Chin Van Dang and Amy Adelan’s, Motion to Dismiss

(Doc. No. 26) are GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s claims are DISMISSED without prejudice. All

remaining pending motions are DENIED as moot. (Doc. Nos. 9, 11, 34, 40).

The Clerk is ordered to close this case.

Signed on this the a ey of March, 2026.

An)

Andrew S. Hanen

United States District Judge

10