Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

LAFAYETTE DIVISION

REGIONS OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, LLC CASE NO. 6:24-CV-01154

VERSUS JUDGE ROBERT R. SUMMERHAYS

CITY OF NEW IBERIA, ET AL. MAGISTRATE JUDGE DAVID J. AYO

RULING

The present matter before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 14] filed

by Defendants, the City of New Iberia and the New Iberia Permit and Inspection Department

(collectively, “New Iberia”). After considering the parties’ arguments, the summary judgment

record, and the relevant authorities, the Court rules as follows.

I.

BACKGROUND

The present case involves a dispute over a building permit decision by the Permit and

Inspection Department of the City of New Iberia (the “Department”). Plaintiff Regions Outdoor

Advertising, L.L.C. (“Regions”) installs and operates electronic billboard signs.1 On April 13,

2023, Regions filed a permit application with the Department to construct an electronic billboard

sign in New Iberia, Louisiana.2 When Regions received no response to its application by April 20,

2023, it contacted New Iberia’s building inspector, James Landry.3 Landry informed Regions that

it must submit a “no rise” certificate from a professional engineer to complete its application but,

according to Regions, Landry made no mention of any requirement for a “hydraulic or hydrologic”

analysis.4 Regions alleges that it consulted with a professional engineer who indicated no

1 ECF No. 1-1 at 4.

2 Id.

3 Id.

4 Id. at 5.

knowledge of any such requirement to construct an electronic billboard.5 On April 26, 2023,

Regions met with Landry and a representative from the Federal Emergency Management Agency

(“FEMA”).6 According to Regions, Landry advised that “the sign post being 36 inches in diameter,

and located in a floodway, a no-rise certificate would be required.”7 The FEMA representative

present at the meeting also stated that “if the pole is 36 inches or larger, and located in a floodway,

that FEMA would require a no-rise certificate in addition to having hydraulic and hydrologic

analyses completed.”8 When pressed on what size pole would avoid having to complete a hydraulic

and hydrologic analysis, Regions alleges that the FEMA representative stated that it was “up to the

city inspector’s discretion.” 9

Based on its conversations with Landry and the FEMA representative, Regions reduced the

size of the pole for its intended billboard sign to 30 inches and began construction of the billboard

sign on May 19, 2023.10 At that time, Regions had not received a building permit for the sign.11

On the same day, Landry delivered a “cease and desist letter” to Regions demanding that Regions

cease construction of the billboard sign.12 Regions alleges that Landry’s actions reflect “decades

old persecution” by Landry against Robert Jordan, the sole member of Regions.13 According to

Regions, “Landry has routinely over the course of many years selectively enforced and incorrectly

interpreted building codes and ordinances, and unlawfully placed stop work orders on job sites for

organizations owned or related to Jordan.”14

5 Id. at 5.

6 Id.

7 Id.; see also ECF No. 22-2 at 2.

8 ECF No. 1-1 at 5; see also ECF No. 22-2 at 2

9 ECF No. 22-2 at 2.

10 ECF No. 1-1 at 5-6; see also ECF No. 22-2 at 3.

11 ECF No. 22-2 at 3.

12 ECF No. 1-1 at 6.

13 Id.

14 Id.

Regions filed the present action in the 16th Judicial District Court, Iberia Parish, Louisiana.

New Iberia then removed this action to federal court on the grounds that the state court petition

alleged federal claims, and the Court thus had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343.15

Plaintiff’s complaint appears to allege claims under Louisiana and federal law. Specifically, the

complaint alleges six “counts”:

(1) “Vagueness”

(2) “Equal Protection under the Law”

(3) “Selective Enforcement and Interpretation”

(4) “Property Rights”

(5) “Error. Arbitrariness. Capriciousness and Abuse of Discretion,” and

(6) “Damages.”16

Regions alleges violations of the Louisiana Constitution, as well as the Due Process and Equal

Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Regions also appears to allege a regulatory

takings claim under the Fifth Amendment, as incorporated against the States through the

Fourteenth Amendment.17

II.

THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

“A party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense—or the part

of each claim or defense—on which summary judgment is sought.”18 District courts “shall grant

summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and

the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”19 “A genuine issue of material fact exists

15 ECF No. 1.

16 ECF No. 1-1 at 7-11.

17 Id. at 10-11.

18 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).

19 Id.

when the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.”20

As summarized by the Fifth Circuit:

When seeking summary judgment, the movant bears the initial responsibility of

demonstrating the absence of an issue of material fact with respect to those issues

on which the movant bears the burden of proof at trial. However, where the

nonmovant bears the burden of proof at trial, the movant may merely point to an

absence of evidence, thus shifting to the non-movant the burden of demonstrating

by competent summary judgment proof that there is an issue of material fact

warranting trial.21

When reviewing evidence in connection with a motion for summary judgment, “the court must

disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe, and

should give credence to the evidence favoring the nonmoving party as well as that evidence

supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted and unimpeached.”22 “Credibility

determinations are not part of the summary judgment analysis.”23 Rule 56 “mandates the entry of

summary judgment . . . against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the

existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden

of proof.”24 Further, if the court provides notice and a reasonable time to respond, it may: “(1)

grant summary judgment for a nonmovant; (2) grant the motion on grounds not raised by a party;

or (3) consider summary judgment on its own after identifying for the parties material facts that

may not be genuinely in dispute.”25

20 Quality Infusion Care, Inc. v. Health Care Serv. Corp., 628 F.3d 725, 728 (5th Cir. 2010).

21 Lindsey v. Sears Roebuck and Co., 16 F.3d 616, 618 (5th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted).

22 Roberts v. Cardinal Servs., 266 F.3d 368, 373 (5th Cir. 2001); see also Feist v. Louisiana, Dept. of Justice, Off. of the

Atty. Gen., 730 F.3d 450, 452 (5th Cir. 2013).

23 Quorum Health Res., L.L.C. v. Maverick Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 308 F.3d 451, 458 (5th Cir. 2002).

24 Patrick v. Ridge, 394 F.3d 311, 315 (5th Cir. 2004) (alterations in original) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317, 322 (1986)).

25 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(f).

III.

DISCUSSION

A. The New Iberia Permit and Inspection Department.

New Iberia has not formally moved for summary judgment with respect to the claims

against the Department on the grounds of legal capacity. However, in footnote 1 of its

memorandum in support of the motion for summary judgment, New Iberia states that the

Department “is not a juridical entity capable of being sued, and therefore should not be named in

this lawsuit.” 26 New Iberia further requests, in the footnote, that the Court take judicial notice of

the Department’s lack of capacity to sue or be sued.27 Rule 17 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure provides that “[c]apacity to sue or be sued shall be determined . . . by the law of the

state where the court is located.”28 Under Louisiana law, an entity must qualify as a juridical person

to possess the capacity to be sued.29 A person may be either natural or juridical. “A natural person

is a human being,” and a “juridical person is an entity to which the law attributes personality, such

as a corporation or partnership.”30 In Roberts v. Sewerage & Water Board of New Orleans, the

Louisiana Supreme Court explained that “a local government unit may be deemed to be a juridical

person separate and distinct from other government entities[] when the organic law grants it the

legal capacity to function independently and not just as the agency or division of another

governmental entity.”31 Thus, where there is no constitutional or statutory authority for the entity

to sue or be sued, that entity is without capacity under the Roberts analysis.32

26 ECF No. 14-2 at 1.

27 Id.

28 FED. R. CIV. P. 17(b)(3).

29 McLin v. Twenty-First Judicial Dist., 79 F.4th 411, 416 (5th Cir. 2023) (citing LA. CIV. CODE art. 24).

30 LA. CIV. CODE art. 24.

31 634 So. 2d 341, 347 (La. 1994).

32 City Council of Lafayette v. Bowen, 649 So.2d 611, 613–616 (La. App. 3rd Cir.1994), writ denied, 650 So.2d 244

(La.1995).

Here, the brief reference in a footnote to the question of capacity and an invitation to take

judicial notice does not support summary judgment dismissing the claims against the Department,

especially when this relief was not explicitly requested. The summary judgment record and briefs

do not include the arguments, authorities, or evidence required to conduct the Louisiana Supreme

Court’s Roberts analysis. Accordingly, to the extent that New Iberia is requesting summary

judgment dismissing the Department, the request is denied.

B. Discretionary Function Doctrine.

New Iberia next argues that it is immune from suit with respect to Regions’ state law claims

under the “discretionary function doctrine.” Louisiana statutory law provides that “[l]iability shall

not be imposed on public entities or their officers or employees based upon the exercise or

performance or the failure to exercise or perform their policymaking or discretionary acts when

such acts are within the course and scope of their lawful powers and duties.”33 This provision thus

provides that governmental decisionmakers exercising discretionary functions are immune from

suit so as to avoid the chilling effect of imposing tort liability for discretionary decisions.34

Louisiana courts generally apply a two-step test to determine whether the discretionary function

exception applies. First, if a statute, regulation or policy prescribes a particular course of action

and there is no choice or discretion involved, the defense does not apply.35 However, when the act

of a government employee involves an element of choice, the employee is protected by the

discretionary acts defense if that choice is grounded in social, economic or political policy.36

Louisiana law creates an exception to this immunity by providing that it does not apply “[t]o acts

33 LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2798.1(B) (emphasis added).

34 Hardy v. Bowie, 744 So.2d 606, 613 (La. 1999); Hanson v. Steven Caruso, Willow Creek, L.L.C., 182 So.3d 1187,

1191 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/23/15), writ denied 190 So.3d 1196 (La. 3/24/16).

35 Simeon v. Doe, 618 So.2d 848, 852–853 (La.1993); Lambert v. Riverboat Gaming Enf’t Div., 706 So.2d 172, 177–

178, writ denied, 715 So.2d 1221 (La. 1998).

36 Id.

or omissions which constitute criminal, fraudulent, malicious, intentional, willful, outrageous,

reckless, or flagrant misconduct.”37 But “[o]nly the most egregious conduct by parish agents,

employees, or representatives that exhibits active desire to cause harm, or a callous indifference to

the risk of potential harm from flagrantly bad conduct, will rise to the level of ‘willful misconduct’

or ‘criminal, willful, outrageous, reckless, or flagrant misconduct.’”38

Here, New Iberia argues that the relevant ordinances and statutes do not mandate or

prescribe any particular course of action with respect to granting or denying a building permit in

this particular case. In short, it argues Landry could exercise discretion in deciding whether or not

to grant Regions’ application. The Court agrees. Louisiana courts have held that zoning

enforcement decisions—including decisions on building permit applications—are discretionary

acts subject to immunity from suit.39 Moreover, although Regions’ argues in conclusory fashion

that Landry engaged in “decades old persecution” of Regions’ sole member, its evidence appears

to show merely that Landry rejected Regions’ building applications on a number of projects. This

evidence, read in the light most favorable to Regions, does not rise to “the most egregious conduct

. . . that exhibits active desire to cause harm, or callous indifference to risk of potential harm from

flagrantly bad conduct.”40 In sum, New Iberia is immune from suit with respect to the state law

claims asserted against it. These claims are dismissed.

37 LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2798.1(C)(2).

38 Falcon v. Par. of Jefferson, 424 So.3d 1163, 1173 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/19/25) (quoting Mariana v. Magnolia Auto

Transp., LLC, 341 So.3d 1281, 1291 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/26/22)).

39 Markiewicz v. Sun Constr., L.L.C., 328 So.3d 487, 495–98 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/22/21), writ granted, cause

remanded, 328 So. 3d 66 (La. 2021); see also Inv. Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. Vill. of Folsom, 808 So.2d 597 (La. App. 1

Cir. 5/11/01) (finding Village of Folsom’s decision to deny the issuance of a building permit to subdivision

developer because subdivision developer provided an invalid re-subdivision plot was discretionary act for which

Village of Folsom was entitled immunity); Rosehill Constr., LLC v. Ted Hebert, LLC, 356 So.3d 1115 (La. App. 1

Cir. 11/28/22) (finding decision by East Baton Rouge Parish’s engineer on how to perform inspections of public

sewer pipelines was a discretionary act such that the parish was entitled to immunity); GBT Realty Corp. v. City of

Shreveport, 180 So.3d 458 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/30/15) (finding City of Shreveport’s decision to deny property

developer’s site plan to build a thrift store was a discretionary act for which the city was entitled to discretionary

immunity).

40 Falcon at 1173.

C. Federal Constitutional Claims.

As noted above, Regions’ complaint can be fairly read to assert a number of federal

constitutional claims. Indeed, New Iberia removed the case to federal court on the basis of federal

question jurisdiction. New Iberia’s memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment

requests that all of Regions’ claims be dismissed. However, neither the motion nor the

memorandum states the grounds for dismissing the federal claims. The sole focus of the

memorandum is New Iberia’s state law defenses, which are only applicable to the state law claims.

Accordingly, to the extent that New Iberia’s motion for summary judgment seeks to dismiss

Regions’ federal claims, the motion 1s denied.

IV.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, New Iberia’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED

IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The Motion is GRANTED with respect to Regions’ state law

claims, and those claims are dismissed. The motion is DENIED to the extent it seeks dismissal of

the New Iberia Permit and Inspection Department and to the extent it seeks dismissal of Regions’

federal law claims.

THUS DONE in Chambers on this 9th day of March, 2026.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE