JEFFRIES

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

KWANEESHA JEFFRIES, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) 1:25cv724

)

AUGUSTINE REALTY, LLC, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION

OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This matter comes before the undersigned United States

Magistrate Judge in connection with the Application to Proceed in

District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (Docket Entry 1)

(the “Application”) filed by Kwaneesha Jeffries (the “Plaintiff”)

in conjunction with her pro se complaint (Docket Entry 2) (the

“Complaint”) against Augustine Realty, LLC (at times, “Augustine

Realty”), Dasan Maisonet (at times, “Maisonet”), and William B.

Davis (“Judge Davis”). The undersigned previously granted the

Application for the limited purpose of recommending dismissal of

this action. (See Text Order dated Feb. 23, 2026.) This

Recommendation completes the process initiated by that Text Order.

(See id. (“The issuing Magistrate Judge will issue a formal

recommendation of dismissal . . . as time permits.”).)

APPLICABLE LEGAL PRINCIPLES

“The federal in forma pauperis statute, first enacted in 1892

[and now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1915], is intended to guarantee

that no citizen shall be denied access to the courts solely because

his poverty makes it impossible for him to pay or secure the

costs.” Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951, 953 (4th

Cir. 1995) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted).

“Dispensing with filing fees, however, [i]s not without its

problems. . . . In particular, litigants suing in forma pauperis

d[o] not need to balance the prospects of successfully obtaining

relief against the administrative costs of bringing suit.” Nagy v.

FMC Butner, 376 F.3d 252, 255 (4th Cir. 2004). To address this

concern, the in forma pauperis statute provides that “the [C]ourt

shall dismiss the case at any time if the [C]ourt determines that

. . . the action,” inter alia, “(ii) fails to state a claim on

which relief may be granted[] or (iii) seeks monetary relief

against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B).

The latter ground applies in situations where doctrines

established by the United States Constitution or at common law

immunize government entities and/or government personnel from

liability for damages. See, e.g., Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.

Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (discussing eleventh-amendment

immunity of states and state officials); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S.

547, 553-54 (1967) (“Few doctrines were more solidly established at

common law than the immunity of judges from liability for damages

for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction, as th[e

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Supreme] Court recognized when it adopted the doctrine[] in . . .

1872[].”).

Additionally, a complaint “fails to state a claim on which

relief may be granted,” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), when it does

not “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state

a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,’” Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). This standard “demands more

than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”

Id. In other words, “the tenet that a court must accept as true

all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to

legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause

of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not

suffice.” Id.

In conducting this analysis, a pro se complaint must “be

liberally construed” and “held to less stringent standards than

formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.

89, 94 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless,

the Court “will not accept legal conclusions couched as facts or

unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.”

United States ex rel. Nathan v. Takeda Pharms. N. Am., Inc., 707

F.3d 451, 455 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted);

see also Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 304 n.5 (4th Cir.

2008) (explaining that the United States Court of Appeals for the

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Fourth Circuit has “not read Erickson to undermine Twombly’s

requirement that a pleading contain more than labels and

conclusions” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Court also

“put[s] aside any naked assertions devoid of further factual

enhancement.” SD3, LLC v. Black & Decker (U.S.) Inc., 801 F.3d

412, 422 (4th Cir. 2015), as _ amended _on reh’g in part (Oct. 29,

2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). “At bottom, determining

whether a complaint states .. .a plausible claim for relief...

will ‘be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court

to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.’” Francis v.

Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 679).

BACKGROUND

This matter arises from an eviction proceeding in “Guilford

District Court Small Claims” (Docket Entry 2 at 4).* (See id. at

1-9.) According to the Complaint:

Augustine Realty “initiated eviction proceedings against

Plaintiff and sought judicial enforcement of a prejudgment

possession order.” (Id. at 3; see id. at 4 (“On or about June 11,

2025, Augustine Realty, LLC initiated a small claims action against

Plaintiff ain Guilford District Court Small Claims seeking

possession of residential property.”).) Maisonet, a property

1 Citations herein to Docket Entry pages utilize the CM/ECF

footer’s pagination.

manager, represented Augustine Realty in those eviction proceedings

(id. at 4), and Judge Davis, “the presiding judge of Guilford

District Court Small Claims” (id.), conducted the proceedings (see

id. at 4-5). Plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss the proceedings,

but Judge Davis “summarily denied” that motion (id. at 4). Judge

Davis then “h[e]ld a possession hearing, resulting in a prejudgment

possession order” (id. at 5), the enforcement of which “was

scheduled for [three weeks later]” (id.).* Plaintiff disputes the

strength of Augustine Realty’s eviction case (see id. at 5) and

asserts that Judge Davis failed to properly resolve her “statutory

challenge” (id.). (See, e.g., id. at 2 (“[T]he violation of

procedural due process rights under color of state law, including

RULE 60 Motion Denied & Motion to dismiss denied and Defendant

[sic] was unable to produce Original agreement pursuant to Rule

1002 Best Evidence Rule, is the basis for this federal action.”

(capitalization in original)); see also id. at 5 (“The Defendant’s

[sic] case was based on unproven allegations. There is no verified

complaint or physical evidence provided. Under the North Carolina

Rules of Civil Procedure and Rules of Evidence, the court must

require the Plaintiff [sic] to substantiate their claims with

Original lease agreement, and Proper documentation” (capitalization

2 Plaintiff waited roughly three more weeks after this

enforcement date to bring her Complaint. (Compare id. at 1

(reflecting filing date of August 12, 2025), with id. at 5

(reflecting enforcement date of July 23, 2025).)

in original)).) Plaintiff thus contends that Augustine Realty’s

utilization of state judicial proceedings to secure her eviction

“constitute[d] state action.” (Id. at 5.) In this regard, the

Complaint asserts:

“The judicial proceedings conducted without resolution of

Plaintiff’s statutory challenge constitute state action under Lugar

v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982), because they involved

the use of state-created procedures and court enforcement initiated

by a private party acting jointly with state actors.” (Id.

(underscoring added).) “The conduct of [Judge] Davis, an officer

of the court, in initiating and prosecuting the eviction without

legal authority, and in conscious disregard of a valid statutory

challenge, constitutes joint participation with the state and

renders his actions under color of law under Shelley v. Kraemer,

334 U.S. 1 (1948).” (Id. (underscoring added); see also id. at 1

(“This case raises the federal question of whether judicial

officers and private actors acting jointly under color of law can

deprive a tenant of her home without adjudicating a legally

sufficient challenge under state law.”).)

“Defendants invoked and utilized the North Carolina eviction

statutory scheme, which is a right or privilege created entirely by

the North Carolina General Assembly. The statutory mechanism for

eviction is not a common law right, but exists solely by enactment

of the legislature.” (Id. at 5-6.) “The state of North Carolina

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created this statutory machinery for the resolution of bona fide

landlord-tenant disputes.” (Id. at 6.) “When private parties such

as Defendants Augustine Realty, LLC and Dasan Maisonet misuse this

mechanism to unlawfully dispossess a tenant, they are invoking the

coercive power of the state itself, satisfying the first prong of

Lugar.” (Id. (underscoring added).) “The deprivation in this

case, Plaintiff’s loss of housing[, ]resulted directly from the

judicial orders issued by the Guilford District Court. The court’s

orders are instruments of state power, and the judge issuing them

is a state official acting under authority conferred by North

Carolina law.” (Id.) “As such, the deprivation satisfies the

second prong of Lugar, which requires that the party responsible

for the deprivation be fairly attributable to the state.” (Id.

(underscoring added)

Based on these allegations, Plaintiff sues, pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983, for violation of her due process rights under the

Fourteenth Amendment, seeking (i) a declaration that Defendants

violated her constitutional rights, (ii) injunctive relief

“enjoining enforcement of the July 15, [sic] 2025 possession order”

(id. at 9),°? and (iii) Plaintiff’s “costs and any other relief the

Court deems just and proper” (id.). (See id. at 6-9.) Plaintiff

3 The “Factual Allegations” (id. at 4 (bold and all-cap font

omitted)) section of the Complaint identifies “July 02, 2025” (id.

at 5), as the date of this order, with enforcement “scheduled for

July 23, 2025” (id.).

sues Judge Davis “in his official capacity only for declaratory and

injunctive relief” (id. at 4) and sues Maisonet “in his individual

capacity for acting under color of law without legal authority and

failing to respond to Plaintiff’s statutory challenge” (id.).

DISCUSSION

“Section 1983 provides a remedy . . . for the deprivation of

‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and

laws’ of the United States.” Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273,

283 (2002) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983); see also Lindiment v. Jones,

No. 1:17cv501, 2017 WL 4119644, at *4 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 15, 2017)

(“The statutory basis for federal claims involving constitutional

violations by state actors appears in 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”),

recommendation adopted, No. 1:17cev501, 2017 WL 4417676 (M.D.N.C.

Oct. 3, 2017). Under Section 1983,

[e]very person who, under color of [state law,] .. .

depriv[es another] of any rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be

liable to the party injured in an action at law[ or] in

equity . . ., except that in any action brought against

a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such

officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not

be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or

declaratory relief was unavailable.

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (underscoring added). Accordingly, to state a

claim for relief under Section 1983, Plaintiff must provide factual

allegations showing “that [she] w[as] deprived of a right secured

by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and that the

alleged deprivation was committed under color of state law.”

American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50

(1999). She must also allege that a “person” subjected her to such

deprivation. See, _ e.g., Land v. Burke, No. 1:19cv1084, 2020 WL

3545147, at *3 (M.D.N.C. June 30, 2020).

However, “a State is not a person within the meaning of

§ 1983.” Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64

(1989); see also id. at 66 (“Section 1983 provides a federal forum

to remedy many deprivations of civil liberties, but it does not

provide a federal forum for litigants who seek a remedy against a

State for alleged deprivations of civil liberties.”). Moreover, “a

suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is

not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the

official’s office. As such, it is no different from a suit against

the State itself.” Id. at 71 (citation omitted). North Carolina

employs Judge Davis. See N.C. Gen. Stat. $§ 7A-3 (bringing all

court operations under control of state), 7A-130 (establishing

district courts), 7A-132 (providing for district court judges).

Accordingly, to the extent it seeks monetary relief, Plaintiff’s

official capacity claim against Judge Davis qualifies as a suit

against North Carolina, see Will, 491 U.S. at 71, which “is not a

person within the meaning of § 1983,” id. at 64.’

4 Additionally, judicial immunity bars any individual-

capacity claim for damages against Judge Davis. The Complaint

challenges certain legal rulings by Judge Davis in Plaintiff’s

state-court eviction proceedings, over which he presided. (See

Docket Entry 2 at 1-9.) However, “[j]ludges performing judicial

Plaintiff’s injunctive claim against Judge Davis likewise

fails as a matter of law. As a general matter, a litigant can

pursue an official-capacity claim for prospective injunctive relief

against a (non-jJudicial) state official under Section 1983. See

Will, 491 U.S. at 71 n.10 (“Of course a state official in his or

her official capacity, when sued for injunctive relief, would be a

person under § 1983 because official-capacity actions for

prospective relief are not treated as actions against the State.”

(internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Green v. Mansour, 474

U.S. 64, 68 (1985) (explaining that, under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S.

123 (1908), “the Eleventh Amendment does not prevent federal courts

from granting prospective injunctive relief to prevent a continuing

violation of federal law”). Here, though, the Complaint seeks

relief for past harms, not ongoing violations of Plaintiff’s

acts within their jurisdiction are entitled to absolute immunity

from civil liability claims,” In re Mills, 287 F. App’x 273, 279

(4th Cir. 2008), “even if such acts were allegedly done either

maliciously or corruptly,” King v. Myers, 973 F.2d 354, 356 (4th

Cir. 1992). See, _ e.g., Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554 (“[Judicial]

immunity applies even when the judge is accused of acting

maliciously and corruptly, and it is not for the protection or

benefit of a malicious or corrupt judge, but for the benefit of the

public, whose interest it is that the judges should be at liberty

to exercise their functions with independence and without fear of

consequences. .. . [A judge’s] errors may be corrected on appeal,

but he should not have to fear that unsatisfied litigants may hound

him with litigation charging malice or corruption.” (internal

quotation marks omitted)); see also King, 973 F.2d at 357 (“[Tl]he

absolute immunity extended to a judge performing a judicial action

is not in any way diminished even if his or her exercise of

authority is flawed by the commission of grave procedural errors.”

(internal quotation marks omitted)).

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rights. (See Docket Entry 2 at 1-9.) Thus, the Eleventh Amendment

bars Plaintiff’s injunctive claim against Judge Davis. See, e.g.,

Green, 474 U.S. at 68 (“We have refused to extend the reasoning of

Young, however, to claims for retrospective relief.”). The plain

language of Section 1983 likewise precludes Plaintiff’s injunctive

claim against Judge Davis. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (providing that,

as relevant here, “in any action brought against a judicial officer

for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity,

injunctive relief shall not be granted”).

The Complaint also fails to state a viable claim against

Augustine Realty and Maisonet (collectively, the “Private

Defendants”). The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits States from

violating individuals’ due process rights. See Lugar, 457 U.S. at

923-24. “Because the Amendment is directed at the States, it can

be violated only by conduct that may be fairly characterized as

‘state action.’” Id. at 924. Similarly, for liability to attach

under Section 1983, the defendant must engage in “conduct supported

by state action.” Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 163

(1970). Importantly, though, “resort to state judicial process

does not,” by itself, “transform an otherwise private entity into

an arm of the state for [Section 1983] purposes.” District 28,

United Mine Workers of Am., Inc. v. Wellmore Coal Corp., 609 F.2d

1083, 1085 (4th Cir. 1979). Here, relying entirely on conclusory

allegations of Private Defendants’ “joint action with a state

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judge” (Docket Entry 2 at 2; see also, e.g., id. at 5), the

Complaint lacks any factual allegations that would transform

Private Defendants’ participation in the state eviction proceedings

into state action. (See id. at 1-9.)

Nor do the Complaint’s factual allegations support a due

process claim. (See id.) “[T]he touchstone of due process is

protection of the individual against arbitrary action of

government, whether the fault lies in a denial of fundamental

procedural fairness or in the exercise of power without any

reasonable justification in the service of a legitimate

governmental objective.” County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S.

833, 845-46 (1998) (citations and internal quotation marks

omitted); see also id. at 846 (noting that “the procedural due

process guarantee protects against ‘arbitrary takings’” and “the

substantive due process guarantee protects against government power

arbitrarily and oppressively exercised”). Notably, though, “only

the most egregious official conduct can be said to be arbitrary in

the constitutional sense,” requiring an “abuse of power .. . which

shocks the conscience” to succeed on a substantive due process

claim. Id. at 846 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id.

at 847 (“[T]he substantive component of the Due Process Clause is

violated by executive action only when it can properly be

characterized as arbitrary, or conscience shocking, in a

constitutional sense.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). In

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turn, “[t]o succeed on a procedural due process claim, a plaintiff

must satisfy three elements,” namely (i) “that he had a

constitutionally cognizable life, liberty, or property interest,”

(ii) “that the deprivation of that interest was caused by some form

of state action,” and (iii) “that the procedures employed were

constitutionally inadequate.” Sansotta v. Town of Nags Head, 724

F.3d 533, 540 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Liberally construed, the Complaint alleges that Judge Davis

(i) “summarily denied” (Docket Entry 2 at 4) Plaintiff’s motions

(see id. at 4, 8), (ii) conducted an eviction proceeding in which

Plaintiff and Augustine Realty’s property manager participated, and

(iii) granted Augustine Realty possession of the property without

requiring Private Defendants to produce Plaintiff’s original lease

agreement. (See id. at 1-9.) Plaintiff’s bare assertions of

wrongdoing, including that Private Defendants “misuse[d]” (id. at

6, 7) the eviction proceedings and that Judge Davis rendered

“arbitrary and unexplained denial[s]” (id. at 8) of Plaintiff’s

motions, do not transform these allegations into a viable due

process claim. See, e.g., SD3, 801 F.3d at 422.

Finally, the Complaint seeks a “[d]eclar[ation] that

Defendants violated Plaintiff’s procedural and substantive due

process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment” (Docket Entry 2 at

9) through the state-court judicial process, which has culminated

in a “final judgment” (id. at 2) slated for enforcement before

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Plaintiff initiated this action (see id. at 1, 5). Yet “it [is]

clear that [Plaintiff] cannot seek a declaration just because [s]he

wants vindication for what happened to [her].” Wells v. Johnson,

150 F.4th 289, 303 (4th Cir. 2025); see also id. (“It is not enough

that a plaintiff wishes to have the moral satisfaction of a

judicial ruling that he was right and his adversary was wrong; the

relief sought must have legal effect in determining the present and

future rights and obligations of the parties.” (internal quotation

marks omitted)). Instead, to seek a declaratory judgment in

federal court, “a plaintiff must show both that future litigation

is likely to happen (at least absent the declaration sought) and

that the declaration’s preclusive effect will likely help [her] in

that litigation.” Id. at 302. Because Plaintiff has not made such

showing (see Docket Entry 2 at 1-9), she cannot proceed on her

declaratory judgment request, see Wells, 150 F.4th at 307.

Under the circumstances, the Court should dismiss the

Complaint.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s claims fail as a matter of law, warranting

dismissal under Section 1915(e)(2)(B).

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IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Court dismiss this action

pursuant to Section 1915(e)(2)(B).

This 27th day of March, 2026.

/s/ L. Patrick Auld

L. Patrick Auld

United States Magistrate Judge

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