Opinion

Simpson

Court
District Court, S.D. Illinois
Filed
Mar 16, 2026
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 39.8%

“[a] suit is duplicative if the ‘claims, parties, and available relief do not significantly differ between the two actions.’”

How later courts described this case

  • “[a] suit is duplicative if the ‘claims, parties, and available relief do not significantly differ between the two actions.’”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

BRICE SIMPSON,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 26-cv-117-NJR

LATOYA HUGHES, ILLINOIS

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

CENTURIAN HEALTH GROUP,

LAWRENCE CORRECTIONAL

CENTER, BROWN, M. BURTON,

MAJOR VON, MAJOR GILHETH,

MAJOR HENTON, GRANGED, LT.

HUNDLEY, LT. TAYLOR, SGT.

THOMPSON, SGT. GIBBONS, C/O

ROBINSON, C/O HOICEDE, and

JOHN DOE #’s 1-4,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge:

Plaintiff Brice Simpson, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections who

is currently incarcerated at Lawrence Correctional Center, brings this action for

deprivations of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On February 3, 2026,

the case was transferred from the United States District Court for the Central District of

Illinois (Docs. 46-47). Simpson’s Complaint is difficult to decipher, but it appears that he

takes issue with officials taking his blood and officials’ attempts to keep him incarcerated

on mental health grounds.

This case is now before the Court for preliminary review of the Complaint

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under Section 1915A, the Court is required to screen

prisoner complaints to filter out non-meritorious claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Any

portion of a complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by law is

immune from such relief must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

The Complaint

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires a complaint to set forth “a short and

plain statement of [Plaintiff’s claim(s)] showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED.

R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). Rule 8(d) requires “simple, concise, and direct” allegations. FED. R. CIV.

P. 8(d)(1). The purpose of these rules is to “give defendants fair notice of the claims

against them and the grounds supporting the claims.” Stanard v. Nygren, 658 F.3d 792,

797 (7th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555

(2007). A successful complaint generally alleges “the who, what, when, where, and

how…” See DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 627 (7th Cir. 1990).

Simpson’s Complaint is difficult to read and even more difficult to understand. He

uses run-on sentences that fail to adequately articulate a coherent thought. Indeed, large

portions of his pleading are incoherent. For instance, Simpson notes at the beginning of

his pleading “that the grounds are the omission of the corruption of blood tooken [sic] by

the officials of Illinois Department of Corrections to stage criminal intent and criminal

acts that will […]1 speculative risk of perverse that the law enforcement agency can create

a nuisance misconduct of an obstruction of justice manner.” (Doc. 1, p. 2).

Simpson later states that “[t]he mental health manipulation that created deceptive

practices by Dr. Cordova and the corporation to be within the malice intent or malice in

law or fuel that the […] the plaintiff to have civil commitment by pushing for the risk to

harm themselves and others. To be the reason to entrap the plaintiff and continue the

confinement of the plaintiff as to enslave the plaintiff of his rights to freedom….” (Doc. 1,

p. 3).

His statement of “undisputed facts” is clearer to read but fails to clarify Simpson’s

intended claims. Simpson notes that he pleaded guilty in 2015 without finding the ones

responsible for the crime (Doc. 1, p. 6). He eventually ended up at Lawrence Correctional

Center where he alleges that on November 24, 2025, C/O Robinson confessed to stealing

his blood, prompting Simpson to file a grievance (Id.). The following day, another

correctional officer confessed to stealing blood (Id.). On December 2, 2025, Simpson woke

up to screams, and on December 10, 2025, he was forced to watch and possibly overheard

someone say they were going to kill a victim being housed on B wing (Id. at p. 7). Two

days later, Simpson learned from a correctional officer who was angry at him that

Dr. Cordeva fabricated mental health papers regarding Simpson (Id.). On another

evening in December, Simpson alleges that he awoke to the sounds of a woman being

1 Indecipherable words and/or phrases are noted by […].

raped and attacked and on January 2, 2026, an officer confessed to raping his son on

8 House, A Gallery (Id.).

His conclusion and request for relief provides little insight into Simpson’s claims.

He merely states that he “ask[s] this court to find the faults at any ongoing action from in

default judgment to […] by required or permissive joinder of parties that has violated or

is from the violation by the agencies […] that by demographics the real person for State

of Illinois and County of Cook County” (Doc. 1, p. 13). A recently filed motion for

injunctive relief (Doc. 57) merely states a list of demands, including Simpson’s release to

a mental health facility or electronic monitoring. The motion fails to further articulate the

nature of his claims.

It appears that Simpson believes that his blood was taken by some officers and his

rights were somehow violated by that action. He also appears to take issue with his

continued confinement. But the Court cannot make sense of the majority of his

allegations, nor can it discern any viable claim against the named Defendants. Simpson

has filed numerous motions (Docs. 52, 53, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 61, 64, 65, and 66), but none

of those further clarify his potential claims.2 Simpson’s Complaint simply fails to provide

enough coherent facts to state a viable claim.

The Court’s usual practice “is to allow defective pleadings to be corrected.”

See Abu-Shawish v. United States, 898 F.3d 726, 738 (7th Cir. 2018); Stibbe v. Evers, No. 22-

2 Simpson appears to have scoured the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to file motions on a

variety of topics, many of which are not relevant to his case.

1455, 2022 WL 16833515, at *2 (7th Cir. Nov. 9, 2022) (citing Runnion ex rel. Runnion v. Girl

Scouts, 786 F.3d 510, 519–20 (7th Cir. 2015)). However, the Court has no basis to conclude

that given another chance, Simpson could articulate a viable claim. His pleading and the

current pending motions (of which there are many) are nonsensical. Further, Simpson’s

Complaint also appears to be duplicative of his Amended Complaint in Simpson v.

Lawrence Correctional Center, Case No. 26-cv-00051-SPM (Doc. 12). The Court directed

Simpson to show cause as to why this case should not be dismissed as duplicative of the

claims in Case No. 26-cv-00051-SPM (Doc. 50). In response, Simpson filed a response

entitled “Summary Judgment in Response of Judges Order to Show Cause” (Doc. 51).

Simpson’s response is also difficult to decipher. As to whether the claims in this case are

duplicative, Simpson seems to acknowledge that both cases include duplicate briefs and

duplicate claims, but he argues that this case should not be dismissed because the Central

District of Illinois stated that the claims were against the warden of Lawrence

Correctional Center (Doc. 51, p. 11). He also seeks permissive joinder of the parties in the

two cases and asks to sort the events and claims out for him (Id. at p. 13). He indicates

that his duplicate briefs were an attempt to inform the court of new information (Id.).

Simpson cannot proceed on identical claims in both cases. See Scholz v. United States,

18 F.4th 941, 951 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[a] suit is duplicative if the ‘claims, parties, and available

relief do not significantly differ between the two actions.’”) (quoting McReynolds v. Merrill

Lynch & Co., Inc., 694 F.3d 873, 889 (7th Cir. 2012)). Thus, to the extent Simpson wishes to

pursue his claims, he could do so in his other pending case. An amended pleading in this

case is not warranted.

Disposition

For the reasons stated above, Simpson’s Complaint is DISMISSED with

prejudice. His pending motions (Docs. 52, 53, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 61, 64, 65, and 66) are

DENIED as moot. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to close the case and enter judgment

accordingly.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 16, 2026 Tl

NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL

United States District Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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