Epps

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

DEVANTE EPPS

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 24-175-JWD-SDJ

RODERICK BROWN, ET AL.

RULING AND ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on the Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 21) filed

by Defendants, Sid J. Gautreaux, III, Sheriff of East Baton Rouge Parish (“Sheriff Gautreaux”)

and Roderick Brown (“Brown”) (collectively, “Defendants”). Plaintiff Devante Epps (“Plaintiff”

or “Epps”) opposes the motion, (Doc. 25), and Defendants have filed a reply, (Doc. 27). Oral

argument is not necessary. The Court has carefully considered the law, the allegations in the

Amending and Supplemental Complaint (“ASC”) (Doc. 17), and the arguments and submissions of

the parties and is prepared to rule. For the following reasons, Defendants’ motion is granted in part

and denied in part.

I. RELEVANT FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Factual Allegations

The following facts are taken from the ASC. The well-pled allegations are assumed to be

true for purposes of this motion. In re Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 624 F.3d 201, 210 (5th

Cir. 2010).

On September 14, 2021, Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee. (ASC ¶ 2, Doc. 17.) Brown was

a deputy with the East Baton Rouge Sheriff’s Office (“EBRSO”). (Id.)

On that day, Brown was scheduled to transport Epps from East Baton Rouge Parish Prison

(“EBRPP”) to the 19th Judicial District Court (“19th JDC”) to attend a hearing. (Id.) Brown loaded

Epps into the EBRSO transport vehicle. (Id. ¶ 3.) When Brown did so, he “deliberately refused to

secure Plaintiff with a seatbelt, who . . . was shackled and helpless.” (Id.¶ 5.) According to Epps,

Brown “knew there was an unreasonable risk of harm associated with transporting a shackled

person without securing him with a seat belt, and as such, showed deliberate indifference, pre-

disposing Plaintiff to the likelihood of injury as it is common knowledge that the use of seatbelts

mitigate against same.” (Id. ¶ 6.)

Brown “began driving in an erratic manner and at an excessive rate of speed with what

appeared to be a deliberate indifference and intent of injuring plaintiff.” (Id. ¶ 7.) Epps “repeatedly

asked [Deputy Brown] to slow down and to stop slinging him around inside the” vehicle. (Id.)

Brown’s erratic driving caused him to crash into the back of a second EBRSO vehicle

traveling southbound on I-110. (Id. ¶ 8.) Epps was unrestrained and shackled, so “the crashed

caused Plaintiff to be violently propelled forward, thereby sustaining bodily injuries.” (Id. ¶ 9.)

Plaintiff claims that Brown (1) violated Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment right to due

process; (2) violated Epps’s Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable seizures and

excessive force; and (3) is not entitled to qualified immunity. (Id. ¶¶ 10–12.) Plaintiff also asserts

that Brown acted “with reckless, malice, or callous disregard for [Epps’s] Constitutional rights . .

. .” (Id. ¶ 13.)

Plaintiff also asserts that Sheriff Gautreaux caused his injuries by, inter alia, (1) “failing to

supervise [EBRSO] employees . . . to follow its policies of restraining inmates being transported

with a seat belt[;]” and (2) “failing to supervise and instruct [EBRSO] employees . . . to follow its

rules and regulations regarding the safe operation of transporting prisoners[.]” (Id. ¶ 17.) Epps also

claims that Brown was employed by Sheriff Gautreaux and was in the course and scope of

employment, so the doctrine of respondeat superior applies. (Id. ¶ 18.)

B. Procedural History

The parties recount the long road from Epps’s initially filing suit in the 19th JDC on

September 13, 2022, (Doc. 1-3 at 2), until today. (See Doc. 21-1 at 3–6.) That history need not be

repeated here.

Most relevant, after removal, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, (Doc. 4), which was

denied without prejudice, (Doc. 10). The Court specifically expressed no view as to the merits of

the motion and granted leave to amend to cure any deficiencies identified by Defendants. (Id. at

1–2.) However, the Court cautioned Plaintiff on several issues, one of which being: “If Defendants

file a second motion to dismiss which the Court ultimately grants, it is highly likely the Court will

dismiss the claims with prejudice as futile and because of undue delay.” (Id. at 2–3.)

Defendants then filed a second motion to dismiss, (Doc. 11), which prompted the ASC,

(Doc. 17). In response, the Court issued an order denying that motion to dismiss without prejudice

to Defendants’ right to re-urge any arguments made in that motion, if appropriate, in response to

Plaintiff’s new complaint. (Doc. 18.)

This led to the filing of the instant motion. (Doc. 21.) In sum, Defendants ask the Court to

dismiss all § 1983 claims with prejudice for failure to state a claim and to decline to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over all state law claims. (Id. at 1.)

II. RULE 12(B)(6) STANDARD

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Hamilton v. Dall. Cnty.,

79 F.4th 494, 499 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007))). “A claim has facial plausibility when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. 678).

“To be plausible, the complaint’s ‘[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to

relief above the speculative level.’” In re Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 624 F.3d at 210

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “In deciding whether the complaint states a valid claim for

relief, [the court] accept[s] all well-pleaded facts as true and construe[s] the complaint in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff.” Id. The Court does “not accept as true ‘conclusory allegations,

unwarranted factual inferences, or legal conclusions.’” Id. (quoting Ferrer v. Chevron Corp., 484

F.3d 776, 780 (5th Cir. 2007). “A claim for relief is implausible on its face when ‘the well-pleaded

facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct.’” Harold H.

Huggins Realty, Inc. v. FNC, Inc., 634 F.3d 787, 796 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. 679).

The Court’s “task, then, is ‘to determine whether the plaintiff has stated a legally

cognizable claim that is plausible, not to evaluate the plaintiff’s likelihood of success.’” Doe ex

rel. Magee v. Covington Cnty. Sch. Dist. ex rel. Keys, 675 F.3d 849, 854 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting

Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678)). “[A] claim is plausible if it supported ‘by enough fact[s] to raise a

reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of [the alleged misconduct.]’” Calhoun

v. City of Hou. Police Dep’t, 855 F. App’x 917, 919-20 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.)

III. DISCUSSION

A. Preliminary Note

The Court first notes that Defendants sought dismissal of any claim against Brown in his

official capacity and all § 1983 claims against Sheriff Gautreaux. (Doc. 21-1 at 16–20.) Plaintiff

responded that he is not bringing either claim. (Doc. 25 at 19–21.) Defendants urge the Court to

dismiss these claims with prejudice. (Doc. 27 at 1.)

Contrary to Plaintiff’s representations, Plaintiff does in fact allege that Brown was acting

in his official capacity, (ASC ¶ 10, Doc. 17), and that Sheriff Gautreaux caused Plaintiff’s injuries

while “acting under color of state law” and by “failing to supervise employees” and failing to

instruct them to follow certain policies, rules, and regulations, (id. ¶ 17). Since the ASC appears to

assert the claims in question, and since Plaintiff now concedes that he is not pursuing them, the

Court will dismiss them with prejudice.

B. Qualified Immunity Generally

“Qualified immunity shields government officials performing discretionary functions from

civil damages liability ‘as long as their actions could reasonably have been thought consistent with

the rights they are alleged to have violated.’” Crittindon v. LeBlanc, 37 F.4th 177, 185 (5th Cir.

2022) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987)). “Determining whether an

officer is entitled to qualified immunity requires a two-step inquiry.” Id. “First, we ask whether

the officer’s alleged conduct has violated a federal right. Second, we ask whether the right in

question was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation, such that the officer was on

notice of the unlawfulness of his or her conduct.” Id. at 185–86 (cleaned up). Courts are “permitted

to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity

analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.”

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).

C. Fourteenth Amendment Claim

1. Parties’ Arguments

a. Defendants’ Original Memorandum (Doc. 21-1)

Defendants first seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s claim for deliberate indifference under the

Fourteenth Amendment. (Doc. 21-1 at 8.) The Fifth Circuit has purportedly held that “there is no

federally protected right to safety restraints in prison transport vehicles,” so Plaintiff cannot claim

a constitutional violation from the failure to provide a seat belt. (Id. at 9–10 (quoting Jimenez v.

Travis Cnty. Sheriff’s Dept., 856 F. App’x 534, 535 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (remaining

citations omitted)).)

Further, Brown’s actions do not arise to the level of deliberate indifference. (Id. at 10.) For

this, Defendants rely on Nixon v. Neal, No. 20-2934, 2021 WL 2688950 (E.D. La. June 7, 2021)

(collecting cases), report and recommendation adopted, No. 20-2934, 2021 WL 2680163 (E.D.

La. June 30, 2021). (Doc. 21-1 at 10.) As in Nixon, Brown did not know of prior prisoner injuries

from the failure to buckle seatbelts, and Brown made no statement reflecting an intent to cause

injuries. (Id.) In any event, most of Plaintiff’s allegations are conclusory and lack the sufficient

detail to be considered a well-pled allegation. (Id. at 10–11.)

As to Brown’s driving, Plaintiff fails to show that Brown had knowledge of a substantial

risk of harm and disregarded it. (Id. at 11.) Again, Plaintiff’s complaint is filled with legal

conclusions; Plaintiff fails to describe how the driving was erratic or how he drove the vehicle

with the intent to harm Plaintiff. (Id. at 11–12.) While Plaintiff alleges he “repeatedly asked

[Brown] to slow down and to stop slinging him around[,]” there is no detail as to where Plaintiff

was in relation to Brown, whether Brown was able to hear this, and what response, if any, Brown

had to these statements. (Id. at 12.)

Moreover, Brown is entitled to qualified immunity; Plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient

facts to show that every reasonable officer would know, beyond debate, that Brown’s conduct was

unlawful. (Id. at 15–16.) Defendants emphasize that clearly established law cannot be defined at a

high level of generality. (Id. at 16.)

b. Plaintiff’s Opposition (Doc. 25)

Plaintiff responds that his claims do not arise solely from Brown’s alleged failure to secure

Epps with a seatbelt; rather, they arise from the fact that Brown knew Epps was shackled and

helpless and yet traveled onto I-110 “and intentionally drove erratically and at an excessive speed.”

(Doc. 25 at 9.) “Brown intentionally disregarded the pleas of pre-trial detainee Epps and others

seated as guest passengers, to slow down and to drive in a safe manner,” all of which caused the

rear-end collision. (Id.)

Brown is not entitled to qualified immunity, says Plaintiff, because Brown violated a

number of safety laws for operating motor vehicles. (Id. at 12.) Epps also relies on Rogers v.

Boatright, 709 F.3d 403 (5th Cir. 2013), which in turn relied on the Eighth Circuit; both

purportedly recognized liability for the failure to provide a seatbelt when combined with the

element of reckless driving. (Id. at 13–14.) Jamirez is also distinguishable, Plaintiff argues, (1)

because it was decided at the summary judgment phase, and (2) there, plaintiff had no evidence

that the defendant was deliberately indifferent or that the motor vehicle accident was caused by

reckless actions. (Id. at 14 (citations omitted).)

Thus, Brown’s deliberate indifference is demonstrated by (1) Plaintiff being shackled and

unbelted; (2) his high rate of speed and erratic driving; (3) Epps and other prisoners “ask[ing]

defendant Brown to slow down and to drive in a safe manner[;]” and (4) the fact that “Brown

disregarded Mr. Epps’s requests to drive safely and laughed at Mr. Epps when he was injured.”

(Id. at 14–15.) Plaintiff then distinguishes some of the cases Defendants rely upon based on these

allegations. (Id. at 15–17.)

c. Defendants’ Reply (Doc. 27)

Defendants reply that Plaintiff has failed to satisfy either prong of the qualified immunity

analysis. (Doc. 27 at 1–2.) As to deliberate indifference, Defendants emphasize what a high burden

deliberate indifference is before turning to why Rogers is distinguishable. (Id. at 2.) According to

Defendants, in Rogers, the driver told another officer about other prisoners being injured when the

transport vehicle stopped abruptly and that such incidents “happen[ed] all the time.” (Id. (quoting

Rogers, 709 F.3d at 406, 408–09).) Thus, the driver’s subjective knowledge of other incidents

made Rogers different from other cases, so the plaintiff there had a non-frivolous argument for an

Eighth Amendment violation. (Id. at 3 (citations omitted).) Here, there are no facts from which

deliberate indifference can be inferred, and there is no basis to conclude that Brown knew of prior

injuries. (Id.) Instead, Epps raises new allegations not included in the ASC, such as Brown being

told by other prisoners to slow down and Brown laughing when Epps was injured. (Id.) Rather,

Epps has only conclusory allegations. (Id. at 4.) Moreover, Plaintiff claims Nixon is

distinguishable, but he fails to explain why. (Id.)

As to qualified immunity, Plaintiff relies on Rogers, but that case does not hold that

Brown’s particular conduct violates the constitution. (Id. at 5.) Again, according to Defendants, in

Rogers, “[t]he Fifth Circuit . . . reversed the district court’s sua sponte dismissal of a deliberate

indifference claim at the initial screening stage and before the filing of any responsive pleadings,

but did not hold that the complained-of conduct violated the Eighth Amendment.” (Id.) Further,

Defendants say Rogers involved reckless driving and knowledge of prior, frequent injuries. (Id.)

The other Eighth Circuit cases Plaintiff relies upon are persuasive only, and clearly established

law requires a “robust consents of cases of persuasive authority.” (Id. at 6.) Finally, the Louisiana

statutes Plaintiff cites do not constitute clearly established law. (Id.)

2. Applicable Law

“The Eighth Amendment ensures the safety of convicted prisoners while due process under

the Fourteenth Amendment protects pretrial detainees.” Baughman v. Hickman, 935 F.3d 302, 306

(5th Cir. 2019) (citing Hare v. City of Corinth, 74 F.3d 633, 639 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc)).

“Fourteenth Amendment case law concerning pretrial detainees [is based] on the Supreme Court’s

Eighth Amendment precedent concerning prisoners.” Id. (quoting Garza v. City of Donna, 922

F.3d 626, 634 (5th Cir. 2019) (citing Hare, 74 F.3d at 643-44))).

Since Epps is making a claim “based on episodic acts or omissions,” he must “‘establish

that the official(s) acted with subjective deliberate indifference.’” Id. at 307 (quoting

Olabisiomotosho v. City of Hou., 185 F.3d 521, 526 (5th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted)). The test

for this is: “(1) ‘the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn

that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,’ and (2) ‘he must also draw the inference.’” Id

(quoting Williams v. Hampton, 797 F.3d 276, 281 (5th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (quoting Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994))).

“The official conduct must be wanton, which is defined to mean reckless. Subjective

deliberate indifference is an extremely high standard to meet.” Baughman, 935 F.3d at 307

(cleaned up). See also Torres v. Livingston, 972 F.3d 660, 663 (5th Cir. 2020) (same). “Actions

and decisions by officials that are merely inept, erroneous, ineffective, or negligent do not amount

to deliberate indifference.” Alderson v. Concordia Par. Corr. Facility, 848 F.3d 415, 420 (5th Cir.

2017) (citing Alton v. Tex. A & M Univ., 168 F.3d 196, 201 (5th Cir. 1999)). “Deliberate

indifference cannot be inferred merely from a negligent or even a grossly negligent response to a

substantial risk of serious harm.” Torres, 972 F.3d at 663 (quoting Williams v. Banks, 956 F.3d

808, 811 (5th Cir. 2020) (brackets omitted)).

Preliminarily, “there is no federally protected right to safety restraints in prison transport

vehicles.” Jimenez, 856 F. App’x at 535 (citing Rogers, 709 F.3d at 408–09). Thus, “[t]he Fifth

Circuit and district courts within the circuit have repeatedly held that the mere failure to provide

seatbelts to inmates during transport does not, without more, amount to deliberate indifference.”

Nixon, 2021 WL 2688950, at *8 (collecting cases). To recover for an automobile collision, the

plaintiff must show “actual knowledge that the manner in which he was driving created a

substantial risk of harm. Merely negligent driving by [the officer] would not support a violation of

a constitutional right.” Baughman, 935 F.3d at 309.

Rogers is the leading Fifth Circuit case on this issue. There, Plaintiff alleged (1) that “he

was not provided with a seatbelt and that he could not protect himself when the prison van stopped

abruptly because he was shackled in leg irons and handcuffs[;]” (2) the driver “knew that other

prisoners had been injured when the prison van in which they were riding stopped abruptly[;]” and

(3) “[n]otwithstanding that knowledge, [the officer] drove the van recklessly and [plaintiff]

sustained serious injuries when [the officer] had to brake suddenly to avoid hitting another

vehicle.” Rogers, 709 F.3d at 408.

Rogers surveyed caselaw recognizing that the lack of a seat belt alone is insufficient to

impose liability. Id. at 408–09 (citing Cooks v. Crain, 327 F. App’x 493 (5th Cir. 2009)

(unpublished); Bell v. Norwood, 325 F. App’x 306, 307–08 (5th Cir. 2009) (unpublished); Jabbar

v. Fischer, 683 F.3d 54 (2d Cir. 2012)). However, the Court then stated:

The Eight Circuit, however, has allowed claims to proceed with

facts more similar to those now before us—namely, the additional

allegation of reckless driving. In Brown, an inmate sued the driver

of a prison van, alleging that he was injured when the driver operated

the van recklessly after refusing to buckle the inmate’s seatbelt.

[Brown v. Fortner, 518 F.3d 552, 559–60 (8th Cir. 2008)]. The

inmate was unable to buckle the seatbelt himself because he was

shackled. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order

denying the defendant driver’s claim to qualified immunity and

motion for summary judgment. Id. at 559–60.

Id. at 409. Rogers further explained:

Rogers alleged that he sustained a serious injury because Jose Garcia

operated the prison van recklessly, knowing that there was a

substantial risk that Rogers would be injured if the van stopped

abruptly because Rogers was shackled in leg irons and handcuffs

and was not provided with a seatbelt. Rogers’s allegation that Jose

Garcia told another officer that other inmates similarly had been

injured the prior week and during other incidents, which “happen [ ]

all the time,” states more than mere negligence. Garcia’s alleged

statement, if true, is sufficient to demonstrate that he knew of the

risk to Rogers.

Id.

The Fifth Circuit found that Cooks and other decisions were (1) “distinguished because

those cases did not involve the additional allegation that the prisoner was injured when the

defendant operated the prison vehicle recklessly knowing of the danger to the prisoner” and (2)

“distinguished because the complaint there was dismissed after the defendant’s motion for

summary judgment, and not at the initial pleading stage.” Id. As a result, and based on Brown, the

Rogers court found that the “district court abused its discretion in sua sponte dismissing this claim

against [the driver] at the initial screening stage and before the filing of any responsive pleading .

. . .” Id.

Several cases have applied this standard to deny liability. For instance, in Baughman, the

Fifth Circuit found that the plaintiff failed to meet his burden at the summary judgment stage in

part because there was no evidence deputy “acknowledged other prisoners have been injured in a

similar fashion” or that the plaintiff “asked to have a seatbelt fastened and [the deputy] refused, or

that he asked the deputy to slow down, or other evidence that would be some support for the

deputy’s awareness.” 935 F.3d at 309 (cleaned up).

Likewise, in Jimenez, the pro se plaintiff alleged that “defendants showed deliberate

indifference to his safety by placing him on a bus without providing him with seat belts and that

he suffered severe injuries when a bus sent to replace a disabled transport vehicle backed into the

bus where Jimenez was located.” 856 F. App’x at 535. The Fifth Circuit held in a per curiam

opinion that plaintiff “failed to show that the defendants evinced deliberate indifference for his

safety, as there is no federally protected right to safety restraints in prison transport vehicles and

because there was no summary judgment evidence establishing that the bus collision arose as a

result of knowingly reckless behavior by the defendants.” Id. (comparing with Rogers, 709 F.3d

at 408–09).

Similarly, in Nixon, the magistrate judge found that such claims were legally frivolous.

2021 WL 2688950, at *9. According to Nixon, “[w]hen . . . a plaintiff goes beyond simply asserting

the need for an extra measure of safety against the possibility of harm, and also asserts additional

allegations that the defendant operated the transport vehicle recklessly, knowing of the danger to

the prisoner due to the lack of seatbelts, the § 1983 claim will survive screening.” Id. at *8

(citations omitted). The Nixon plaintiff made “no allegations that [he] knew of prior injuries due

to prisoners due to lack of seatbelts during transport, that his driver made any statement reflecting

an intent to cause injury through reckless driving, or any other facts to establish more than a

negligence claim.” Id. While the plaintiff’s claims may constitute negligence, they were not viable

under § 1983. Id.

Other cases have allowed claims to proceed along lines similar to Rogers. For instance, in

Johnson v. Thaler, No. 10-25, 2011 WL 4592384, at *5–6 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2011), the

magistrate judge found that a reckless driving claim was not legally frivolous. The court surveyed

case law and concluded:

Considering the different court opinions, it appears that an allegation

of simply being transported without a seatbelt does not, in and of

itself, give rise to a constitutional claim. However, if the claim is

combined with allegations that the driver was driving recklessly,

then their actions may violate the Eighth Amendment. Brown v.

Fortner, 518 F.3d at 560; see also Wilbert v. Quarterman, 647

F.Supp.2d 760, 770 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (denying motion to dismiss a

deliberate indifference claim where inmate was denied a seatbelt

and the vehicle was driving too fast); Walls v. Kaho, No. 5:06–cv–

188, 2008 WL 508618 (S.D. Miss. Feb.20, 2008) (unpublished)

(transportation of prisoners without seatbelts might constitute

deliberate indifference where plaintiff can demonstrate “a pattern of

unconstitutional behavior,” such as a large number of prisoners

suffering injuries during transport as a result of not wearing

seatbelts, and that defendants knew of the injuries and risk); Barela

v. Romero, No. 06–41, 2007 WL 2219441, at *7–8 (D.N.M. May

10, 2007) (unpublished) (denying dismissal and distinguishing

Dexter where plaintiff-inmate received no seatbelt and defendants

were driving recklessly).

In Barela, the court concluded “that a reasonable officer would

understand that driving a transport van at high speeds, and stopping

erratically, is likely to endanger prisoners who are unsecured and

who cannot brace themselves because they are handcuffed and

shackled.” 2007 WL 2219441, at *7. The court further explained

that the plaintiff had “pled that these particular officers were actually

aware of these conditions and were indifferent to the consequences

of their actions.” Id.

In this case, plaintiff testified that, not only did he not have a

seatbelt, he was chained to another, heavier, inmate. In addition, he

alleges that Officer Adams was driving at a high rate of speed and

in a reckless manner. For purposes of § 1915A, plaintiff has stated

sufficient facts to state a claim of deliberate indifference against

Officer Adams, and service will be ordered on this defendant.

Id. at *5–6.

Likewise, in Miller v. Chapman, No. 13-367, 2014 WL 2949287, *2 (M.D. La. June 30,

2014), another division of this Court found that it “would be in error to dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth

Amendment claim. . . .” Judge Dick explained, “While Fifth Circuit jurisprudence instructs that an

inmate’s allegations of being deprived of seatbelts while being transported in restraints alone will

not give rise to a constitutional claim, when combined with allegations of reckless driving or a

prior pattern of incidents, a viable claim may exist.” Id. (citing Rogers, 709 3d 403, and then citing

Johnson, 2011 WL 4592384, at *5). The Court concluded that the “Eighth Amendment claim is

based not only on the deprivation of safety restraints, but also Defendant Chapman’s operation of

the inmate transport van.” Id. Judge Dick also distinguished other Fifth Circuit case law which was

“made at the summary judgment stage where evidence had been considered” and noted that “this

lawsuit [wa]s still in its infancy and discovery ha[d] not yet begun.” Id.

Most recently, in Chatton v. Bosede, No. 23-212, 2025 WL 848444, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Mar.

17, 2025), the district court found that plaintiff stated a viable claim for deliberate indifference

when he pled that defendant “was recklessly handling his cell phone while driving and drove over

a curb while Plaintiff was shackled and handcuffed in the transport van without a seatbelt” and

that he was thrown from his seat and struck the roof, seat, and side of the van,” to the point that

“the impact caused him to visibly bleed from his mouth, nose, and head.” Chatton distinguished

Baughman on the grounds that it was decided at the summary judgment stage. Id.

3. Analysis

Having carefully considered the matter, the Court will deny Defendants’ motion. In sum,

Plaintiffs have, at this stage, adequately pled a constitutional violation and overcome qualified

immunity.

Again, stripped of conclusions, the ASC alleges that (1) Brown “deliberately refused to

secure Plaintiff with a seatbelt,” (ASC ¶ 5, Doc. 17); (2) Brown “began driving in an erratic manner

and at an excessive rate of speed” (id. ¶ 7); (3) perhaps most critically, Epps “repeatedly asked

[Brown] to slow down and to stop slinging him around inside the” vehicle, (id.); and (4) Brown’s

erratic driving caused the car accident, (id. ¶ 8). As in Rogers and Miller, the Court can reasonably

infer that Brown knew Epps was unsecure and helpless, that Brown knew (from Epps’s repeated

requests) that a substantial risk of harm existed to Epps, and that Brown deliberately chose to drive

recklessly anyway. And, as in Rogers, Johnson, Miller, and Chatton, Brown drove recklessly

despite choosing not to secure Plaintiff. Under the above authority, this is sufficient to establish a

plausible claim at this stage.

For the same reasons, Brown’s knowledge makes cases like Jimenez and Nixon

distinguishable. Indeed, Baughman supports this Court’s conclusion, as Baughman found no

liability in part because the plaintiff failed to present evidence that he “asked to have a seatbelt

fastened and [the deputy] refused, or that he asked the deputy to slow down, or other evidence that

would be some support for the deputy’s awareness.” 935 F.3d at 309. But here Epps “repeatedly

asked [Brown] to slow down and to stop slinging him around inside the” vehicle. (ASC ¶ 7, Doc.

17.) Thus, Baughman suggests Epps’s claims are viable.

Defendants complain that Plaintiff fails to allege certain details, like whether Brown in fact

heard Epps, but Defendants ask for too much at this stage. The only question is whether the ASC

sets forth enough well-pleaded facts which, when accepted as true and construed in the light most

favorable to the Plaintiff, raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence that

Brown “was subjectively – actually – ‘aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn

that a substantial risk of serious harm exists’ from the manner in which he was driving the

[vehicle], and that the deputy must also have drawn that inference yet continued to drive

dangerously,” Baughman, 935 F.3d at 308. See also Section II, supra (Rule 12(b)(6) standard).

Epps has met that burden here.

As to the second prong of qualified immunity, “[i]n determining what constitutes clearly

established law, [the Fifth Circuit] first looks to Supreme Court precedent and then to [its] own.”

Crittindon, 37 F.4th at 186 (quoting Shumpert v. City of Tupelo, 905 F.3d 310, 320 (5th Cir. 2018)).

“When there is no direct controlling authority, ‘[the Fifth Circuit] may rely on decisions from other

circuits to the extent that they constitute a robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority.’” Id.

(quoting Shumpert, 905 F.3d at 320 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). “An officer

‘cannot be said to have violated a clearly established right unless the right’s contours were

sufficiently definite that any reasonable official in the defendant’s shoes would have understood

that he was violating it.’” Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1153 (2018) (per curiam) (quoting

Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 778–79 (2014)). “Ultimately, the touchstone is ‘fair warning’:

The law can be clearly established ‘despite notable factual distinctions between the precedents

relied on and the cases then before the Court, so long as the prior decisions gave reasonable

warning that the conduct then at issue violated constitutional rights.’” Crittindon, 37 F.4th at 186

(quoting Shumpert, 905 F.3d at 321 (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 740 (2002))).

Considering this standard, the Court finds that the law was clearly established as of the day

of Epps’s accident that, under Rogers, an officer driver is deliberately indifferent to inmate safety

by leaving a pretrial detainee unrestrained in the car and continuing to drive recklessly despite

knowing that he is exposing the detainee to a substantial risk of harm. That is, Rogers gave Brown

fair warning that his conduct was unlawful, at least based on the facts as pled.

Defendants complain that Rogers does not constitute clearly established law because it was

decided at the screening stage and not at the motion to dismiss stage, but other Courts have applied

Rogers to deny a motion to dismiss. See Chatton, 2025 WL 848444, at *1. Moreover, Rogers relied

on Brown, which denied qualified immunity on this issue. 518 F.3d 552. The point here is not that

Brown constitutes a “robust consensus” but rather that the Fifth Circuit incorporated Brown into

its caselaw to give fair warning to officers for what constitutes unlawful behavior in this circuit.

Defendants cite one decision for the proposition that Brown and Rogers do not create

clearly established law in this circuit. See Martinez v. Texas Dep’t of Crim. Just., No. 23-131, 2024

WL 5111975, at *16 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 12, 2024), report and recommendation adopted sub nom.

Martinez v. Trevino, No. 23-131, 2024 WL 5110066 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 13, 2024) (stating that

“Brown, as an out-of-circuit decision, is persuasive authority only” and that “[t]he Fifth Circuit in

Rogers reversed a district court’s sua sponte dismissal of a reckless driving claim, but did not find

that the complained-of conduct violated the Eighth Amendment.”). But Defendants cite to no Fifth

Circuit case holding that cases like Rogers, which evaluated a claim for being legally frivolous,

cannot recognize clearly established law. Such a position would make much the above authority,

from Rogers to Baughman, contain considerable surplusage. Nevertheless, if Defendants present

the Court with contrary authority, the Court will reconsider its present ruling.

For all these reasons, Epps has sufficiently pled a Fourteenth Amendment claim against

Brown for deliberate indifference. Brown’s motion will be denied on this issue.

D. Fourth Amendment Claims

Defendants next seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment excessive force and

unreasonable seizure claims. (Doc. 21-1 at 12–13.) According to Defendants, the Fourth

Amendment is inapplicable to a pretrial detainee who is properly arrested and is awaiting trial. (Id.

at 13 (citing Brooks v. George Cnty., Miss., 84 F.3d 157, 167 (5th Cir. 1996)).) Thus, because

Plaintiff alleges he was a pretrial detainee, he has no Fourth Amendment claims. (Id.) In any event,

Defendants contend that Plaintiff makes no allegation of an unreasonable search or seizure, so this

claim is meritless for that additional reason. (Id.) Likewise, Plaintiff’s excessive force claims are

conclusory and thus insufficient to state a claim under the Due Process Clause. (Id.) Defendants

say Plaintiff must show that the officer purposefully caused him harm and was objectively

unreasonable, and, for all the reasons given above, Brown did not use objectively unreasonable

excessive force. (Id. at 14–15.)

In response, Epps asserts:

The plaintiff opposes the dismissal of 4th Amendment claims, with

prejudice, as the plaintiff’s official status has not been verified and

supported by certified documentation that will likely be obtained by

virtue of discovery. For example, documentation evincing a pre-trial

detainee’s status is expected to include court orders,

release/detention reports, risk assessment documents, pre-trial

service reports, arrest reports, charging documentations and/or

records of prior offenses will reflect the official status of Mr. Epps,

which will confirm whether the 4th Amendment or the 14th

Amendment of the Constitution provides a remedy for the violations

he suffered. Should information be discovered, which contradicts

the plaintiff’s belief that he was a pre-trial detainee at the time of the

crash, a dismissal with prejudice would impede his ability to pursue

claims under the 4th Amendment.

(Doc. 25 at 18.)

Defendants reply that, contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, no discovery is needed because

Plaintiff alleges he was a pretrial detainee, and there is no allegation that the incident occurred

during his arrest. (Doc. 27 at 6–7.) Thus, the Fourth Amendment claim should be dismissed with

prejudice. (Id. at 7.) Alternatively, Defendants say Plaintiff waived any opposition by failing to

meaningfully oppose it. (Id.) Moreover, Plaintiff has not overcome qualified immunity, for the

above reasons and because he fails to point to binding authority constituting clearly established

law for these claims. (Id. at 7–8.)

Having carefully considered the matter, the Court agrees with Defendants. “The Fourth

Amendment is inapplicable to a pretrial detainee who was properly arrested and is awaiting trial.

That detainee has recourse to due process protections, not protection against unreasonable seizures

after a lawful seizure has occurred.” Brooks v. George Cnty., Miss., 84 F.3d 157, 167 (5th Cir.

1996). See also Valencia v. Wiggins, 981 F.2d 1440, 1445 (5th Cir. 1993) (“the Supreme Court's

decisions in Graham and Bell indicate that the due process clause in the Fifth (or Fourteenth)

Amendment is the appropriate constitutional basis for pretrial detainee excessive force suits.”).

Here, Plaintiff pleads that he “was a pre-trial detainee who was scheduled to be transported by . .

. [Brown] . . . from [EBRPP] to the [19th JDC] . . . for the purposes of attending a hearing.” (ASC

¶ 2, Doc. 17.) Thus, he has no viable Fourth Amendment claim.

Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to point to any relevant case law articulating how Brown’s

conduct constitutes excessive force or an unlawful seizure or how it violates clearly established

law, beyond what was given above. Accordingly, any claim for unlawful seizure or excessive force

is dismissed on the grounds of waiver and for qualified immunity. See Payton v. Town of

Maringouin, No. 18-563, 2021 WL 2544416, at *26 (M.D. La. June 21, 2021) (deGravelles, J.)

(collecting authorities on waiver), aff’d, No. 21-30440, 2022 WL 3097846 (5th Cir. Aug. 3, 2022);

Joseph on behalf of Est. of Joseph v. Bartlett, 981 F.3d 319, 330 (5th Cir. 2020) (“to overcome

qualified immunity, the plaintiff’s version of those disputed facts must also constitute a violation

of clearly established law. This requires the plaintiff to identify a case—usually, a body of relevant

case law—in which an officer acting under similar circumstances . . . was held to have violated

the Constitution.” (cleaned up)). Accordingly, these claims will be dismissed.

E. Punitive Damages

Defendants argue that the Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for punitive damages.

(Doc. 21-1 at 20.) According to Defendants, Plaintiff’s allegations against Brown are conclusory,

and Plaintiff cannot recover punitive damages against government agencies. (Id.)

Plaintiff responds that his allegations for failure to protect “provide the foundation” for his

punitive damages claim. (Doc. 25 at 21.) Further, Epps asserts § 1983 claims against Brown only,

not Sheriff Gautreaux. (Id.)

Defendants reply that (1) again, Plaintiff pleads only conclusions; (2) Plaintiff has failed

to address Defendants’ arguments and thus waived them; and (3) again, § 1983 does not allow for

recovery of punitive damages against a government agency. (Doc. 27 at 8–9.)

“To prevail on punitive damages, Plaintiffs must show that the official conduct was

motivated by evil intent or demonstrated reckless or callous indifference to a person’s

constitutional rights.” Moore v. LaSalle Mgmt. Co., L.L.C., 41 F.4th 493, 513 (5th Cir. 2022)

(cleaned up). “Reckless or callous indifference requires recklessness in its subjective form, i.e. a

subjective consciousness of a risk of injury or illegality and a criminal indifference to civil

obligations.” Id. (cleaned up).

Plaintiff has only one remaining § 1983 claim: against Brown in his individual capacity for

deliberate indifference. “Showing deliberate indifference requires showing a defendant was

subjectively aware that ‘a substantial risk of serious harm’ existed and was indifferent to it.

Plaintiffs have therefore met their burden [as] to . . . whether [Brown] demonstrated reckless or

callous indifference to [Epps’s] constitutional rights.” Id. (reversing the granting of summary

judgment on plaintiff’s punitive damage claim because questions of fact existed on deliberate

indifference). Consequently, the Court will deny Defendants’ motion to dismiss the punitive

damage claim against Brown.

F. Leave to Amend

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) “requires a trial court to grant leave to amend freely,

and the language of this rule evinces a bias in favor of granting leave to amend.” Jones v. Robinson

Prop. Grp., L.P., 427 F.3d 987, 994 (5th Cir. 2005) (cleaned up). However, “[l]eave to amend is

in no way automatic.”  Marucci Sports, L.L.C. v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 751 F.3d 368,

378 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing Jones, 427 F.3d at 994 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

The Court can deny a party’s request for leave to amend if it has a “substantial reason” for doing

so. Id. The Fifth Circuit has further described a district court’s discretion on a motion to amend as

follows:

The district court is entrusted with the discretion to grant or deny a

motion to amend and may consider a variety of factors including

“undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant,

repeated failures to cure deficiencies by amendments previously

allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party . . . , and futility of

the amendment.” [Jones, 427 F.3d at 994] (citation omitted). “In

light of the presumption in favor of allowing pleading amendments,

courts of appeals routinely hold that a district court’s failure to

provide an adequate explanation to support its denial of leave to

amend justifies reversal.” Mayeaux v. La. Health Serv. and Indent.

Co., 376 F.3d 420, 426 (5th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). However,

when the justification for the denial is “readily apparent,” a failure

to explain “is unfortunate but not fatal to affirmance if the record

reflects ample and obvious grounds for denying leave to

amend.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Id.

In addition, the Fifth Circuit has made clear that “[d]enying a motion to amend is not an

abuse of discretion if allowing an amendment would be futile.” Id. (citing Briggs v. Mississippi,

331 F.3d 499, 508 (5th Cir. 2003)). An amendment is futile “if it would fail to survive a Rule

12(b)(6) motion.” Id. (citing Briggs, 331 F.3d at 508).

Having carefully considered the matter, the Court will deny leave to amend. First, as stated

above, one factor to consider is whether there have been “repeated failures to cure deficiencies by

amendments previously allowed,” and another is undue delay. Id. (citation omitted). Here, the

Court denied Defendants’ initial motion to dismiss without prejudice and specifically cautioned

Plaintiff: “If Defendants file a second motion to dismiss which the Court ultimately grants, it is

highly likely the Court will dismiss the claims with prejudice as futile and because of undue delay.”

(Doc. 10 at 2–3.) Plaintiff was thus given a chance to put his “best foot forward,” and any failure

to do so at this point was the result of undue delay or an inability to plead viable claims.

Consequently, Plaintiffs will not be given leave to amend, and the Court will dismiss all

§ 1983 claims—other than Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference claim (with

its accompanying punitive damage claim)—with prejudice. See Apollo Energy, LLC v. Certain

Underwriters at Lloyd’s, Lond., 387 F. Supp. 3d 663, 679 (M.D. La. 2019) (deGravelles, J.)

(denying leave to amend when plaintiff should have had notice of issue from court’s ruling on

original motion to dismiss, and when further amendment would be futile); Skinner v. Ard, 519 F.

Supp. 3d 301, 321–22 (M.D. La. 2021) (deGravelles, J.) (same); Martin v. Roy, No. 20-339, 2022

WL 894599, at *13–14 (M.D. La. Mar. 25, 2022) (deGravelles, J.) (same).

G. Supplemental Jurisdiction

Defendants last urge the Court to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the

remaining state law claims. (Doc. 21-1 at 22.) “[S]ince all federal claims against Defendants are

subject to dismissal, Plaintiff’s supplemental state law claims should also be dismissed.” (Id.)

Defendants then hammer the statutory and common law factors relevant to this issue. (Id. at 22–

23 (citations omitted).) Plaintiffs respond that state law does not preempt federal law and that state

courts have concurrent jurisdiction over § 1983 claims. (Doc. 25 at 21–23.) Defendants reply that

they do not argue preemption but that they instead seek remand because all federal claims are

subject to dismissal. (Doc. 27 at 9.)

Having carefully considered the matter, the Court will deny Defendants’ motion without

prejudice. Defendants’ argument was premised on the Court dismissing all federal claims. Since

that has not happened, the Court will maintain the action. If the Court later dismisses Plaintiff’s

remaining federal claim, the Court will revisit this issue.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that the Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 21) filed by Defendants,

Sid J. Gautreaux, III, Sheriff of East Baton Rouge Parish and Roderick Brown is GRANTED IN

PART and DENIED IN PART. The motion is GRANTED in that all § 1983 claims are

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, except Plaintiff’s claim for deliberate indifference under the

Fourteenth Amendment and for compensatory and punitive damages in connection with that claim.

In that respect, the motion is DENIED. Further, Defendants’ request to decline to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to

Defendants’ right to re-urge if the remaining federal claim is later dismissed.

Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on March 27, 2026.

S

JUDG E JOHN W. deGRAVELLES

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA