“Vast discretion is accorded the trier of fact in fixing general damage awards.”
How later courts described this case
- “Vast discretion is accorded the trier of fact in fixing general damage awards.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT
21-161
TERESA JEFFRIES
VERSUS
PRIME INSURANCE COMPANY, ET AL.
**********
APPEAL FROM THE
FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF CALCASIEU, NO. 2017-5215
HONORABLE SHARON D. WILSON, DISTRICT JUDGE
**********
JOHN E. CONERY
JUDGE
**********
Court composed of Shannon J. Gremillion, John E. Conery, and Charles G.
Fitzgerald, Judges.
AFFIRMED IN PART; AMENDED IN PART AND RENDERED.
REMANDED.
Paul A. Eckert
Sidney W. Degan, III
Degan, Blanchard & Nash
5555 Hilton Avenue, Suite 620
Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70808
(225) 610-1110
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
Prime Insurance Company
Randall A. Smith
J. Geoffrey Ormsby
Dylan T. Leach
Smith & Fawer, L.L.C.
201 St. Charles Avenue, Suite 3702
New Orleans, Louisiana 70170
(504) 525-2200
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
Prime Insurance Company
Frank X. Neuner, Jr.
Jennifer M. Ardoin
Katelyn E. Bayhi
NeunerPate
One Petroleum Center
1001 West Pinhook Road, Suite 200
Lafayette, Louisiana 70503
(337) 237-7000
APPELLATE COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLANTS:
Terry Graham Trucking, Inc.
Elvis Thompson
Matthew Green
Dill Law Firm
P.O. Box 3324
Lafayette, Louisiana 70502
(337) 261-1408
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLANTS:
Terry Graham Trucking, Inc.
Elvis Thompson
Justin T. Morales
Todd A. Townsley
David H. Hanchey
The Townsley Law Firm
3102 Enterprise Boulevard
Lake Charles, Louisiana 70601
(337) 478-1400
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE:
Teresa Jeffries
Thomas H. Huval
Jones Fussell, LLP
Post Office Box 1810
Covington, Louisiana 70434
(985) 892-4801
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE:
Financial Indemnity Company
John M. Welborn, III
Attorney at Law
508 North Pine Street
DeRidder, Louisiana 70634
(337) 462-1200
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS/APPELLEES:
Tracey Day on behalf of Briley Day
Tracey Day on behalf of Brooklyn Day
Bradley Day on behalf of Briley Day
Bradley Day on behalf of Brooklyn Day
Tracey Day
Bradley Day
J. Craig Jones
Jones & Hill
131 Hwy 165 South
Oakdale, Louisiana 71463
(318) 335-1333
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS/APPELLEES:
Tracey Day on behalf of Briley Day
Tracey Day on behalf of Brooklyn Day
Bradley Day on behalf of Briley Day
Bradley Day on behalf of Brooklyn Day
Tracey Day
Bradley Day
L. Phillip Canova, Jr.
Canova and DeLahaye, LLC
58156 Court Street
Plaquemine, Louisiana 70764-2708
(225) 687-8340
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE:
Government Employees Insurance Company
Martin Edward Golden
Keogh, Cox & Wilson
Post Office Box 1151
Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70821
(225) 383-3796
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Rescare, Inc.
James Morgan Passman
Attorney at Law
201 Johnston Street, Suite 402
Alexandria, Louisiana 71301
(318) 445-6384
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE:
Government Employees Insurance Company
Thomas A. Filo
Cox, Cox, Filo, Camel & Wilson, LLC
723 Broad Street
Lake Charles, Louisiana 70601
(337) 436-6611
COUNSEL FOR CROSS-CLAIMANT:
Terry Graham Trucking, Inc.
CONERY, Judge.
The claims of the three Defendants in the case now before us were severed for
trial purposes from claims of others in litigation arising out of the same accident.
Defendants, Terry Graham Trucking, Inc. (Graham), its driver, Elvis Thompson (Mr.
Thompson), and Prime Insurance Company (Prime) (collectively, Defendants)
timely appeal the trial court’s pre-trial ruling granting the Plaintiff, Theresa Jefferies’
(Ms. Jeffries) motion to strike Defendants’ two expert witnesses, K. Samer Shamieh,
M.D and Stephanie S. Haupt at a pre-trial hearing held immediately prior to the start
of a jury trial. A request for a continuance by Defendants was heard and denied on
September 27, 2017, and judgment denying the continuance was issued on Thursday,
October 3rd before trial on Monday the 7th. Following a jury trial on the merits, the
jury returned a verdict of $2,508,853.00 against Defendants in solido, which was
reduced to judgment on October 30, 2019.
Following the jury trial and entry of that final judgment, Defendants timely
filed a motion for new trial, claiming prejudicial error based on the trial court’s ruling
on Plaintiff’s motion to strike excluding their only two expert witnesses. The trial
court denied Defendants’ motion for new trial at a hearing held on January 3, 2021.
On February 6, 2020, the trial court signed a final judgment denying
Defendants’ motion for new trial, and notice of mailing of judgment was issued on
March 3, 2020. A motion for suspensive appeal was filed by Defendants on March
16, 2020, with the order granting the appeal signed on April 3, 2020. The appeal
bond for the entire amount of the judgment was filed on June 1, 2020. At trial, the
Defendants stipulated to liability, and that issue is not before us on appeal. For the
following reasons, we affirm in part, amend in part, and remand for further
proceedings.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Defendants Graham and Mr. Thompson assert the following assignments of
error on appeal:
1. The trial court’s Pre-Trial Scheduling Order did not require the
exchange or production of expert witness reports. The trial court erred
in granting Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Defendants’ Experts based on
the failure to produce and exchange expert witness reports.
2. The trial court’s damages award was excessive and a clear abuse of the
jury’s discretion.
Defendant Prime asserts the following assignments of error on appeal:
1. The District Court erred in striking Defendants’ only two (2) experts on
the morning of trial.
2. The District Court erred in casting Prime in judgment in excess of the
limits of the Policy.
3. The District Court erred in failing to find that the applicable limits of
the Policy were $300,000.00 per occurrence, or $100,000.00 for injury
or death for one person.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This lawsuit resulted from a rear-end collision on March 31, 2017, wherein
Defendant, Mr. Thompson, who was driving an eighteen wheeler owned by Graham
and insured by Prime, collided into the rear of a vehicle owned by Bradley Day,
which in turn was propelled into Plaintiff/Jeffries vehicle, allegedly causing the
injuries to Plaintiff Ms. Jeffries (Ms. Jeffries). Ms. Jeffries filed suit against Prime,
Graham, and Thompson on December 15, 2017. On August 23, 2018, Defendants
filed a motion to consolidate Ms. Jeffries’ suit with the two other lawsuits resulting
from the same accident, including a suit filed by Bradley and Tracey Day (hereafter
“the Day case.”)1 Financial Indemnity Company (Financial), Ms. Jeffries’ collision
1
The Days filed suit individually and on behalf of their minor children Brooklyn and
Briley Day. See Bradley Day, et al. v. Elvis Dean Thompson, et al., bearing 14th Judicial District
2
insurer, filed suit against Defendants to recover the amount paid for property damage
to her vehicle. The trial court signed an order granting Defendants’ motion to
consolidate on September 4, 2018.
A jury trial was fixed for October 7, 2019, and the trial court signed its Pre-
Trial Order on February 5, 2019, setting various deadlines, including a July 7, 2019
deadline for exchange of expert witness lists. The Pre-Trial Order stated in pertinent
part, “Each party shall furnish to all other parties, in writing, a list of all expert
witnesses with addresses and their expertise with a duplicate copy thereof to be filed
with the Clerk of Court three (3) months before trial.” (Emphasis added.)
The Pre-Trial Order did not specifically provide for either the production or
exchange of expert reports in accordance with La.Code Civ.P. art. 1425(B) and (C).2
Court Docket Number 2017-4574. The cases were consolidated, but problems with scheduling
during discovery caused the Days to file a motion to sever, which was heard by the trial court on
September 27, 2019 and granted on October 3, 2019, shortly before Ms. Jeffries’ trial on October
7, 2019. Financial Indemnity Company, as Ms. Jeffries’ automobile liability insurer, entered into
a joint stipulation with counsel for Ms. Jeffries and Prime agreeing that if Ms. Jeffries was
successful in her lawsuit against Defendants, a judgment would be entered in favor of Financial in
the amount of $20,578.73 for property damages paid to Ms. Jeffries based on her auto collision
policy with Financial. On appeal, Financial adopted the briefs filed by Ms. Jeffries counsel in their
entirety.
2
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 1425 provides, in pertinent part:
B. Upon contradictory motion of any party or on the court’s own motion,
an order may be entered requiring that each party that has retained or specially
employed a person to provide expert testimony in the case or whose duties as an
employee of the party regularly involve giving expert testimony provide a written
report prepared and signed by the witness. The report shall contain a complete
statement of all opinions to be expressed and the basis and reasons therefor and the
data or other information considered by the witness in forming the opinions. The
parties, upon agreement, or if ordered by the court, shall include in the report any
or all of the following: exhibits to be used as a summary of or support for the
opinions; the qualifications of the witness, including a list of all publications
authored by the witness within the preceding ten years; the compensation to be paid
for the study and testimony; a listing of any other cases in which the witness has
testified as an expert at trial or by deposition within the preceding four years.
C. If the court orders the disclosures of Paragraph B of this Article, they
shall be made at the times and in the sequence directed by the court. In the absence
of directions from the court or stipulation by the parties, the disclosures ordered
pursuant to Paragraph B of this Article shall be made at least ninety days before the
trial date or, if the evidence is intended solely to contradict or rebut evidence on the
3
On July 3, 2019, Defendants timely filed their Expert Witness List which
included the two expert witnesses at issue in this appeal and described each as
follows:
1. K. Samer Shamieh, M.D., DISC of Louisiana, 76 Starbrush
Circle, Covington, Louisiana 70433, via live testimony or trial
deposition, defense medical expert in the field of neurology and
neurosurgery to testify regarding medical causation and of the
plaintiff’s medical damages.
....
4. Stephanie S. Haupt, Hegwood & Company, LLC, Vocational
Rehabilitation Counselor, 2017 Ormond Blvd., Destrehan, Louisiana,
70047, via live testimony or trial deposition, defense expert to testify
regarding her vocational assessment.
Shortly before the consolidated cases were scheduled for trial, a motion to
sever the Day case was filed on September 11, 2019, by Bradley and Tracey Day.
On September 16, 2019, Defendants filed a motion to continue the consolidated trials.
A hearing was held on both motions on September 27, 2019. The trial court issued
a judgment on October 3, 2019 granting the Days’ motion to sever as well as a
continuance of the Days’ trial date. The trial court denied the Defendants motion to
continue Ms. Jeffries’ trial date and it proceeded on October 7, 2019.
Defendants’ counsel had requested that Plaintiff submit to an IME by Dr.
Shamieh as well as an evaluation by its chosen Vocational Rehabilitation Expert,
Stephanie Haupt. Plaintiff voluntarily and timely co-operated with both requests
without the necessity of a court order. Due to Defendants’ late request for IMEs,
and through no fault of Plaintiff, Dr. Shamieh’s examination was not scheduled by
same subject matter identified by another party under Paragraph B of this Article,
within thirty days after the disclosure made by the other party. The parties shall
supplement these disclosures when required by Article 1428.
4
Defendants and did not take place until September 19, 2019, just seventeen (17) days
before trial on October 7. Ms. Haupt’s vocational rehabilitation evaluation was not
scheduled for and was not conducted until September 4, 2019, just thirty four (34)
days before trial. Defense counsel agreed with Plaintiff’s counsel to provide copies
of the reports of the two experts as soon as they were available. Counsel for
Defendants claimed that Dr. Shamieh did not render a report of his evaluation of Ms.
Jeffries. Ms. Haupt’s report was sent on October 3, 2019, just one business day
before trial.
On October 4, 2019, the Friday before trial was to begin on Monday, October
7, 2019, Ms. Jeffries’ counsel fax filed a motion to strike Defendants’ experts, Dr.
Shamieh and Ms. Haupt. Ms. Jeffries’ counsel actually sought to strike all of the
eight experts initially listed on Defendants’ expert witness list, but Dr. Shamieh and
Ms. Haupt were the only two experts that Defendants intended to call as witnesses
to testify at trial based on Defendants’ intention to stipulate to liability.
Ms. Jeffries’ counsel argued in the motion to strike Defendants’ experts that
Defendants had failed to timely produce expert reports, and cited La.Code Civ.P. art.
1465. However, an examination of the record shows that the trial court’s Pre-Trial
Order did not specifically require the exchange of expert reports. Hence, there had
been no motion to compel filed by Ms. Jeffries’ counsel seeking an order from the
trial court requiring Defendants to produce an expert report for any of the experts
listed, though production of the expert reports of Dr. Shamieh and Ms. Haupt was
part of Plaintiff’s counsel’s consent to voluntarily participate in Defendants’
requested IMEs by Dr. Shamieh and Ms. Haupt without the necessity of a court order.
A hearing was fixed for the motion to strike on the morning of trial. No
witnesses were called. The arguments of counsel were heard. Defendant’s counsel
5
argued that Dr. Shamieh had not produced an expert report and that he was informed
that Dr. Shamieh did not intend to write a report. Defendants’ counsel also argued
that a written report was not specifically required by the Pre-Trial Order. Ms.
Haupt had produced an expert report on Thursday, October 3, 2019, which was
transmitted to Plaintiff’s counsel that same day. It contained a reservation by Ms.
Haupt to modify the report after reviewing the findings and opinion by Dr. Shamieh.
After hearing argument of counsel, the trial court granted Plaintiff’s motion
to strike, stating:
It just seems unfair, and I have no other word for it, to not give a report
when it’s been requested. And for that reason[,] in balancing this out,
I am going to strike the testimony of Dr. Shamieh, as well as the
vocational rehab expert offered by the defense because her opinion is
based on the report that she never received, or is subject to change based
on the report she never received.
Defendants attempted to craft a stipulation admitting to liability, which
Plaintiff’s counsel refused to accept. Defendants did, however, admit liability in their
opening statement to the jury, so the only witnesses Defendants intended to call were
their two experts, Dr. Shamieh and Ms. Haupt, who would testify as to medical
causation and damages for Ms. Jeffries’ alleged injuries. The ruling by the trial court
obviously left Defendants without any witnesses to call in their case-in-chief to rebut
the testimony of the witnesses called by Ms. Jeffries, which included expert witnesses
on medical causation and damages in the fields of orthopedic surgery, neurosurgery,
vocational rehabilitation and lifecare planning, economics, and psychiatry.
At the close of Plaintiff’s case, defense counsel requested a bench conference,
which was not recorded. Counsel for Defendants then stated:
THE COURT:
All right. Mr. Eckert (Counsel for Defendants)?
6
MR. ECKART:
Yes, Your Honor. As we discussed, due to prior evidentiary rulings by
the Court, the Defense is not going to present any witnesses and we will
rest.
Defendants did not make an offer of proof outside the presence of the jury as
to the testimony of Dr. Shamieh and Ms. Haupt. The record does not indicate that
there were any objections by counsel for Defendants to the jury instructions or the
jury verdict form. After deliberating, the jury rendered a verdict in favor of Ms.
Jeffries and against all Defendants in solido in the amount of $2,508,853.00. The
trial court signed a final judgment on October 30, 2019 for that amount, with legal
interest from the date of judicial demand until paid. Defendants stated no opposition
to the trial court’s October 30th final judgment and, again, did not attempt to proffer
the testimony of Dr. Shamieh and Ms. Haupt. The notice of judgment was dated
November 18, 2019, and a motion to tax costs was filed the same day.
Prime, now represented by new counsel, timely filed a motion for new trial,
which was adopted and joined by Graham and Mr. Thompson, who continued to be
represented by their original trial counsel. 3 Defendants claimed that they were
subject to “unfair prejudice caused by the trial court’s decision to strike Defendants’
expert witnesses immediately prior to trial.” On January 3, 2020, the trial court heard
Defendants’ motion for new trial and Plaintiff’s motion to tax costs. The motion to
tax costs is not before this court on appeal.
3
At the hearing prior to trial, counsel for Defendants again discussed the issue of a conflict,
which he had previously raised on September 16, 2019, in Defendants’ motion for continuance,
wherein he disclosed for the first time the possible conflict by his representation of all three
Defendants, Graham, Thompson, and Prime. Counsel reiterated that Prime had asserted a coverage
defense. Defendants Graham and Thompson were unaware of any coverage issues at the time
Defendants’ trial counsel was hired to defend all three Defendants by Prime. The trial court was
made aware of the possible conflict.
7
At the hearing on the motion for new trial, no evidence was presented and no
proffer of the excluded expert testimony of Dr. Shamieh and Ms. Haupt was made.
Defendants simply informed the trial court that their experts were being offered to
“refute the testimony of Plaintiff’s treating physicians concerning the necessity of
surgical intervention in light of Ms. Jeffries’ long standing history of back pain and
her inability to return to her previous employment.” Defense counsel also pointed
to the general description of the experts’ intended role given on Defendants’ expert
witness list filed on July 3, 2019.
Further, at the new trial hearing, new counsel for Prime argued:
And, as you well know, Your Honor, you sat through the trial,
this was a case of pre-existing conditions, medical conditions, future
lost wages, future medical expenses; things that would have been
addressed by Dr. Shamieh and Ms. Haupt.
No detail or summary of the testimony of Prime’s experts, Dr. Shamieh and
Ms. Haupt, was offered. Counsel for Ms. Jeffries argued that there was no proper
proffer of the testimony of Dr. Shamieh and Ms. Haupt by Defendants pursuant to
La.Code Civ.P. art. 1636, which states in pertinent part:
A. When the court rules against the admissibility of any
evidence, it shall either permit the party offering such evidence to make
a complete record thereof, or permit the party to make a statement
setting forth the nature of the evidence.
....
C. In all cases, the court shall state the reason for its ruling as
to the inadmissibility of the evidence. This ruling shall be reviewable
on appeal without the necessity of further formality.
Ms. Jeffries’ counsel argued that Defendants could not show prejudice based
on the exclusion of Dr. Shamieh and Ms. Haupt as witnesses as no evidence was
actually proffered with respect to the experts’ expected testimony. Ms. Jeffries’
counsel also argued that Ms. Jeffries, as the person examined, had made several
8
requests for the experts’ reports in question through counsel pursuant to La.Code
Civ.P. art. 1465, which provides, in pertinent part:
A. If requested by the party whom an order is made under Article
1464 or by the person examined, the party causing the examination to
be made shall deliver to him a copy of a detailed written report of the
examining physician setting out his findings, including results of all
tests made, diagnoses, and conclusions, together with like reports of all
earlier examinations of the same condition. . . . . The court on motion
may make an order against a party requiring delivery of a report on such
terms as are just, and if a physician fails or refuses to make a report the
court may exclude his testimony if offered at the trial.
(Emphasis added.) Ms. Jeffries’ counsel offered copies of several e-mails
received in evidence to support his argument that the reports were properly
requested on behalf of Plaintiff, Ms. Jeffries.
After argument of counsel, the trial court immediately ruled on the
record and denied the Defendants’ motion for a new trial, stating:
THE COURT:
Thank you. All right. This matter comes to the Court on a
Motion for New Trial filed by the Defendant, Prime Insurance, and
adopted by the other defendants in this case.
The Court has had an opportunity to review the memorandums
in favor, and in opposition, and also to listen to the arguments of
counsel. And, after having carefully considered what’s been argued, I
don’t – do not subscribe[] to the reading of 1465 that’s being put
forward by the defense. I just don’t think it leads to the right result
and I don’t interpret the statute that way. So, I just want to make
sure it’s clear to whoever reviews this after me, that I just don’t agree
and that does help with me making my ruling.
I do not see a basis. The Court stands by [its] ruling from the
morning of trial and I don’t see a basis for granting a Motion for New
Trial. So, the Motion for New Trial is denied.
(Emphasis added.)
9
Standard of Review - Pre-Trial and Post-Trial Motions
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 1551 provides a trial court with
vast discretion in pre-trial and post-trial matters, including issues related to
whether witnesses will be allowed to testify at trial. A trial court’s determination
of an appropriate penalty for violation of any pre-trial or discovery order is reviewed
under the abuse of discretion standard of review. See Benware v. Means, 99-1410
(La. 1/19/00), 752 So.2d 841. That standard extends to issues regarding whether a
witness will be allowed to testify at trial. See, e.g., Baker v. Baker, 09-507 (La.App.
3 Cir. 11/4/09), 27 So.3d 958, writ denied, 09-2640 (La. 2/12/10), 27 So.3d 850.
In Labauve v. Louisiana Medical Mutual Insurance Co., 19-848, pp. 6-7
(La.App. 3 Cir. 4/28/21), 318 So.3d 983, 989, writ granted, 21-763 (La. 10/5/21), _
So.3d _ (2021 WL 4551226), a recent panel of our court fully explained the abuse
of discretion standard, particularly with respect to excluding expert witnesses, and
stated:
The trial court has great discretion in determining who should
qualify as an expert and whether expert testimony is admissible, and its
decision in regards to expert testimony will not be upset on appeal
unless it is clearly erroneous. Mistich v. Volkswagon of Ger., Inc., 95-
939 (La. 1/129/96), 666 So.2d 1073; Massie v. Cenac Towing Co., Inc.,
00-1596 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/25/01), 796 So.2d 14, writ denied, 01-1511
(La. 8/31/01), 795 So.2d 1213. The abuse of discretion standard is
highly deferential, though it is not absolute. [Quoting Boudreaux v.
Bollinger Shipyard, 15-958, 15-1345, p. 16 (La.App. 4 Cir. 6/22/16),
197 So.3d 761, 771, which held in pertinent part:]
The abuse-of-discretion standard is highly
deferential to the trial judge’s determination under
consideration. See LCR-M Ltd. P’ship v. Jim Hotard Prop.,
L.L.C., 13-0483, p.9 (La.App. 4 Cir. 10/9/13), 126 So.3d
668, 675. An abuse of discretion generally results from a
conclusion reached capriciously or in an arbitrary manner.
See Tugwell v. Plaquemines Parish Gov’t, 14-0657, p. 5
(La.App.4 Cir. 11/19/14), 154 So.3d 695, 699. “Arbitrary
or capricious” means the absence of a rational basis for the
action taken. See A.S. v. D.S., 14-1098, p.17 (La.App. 4
10
Cir. 4/8/15),165 So.3d 247, 257.And a court necessarily
abuses its discretion if its ruling is based on an erroneous
view of the law. See Show & Tell of New Orleans, L.L.C.
v. Fellowship Missionary Baptist Church, 14-0843, p.8
(La.App. 4 Cir. 12/17/14), 156 So.3d 1234, 1240.
Defendants’ Assignments Of Error One – Motion To Strike
In this case, the Pre-Trial Order of the trial court did not specifically require
that the parties exchange expert reports. The Pre-Trial Order did require that experts
be designated and that the Expert Witness List be filed three months before trial.
Defendants’ list of designated experts was timely filed on July 3, 2019. However,
Defendants did not schedule an IME with Dr. Shamieh until September 19, 2019,
seventeen (17) days before trial. Plaintiff voluntarily co-operated with Defendants’
request for an IME by Dr. Shamieh as well as a vocational rehabilitation assessment
by Defendants’ expert, Stephanie Haupt. Plaintiff filed a motion to strike both
experts because, in spite of repeated e-mail requests by Plaintiff’s counsel, no expert
report from Dr. Shamieh was ever furnished. Ms. Haupt’s report was not received
until the afternoon of October 3, 2019, just one business day before trial, and was
signed subject to revision based on Dr. Shamieh’s findings. The trial court heard the
motion to strike on the morning of trial and granted Plaintiff’s motion to strike both
witnesses.
Counsel for Ms. Jeffries stressed that pursuant to La.Code Civ.P. art. 1465,
Ms. Jeffries, as the person examined, did request the expert reports in question. In
this regard, Article 1465 specifically provides, in pertinent part:
A. If requested by the party against whom an order is made
under Article 1464 or by the person examined, the party causing the
examination to be made shall deliver to him a copy of a detailed written
report of the examining physician setting out his findings, including
results of all tests made, diagnosis, and conclusions, together with like
reports of all earlier examinations of the same condition. . . . The court
on motion may make an order against a party requiring delivery of a
11
report on such terms as are just, and if a physician fails or refuses to
make a report the court may exclude his testimony if offered at the trial.
(Emphasis added.)
Defendants contend that, while La.Code Civ.P. art. 1465 allows the trial court
to issue an order requiring a party to deliver an expert report on request of the person
examined, Ms. Jeffries did not file a motion to have the court order production of
expert reports pursuant to La.Code Civ.P. art. 1465 in advance of trial. Neither did
the Pre-Trial Order signed on February 5, 2019, so require. Defendants argue that
since there was no order issued by the trial court pursuant to La.Code Civ.P. art.
1465(A), and due to the time constraints with the late examination of Ms. Jeffries,
they were unable to secure a report from Dr. Shamieh and the trial judge’s ruling
was erroneous.
In this case, Plaintiff’s counsel co-operated fully and timely with Defendants’
request for an IME from Dr. Shamieh and an assessment from Ms. Haupt without
the necessity of a court order. Ms. Jeffries attended the appointments as scheduled
by Defendants and was not in control of when Defendants would schedule the
examinations, or whether the experts would timely send the reports, or whether
Defendants would timely receive and transmit the reports to her attorney. However,
Ms. Jeffries and her attorney had the reasonable expectation that Defendants would
timely furnish the reports, since Ms. Jeffries had co-operated fully in the
examinations without the necessity of a motion and court order for the examinations
issued pursuant to La.Code Civ.P. art. 1465(A).
Under the undisputed factual circumstances of this case, and applying the law
as fully explained in our court’s recent ruling in Labauve, 318 So.3d 983, we find
12
the trial court’s ruling to strike Defendants’ experts was not an abuse of its vast
discretion.
Lack of Proffer By Defendants Of Evaluations of Dr. Shamieh and Ms. Haupt
At the hearing on the motion for new trial, counsel for Plaintiff, Ms. Jeffries,
argued that since Defendants had failed to properly proffer the testimony of Dr.
Shamieh and Ms. Haupt, Defendants could not show prejudice by the exclusion of
the experts’ testimony. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 1636 provides
the basis of and procedure for a “proffer” of excluded evidence, and provides, in
pertinent part:
A. When the court rules against the admissibility of any
evidence, it shall either permit the party offering such evidence to
make a complete record thereof, or permit the party to make a
statement setting forth the nature of the evidence.
....
C. In all cases, the court shall state the reason for its ruling as
to the inadmissibility of the evidence. This ruling shall be reviewable
on appeal without the necessity of further formality.
(Emphasis added.)
Defendants have specifically appealed the trial court’s ruling on the motion to
strike excluding their expert witnesses both at the pre-trial hearing, which occurred
on the morning of trial, and at the hearing on their motion for new trial. The
transcripts of both hearings have clearly delineated the issues involved leading to the
trial court’s order granting Plaintiff’s motion to strike and denying Defendants’
motion for new trial. In Williams v. Lafayette City-Par. Consol. Gov’t, 11-281, p. 5
(La.App. 3 Cir. 10/5/11), 72 So.3d 1023, 1028, writ denied, 11-2473 (La. 2/3/12),
79 So.3d 1027, a panel of this court stated, “[t]he failure to proffer excluded
testimony or evidence may be excused if there is sufficient other evidence in the
13
record to make the content of the excluded testimony abundantly clear from the
face of the record.” (Emphasis added.) Here we find there is no “sufficient other
evidence … to make the content of the excluded testimony abundantly clear[.]” Id.
at 1028.
In fact, in this case there has been no proffer whatsoever of the testimony of
Dr. Shamieh or Ms. Haupt in the record. Instead, the record reflects that at the
hearing on Defendants’ motion for new trial held on January 3, 2020, some three
months after the trial, Dr. Shamieh’s testimony still had not been properly proffered.
Dr. Shamieh had been listed as a defense witness pursuant to the Pre-Trial Order on
July 3, 2019. The trial was set for October 7, 2019. There is no testimony or
evidence in the record as to whether Dr. Shamieh actually issued a report. Dr.
Shamieh could have been subpoenaed as a defense witness at trial or at the pre-trial
hearing on the motion to strike, yet there is no evidence of a subpoena served on him
in the record. Moreover, there is no evidence of any attempt by Defendants to depose
Dr. Shamieh for trial purposes, obtain a sworn affidavit from him, or present a
certified copy of his medical records to properly put forth a proffer that would “make
the content of the excluded testimony ‘abundantly clear’ from the face of the
record.” Williams, 72 So.3d at 1028 (emphasis added). See also Gulf Outlet Marina,
Inc. v. Spain, 02-1589 (La.App. 4 Cir. 6/25/03), 854 So.2d 386, writ denied, 03-2075
(La. 11/7/03), 857 So.2d 497.
Further, Defendants did not obtain a report, take Dr. Shamieh’s deposition, or
obtain an affidavit after the trial for purposes of a proffer at the hearing on the motion
for new trial held on January 3, 2020, some three (3) months after the trial.
Likewise, he was not subpoenaed by Defendants to testify as to his findings and
opinion at the hearing on the motion for new trial. See Williams, 72 So.3d 1023.
14
A panel of this court in Romero v. LaGrange, 19-689 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/4/20),
297 So.3d 127, writ denied, 20-1435 (La. 2/9/21), 310 So.3d 178, summed up the
responsibility of a party who seeks to preserve evidence on appeal by making a
proffer to the trial court. Keeping in mind the vast discretion accorded to the trial
court and the applicable abuse of discretion standard, the panel stated:
In order for this Court to review evidence deemed inadmissible
by the trial court, the party must comply with La. C.C.P. art. 1636 to
preserve the evidence. Tatum v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 10-1053
(La.App. 5 Cir. 11/15/11), 79 So.3d 1094, 1104. It is well-settled that
error may not be predicated upon a ruling that excludes evidence, unless
a substantial right of a party is affected and the substance of the
evidence was made known to the court by counsel. Id. at 1105. In those
instances, it is incumbent upon the party who contends the evidence
was improperly excluded to make a proffer; and if the party fails to do
so, then that party cannot contend such exclusion was erroneous. Id.
Without a proffer, an appellate court cannot ascertain the nature of the
excluded evidence. Abadie v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 00-344 (La.App. 5
Cir. 3/28/01), 784 So.2d 46, 86, writ denied, 01-1735 (La. 12/14/01),
804 So.2d 644, citing McLean v. Hunter, 495 So.2d 1298, 1305
(La.1986).
Id. at 134 (quoting McMillion v. E. Jefferson Gen. Hosp., 15-578 (La.App. 5 Cir.
5/26/16), 193 So.3d 448, writ denied, 16-1192 (La. 10/10/16), 207 So.3d 405).
In Lavespere v. Lavespere, 07-2171, pp. 8-9 (La.App. 1 Cir. 5/2/08), 991
So.2d 81, 86, the appellate court found that “Mr. Lavespere made no effort to proffer
the evidence he claims was excluded by the trial [court], no motion for new trial was
filed, and there is no indication either in the record or brief submitted to this court
on appeal as to the nature or substance of his evidence.” The panel further explained
that absent a proper proffer, a “party cannot complain that the exclusion of the
testimony was error.” Id.
Likewise, in the case of Yokum v. Funky 544 Rhythm & Blues Café, 16-1142
(La.App. 4 Cir. 5/23/18), 248 So.3d 723, the trial court gave the plaintiff the
opportunity to proffer the excluded testimony. Instead, the plaintiff’s counsel simply
15
made a general statement to the trial court that the excluded witness “‘would have
said that Funky 544 was a nuisance and confirmed what Mr. Yokum and Ms.
Anderson say and contradicted what the defense witnesses say[.’]” Id. at 744
(emphasis added). The fourth circuit found the statement made by defense counsel
did not fulfill the requirements of La.Code Civ.P. art. 1636, as it failed to set forth
the “nature of the evidence[,]” once again citing Williams, 72 So.3d at 1028. Id.
At oral argument in this appeal, counsel for Graham and Mr. Thompson urged
the application of the recent fourth circuit case of Torregano v. Cohen, 21-0005
(La.App. 4 Cir. 5/19/21), 319 So.3d 401, writ denied, 21-865 (La. 10/12/21), _ So.3d
_ (2021 WL 4739383). In Torregano, the trial court granted the motion to strike
filed by Mr. Torregano, excluding the testimony of the defendant’s two non-party
witnesses for their failure to either attend or answer questions at properly scheduled
depositions set by counsel for Mr. Torregano. Id. The appellate court found the trial
court had committed legal error by striking the testimony of the two non-party
witnesses. The panel explained, however, that Defendant Cohen was not to blame
for and had no control over the actions of the two non-parties, and that, by granting
the motion to strike, “the trial court deprived Mr. Cohen of the substantial right to
defend himself against the Torreganos’ claims.” Torregano, 319 So.3d at 404.
Here, there was no attempt by Defendants to proffer any documents or
evidence whatsoever outlining the testimony of either Dr. Shamieh or Ms. Haupt.4
4
New counsel for Graham and Mr. Thompson claims that Ms. Haupt’s report was
“attached” to Defendant’s “Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for New Trial.” However,
the “report” was not proffered as evidence at the new trial hearing. See Denoux v. Vessel Mgmt.
Servs., Inc., 07-2143, p. 6 (La. 5/21/08), 983 So.2d 84, 88 (wherein the supreme court explained
that “[e]vidence not properly and officially offered and introduced cannot be considered, even if
it is physically placed in the record. Documents attached to memoranda do not constitute evidence
and cannot be considered as such on appeal.”). See also Burley v. New York Life Ins. Co., 15-263
(La.App. 3 Cir. 11/25/15), 179 So.3d 922. And, as noted by the trial judge, the “report” was subject
to revision based on receipt of Dr. Shamieh’s findings.
16
Defendants relied on only their attorney’s general statements to support their
“proffer” of the anticipated testimony of Dr. Shamieh and Ms. Haupt. As stated in
Williams, 72 So.3d at 1028:
On at least two occasions, our courts have found that an
attorney’s statement as to what a witness would say does not meet the
requirements of La.Code Civ.P. art. 1636, insofar as it calls for “a
statement setting forth the nature of the evidence.” See Holt v. Bethany
Land Co., 36,888 (La.App. 2 Cir. 4/9/03), 843 So.2d 606; McHale v.
Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super Mkts., Inc., 97-788 (La.App. 5 Cir.
11/23/98), 722 So.2d 328.
Given the clarity of the record and the failure by Defendants to subpoena Dr.
Shamieh and Ms. Haupt, or to properly proffer Dr. Shamieh’s and Ms. Haupt’s
testimony before or during trial, as well as their failure to offer that testimony
through deposition, affidavit, or live testimony at the post-trial hearing on the motion
for new trial, we hereby affirm the trial court’s rulings striking the testimony of Dr.
Shamieh and Ms. Haupt and denying the motion for new trial.
Defendants Graham and Mr. Thompson - Assignment of Error Two
Defendants Graham and Mr. Thompson, now represented by separate counsel
from Prime, assert that the trial court’s damages award was excessive and a clear
abuse of the jury’s discretion.
In the case of Etienne v. C. Thompson Automotive, Inc., 18-725, p. 3 (La.App.
3 Cir. 3/13/19), 269 So.3d 1088, 1091 (quoting Bouquet v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
08-0309, pp. 4-5 (La. 4/4/08), 979 So.2d 456, 458-59), a panel of this circuit
addressed appellate review of general damages awarded under the provisions of
La.Civ.Code art. 2324.1,5 as follows:
General damages are those which are inherently speculative in nature
and cannot be fixed with mathematical certainty. Duncan v. Kansas
5
Louisiana Civil Code Article 2324.1 provides, “In assessment of damages in cases of
offences, quasi offences, and quasi contracts, much discretion must be left to the judge or jury.”
17
City So. Ry. Co. 00-0066, p. 13 (La.10/30/00), 773 So.2d 670, 682;
Boswell v. Roy O. Martin Lumber Co., 363 So.2d 506, 507 (La.1978);
Anderson v. Welding Testing Lab., Inc., 304 So.2d 351, 352 (La.1974).
The standard of review applicable to a general damages award is the
abuse of discretion standard. Anderson, 304 So.2d at 353; Coco v.
Winston Indus., Inc., 341 So.2d 332, 335 (La.1976). The trier of fact is
afforded much discretion in assessing the facts and rendering an award
because it is in the best position to evaluate witness credibility and see
the evidence firsthand. Duncan, 00-0066, p. 13, 773 So.2d at 682 (“Vast
discretion is accorded the trier of fact in fixing general damage
awards.”); Anderson v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 583 So.2d 829,
834 (La.1991). An appellate court may disturb a damages award only
after an articulated analysis of the facts reveals an abuse of discretion.
Theriot v. Allstate Ins. Co., 625 So.2d 1337, 1340 (La.1993); Youn v.
Maritime Overseas Corp., 623 So.2d 1257, 1261 (La.1993), cert.
denied, 510 U.S. 1114, 114 S.Ct. 1059, 127 L.Ed.2d 379 (1994). The
role of an appellate court in reviewing a general damages award is not
to decide what it considers to be an appropriate award but rather to
review the exercise of discretion by the trier of fact. Duncan, 00-0066,
p. 13, 773 So.2d at 682-83; Youn, 623 So.2d at 1260. To determine
whether the fact finder has abused its discretion, the reviewing court
looks first to the facts and circumstances of the particular case. Theriot,
625 So.2d at 1340; Youn, 623 So.2d at 1261.
The jury in this case returned a verdict for all damages on a special verdict
form as follows:
2. What sum of money, if any, would compensate Plaintiff,
Theresa Jeffries, for the following?
Do NOT make any actual monetary reduction in the figure you
reach, if any. The Court will make the appropriate reductions
after your return your verdict.
a. Past medical expenses $112,272.00
b. Future medical expenses $658,407.00
c. Past lost wages $78,000.00
d. Future lost wages $113,788.00
e. Past physical pain & suffering $150,000.00
f. Future physical pain & suffering $622,003.00
g. Past mental anguish $60,413.00
h. Future mental anguish $229,640.00
i. Past loss of enjoyment of life $75,000.00
j. Future loss of enjoyment of life $388,752.00
k. Property damage $20,578.00
Total $2,508,853.00
18
Defendants argue that the award was extremely high and an abuse of
discretion. We agree in part that the award is high.6
Having found that Defendants failed to properly proffer the excluded
testimony of their experts, Dr. Shamieh and Ms. Haupt, the record before us is silent
as to what their testimony would have been at trial and we can only speculate as to
what effect, if any, that testimony would have had on the jury’s verdict. Again,
Defendants are unable to show prejudice. Therefore, there is nothing in the record
to contradict the testimony of Plaintiff and the expert witnesses and evidence
Plaintiff offered as to her damages. Though the general damages arguably may be
high for injuries of this type, Defendants are unable to show that the jury’s award
was an abuse of its much discretion. See Wainwright v. Fontenot, 00-0492 (La.
10/17/00), 774 So.2d 70. We are therefore constrained to affirm that award.
6
Arguably the “high” general damages award may be attributable to the itemized general
damage categories on the jury verdict form. In Stutes v. Greenwood Motor Lines, Inc., 17-52
(La.App. 3 Cir. 11/22/17), 234 So.3d 75, 88-89, the concurrence in that case stated:
I am of the view that the itemization of general damage categories on the
verdict form added substantially to the likelihood that the jury would award
separate general damages for, essentially, the same injury, and, in my view,
contributed to the high verdict. However, since there was no objection to the jury
verdict form, a finding of manifest error cannot be supported on that basis. Royer
v. State Dep’t of Transp. & Dev., 16-534 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1/11/17), 210 So.3d 910,
923, writ denied, 17-288 (La. 4/24/17), 221 So.3d 69; Kennedy v. Davis, 17-218
(La. App. 3 Cir 10/4/17), 229 So.3d 558.
19
Prime’s Assignments Of Error Two And Three – Prime’s Insurance Policy
Limitations
Waiver of Coverage Defenses
In this case, Prime’s counsel answered the original lawsuit on behalf of its
insured, Graham and, by separate pleading, also answered on behalf of Graham’s
driver, Mr. Thompson. By the answers, Prime pled the limitations, terms, and
conditions of the policy “as if copied in extenso.” That policy was introduced into
evidence.
However, Defendants’ counsel had continued to represent all three defendants
until days before the trial was to begin. No reservation of rights letter was proven
to have been received by either Graham or its driver, Mr. Thompson. In light of that
purported omission, Plaintiff alleged that, under the applicable law, Prime waived
any policy defenses or coverage issues.
Prime filed a Motion to Continue on September 16, 2019, which was heard
on September 29, 2019. Prime sought to introduce into evidence an unsigned letter
dated May 3, 2017 addressed to Graham, allegedly reserving its rights to plead a
coverage defense. Prime alleged that since Mr. Thompson was an “unscheduled
driver,” its policy either did not provide coverage or alternatively provided only a
single limit of $300,000 for all claims, including those of other plaintiffs. That limit
would be further “depleted” by all defense costs and attorney fees as the policy
provides, in pertinent part:
COMMERCIAL BUSINESS AUTO INSURANCE POLICY
....
Claim Expenses reduce the available Limits of Liability stated on the
Declarations . . . .
SECTION IV – LIMITS OF LIABILITY
....
20
B. Each Accident Limit of Liability listed on the Declarations or
any Endorsement is the most we will pay for any combination
of Damages and/or Claim Expenses because of all Bodily
Injury and Property Damage arising out of any one Accident.
Claim Expenses reduce the available Limits of Liability.
SECTION VIII – DEFINITIONS
....
I. “Claim Expenses” mean:
1. All fees, costs, and expenses charged by any lawyer or
other service provider designated by the Insurer to
represent the Insured; and
2. All other fees, costs, and expenses, including the Insurer’s
own internal fees, costs, and expenses, or those of an
affiliate, resulting from the investigation, adjustment,
defense, and appeal of a Claim, as authorized by the
Company.
The determination of the Insurer as to the reasonableness of
Claim Expenses shall be conclusive on the Insured. All Claim
Expenses reduce the available Limits of Liability.
(Emphasis added.)
Ms. Jeffries’ counsel argued that jurisprudence on this issue requires that such
a “reservation of rights” must be promptly made before insurance counsel enters
representation of the insureds or all coverage defenses are waived. The supreme
court addressed an insurer’s waiver of coverage defenses in Steptore v. Masco
Constr. Co., Inc., 93-2064 (La. 8/18/94), 643 So.2d 1213. The insurer in Steptore,
Ocean Marine, initially assumed the defense of Masco, its insured. Six months into
the representation, however, Ocean Marine denied coverage based upon a purported
violation of a navigation warranty contained within the policy. Defense counsel
withdrew from its representation of Masco but remained in the litigation as counsel
for Ocean Marine.
21
On review, the supreme court determined that Ocean Marine’s right to assert
a coverage defense was waived by its assumption and continuation of its defense of
Ocean Marine despite facts that would otherwise indicate a right to deny coverage.
Steptore, 643 So.2d 1213. The supreme court explained that:
Waiver is generally understood to be the intentional
relinquishment of a known right, power, or privilege. Waiver occurs
when there is an existing right, a knowledge of its existence and an
actual intention to relinquish it or conduct so inconsistent with the intent
to enforce the right as to induce a reasonable belief that it has been
relinquished. A waiver may apply to any provision of an insurance
contract, even though this may have the effect of bringing within
coverage risks originally excluded or not covered.
It is well established that an insurer is charged with knowledge
of the contents of its own policy. In addition, notice of facts which
would cause a reasonable person to inquire further imposes a duty of
investigation upon the insurer, and failure to investigate constitutes a
waiver of all powers or privileges which a reasonable search would
have uncovered.
Waiver principles are applied stringently to uphold the
prohibition against conflicts of interest between the insurer and the
insured which could potentially affect legal representation in order to
reinforce the role of the lawyer as the loyal advocate of the client’s
interest. Accordingly, when an insurer, with knowledge of facts
indicating noncoverage under the insurance policy, assumes or
continues the insured’s defense without obtaining a nonwaiver
agreement to reserve its coverage defense, the insurer waives such
policy defense.
Id. at 1216 (citations omitted).
In Rivers v. Daigle, 16-805 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/1/17), 210 So.3d 815, a panel of
this court cited Steptore in finding that Allstate, the insurer in the case before it, had
similarly waived its claim of coverage in a case involving its insureds, the
Allemands. The panel noted that Allstate had hired an attorney to represent its
insured, Mrs. Allemand, the mother of the alleged minor tortfeasor in that case.
Counsel hired by Allstate, in turn, answered on behalf of itself, Mrs. Allemand, and
22
the minor. Although Allstate notified Mrs. Allemand of its representation of her, it
specifically “did not seek a non-waiver agreement or assert any coverage defenses.”
Id. at 819. The following month, however, Allstate discovered a potential coverage
defense and notified Mrs. Allemand of such by sending reservation of rights letters
to Mrs. Allemand and her minor daughter. It thereafter “split the defense between it
and the Allemands” and hired separate counsel for each. Id.
Despite Allstate’s decision to split its defense prior to trial, the plaintiffs in
Rivers argued that the insurer had waived its coverage defense. The panel agreed,
finding that “Allstate had all the information it needed to determine a coverage
defense existed upon being served with and reviewing the Rivers’ petitions. At the
least, Allstate had ‘knowledge of facts indicating noncoverage under its policy.’”
Rivers, 210 So.3d at 819-20 (quoting, in part, Steptore, 643 So.2d at 1216). In light
of the available facts, Allstate’s attorney or adjuster could have inquired into the
potential defense to clarify that information “before filing an answer[.]” Id. at 820.
Accordingly, when Allstate proceeded to file an answer and defend both Mrs.
Allemand and the minor, Allstate waived its coverage defense.
Just days before trial in this case, Prime filed a motion to continue and cited
its “conflict.” As in Steptore and Rivers, however, the attorney hired by Prime,
answered for and defended all three Defendants until just days before the trial. The
trial judge in this case granted the motion to continue the consolidated Day case for
other reasons and severed that case from that of Ms. Jeffries. It denied the motion
to continue this case. Plaintiff then filed a motion to strike Defendants’ experts,
which was heard on the morning of trial, October 7, 2019.
At that hearing, Defendants’ counsel for all three Defendants again argued
that he had a conflict in his representation of all three Defendants due to alleged
23
insurance policy limitations and exclusions. Prime sought to exclude coverage to
Graham and Mr. Thompson because it alleged that Mr. Thompson was an
“unscheduled driver” not covered by the policy. Counsel for Ms. Jeffries argued
that it was too late to urge such a conflict, and that under existing case law, Prime
had waived all policy defenses by its actions defending Prime and its insured
Graham as well as its insured driver, Mr. Thompson. The trial court issued a ruling
finding, “no conflict. If there was a conflict I find that it’s been waived by the
insurance company. Okay. . . . . And I will make a decision once the jury decides as
to what the amount is.”
At the trial on the merits, the jury rendered a verdict in favor of Plaintiff
Jeffries and against Prime, Graham, and Mr. Thompson in the total amount of
$2,508,853.00. Plaintiff submitted a proposed judgment to the trial court, to which
no objection was filed by Defendants’ counsel even though the judgment far
exceeded Prime’s policy limits of one million ($1,000,000.00) dollars per
occurrence. Defendants likewise never requested that the trial court set a hearing on
the amount of coverage, in spite of her stated intention to do so.
Reliance on an exclusion or limitations on coverage are affirmative defenses
which are waived if not specifically plead. See La.Code Civ.P. art. 1005. See also
Davis v. Nola Home Constr., L.L.C., 16-1274 (La.App. 4 Cir. 6/14/17), 222 So.3d
833; Royal Cloud Nine, L.L.C. v. Lafayette Ins. Co., 08-34 (La.App. 4 Cir. 6/11/08),
987 So.2d 355, writs denied, 08-1551, 08-1568 (La. 10/10/08), 993 So.2d 1286,
1287; Dixie Sav. & Loan Assoc. v. Pitre, 99-154 (La.App. 5 Cir. 7/27/99), 751 So.2d
911, writ denied, 99-2867 (La. 12/10/99), 751 So.2d 855; Pendleton v. Smith, 95-
1805 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/8/96), 674 So.2d 434, writ denied, 96-1425 (La. 9/13/96),
679 So.2d 107; Nippert v. Baton Rouge Railcar Servs., 526 So.2d 824 (La.App. 1
24
Cir.), writs denied, 530 So.2d 84, 87, 91 (La.1988); and Tudury v. Coop. Cab Co.,
Inc., 265 So.2d 307 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1972).
As a panel of our court noted in Rivers, 210 So.3d at 817, “an insurer’s failure
to obtain a reservation of rights to contest coverage before assuming the defense of
a claim can result in the waiver of the right to contest coverage if the insurer assumes
the defense having knowledge of facts indicating a coverage defense may exist.”
Such a “[w]aiver may apply to any provision of an insurance contract under which
the insurer knowingly and voluntarily elects to relinquish his right, power or
privilege to avoid liability, even though the effect may bring within coverage risks
originally excluded or not covered.” Arceneaux v. Amstar Corp., 10-2329, p. 18
(La. 7/1/11), 66 So.3d 438, 451 (quoting Tate v. Charles Aguillard Ins. & Real
Estate, Inc., 508 So.2d 1371, 1375).
For whatever reason in this case, Prime hired a single attorney for all three
defendants. No waiver of rights letter was proven to have been received by the
insured Graham or sent to or received by Mr. Thompson. Absent any such waiver,
the insureds were led to believe the insurer had relinquished its coverage defenses
as the insurer continued to defend the insureds while having knowledge of facts
indicating noncoverage. See, e.g., Arceneaux, 66 So.3d 438. Based on the
uncontradicted facts in this case, we find Prime’s coverage defenses have been
waived. See Steptore, 643 So.2d 1213; Rivers, 210 So.3d 815.
25
Waiver of Policy Limits under the “Good Faith and Fair Dealing Statute”
Prime urges that the trial court committed legal error when it signed a
judgment against Prime holding Prime jointly and severally liable for the entirety of
the judgment in excess of $2,508,853.00, which is in excess of its determined policy
limits of one million ($1,000,000.00) dollars for all claims, less defense costs. Prime
argues that its exposure cannot be greater than its policy limits.
Mr. Jeffries argues that Prime’s coverage limits only apply when the insurer
is found to have dealt in good faith with its insured. See La.R.S. 22:1973. See also
Herron v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 19-236 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/30/19), 288
So.3d 859, writ denied, 20-0191 (La. 4/27/20), 295 So.3d 948. On this point, the
fifth circuit explained in Larios v. Martinez, 17-514, p. 9 (La.App. 5 Cir. 2/21/18),
239 So.3d 1041, 1047, that “Louisiana jurisprudence recognizes that a liability
insurer may be liable for a judgment against its insured in excess of the policy limits,
when the insurer failed to deal in good faith with a claim against its insured.”
The question still to be decided is whether the one million ($1,000,000.00)
dollar policy limits on Prime’s policy issued to Graham should apply, or whether the
“waiver of coverage defenses” also applies to a waiver of policy limits. Prime
alternatively contends that the policy is in evidence and its “depleting” one million
($1,000,000.00) dollar limit applies. The “coverage defense” it waived was whether
and to what extent Mr. Thompson’s actions as an “unscheduled driver” “were
covered by Graham’s policy.”
In this case, the trial court charged the jury on damages with no reservation of
rights placed on the record by Defendants’ counsel, then representing all three
Defendants. The jury returned a verdict and, again, defense counsel made no
objection as to Prime’s limits. Neither did Defendants’ counsel make any argument
26
that Prime could only be responsible for a total of one million ($1,000,000.00)
dollars, less claims and defense costs. In fact, Defendants’ attorney actually
approved the final judgment without any objection.
After the trial, Prime hired separate counsel, who filed a motion for new trial,
citing error in the trial judge’s pre-trial striking of Defendants’ experts. Prime’s
counsel also argued that Prime’s policy limits of one million ($1,000,000.00) dollars
less defense costs must still be enforced. Indeed, in its pre-trial ruling discussed
infra, the trial judge stated: “And I will make a decision once the jury decides as to
what the amount is.”
The record shows that prior to the hearing on Prime’s motion for new trial,
Graham and Mr. Thompson, represented by separate counsel, filed a cross-claim
against Prime seeking to hold Prime responsible for all damages it may owe. There
is nothing in the record before this court showing whether that cross-claim was ever
presented for hearing in this case, or whether a trial court decision on that cross-
claim was ever entered.
In fact, there was no mention of the cross-claim at the hearing on the motion
for new trial except for an acknowledgement that Attorney Thomas Filo made an
appearance and advised the court that he had filed such a claim. The original trial
counsel for Graham and Mr. Thompson was still representing those defendants at
the hearing of the new trial motion.
Reference to the actual pleading in the record indicates that Prime’s insured,
Graham Trucking Company, Inc. filed its cross-claim alleging that Prime had acted
in bad faith in defending Plaintiff’s suit against Graham without a reservation of
rights to argue a coverage defense. Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:1973 (emphasis
added) provides, in pertinent part:
27
A. An insurer, including but not limited to a foreign line and
surplus line insurer, owes to his insured a duty of good faith and fair
dealing. The insurer has an affirmative duty to adjust claims fairly and
promptly and to make a reasonable effort to settle claims with the
insured or the claimant, or both. Any insurer who breaches these duties
shall be liable for any damages sustained as a result of the breach.
....
C. In addition to any general or special damages to which a
claimant is entitled for breach of the imposed duty, the claimant may
be awarded penalties assessed against the insurer in an amount not to
exceed two times the damages sustained or five thousand dollars,
whichever is greater. Such penalties, if awarded, shall not be used by
the insurer in computing either past or prospective loss experience for
the purpose of setting rates or making rate filings.
However, there is nothing in the record to show that the cross-claim has been
adjudicated and that issue is not before us on appeal. Hence, we find that issue has
not been properly presented for our decision, and we must remand that issue to the
trial court for a separate hearing and eventual decision.
Determination of Limits of Liability Under Terms of Policy
Similarly, by its third assignment of error, Prime asks that this court decide
the amount of coverage actually owed to Plaintiff for damages for the accident at
issue based on the terms of its policy issued to Graham. The trial court judgments
cast Prime in solido with Graham and Mr. Thompson for $2,508,853.00, the total
amount of damages awarded by the jury. Prime claims that it’s stated policy limits
are one million ($1,000,000.00) dollars per accident for all claims caused by the fault
of Graham and its driver, Mr. Thompson, less its defense costs. Plaintiff claims that
since Prime did not issue a valid waiver of rights letter to Graham and Mr. Thompson,
all policy defenses, including the amount of available insurance, is waived.
Again, the trial court did not rule on this issue. Graham and Mr. Thompson’s
cross-claim against Prime was not filed until after the trial had been concluded and
28
there is no judgment by the trial court in the record as to the amount of coverage, or
the “bad faith” issues raised by Graham, post-trial, in its cross-claim against Prime.
Those issues are not properly before this court on appeal, and we remand the issue
of the amount of insurance coverage and whether Prime waived its coverage
defenses as to any damages in excess of its admitted one million ($1,000,000.00)
dollar coverage less claims expenses. We amend the judgment against Prime to one
million ($1,000,000.00) dollars in solido with Graham and Mr. Thompson, less
defense costs to be determined by the trial court on remand. We further remand the
claims of Graham and Mr. Thompson that Prime violated the “Good Faith and Fair
Dealing Statute,” La.R.S. 22:1973, and should be liable for additional damages and
attorney fees pursuant to that statute, to the trial court for adjudication and decision.
CONCLUSION
We hereby affirm the judgment of the trial court in its entirety as to
Defendants Terry Graham Trucking, Inc. and Elvis Thompson.
We amend the judgment of the trial court and enter judgment in favor of
Plaintiff Teresa Jeffries against Prime Insurance Company for one million
($1,000,000.00) dollar coverage limits, reserving to Terry Graham Trucking, Inc.
and Elvis Thompson all rights to pursue the cross-claim against Prime, and reserving
all rights to Plaintiff Jeffries to present her claim to the trial court that Prime has also
waived its right to plead limitations on its policy limits of one million ($1,000,000.00)
dollars less defense costs.
All costs of this appeal are assessed to Prime Insurance Company.
AFFIRMED IN PART; AMENDED IN PART AND RENDERED.
REMANDED.
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