United States v. Wilmar Mosquera

USCA11 Case: 23-13312 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 03/27/2026 Page: 1 of 11

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-13312

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

ANGEL LUVI-RAMIREZ,

a.k.a. Angel Luvi,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 1:23-cr-20185-CMA-2

____________________

____________________

No. 23-13313

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

USCA11 Case: 23-13312 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 03/27/2026 Page: 2 of 11

2 Opinion of the Court 23-13312

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

WILMAR MOSQUERA,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 1:23-cr-20185-CMA-4

____________________

____________________

No. 23-13336

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JOSE HERNANDEZ,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 1:23-cr-20185-CMA-1

____________________

Before JILL PRYOR, ABUDU, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

USCA11 Case: 23-13312 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 03/27/2026 Page: 3 of 11

23-13312 Opinion of the Court 3

Appellants Angel Luvi-Ramirez, Jose Hernandez, and Wil-

mar Mosquera pleaded guilty to conspiring to possess with intent

to distribute cocaine on a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the

United States. On appeal, they challenge their convictions. The

government has moved for summary affirmance. We grant the

government’s motion.

I.

In April 2023, a go-fast vessel bearing no indicia of national-

ity was spotted in the Caribbean Sea about 125 nautical miles off

the coast of the Dominican Republic. There were four people

aboard the go-fast vessel, which was loaded with fuel drums and

visible packages. The United States Coast Guard, suspecting that

the go-fast vessel was involved in drug smuggling, launched a heli-

copter as well as a boat to track it. When the individuals aboard the

go-fast vessel spotted the Coast Guard, they began to throw pack-

ages overboard. The Coast Guard helicopter fired warning shots.

After seeing that the warning shots were ineffective, the Coast

Guard helicopter fired shots to disable the vessel.

When members of the Coast Guard team reached the disa-

bled vessel, they found Hernandez, Luvi-Ramirez, and Mosquera

aboard. 1 Hernandez identified himself as the vessel’s master and

1 The fourth person aboard the go-fast vessel was Endris Hernandez. Endris

pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine on a

vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and received a sentence

of 66 months’ imprisonment. Endris has not appealed his conviction or sen-

tence.

USCA11 Case: 23-13312 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 03/27/2026 Page: 4 of 11

4 Opinion of the Court 23-13312

refused to make a claim of nationality for it. Based on his answers,

the Coast Guard treated the go-fast vessel as a vessel without na-

tionality. The Coast Guard team recovered some of the bales of

cocaine that had been tossed overboard.

A grand jury in the Southern District of Florida returned an

indictment charging Hernandez, Luvi-Ramirez, and Mosquera

with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms

or more of cocaine while on board a vessel subject to the jurisdic-

tion of the United States (Count One) and possession with intent

to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine while on board a

vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States (Count Two).

The defendants moved to dismiss the indictment. They argued that

the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (“MDLEA”), 46 U.S.C.

§§ 70501–08, was unconstitutional as applied to them. They as-

serted that the United States lacked the authority to punish them

because their conduct occurred in the Dominican Republic’s exclu-

sive economic zone and had no nexus to the United States. The

district court denied the motion.

After the court denied the joint motion to dismiss, the de-

fendants pleaded guilty to Count One in exchange for the govern-

ment’s dismissal of Count Two. As part of the plea agreement,

each defendant admitted that when the Coast Guard team boarded

the go-fast vessel, Hernandez identified himself as its master and

refused to make a claim of nationality for it. Each defendant also

References to “Hernandez” in this opinion refer to Jose Hernandez.

USCA11 Case: 23-13312 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 03/27/2026 Page: 5 of 11

23-13312 Opinion of the Court 5

stipulated that because of this response, the United States treated

the go-fast vessel as a vessel without nationality that was subject to

the jurisdiction of the United States. And each defendant agreed

that he was responsible for 250 kilograms of cocaine. The district

court ultimately sentenced Luvi-Ramirez to 48 months’ imprison-

ment, Hernandez to 76 months’ imprisonment, and Mosquera to

58 months’ imprisonment.

Luvi-Ramirez, Hernandez, and Mosquera appeal.

II.

Summary disposition is appropriate either where time is of

the essence, such as “situations where important public policy is-

sues are involved or those where rights delayed are rights denied,”

or where “the position of one of the parties is clearly right as a mat-

ter of law so that there can be no substantial question as to the out-

come of the case, or where . . . the appeal is frivolous.” Groendyke

Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969). 2

We review de novo a district court’s determination on its sub-

ject-matter jurisdiction. United States v. Canario-Vilomar, 128 F.4th

1374, 1378 (11th Cir. 2025). “Likewise, we review de novo the con-

stitutionality of a criminal statute.” Id. “Although a guilty plea gen-

erally waives a defendant’s right to appeal his conviction, it does

2 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), we

adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit issued

before October 1, 1981.

USCA11 Case: 23-13312 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 03/27/2026 Page: 6 of 11

6 Opinion of the Court 23-13312

not waive the right to challenge the constitutionality of the statute

underlying the conviction.” Id.

When a defendant raises a challenge for the first time on ap-

peal, we review for plain error. See United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th

815, 820 (11th Cir. 2024). To establish plain error, a defendant must

show: (1) an error, (2) that is “plain,” (3) that “affects substantial

rights,” and (4) that “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or pub-

lic reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Lejarde-Rada,

319 F.3d 1288, 1290 (11th Cir. 2003) (citation modified).

III.

The MDLEA makes it a crime to “knowingly or intention-

ally . . . possess with intent to . . . distribute, a controlled sub-

stance” on board “a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United

States” and to conspire to do the same. 46 U.S.C. §§ 70503(a)(1),

(e)(1); 70506(b). The MDLEA’s prohibitions apply even when the

criminal conduct is “committed outside the territorial jurisdiction

of the United States.” Id. § 70503(b).

As the MDLEA’s text shows, its prohibitions apply to vessels

“subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.” Id. § 70503(e)(1).

It defines a “vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States”

to include “a vessel without nationality.” Id. § 70502(c)(1)(A). And

it explains when a boat qualifies as a vessel without nationality. Id.

§ 70502(d). The MDLEA’s definition of “vessel without national-

ity” includes: (1) “a vessel aboard which the master or individual in

charge makes a claim of registry that is denied by the nation whose

USCA11 Case: 23-13312 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 03/27/2026 Page: 7 of 11

23-13312 Opinion of the Court 7

registry is claimed”; (2) “a vessel aboard which the master or indi-

vidual in charge fails, on request of an officer of the United

States . . . , to make a claim of nationality or registry for that ves-

sel”; (3) “a vessel aboard which the master or individual in charge

makes a claim of registry and for which the claimed nation of reg-

istry does not affirmatively and unequivocally assert that the vessel

is of its nationality”; and (4) “a vessel aboard which no individual,

on request of an officer of the United States . . . , claims to be the

master or is identified as the individual in charge, and that has no

other claim of nationality or registry” under the MDLEA. Id.

§ 70502(d)(1).

On appeal, Luvi-Ramirez, Hernandez, and Mosquera chal-

lenge their MDLEA convictions. We begin by addressing the con-

stitutional challenges raised by all three defendants. We then dis-

cuss two additional issues raised by Luvi-Ramirez.

The two constitutional challenges raised by all defendants

are based, in whole or in part, on the Felonies Clause of the Con-

stitution, which authorizes Congress to punish certain offenses

committed on the high seas. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (grant-

ing Congress the authority “[t]o define and punish Piracies and Fel-

onies committed on the high Seas”). In the first challenge, they ar-

gue that the Felonies Clause did not authorize their prosecutions

USCA11 Case: 23-13312 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 03/27/2026 Page: 8 of 11

8 Opinion of the Court 23-13312

because the waters where they were arrested are part of the exclu-

sive economic zone of the Dominican Republic. 3 Relying on cus-

tomary international law, they assert that when waters are part of

another nation’s exclusive economic zone, they are not part of the

high seas and thus the United States lacks jurisdiction to enforce

the MDLEA over a vessel located in those waters. In the second

challenge, they argue that their prosecutions violated due process

and exceeded Congress’s power under the Felonies Clause because

their offenses had no connection or nexus to the United States.

Both challenges are foreclosed by precedent. First, we have

held that other countries’ exclusive economic zones are “part of the

‘high seas’ for purposes of the Felonies Clause” and thus enforce-

ment of the MDLEA in an exclusive economic zone is proper. Al-

fonso, 104 F.4th at 823. In reaching this conclusion, we rejected the

argument that “Congress’s authority under the Felonies Clause to

define and punish felonies committed on the ‘high seas’ is limited

by customary international law.” Id. at 825.

Second, we have rejected challenges to the MDLEA’s appli-

cation to a vessel on the high seas on the basis that the vessel lacked

a sufficient nexus to the United States and thus the prosecution vi-

olated principles of due process or was not permitted under the

3 A nation’s exclusive economic zone sits beyond its territorial waters but

within 200 nautical miles of its coastal baseline. Alfonso, 104 F.4th at 821. We

have described the concept of an exclusive economic zone as of “relatively

modern vintage.” Canario-Vilomar, 128 F.4th at 1382; see also Alfonso, 104 F.4th

at 823 (explaining that at the time of the adoption of Article I of the Constitu-

tion, the concept of an exclusive economic zone “did not exist”).

USCA11 Case: 23-13312 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 03/27/2026 Page: 9 of 11

23-13312 Opinion of the Court 9

Felonies Clause. See United States v. Campbell, 743 F.3d 802, 809–12

(11th Cir. 2014). “[W]e have long upheld the authority of Congress

to extend the criminal jurisdiction of this country to any stateless

vessel in international waters engaged in the distribution of con-

trolled substances.” Id. at 810 (citation modified). We have recog-

nized that the prosecution of a noncitizen “captured on the high

seas while drug trafficking” does not offend due process because

the MDLEA “provides clear notice that all nations prohibit and

condemn drug trafficking aboard stateless vessels on the high seas.”

Id. at 812; see also Canario-Vilomar, 128 F.4th at 1382–83 (holding

that an identical nexus challenge was foreclosed by precedent).

Our precedent compels us to reject these two constitutional

challenges. We remain bound by our earlier decisions, which have

not been overturned or undermined to the point of abrogation by

the Supreme Court or this Court sitting en banc. See United States v.

Archer, 531 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2008). As to these two consti-

tutional challenges, we conclude summary affirmance is appropri-

ate because the government’s position is clearly correct as a matter

of law.

We now turn to the two additional issues Luvi-Ramirez

raised. First, he says that § 70502(d)(1)(C)—the MDLEA provision

that defines “vessel without nationality” to include a vessel for

which the master made a claim of nationality, but the claimed na-

tion did not affirmatively and unequivocally assert that the vessel

was of its nationality—is unconstitutional. He argues that the

power granted to Congress under the Felonies Clause “is limited

USCA11 Case: 23-13312 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 03/27/2026 Page: 10 of 11

10 Opinion of the Court 23-13312

to those felonies which the United States has the right to prosecute

under international law.” Luvi-Ramirez Appellant’s Br. 7. He then

asserts that § 70502(d)(1)(C) is unconstitutional because it allows

the United States to extend its criminal jurisdiction to vessels that

“are not stateless under international law.” Id. Second, he asserts

that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that the

go-fast vessel here qualified as a vessel without nationality under

§ 70502(d)(1)(C) because there was no evidence that the Domini-

can Republic “fail[ed] to unequivocally confirm a verbal claim of

nationality.” Id. at 9–10. Luvi-Ramirez raises these two issues for

the first time on appeal. He raises both issues in the summary of

argument section of his opening brief. But he cites no case law to

support his position on either issue and does not discuss either issue

in the argument section of his brief.

Assuming that Luvi-Ramirez adequately raised these issues

on appeal, we agree with the government that there is no substan-

tial question as to their outcome. Because he raises them for the

first time on appeal, we review for plain error. Here, Luvi-Ramirez

cannot show any error. Both of his challenges rest on the premise

that the United States relied on § 70502(d)(1)(C) to establish that

the go-fast vessel was a vessel without nationality and to exercise

jurisdiction over it. But the record roundly refutes his position. As

Luvi-Ramirez admitted in the factual proffer in his plea agreement,

Hernandez admitted to the Coast Guard that he was the master of

the vessel and then made no claim of nationality or registry for it.

Given these responses, the United States treated the go-fast vessel

as a vessel without nationality and exercised jurisdiction over it

USCA11 Case: 23-13312 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 03/27/2026 Page: 11 of 11

23-13312 Opinion of the Court 11

pursuant to § 70502(d)(1)(B), not § 70502(d)(1)(C). Luvi-Ramirez

makes no argument that § 70502(d)(1)(B) is unconstitutional be-

cause it is inconsistent with international law or that there was in-

sufficient evidence to establish that the go-fast vessel was without

nationality under this provision.

We GRANT the government’s motion for summary affir-

mance.