Opinion

Council

Court
District Court, N.D. Texas
Filed
Jan 14, 2026
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 39.7%

cleaned up; quoting Brown v. Miller, 519 F.3d 231, 236 (5th Cir. 2008)

How later courts described this case

  • cleaned up; quoting Brown v. Miller, 519 F.3d 231, 236 (5th Cir. 2008)

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

KENNETH COUNCIL, §

Plaintiff, §

§

v. § No. 3:24-CV-1370-D-BW

§

DRAFTKINGS, et al., §

Defendants. § Referred to U.S. Magistrate Judge1

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION

OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Before the Court is Plaintiff Kenneth Council’s Complaint, received on June

5, 2024, and as subsequently amended. (Dkt. No. 3; see also Dkt. Nos. 6-7.) Based

on the relevant filings and applicable law, the Court should DISMISS this action

with prejudice for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

I. BACKGROUND

Council filed this action against Draftkings and two John Doe defendants,

alleging a “civil rights claim” premised on the contention that “Draftkings geoplay

does not function properly and is publicly known to have issues which provide unfair

and unequal advantages to nonurban players, costing [ ] thousands of dollars to

urban players like Council.” (Dkt. No. 3 at 2 (capitalization altered).) Based on

Council’s complaint, the Court recommended that the action be dismissed for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction, to which recommendation Council filed a response that

1 By Special Order No. 3-251, this pro se case has been automatically referred to a

magistrate judge for judicial screening. By Special Order No. 3-354, it was transferred and

reassigned to the undersigned on August 23, 2024. (See Dkt. No. 21.)

he subsequently amended. (See Dkt. Nos. 5-7.) Liberally construing the responses as

an amendment to the complaint and noting that the amendment included allegations

to establish diversity subject matter jurisdiction, the undersigned withdrew the

original recommendation of dismissal. (See Dkt. No. 8.)

In his complaint, as amended, Council adds the CEO of Geocomply and the

CEO of Draftkings as defendants in the action and alleges claims pursuant to § 13(b)

of the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) Act for violation of § 5(a) of the FTC

Act. (See Dkt. No. 7 at 1.) In addition to repeating contentions from his original

complaint, Council states that Defendants’ “violations are in connection with

acquiring consumers’ imprecise geolocation data and selling the data in a format that

allows entities to track the consumers’ movements to and from sensitive locations

and provide imprecise and inaccurate geolocation information relied upon by third

parties to deprive Council of revenue and income.” (Id.; see also id. at 4-10.) He

seeks monetary damages and injunctive relief. (See id. at 11.)

II. PRELIMINARY SCREENING

Because Council has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, his

complaint is subject to preliminary screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Section

1915(e)(2) provides for sua sponte dismissal of a complaint, or any portion thereof, if

the Court finds it “is frivolous or malicious” or “fails to state a claim on which relief

may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (ii); see also Neitzke v. Williams, 490

U.S. 319, 325 (1989).

A complaint is frivolous when it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in

fact.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325. A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted when it fails to plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Mere

“labels and conclusions” and “formulaic recitation[s] of the elements of a cause of

action” are insufficient to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Id. at 555.

The same analysis for determining a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6) applies to determine whether a complaint fails to state a claim

under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). See Hale v. King, 642 F.3d 492, 497 (5th Cir. 2011).

III. ANALYSIS

As the Court has noted, “Council brings this action under Section 13(b) of the

[FTC Act], 15 U.S.C. § 53(b), which authorizes Council to seek, and the Court to

order, permanent injunctive relief and other relief for Defendant’s acts or practices in

violation of Section 5(a) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a).” (Dkt. No. 7 at 1.)

Section 5(a) of the FTC Act, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a), prohibits certain

“persons, partnerships, or corporations” from “using unfair methods of competition

in or affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting

commerce.” 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2). Under § 13(b) of the FTC Act, codified at 15

U.S.C. § 53(b), the FTC may file a federal action to enjoin any act or practice that

violates a provision of the FTC Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 53(b). The FTC Act “does not

provide for private causes of action,” and its provisions may be enforced only by the

FTC. Yumilicious Franchise, L.L.C. v. Barrie, 819 F.3d 170, 176 (5th Cir. 2016) (citing

Fulton v. Hecht, 580 F.2d 1243, 1248 n.2 (5th Cir. 1978)); see also Arruda v. Curves Int’l,

Inc., 861 F. App’x 831, 835 (5th Cir. 2021) (“Plaintiffs concede the [FTC Act]

provides no private right of action. Other circuits agree. . . . [And] Congress’s

omission of a private right of action in the [FTC Act] controls.” (internal citations

omitted)). Because the FTC Act under which Council brings this action does not

provide for private causes of action, Council fails to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted, and his claims do not survive judicial screening.

Further, to the extent Council continues to characterize this action as a “civil

rights claim,” the Court has previously explained in this case that “[a] plaintiff makes

out a [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 claim if he ‘shows a violation of the Constitution or of

federal law, and then shows that the violation was committed by someone acting

under color of state law.’” (Dkt. No. 5 at 6 (quoting Rich v. Palko, 920 F.3d 288, 293-

94 (5th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up; quoting Brown v. Miller, 519 F.3d 231, 236 (5th Cir.

2008))).) “The traditional definition of acting under color of state law requires that

the defendant in a § 1983 action have exercised power ‘possessed by virtue of state

law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of

state law.’” (Id. (quoting Gomez v. Galman, 18 F.4th 769, 775 (5th Cir. 2021)

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). A private individual or

corporation—such as each Defendant in this case—“‘can qualify as a state actor in a

few limited circumstances.’” Bridges v. Methodist Hosp., No. 24-20483, 2025 WL

1693074, at *3 (5th Cir. June 17, 2025) (unpublished) (quoting Pearson v. Shriners

Hosps. for Child., Inc., 133 F.4th 433, 443 (5th Cir. 2025), and identifying such limited

circumstances).

Here, Council fails to allege any facts to demonstrate that the private

individuals and corporations he sues may be treated as state actors for purposes of a

civil rights action under § 1983. See id. Because Council has failed to plead sufficient

facts to state a plausible claim to relief under § 1983, any such claim also does not

survive judicial screening.

Accordingly, the Court should dismiss Council’s case with prejudice under

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim.

IV. LEAVE TO AMEND

Notwithstanding a failure to plead sufficient facts, a pro se plaintiff ordinarily

should be granted leave to amend his complaint before dismissal. See Brewster v.

Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 767-68 (5th Cir. 2009). Leave to amend is not necessary,

however, when the plaintiff has already pled his best case. See Wiggins v. La. State

Univ.—Health Care Servs. Div., 710 F. App’x 625, 627 (5th Cir. 2017).

Here, Council has already had the opportunity to allege his best case by

amending his complaint. (See Dkt. Nos. 6-7.) Additionally, even having been

notified by the Court about the deficiencies relating to the bases on which he brought

this action and despite ample time to move for leave to amend again, Council has

failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. He therefore has had

sufficient opportunity to plead his best case and further leave to amend is not

warranted.

V. RECOMMENDATION

The Court should DISMISS this action with prejudice for failure to state a

claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

SO RECOMMENDED on January 14, 2026.

a McKAY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT

A copy of this report and recommendation will be served on all parties in the

manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and

recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being

served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). To be specific,

an objection must identify the finding or recommendation to which objection is

made, state the basis for the objection, and indicate the place in the magistrate

judge’s report and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An

objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the

magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections will bar the

aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the

magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon

grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Services Automobile Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415,

1417 (5th Cir. 1996), modified by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)

(extending the time to file objections to 14 days).

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.