Gauthier

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

HARRISON DIVISION

JOHN PHILIP GAUTHIER PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 3:25-cv-03025-CDC

CHIEF DEPUTY TIM ROBERSON, Boone

County, Arkansas; CORPORAL TONY

MCCUTCHEON, Boone County Detention

Center (BCDC); NURSE TAMMY

LANGLEY; TURN KEY HEALTH

CLINICS, LLC; and SHERIFF TROY

MARTIN DEFENDANTS

OPINION AND ORDER

This is a civil rights action filed by the Plaintiff pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff

John Philip Gauthier proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis. The case is before the Court on

Plaintiff’s failure to obey the orders of the Court.

I. DISCUSSION

On January 30, 2026, a mailing from this Court to Plaintiff at his last known address was

returned as undeliverable. See ECF No. 77. This Court previously ordered that if Plaintiff is

transferred to another jail or prison or released, then he must notify the Court of his new address

within 30 days of his transfer or release. See ECF No. 3. However, Plaintiff never provided the

Court with his new address after the aforementioned mailing was returned. Accordingly, on March

3, 2026, this Court entered an Order directing Plaintiff to show cause why he failed to obey the

previous Order, and imposing a deadline of March 24, 2026 for Plaintiff’s show-cause response.

See ECF No. 78. Plaintiff never responded to this Order either, and his deadline to do so has now

passed.

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure specifically contemplate dismissal of a case on the

ground that the plaintiff failed to prosecute or failed to comply with an order of the court. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 41(b); Line v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962) (stating that the district court

possesses the power to dismiss sua sponte under Rule 41(b)). Pursuant to Rule 41(b), a district

court has the power to dismiss an action based on “the plaintiff’s failure to comply with any court

order.” Brown v. Frey, 806 F.2d 801, 803-04 (8th Cir. 1986) (emphasis added). Additionally,

Rule 5.5(c)(2) of the Local Rules for the Eastern and Western Districts of Arkansas requires parties

appearing pro se to monitor the case, and to prosecute or defend the action diligently. Therefore,

Plaintiff’s case should be dismissed for failure to comply with the Court’s Local Rules and orders

and for failure to prosecute this case.

The only remaining question is whether the dismissal should be with or without prejudice.

A dismissal under Rule 41(b) operates as an adjudication on the merits unless otherwise specified.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); Brown v. Frey, 806 F.2d 801, 803 (8th Cir. 1986). “At the same time,

however, ‘dismissal with prejudice under Rule 41(b) is a drastic sanction which should be

exercised sparingly.’” Id. (quoting Pardee v. Stock, 712 F.2d 1290, 1292 (8th Cir. 1983)). “The

district court’s exercise of this power is within the permissible range of its discretion if there has

been a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct by the plaintiff.” Id. (internal citation and

quotations omitted). In considering a Rule 41(b) dismissal, the Court must balance “the degree of

egregious conduct which prompted the order of dismissal and to a lesser extent . . . the adverse

impact of such conduct upon both the defendant and the administration of justice in the district

court.” Rodgers v. Curators of University of Missouri, 135 F.3d 1216, 1219 (8th Cir. 1998)

(internal quotations omitted). In reviewing a dismissal with prejudice, the Eighth Circuit considers

“whether in the particular circumstances of the case, the needs of the court in advancing a crowded

docket and preserving respect for the integrity of its internal procedures are sufficient to justify the

harsh consequences of forever denying a litigant of his day in court.” Id. “However, the district

court need not have found that [the plaintiff] acted in bad faith, only that he acted intentionally as

opposed to accidentally or involuntarily.” Id.

Plaintiff vigorously litigated this case while he was incarcerated, filing voluminous

motions throughout. The Court has no doubt that he carefully monitored this case and was aware

of the requirement that he keep the Court apprised of changes in his address; indeed, he had

recently complied with that very requirement following a previous change in his address. See ECF

No. 75. The Court therefore finds that his more recent failure to comply with that requirement

was intentional, as was his failure to respond to the Court’s show-cause order. The Court also

recognizes that the Defendants in this case have expended considerable resources conducting

discovery and responding to Plaintiff’s voluminous filings, all the way up to the final week before

their deadline to file dispositive motions (which this Court stayed, pending resolution of its show-

cause order). See ECF Nos. 62, 79, 80. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s intentional

failure to comply with court orders, combined with the resources expended by the Defendants (and

by this Court), warrant this case being dismissed with prejudice.

II. CONCLUSION

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint (ECF No.

25) is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE based on Plaintiff’s failure to prosecute this case and

his failure to obey the orders of the Court. Judgment will be entered contemporaneously with this

Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 25th day of March 2026.

/s/ Christy Comstock

HON. CHRISTY COMSTOCK

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE